Haiti (Catch all)

[Rex Brynen]

Opening Thread explanation:

Moderators Note

Created to house some recent postings on another thread, which discussed the Haiti-Canada linkage: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9534

This thread was created as some have suggested that a solution to the problems of Haiti is to be harsh.

Posts here will be moderated if their tone verges on what can be perceived inside and outside SWC as advocating lynching (taken from Rex).

Back to the thread below

In my cynical and jaded moments, I have to wonder if the current response isn't just another example of reinforcing the dependence of Haiti on the rest of the world while, at the same time, providing "us" with an opportunity to feel good about ourselves: a post-Westphalian form of "Save the Children", complete with the full range of Cosmo propaganda and emotional blackmail.

Perhaps a little too cynical, Marc? It is not as if Haiti has any other options at the moment, and periodic outbreaks of Western altruism are probably better than no altruism at all.

The Haiti crisis does raise some real question about the limits of our understanding and capacity to transform highly unequal, corrupt, and poorly governed social and political systems into something that is more just and better governed. For all the "we must leave Haiti better off than before" rhetoric (a sentiment that I fully agree with), I'm not sure we've yet adequately examined why we've failed in the past, and how (and the extent to which) we can do better in the future.

As to the broader issue of Afghanistan--we're pulling our combat forces out of Afghanistan, and that decision was pretty much set in stone long before the Haiti crisis.

[John T. Fishel]

issues since 1994, I was especially pessimistic about the capability of Haiti and the will of the international community to do what was needed to develop both a Haitian state and nation. (I said so several times in print) In the present emergency, however, I am beginning to wonder about my previous judgment. First, the Haitian people have responded far better than I expected to the emergency based on my experience on the ground in 1995 and research of the 2004 crisis. Second, I have seen some very positive things coming out of one of the important health NGOs involved in the relief effort. Third, former Pres Bill Clinton has spoken of the economic and governance strides that Haiti was making before the earthquake hit. Finally, the skills and responses of the Haitian diaspora give rise to some hope. So, if the international community maintains its will, there may be reason to be cautiously optimistic about Haiti's mid-range future.

Cheers

JohnT

[Stan]

issues since 1994, I was especially pessimistic about the capability of Haiti and the will of the international community to do what was needed to develop both a Haitian state and nation. (I said so several times in print) In the present emergency, however, I am beginning to wonder about my previous judgment. First, the Haitian people have responded far better than I expected to the emergency based on my experience on the ground in 1995 and research of the 2004 crisis. Second, I have seen some very positive things coming out of one of the important health NGOs involved in the relief effort. Third, former Pres Bill Clinton has spoken of the economic and governance strides that Haiti was making before the earthquake hit. Finally, the skills and responses of the Haitian diaspora give rise to some hope. So, if the international community maintains its will, there may be reason to be cautiously optimistic about Haiti's mid-range future.

Cheers

JohnT

Hey John,
I decided to remain pessimistic following our relief team's last this morning.

We managed to save 21 today despite the local resistance and the cops going home at 1630. A shame the looters, that keep trying to steal our medical supplies, don't quit at five sharp too!

Relatively speaking this reminds me of a money hole in Africa that just never manages to get full and we move on. It never really mattered that some cataclysmic event occurred, the end was the same decades later.

Just exactly how did this become a Canadian problem?

[John T. Fishel]

I hope you're wrong! Unfortunately, you are probably right and I will have to return to my normal pessimistic state.

JohnT

[marct]

I hope you're wrong! Unfortunately, you are probably right and I will have to return to my normal pessimistic state.

Hey, John, I thought we had agreed that I would be the pessimist for this thread !

[marct]

Hi Rex,

Perhaps a little too cynical, Marc? It is not as if Haiti has any other options at the moment, and periodic outbreaks of Western altruism are probably better than no altruism at all.

