Shortchanging the Joint Doctrine Fight

[Tom Odom]

Dunlap revisited, more like. While he offers a slightly different approach, the message is essentially the same.

Not that I totally disagree with what either he or Dunlap have to say; just that I think in both cases they unfortunately come across as a little whiney and "Hey, you left us out..."

Agreed. I am not convinced Buck like Dunlap ever read 3-24. He read passages and filled in with what he wanted it to say. More Hap Arnold airmindedness mess.

Tom

[Entropy]

Anyone know when JP 3-24 is due? It will be interesting to see how the joint vision of COIN ends up.

[Cavguy]

Anyone know when JP 3-24 is due? It will be interesting to see how the joint vision of COIN ends up.

Early next year if the timeline holds up. The lead author is at Leavenworth and works near us.

No drafts for passing around yet. I do know the USAF is participating fully.

[Darksaga]

You know, it is nice to have the capabilities that the Air Force offers however when you get down to brass tacks you have to have boots on the ground to accomplish the mission effectively.

[selil]

In one of the LIC books commissioned by the USAF in the late 80s early 90s I read recently it said something to the effect "It is as imperative to mission success that the Air Force have infantry as the Army have Air Power" I about fell out of my chair.

C4ISR Journal this month has some pretty good articles on detecting stealthy air craft using ultra-violet and other out of visible spectrum light techniques. Cheap, inexpensive, useable for targeting (as anybody who knows anything about missiles will tell you), light is a big handicap for stealth. High power lasers of course are the answer for AAA and SAMs. But, then who needs stealth. Somebody smarter than me likely has figured that out.

[Gian P Gentile]

Agreed. I am not convinced Buck like Dunlap ever read 3-24. He read passages and filled in with what he wanted it to say. More Hap Arnold airmindedness mess.

Tom

Tom:

Great point; many people have lots of things to say about FM 3-24 but seemingly have not taken the time to sit down and carefully read it; word for word, page for page.

Ironic that you point out Hap Arnold because my work on the World War II USSBS shows heavy influence by Hap Arnold and other airmen in the reports and conclusions of it. In fact in late 1944 as the USSBS was ramping up Hap Arnold had commissioned a report by a group of leading American historians (Carl Becker, Henry Commager Steele, Bernadotte Schmidt, Edward Meade Earle, to name a few who were leading American and World historians at the time) but became increasingly frustrated with the group because they couldnt finish their report on time and were not prepared to make the sweeping conclusions that Arnold and other airmen were looking for.

You know how those historian-types can be; go figure...

gian

[Tom Odom]

Ironic that you point out Hap Arnold because my work on the World War II USSBS shows heavy influence by Hap Arnold and other airmen in the reports and conclusions of it. In fact in late 1944 as the USSBS was ramping up Hap Arnold had commissioned a report by a group of leading American historians (Carl Becker, Henry Commager Steele, Bernadotte Schmidt, Edward Meade Earle, to name a few who were leading American and World historians at the time) but became increasingly frustrated with the group because they couldnt finish their report on time and were not prepared to make the sweeping conclusions that Arnold and other airmen were looking for.

Gian

And that exact same thing happened after Desert Storm with the AF study--modeled on the USSBS--with the Af historians and the CSAF GEN McPeak. When he could not force the team to force its conclusions to fit his preordained conclusions, the study suddenly went classified.

Airmindedness is faith-based doctrine. You believe it so it must be true. All non-believers are flawed, small-minded creatures incapable of grasping the truth--like me.

Tom

[Gian P Gentile]

And that exact same thing happened after Desert Storm with the AF study--modeled on the USSBS--with the Af historians and the CSAF GEN McPeak. When he could not frce the team to force its conclusions to fit his preordained conclusions, the study suddenly went classified.

Tom:

Right, the last chapter in my book was a look at the GWAPS led by Eliot Cohen, Wick Murray, and others which was a very objective view of air power in the gulf war which is why it specifically drew the ire of some senior airmen. Further, I still cant believe that Dick Halion (in Storm over Iraq) had the chutzpah to proclaim that the gulf war had proven that airpower could now control ground from the air without the need for ground forces.

gian

[Old Eagle]

Believe it.

[CharlieDunlap]

Colleagues,

Yes, I have read FM 3-24...and quite a few other sources.

