What will our expedition to Afghanistan teach us?

[jcustis]

- That if hell-bent on executing COIN, then understanding the language and culture are pretty fraking important (I know JCustis will disagree)

I'm typically more dramatic about that topic than I probably should be. I should probably temper my distate for the snake oil sales pitch over culture and language by saying that I'd take a sharp, motivated linguist every time, over a lengthy spin-up package delivered by the culture pimps based at the mission rehearsal sites, or Quantico.

The culture pimps are a fleeting nuisance for commanders who are forced to endure the mandatory training before deployment, at a time when their schedules are already crushed.

Linguists can (and usually do) form powerful bonds that are a better return on investment. That's where the cultural immersion and language should come from.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I should probably temper my distate for the snake oil sales pitch over culture and language by saying that I'd take a sharp, motivated linguist every time, over a lengthy spin-up package delivered by the culture pimps based at the mission rehearsal sites, or Quantico.

The culture pimps are a fleeting nuisance for commanders who are forced to endure the mandatory training before deployment, at a time when their schedules are already crushed.

JCustis, I am going to heartily, and respectfully, disagree with you. Returning to the macro level I am not sure the (US) military, as currently configured and run, has any business getting involved in these types of operations. They can effect regime change, that is easy. They cannot effect the social engineering, modernization, and nation creating necessary in a place like Afghanistan. It is well beyond their training and certainly beyond their temperament. I have heard more than one commander assess his unit's capability based on their historic body count. You are not going to change that attitude with some cultural awareness training.

I agree with KingJaja. What we are attempting to achieve, a democratic Afghanistan, is not something we can accomplish. It is something the Afghans have to do for themselves on their own timeline (if ever). It is the ultimate in Imperial Hubris to believe we can do this.

That does not mean we never get involved. That means that we are more realistic about what military force can accomplish and what it can't.

The military will remain the default organization to go to when things go to #### in a far away country. We, as members of the military, need to stop thinking "here is my chance to kick some ass" and start thinking "maybe this is something that we do not have the capability to do" -- and then have the balls to tell our civilian leadership that. It will be easier for the next decade or so but as those who have never been to war start to get in positions of power their is the inevitable erg to push the limits.

[jcustis]

I completely agree, and I think we are more in line with common views than you realize. Yes, the military has little business trying to do what it does sometimes, and from that I think much of the money we have spent on cultural training, products (which tend to conflict each other) and immersion, is a waste of time. The proficiency has been superficial, and the guys who "get it" will always go their own way to study and prep for the mission on a path they feel they need to.

Buried somewhere here is a comment I made during my Afghan deploy. I let my bearing slip while I asserted it was time for Afgans in my valley to get off their knees and shoot some knuckleheads in the face. The answer has always rested with the Afghans, but they are incapable of unlocking it. I concur with you on that account as well.

As a case in point, a former Kabul elite can only tell me so much about pashtunwali, cultural idiocracies, and the like. The rest is just having the commonsense to be patient, tread softly, and not act like an ogre amongst the locals. I don't need a professor to teach me that stuff.

My units have always received better info from the linguists, compared to the cultural specialists back at homestation training venues. The linguists have some skin in the game. The guy pontificating about cultural norms from an office in Quantico? Not so much.

Perhaps the aim of the training has value, but we've merely failed with the delivery when trying to cram it into an already overflowing five pound bag.

Here's a brief side story and then I'll stop drifting off thread. It was Iraq, circa late 2008. I was having dinner with a civil affairs soldier attached to a SOF detachment operating in our battlespace. We got onto the subject of the local power player who they were conducting a lot of engagement with, and in turn getting a lot of intel from. He giggled when he said that this sheik would typically spend the majority of the visit talking about blondes, big tatas, and watching porn, while sitting around drinking chai and smoking cigarettes. You're never going to get that gouge from a culture pimp, so we need to rethink our priority and where we want to apply the resources.

The formal, stiff stuff can be saved for the diplomats, who are always optimized to live it and nurture it.

[KingJaja]

Let me add a few words.

Is it possible that the Taliban offered Afghans a more compelling narrative than the US? Think about it - if you are poor, uneducated and religiously conservative would a US propped Karzai (corrupt, insensitive & incompetent) be vastly preferable to the simplicity & piety of the Taliban (or other religious conservatives).

