Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
...I don't disagree at all with the above. However, in the end, Saddam's attempts at an unconventional strategy and use of unconventional forces to defend Iraq and his regime failed spectacularly.
Did they? We're still there and I'm quite sure that was not the original US plan...
Col. McMaster is completely correct about the limits of surveillance and technology against unconventional forces, but they proved very useful against his conventional forces.
Well, I see no RMA invovled in any of that or Afghanistan -- or in Iran, come to that. Absolutely none. As for 'transformation' I see none, really; what I do see is technological progress at an accelerated rate (compared to historical change) being adapted -- and that not as well or as rapidly as I would wish. So I guess we have a definition discrepancy more than a disagreement.
Sure, but the case he points out was Iran - what force structure will help us coerce, deter them? One more focused on LIC/COIN or one more focused on HIC?
Any fight with Iran will absolutely require both and thus both capabilities would seem required to effectively deter.
Ironically, it was after what appeared to be the complete success of OIF in mid-2003 that Iran put forward a tentative offer for a grand rapprochement with the US.
One of many over the years. Having served in Iran long ago, i've watched it pretty closely over the years. They're as good as North Korea at playing the US and they constantly approach and scuttle away. They're good at it; haggling is national sport...
...And of course there was the political pressure to act sooner which, IMO, also helped push the plan toward using locals.
Too true, that.