Probably, but I'm in that sort of mood right now . Is it even altruism I have to ask myself? Probably, at least on the part of most people - I'm just in a very weird headspace right now...

The Haiti crisis does raise some real question about the limits of our understanding and capacity to transform highly unequal, corrupt, and poorly governed social and political systems into something that is more just and better governed. For all the "we must leave Haiti better off than before" rhetoric (a sentiment that I fully agree with), I'm not sure we've yet adequately examined why we've failed in the past, and how (and the extent to which) we can do better in the future.

Agreed which, in part, is a (miniscule) part of where my cynicism comes from. We are, however, engaged in a Peacock Effect type of mission (cf. Dawkins, The God Delusion, p.163); if we actually solved the problem, "we" would just have to create another opportunity to display our altruism.

As to the broader issue of Afghanistan--we're pulling our combat forces out of Afghanistan, and that decision was pretty much set in stone long before the Haiti crisis.

Yup, I totally agree, which is why I said we don't "need" Haiti as a justification. Having said that, I'm sure that Jack Layton will, however, use it as a justification for pushing us to get out of combat missions entirely .

[Tom Kratman]

Hmmm ... what would a proper response be, sans "Cosmo propaganda and emotional blackmail"? Also, what is Cosmo propaganda?

"Cosmo," rather "Kosmo," was a term I coined for A Desert Called Peace as a substitute for "Tranzi." They're essentially the same. I rather had to coin a new term because I'd used "Tranzi" in the form of the "Tranzitree," a genetically engineered fruit-bearing tree, the fruit of which is green on the outside, red on the inside, and intensely poisonous but only to intelligent life. Frankly, I think cosmopolitan progressive is slightly more accurate than transnational progressive.

Their propaganda might range from the memetic attack on all things western in the movie Avatar to a still shot of a boated-bellied and starving African child covered by flies to the silly notion that when you sign up to pay 54 cents a day to feed, clothe, and educate Maritza, the starving Guatamalan child, that your money is actually doing that, rather than paying for first class flights to five star resorts for Tranzi, or Kosmo, conferences to discuss the plight of migrant widget pickers in Eastern West ####istan. Or maybe it was Western East ####istan; these conferences tend to be largely interchangeable and _completely_ useless.

[Tom Kratman]

Perhaps a little too cynical, Marc? It is not as if Haiti has any other options at the moment, and periodic outbreaks of Western altruism are probably better than no altruism at all.

The Haiti crisis does raise some real question about the limits of our understanding and capacity to transform highly unequal, corrupt, and poorly governed social and political systems into something that is more just and better governed. For all the "we must leave Haiti better off than before" rhetoric (a sentiment that I fully agree with), I'm not sure we've yet adequately examined why we've failed in the past, and how (and the extent to which) we can do better in the future.

As to the broader issue of Afghanistan--we're pulling our combat forces out of Afghanistan, and that decision was pretty much set in stone long before the Haiti crisis.

What question? We have essentially no ability to do so with the means we are willing to use.

[Tom Kratman]

Hey, John, I thought we had agreed that I would be the pessimist for this thread !

Where Haiti is concerned, you cannot be more pessimistic than I am. It's simply not possible.

[Rex Brynen]

It is really easy to be cynical about the prospects for development in the so-called "third world"--especially if you ignore the actual data on third world development over the last thirty years or so.

In most places, we've seen striking reductions in mortality, and improvements in nutrition, education, and real disposable income--largely due to local efforts, but in some cases (notably the reductions in infant and child mortality as a consequence of vaccination and education) due to critical contributions from the international community.

Even in Haiti--certainly the most difficult development challenge in the Western hemisphere, even before the recent earthquake--under-5 mortality has dropped from 143 (per thousand) in 1994 to 76 (per thousand) in 2008--almost halving the number of child deaths.

GapMinder provides a fascinating software-based way of viewing these trends over time--have a look here. Charles Kenny also had a good piece on some of the under-recognized achievements of African development in Foreign Policy Magazine last year.

