The John Boyd collection (merged thread)

[Sargent]

I don't intend to take a position on the value of the content of what the 4GWers were (and still are) arguing. However, I do think they did an invaluable service in taking on the conventional wisdom regarding the future of warfare, primarily the dead hand of recent operational and strategic history, where past success and dominance were used to define the future, even if that future seemed headed elsewhere.

I do agree with the comments put forth by various folks that the notion of "generations" of warfare is too linear and imputes a sort of movement or evolution that does not occur. I don't know whether he still uses it now that he's at Carlisle, but Craig Nation, back when he was at SAIS, offered what I think was a far more compelling vision of the history of warfare, where different forms of warfare dominated in cycles, in an almost predictable fashion. Furthermore, the strength and dominance of a form at any given time was the key to the shift to a new cycle -- those who could not compete according to the current form were inspired to find a "new" way. Likely I'm butchering his argument a bit -- it's been a long time -- but this is the gist of it.

Cheers,
Jill

[Ski]

This is a nice troll. Lots of bait in the water, the chum line is ready.

By the way, Jill, I agree with your take.

[William F. Owen]

. However, I do think they did an invaluable service in taking on the conventional wisdom regarding the future of warfare, primarily the dead hand of recent operational and strategic history, where past success and dominance were used to define the future, even if that future seemed headed elsewhere.

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I agree the intention was honest enough, but look where we are today. Boyd is applauded in ways that just make no sense given the evidence, and the facts. Lind came up with 4GW, which actually harmed understanding, and I won't even start on the OODA loopy garbage.

The intervening years have given us Maneuver Warfare, which once you actually break it down is an arbitrary collection of the obvious with a few attractive myths thrown in.

Wilf

[Global Scout]

I hear the traditionalists, "if Clausewitz, Mao or Sun Tzu didn't say it, then it isn't worth saying". Perfect position for an arm chair warrior, but not for someone who is leading our Soldiers in battle. What is important to the leader is successfully accomplishing the mission, and if traditional theory doesn't contribute to this, then its value is questionable.

We bring preconceived solutions and theories to the table before we even study the problem. This mindset is a perfect example of why we fail more than we should in irregular warfare.

Those who fault 4GW for its short comings have a lot of ammunition to support their arguments, but one could argue that the whole generational method to describe warfare is what is at faulty. It assumes that one generation replaces another, but the reality is that 1GW through 5GW are additive, they add to the repatoire of options available. The first step to clarifying the debate is doing away with the generations of warfare, then we won't have to waste time defending them, and instead can focus on the real issues at hand.

The nature of warfare and conflict can change as technology and political systems evolve. 5GW is supposed to describe the empowered individual, which is a possibility that can't be denied unless you live under a rock. An intelligent deviant can to some extent now, and to a much greater extent later, will be able to wreck various degrees of havoc with information technology, bio-engineering, etc., but then we argue can one man declare war? or is it just a crime? One man spreading bio-engineered small pox is a national security threat whether it is a war or a crime, and key take away isn't whether this is 1GW, 2GW, or 5GW, but that we have a security problem to solve.

I having seen where serious futurists have criticized Clausewitz, they simply added ideas to be discussed. Clausewitz, Mao, and maybe even Sun Tzu, were extremely intelligent and effectively captured the truth as it existed in their day for the situations they observed, and much of it remains relevant today, but evolution of war didn't stop with the death of Clausewitz (unless you're an U.S. Army CGSC product).

Everyone wants to throw stones at everyone else's ideas and endlessly debate: principles of war, centers of gravity, etc., which unfortunately rarely translates into effective strategy that wins wars. Did we get the center of gravity correct in Vietnam? Iraq? Afghanistan? And as Steve Metz pointed out in another post we're still fighting the insurgencies in the Philippines and Columbia, where victory always seems to be just beyond reach after tens of years of various efforts, so again did we correctly identify the center of gravity, apply the logical lines of operation correctly? Did we incorrectly apply the principles of war?

Instead of criticizing those who at least attempt to develop new ideas at least listen to them, then if need me attack the idea, not the person. So far all I have seen is attacks on the person (in this post Boyd and Lind), but not one valid counter argument to refute their positions.

If the traditionalists are intellectually correct, then prove it. To make it clear I'm not defending the new or the old, but simply want to see the argument evolve into something more productive than saying Boyd (for example) didn't add anything to the body of knowledge, but fail to explain why not.

Boyd added considerably to the body of knowledge of how to engage in aerial combat, and his OODA loop is applicable there. That doesn't mean it applies at the operational and strategic level. However, Boyd brought more to the table than the OODA loop over the years. He also supposedly was involved in crafting the Desert Storm offensive, after then SECDEF Chenny rejected Swarcofts (sp?) initial proposals. I suspect he added a little something to the body of knowledge, as I suspect Lind did also. The question is the same as it is for the traditionalists, does it translate into effective strategy that accomplishes our missions?

[William F. Owen]

Instead of criticizing those who at least attempt to develop new ideas at least listen to them, then if need me attack the idea, not the person. So far all I have seen is attacks on the person (in this post Boyd and Lind), but not one valid counter argument to refute their positions.

As the thread starter, let me respond to this point.

I am not attacking either man personally. I am holding their ideas and writing up for examination and I, and many more, find them lacking. In contrast I find others, less well know, less vocal, whose ideas are generally sound, are ignored as a result of ideas that are marketed rather than being presented for peer review.

Boyd and Lind are the two most well known originators of recent military theory. There ideas and writing are pervasive.

Ideas like "Recon Pull" are patently faulty, yet have received wide spread acceptance because no one had studied and understood exploitation.

I say again, I am not attacking the men personally. Only what they have written and what they have said.

...so what have Lind and Boyd contributed to Military Theory that is so useful? - or that others had not done before?