America holds great promise to the World's educated middle classes, but of what relevance is it to the World's poor? This is something that strikes me when I walk around the streets of Lagos.

The last great narrative, Socialism was very attractive to the poor (I feel the US thinks it won the Cold War, so it has never seen the need to reflect on "lessons learned").

Today, the most attractive narratives to the World's poor are religion and/or ethnic nationalism. Pentecostal Christianity & Fundamentalist Islam are the two most dynamic narratives among the poor. Thankfully, the first isn't anti-US, but the second is.

Does the United States of America have a narrative it can sell to the World's poor?

US diplomats, policy makers & politicians should ponder over that question, because it will contribute to the success of future "nation building" exercises.

[slapout9]

I don't know if this is a lesson to be learned or not but here is a link to how valuable female soldiers are in A'stan and they are clearly designated as special forces both by the commentator and their shoulder patches.



http://videos.komando.com/watch/3231...-screen-shot-b

[TheCurmudgeon]

Let me add a few words.

Is it possible that the Taliban offered Afghans a more compelling narrative than the US? Think about it - if you are poor, uneducated and religiously conservative would a US propped Karzai (corrupt, insensitive & incompetent) be vastly preferable to the simplicity & piety of the Taliban (or other religious conservatives).

The last great narrative, Socialism was very attractive to the poor (I feel the US thinks it won the Cold War, so it has never seen the need to reflect on "lessons learned").

This is very true. Plus American's tend to equate socialism with communism without realizing that many of the "liberal democracies" of Europe have socialist leanings including England.

Now our new "threat" is China, a poor country that rose to become a economic giant in just a few generations (much like the USSR, except with less interest in expanding beyond their own territory).

Today, the most attractive narratives to the World's poor are religion and/or ethnic nationalism. Pentecostal Christianity & Fundamentalist Islam are the two most dynamic narratives among the poor. Thankfully, the first isn't anti-US, but the second is.

Religion offers simple answers to complex questions. Religions like Christianity and Islam offers the poor the ideal narrative - the faithful will receive their just reward in the afterlife (and the immoral wealthy their just desserts). They define clearly how we need to be in life to ensure everlasting bliss - a powerful narrative and one that is difficult to overcome as long as the poor remain poor. Economic stability, personal security, and a real hope (not just failed promises) of a better future may be the only way out.

[KingJaja]

TheCurmudgeon,

Economic stability, personal security, and a real hope (not just failed promises) of a better future may be the only way out.

That is true, but the fact is that the most dynamic economic player in the poorest and most troubled regions of the World (South Asia, Middle East and Africa) is not the US, it is China.

In a perfect World, US and China will enter a partnership - US does what it can on security (the minor part) and China does the heavy lifting (trade & infrastructure).

Please note: Aid isn't going to drive economic stability.

[Madhu]

TheCurmudgeon,



That is true, but the fact is that the most dynamic economic player in the poorest and most troubled regions of the World (South Asia, Middle East and Africa) is not the US, it is China.

In a perfect World, US and China will enter a partnership - US does what it can on security (the minor part) and China does the heavy lifting (trade & infrastructure).

That is the Thomas Barnett model and I'm as skeptical of that model as I am of his Core-Gap model:

http://pundita.blogspot.com/2008/04/...l-see-you.html

In a way, isn't that the model today? China builds its export driven economic model while the US provides security and gains debt and loses market share? It hasn't worked out so well for the US (largely because of our sillier than silly elites that can't think their way out of a paper bag, IMO). Two nations that want to be the top dog are going to have trouble with that model until the whole top dog thing is sorted out. The British-American Atlantic alliance model with China?

The US doesn't need it, we are huge with two great oceans on either side and relationships with lots of different nations. We can hang out and do our own thing and be involved only as much as it suits us, the China model for the US.

That model will bankrupt the US. Heck, even the Chinese model may eventually slow down for internal reasons and as others get in on the Africa game and learn from the Chinese.

Sorry, don't see it except in a de facto way which doesn't require any kind of grand partnership. As part of larger international governing treaties and alliances and networks (UN), sure.

[AmericanPride]

Let me add a few words.

Is it possible that the Taliban offered Afghans a more compelling narrative than the US? Think about it - if you are poor, uneducated and religiously conservative would a US propped Karzai (corrupt, insensitive & incompetent) be vastly preferable to the simplicity & piety of the Taliban (or other religious conservatives).