[Tom Kratman]

It is really easy to be cynical about the prospects for development in the so-called "third world"--especially if you ignore the actual data on third world development over the last thirty years or so.

In most places, we've seen striking reductions in mortality, and improvements in nutrition, education, and real disposable income--largely due to local efforts, but in some cases (notably the reductions in infant and child mortality as a consequence of vaccination and education) due to critical contributions from the international community.

Even in Haiti--certainly the most difficult development challenge in the Western hemisphere, even before the recent earthquake--under-5 mortality has dropped from 143 (per thousand) in 1994 to 76 (per thousand) in 2008--almost halving the number of child deaths.

GapMinder provides a fascinating software-based way of viewing these trends over time--have a look here. Charles Kenny also had a good piece on some of the under-recognized achievements of African development in Foreign Policy Magazine last year.

And the effect of more Haitians is to be precisely what, do you think? Other than further deforestation of an already largely deforested country, said deforestation leading to top soil erosion and the killing of fish on the coast, said deforestation caused by the trees being turned into charcoal, so that the already excessive numbers of Haitians (excessive for what their third of the island can support) can cook, I mean.

Further, what improvement would you expect increased but still limited opportunities for education to do for Haiti, other than to make that fraction talented enough to qualify for the education high-tail it for a better place? Yes, they'll send remittances back, for a generation or so. But after that, the place will be the poorer for its more talented people having left, and the remittances will have stopped.

[Rex Brynen]

And the effect of more Haitians is to be precisely what, do you think? Other than further deforestation of an already largely deforested country, said deforestation leading to top soil erosion and the killing of fish on the coast, said deforestation caused by the trees being turned into charcoal, so that the already excessive numbers of Haitians (excessive for what their third of the island can support) can cook, I mean.

Further, what improvement would you expect increased but still limited opportunities for education to do for Haiti, other than to make that fraction talented enough to qualify for the education high-tail it for a better place? Yes, they'll send remittances back, for a generation or so. But after that, the place will be the poorer for its more talented people having left, and the remittances will have stopped.

Deforestation tends to also be an issue of poor access to alternative energy supplies (including sparse rural electrification), land tenure and inequality, education, disposable income and government policy—not merely population density. Moreover, in Haiti we've seen a significant decline in population growth rates since the 1980s (1.7% in 2007, down from 2.3% in 1984), hopefully indicating that the usual demographic transition is slowly underway.

My broader point, however, was that infant mortality rate (one of the best indicators of average living conditions, since it is affected by income, education, shelter, nutrition, access to safe water, etc.) has steadily declined even in Haiti, and much more rapidly in other places. Methodologically, an even better measure of the slow but significant improvement in Haitian living conditions in recent years is its Human Development Index score (an amalgam measure of quality-of-life indicators):



I'm not saying that reconstruction and development in Haiti will be easy. It won't--it will be enormously difficult, challenging, and prone to setbacks. We might even fail.

I am suggesting, however, that it is not impossible.

[Tom Kratman]

Deforestation tends to also be an issue of poor access to alternative energy supplies (including sparse rural electrification), land tenure and inequality, education, disposable income and government policy—not merely population density. Moreover, in Haiti we've seen a significant decline in population growth rates since the 1980s (1.7% in 2007, down from 2.3% in 1984), hopefully indicating that the usual demographic transition is slowly underway.

My broader point, however, was that infant mortality rate (one of the best indicators of average living conditions, since it is affected by income, education, shelter, nutrition, access to safe water, etc.) has steadily declined even in Haiti, and much more rapidly in other places. Methodologically, an even better measure of the slow but significant improvement in Haitian living conditions in recent years is its Human Development Index score (an amalgam measure of quality-of-life indicators):



I'm not saying that reconstruction and development in Haiti will be easy. It won't--it will be enormously difficult, challenging, and prone to setbacks. We might even fail.