[Ski]

A few points, then I have to run to the airport. I love 6AM flights.

Context is important when discussing maneuver warfare. The concept was never new - and it was a reaction to the American involvement in Vietnam. Lind challenged the old ways of thinking and the old Guard in the 70's when he wrote a public rebuttal to the FM 100-5 which in its initial draft was more of the same old #### that helped get 58,000 Americans dead in Vietnam. I've often felt that he was a useful whipping boy for many American officers = never served in uniform, so how could he know about warfare? The Manuever Warfare handbook was the culmination of 15 years of trying to reintroduce some concepts into the American way of war that seemed to have perished after Korea. Nature abhors a vacuum.

Boyd is far, far more complex than the OODA Loop. Unfortunately, it seems that this is destined to be his fate - another victim of a military culture that has become the ultimate in reductionist thinking. Hey, we have to get this concept down to the 9th Grade level of thinking and writing. I suggest you read Frans Osinga's book on Boyd's theories to see how complex his writings actually are, and more important, to see how the military has simplified his theories. Boyd talked about friction quite a bit, and questioned Clausewitz and Jomini at length, and finally said that dealing with friction was not necessarily bad, as long as you could reduce it as much as possible on your side and increase it as much as possible on your advisaries side. I would go as far as saying that Boyd is the most misunderstood theorist of the modern era because of the inherent complexities of his work - a lot of the scientific background baffles me to a great extent.

At least the FMFM1-A was something to read about the nature of 21st Century war. The US Army took 6 years to produce a new counterinsurgency manual after the invasion of Afghanistan, and it is still using an operations manual from before the war.

I try and read as much as possible from a variety of sources and theories in order to shape my mental impressions about war and the conduct of war. Lind and Boyd may not be perfect (no theory ever is), but they have introduced concepts that were either ignored, forgotten or in the case of Boyd, never codified in the first place.

I do not hold any one theorist in greater regard than another. Like Boyd said about doctrine in general "The day after it's written, it becomes dogma. Don't talk to me about German, Russian, British doctrine - learn them all and use them as necessary."

[Steve Blair]

I've critiqued their positions on many occasions on these boards, GS. To cut it short, we're not seeing the titanic shift that 4GW advocates claim. What we are seeing is older methods being adapted to suit new technology combined with a bleed-over of methods that have been used by terrorist groups since the 1970s. Boyd was certainly more revolutionary than Lind, but that does not change the basic proposition that "4GW" is really nothing new...just older ideas that have been accelerated through technology. Just because most advocates stop at Mao does not mean that it all started with the ol' Chairman.

[stanleywinthrop]

I've critiqued their positions on many occasions on these boards, GS. To cut it short, we're not seeing the titanic shift that 4GW advocates claim. What we are seeing is older methods being adapted to suit new technology combined with a bleed-over of methods that have been used by terrorist groups since the 1970s. Boyd was certainly more revolutionary than Lind, but that does not change the basic proposition that "4GW" is really nothing new...just older ideas that have been accelerated through technology. Just because most advocates stop at Mao does not mean that it all started with the ol' Chairman.

Am I missing something here? How did Boyd get wrapped up into the 4GW theorists? To my knowledge he never uttered those words, and a careful reading of him shows that he divides warfare into very different categories (mental, moral, physical). Say what you want about his theories, but he really didn't have anything to do with 4GW.

He did have a lot to say about guerilla warfare, however, but only viewed it as another potential form of warfare.

[Granite_State]

I've critiqued their positions on many occasions on these boards, GS. To cut it short, we're not seeing the titanic shift that 4GW advocates claim. What we are seeing is older methods being adapted to suit new technology combined with a bleed-over of methods that have been used by terrorist groups since the 1970s. Boyd was certainly more revolutionary than Lind, but that does not change the basic proposition that "4GW" is really nothing new...just older ideas that have been accelerated through technology. Just because most advocates stop at Mao does not mean that it all started with the ol' Chairman.

I'm a regular reader of Lind, don't always agree with him, but I think he's entertaining and raises interesting issues on a regular basis. This forum has been great at pointing out areas where he's off base (the distributed ops thread for one).

I think most of the 4GW folks wouldn't necessarily say it was new though. A point a lot of people forget is that it's "Four Generations of Modern War." They start with Westphalia, and the hanging of mercenaries after the Thirty Years War, as the point when the state tried to take a monopoly on the use of violence. I remember Lind recommending reading about the Thirty Years War, Italian condottiere, and the Warring States period in China as a means to understand the way we're headed.

I agree the generations are simplistic, and that 4GW is (in some ways) as old as warfare itself.

[Fuchs]

I agree the intention was honest enough, but look where we are today. Boyd is applauded in ways that just make no sense given the evidence, and the facts. Lind came up with 4GW, which actually harmed understanding, and I won't even start on the OODA loopy garbage.

The intervening years have given us Maneuver Warfare, which once you actually break it down is an arbitrary collection of the obvious with a few attractive myths thrown in.Wilf

Sometimes old stuff needs a new, fashionable package to be seen.

Every - absolutely every - concept outside of hard scientific natural laws seems to be exaggerated. That's how things work. You won't be heard and won't get funds for research or sell books by stating the obvious in an unspectacular manner. Extreme concepts have a much larger audience potential (they need to please the people to realize this potential).

Practitioners don't need a perfect theoretical framework, and it's obvious that such a thing didn't exist any more since the Great War.
It's like the history of universal geniuses; the mankind had individuals who knew everything that was known about sciences till the 18th century - afterwards, we knew too much to fit this knowledge into one mind.
I believe we need to accept that the art of war will forever be a mosaic rather than a one-volume publication as in earlier times.
And every mosaic will have have an unrepresentative colour if looked at in isolation.