Actually, I am a fan of much of what FM 3-24 says - and it can work. My view is that we also need to look for options beyond a manpower-intensive one.

I think that in the post-Iraq era - which, I'd respectfully suggest is coming upon us faster than many may realize - if the only option offered decision-makers is one that requires the deployment of thousands of ground forces, then we may not be offering our civilian masters a really viable option.

FWIW, I think that we ought to study very carefully what the Colombians have done rather successfully with US support... True, a very different COIN situation than Iraq, but still worthy of real study.

In any event, I am very concerned about what seems to be an over-correction in the Army towards COIN. Yes, we need to have that capability, but I think we also need an Army ready - sooner rather than later - to conduct high-intensity operations against a peer or near-peer competitor - at least in a regional scenario.

For many reasons, I don't want to see our Army become too much of a constabulary force. I am concerned that in a few years the ongoing Army manpower plus-up, as well as over-investment in certain COIN-only equipment, will drain resources from Army modernization.

I am one of a minority - I guess - that believes we need a powerful, truly high-tech, and full-spectrum Army...teamed with an Air Force with similar qualities.

Just FYI, I have posted something of a counterpoint to Lt Col Elton's essay, and I have an article coming out in the next issue of Parameters that talks about airpower in COIN today. So lots more targets for everyone to shoot at!

Regards, Charlie

[Ken White]

...In any event, I am very concerned about what seems to be an over-correction in the Army towards COIN. Yes, we need to have that capability, but I think we also need an Army ready - sooner rather than later - to conduct high-intensity operations against a peer or near-peer competitor - at least in a regional scenario.

Don't think you'll get a whole lot of disagreement on that here, though there will be a tad. Most denizens of SWJ advocate balance and multi-spectral capability; hard but not impossible.

I am one of a minority - I guess - that believes we need a powerful, truly high-tech, and full-spectrum Army...teamed with an Air Force with similar qualities.

Nor will you get much argument on that score -- other than a cautionary re: going too far...

None of the above should be construed as saying there will be no mostly jocular Air Force bashing; that after all, is idle entertainment and in the job description for all us earthlings...

[William F. Owen]

My view is that we also need to look for options beyond a manpower-intensive one.

- if the only option offered decision-makers is one that requires the deployment of thousands of ground forces, then we may not be offering our civilian masters a really viable option.

I have the greatest of difficulty with the idea that airpower saves on manpower in terms of numbers. The RAF has done it's best to corrupt the operational and historical record with this argument and it just doesn't hold water. Some air assets can give ground forces greater capability, but you can't make a 650-man battalion a 300 man battalion just because of air support. Air power can never have the persistence, endurance, discrimination, precision and proportionality that land forces have, regardless of the threat, and the environment.

I think that we ought to study very carefully what the Colombians have done rather successfully with US support... True, a very different COIN situation than Iraq, but still worthy of real study.

I don't think any study would really be necessary. The Colombian use of air assets seems very simple and very obvious to me. I think it might be germain to ask why the USAF does not have similar types, (or useful numbers of such types) such as the Super Tucano, Schweizer SGM 2-37, and the OV-10 Bronco. On one possibly simplistic level the SGM 2-37 would seem the challenge the high costs associated with Predator procurement and operations.

Yes, we need to have that capability, but I think we also need an Army ready - sooner rather than later - to conduct high-intensity operations against a peer or near-peer competitor - at least in a regional scenario.

At a conceptual level, I agree, but who is a near-peer competitor that is in any way of comparable competence, that may be a threat framed in a possible geo-political reality? I don't see why China and Iran are going to form up in land manoeuvre formations for the convenience of the USAF.

For many reasons, I don't want to see our Army become too much of a constabulary force. I am concerned that in a few years the ongoing Army manpower plus-up, as well as over-investment in certain COIN-only equipment, will drain resources from Army modernization.

As Ken White said, few folks do. I agree the COIN agenda has been misused by some, but I can't see how any focus USAF capabilities corrects that. I also have difficulty seeing any "COIN only" equipment. A lot of the COIN equipment requirements are not ones of choice, but necessity.

[selil]

.
Actually, I am a fan of much of what FM 3-24 says - and it can work. My view is that we also need to look for options beyond a manpower-intensive one.

I guess I'll argue with you about COIN tomorrow. See you at the conference. I'm the invisible one.