America holds great promise to the World's educated middle classes, but of what relevance is it to the World's poor? This is something that strikes me when I walk around the streets of Lagos.

The last great narrative, Socialism was very attractive to the poor (I feel the US thinks it won the Cold War, so it has never seen the need to reflect on "lessons learned").

Today, the most attractive narratives to the World's poor are religion and/or ethnic nationalism. Pentecostal Christianity & Fundamentalist Islam are the two most dynamic narratives among the poor. Thankfully, the first isn't anti-US, but the second is.

Does the United States of America have a narrative it can sell to the World's poor?

US diplomats, policy makers & politicians should ponder over that question, because it will contribute to the success of future "nation building" exercises.

I agree, perceptions matter. And perceptions must be shaped by smart information campaigns. But these information campaigns must be nested within the broader political objectives -- which may not be helpful or relevant for the poor. It's not to say that the global poor don't matter; they most certainly do, but not in every context, and their interests are definitely not the same as those shaping American foreign policy. There are also a couple of risks: (1) information blow-back where people take our ideas seriously and hold us accountable for not meeting them, thereby decreasing our legitimacy; (2) the message is convoluted because of competing bureaucratic interests within our own government and (3) ideological competition with other competing ideas. In the end, coercion is more reliable and comforting than debate, which requires a degree of trust. And trust is notably absent in conflict. Like I tell my wife: if you don't trust me, it doesn't matter if I tell the truth.

[jcustis]

(5) Conflict is determined by the position of the actors in relation to one another, rather than from some inherent conflictive nature. Our adversaries are not political drunkards looking for the next street fight -- they're smart, calculating opponents looking for every advantage. It was 20 years ago the Taliban was in negotiations with the US government for economic concessions. That prospect is far off now, and it will be a long hard road to untangle the US and the Taliban from one other. But the point is that there's a way forward, for better or worse, and there is a political relationship in which neither party is antagonizing the other. At some point, neither party will gain from continued conflict and it will end.

Alas, Columbia is experiencing this condition mentioned in the last sentence, while Mexico is just warming up.

[Bob's World]

In most ways, I suspect we actually won't learn much from the Afghanistan experience. We have no real strategy now, so there will be no way to assess any lessons learned from that; our metrics are all tactical in nature, so all of our lessons learned are about how to optimize those metrics, while at the same time slipping farther and farther behind in regards to the larger strategic picture. Years from now retired generals will write books and give speeches about how "we defeated the Taliban, but that later, after we left, a corrupt GIRoA fell to (insert name of country here) inspired forces.

But to get an idea of the future of Afghanistan, one need only look due north and see who it is that is earning tremendous influence throughout this central Asian region:

http://www.realclearworld.com/lists/...sia_countries/

[slapout9]

Buried somewhere here is a comment I made during my Afghan deploy. I let my bearing slip while I asserted it was time for Afgans in my valley to get off their knees and shoot some knuckleheads in the face. The answer has always rested with the Afghans, but they are incapable of unlocking it. I concur with you on that account as well.

JC,
I remember that post. I don't think you lost your bearing it was one of your better post and very accurate at least from my sources.

[Madhu]

Heard the authors on the John Batchelor show sometime back. Have not read the book but it may be of interest:

These experts in the field challenge commonly held views about the success of the global war on terrorism and its campaign in Afghanistan. Their book questions some fundamentals of the population-centric COIN doctrine currently in vogue and harshly criticizes key decisions about the prosecution of the Afghan war. It is the only book to compare the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan from a national strategic perspective. It questions several key operational factors in Afghanistan, including the decision to give NATO the lead, the performance of both civilian and military leaders, and the prosecution of an Iraq War-style surge. It also contrasts the counterinsurgency campaign styles and the leadership of senior American officials in both Iraq and Afghanistan. A final chapter outlines key lessons of the two campaigns.

http://www.amazon.com/From-Kabul-Bag.../dp/1612510221


Any suggestions on what to read regarding coalitions and counterinsurgency or is our NATO experiment kind of a first?

If you go back to the 2002-3 period and are given the military task again, given that NATO and the US wanted to stay in some peace keeping capacity, is there a different way to do things? I suppose the complaint back then is that requests for troops were turned down. How to stabilize in a more modest way if you are given that civilian task, whether it be wise strategically or not?