I am suggesting, however, that it is not impossible.

"Not impossible," in this case, might as well be code for, "oh, me, oh, my; if only we care enough, and are sensitive enough, and toss enough money into the bottomless pit, we can rescue poor Haiti from itself."

I think it is impossible, because the core problem is not material, nor educational, nor health related, nor anything we can do anything about. The core problem is that the place has been such a disaster for so long - arguably, given its history as a slave colony, since inception - that it is engrained in them, or at least most of them, that nothing can work because nothing ever has, and that the only way to rise above the muck, even a little, is to look out for number one and number one's blood relations (and even the latter is somewhat atrophied by local reproductive mores). The problem is, therefore, moral and memetic and is not helped in the slightest by our on again-off again, feel-good-while-undermining-what-little-self-confidence-they-might-have attempts at western guilt reduction. Nor, for that matter, would a more sustained effort help for the reasons I gave above and because it is simply tangential to the core problem.

Frankly, I'm of the James Shikwati school of foreign aid, which is to say, "Don't."

[marct]

Hi Rex,

It is really easy to be cynical about the prospects for development in the so-called "third world"--especially if you ignore the actual data on third world development over the last thirty years or so.

I'll admit, I'm enough of a particularist to dislike generalist terms like the "third world". I've actually looked at a fair bit of the development work, although mainly in Africa, but I do have some problems with the indicators.

In most places, we've seen striking reductions in mortality, and improvements in nutrition, education, and real disposable income--largely due to local efforts, but in some cases (notably the reductions in infant and child mortality as a consequence of vaccination and education) due to critical contributions from the international community.

Which is all well and good. we saw exactly the same type of drop in child mortality 100 years ago in Nigeria, but what is not generally talked about is two things. First, is the drop brought about by permanent changes in the environment (e.g. swamp draining, massive but long last infrastructure, etc.) or is it brought about by external applications (e.g. vaccines)? The source of the change is crucial since external changes cannot be assumed to be lasting, while local changes, especially environmental, can be.

The second key point is that there is a culture lag relating to perceptions of how many children are "acceptable" and "necessary", and this is where the time element in the changes leading to drops in infant mortality becomes critical. It usually takes about 60 years for cultural perceptions of the required number of children per family to change to meet the "new" environment (BTW, as a point of clarification, I'm talking about population-level here).

Once you start to get these culture level changes going, usually 30-40 years and solidified by 60-70, you have a related problem which is controlling the birth rate via non-environmental factors (e.g. birth control). That's another culture lag problem, so you end up with a fairly big population bulge.

You mentioned changes in nutrition, education and real disposable income, so let me take up some of these. Nutrition is especially important, especially in early childhood, but it requires a number of different factors in your food production / distribution cycles - i.e. a fair diversity of foods being widely available and affordable. Education may or may not be useful as an indicator, it depends on education for what and the quality of the education, and Tom's point about setting up a diasporic brain drain is well taken (consider the Canada - US relationship on this one, and when it flips).

Let's talk about real disposable income, then. What resource potentials does it actually indicate and what will it be spent on? This is critical, especially if it is combined with a culture that tends towards kinetic "answers" to political problems. Consider, by way of example, the Muslim Brotherhood - well educated, fairly decent disposable income and a tendency to use it in kinetic terms, at least for the first 40-50 years of the operation. Nutrition, education and income do not automatically equate to a peaceful nation state .

Tom touched on the slave country problem, and it really is at the root of a lot of the cultural problems Haiti is facing. I'm not (quite) as pessimistic as Tom about there being a solution, but it isn't going to be easy at all, and would require some pretty massive socio-cultural engineering. Let's just take the familiarism that Tom raises which, BTW, is the only same response in that type of situation. How do you expand people's moral "inner curcle" to include people who are in the country, but not of your or an allied bloodline?

Historically, this has only been done via some form of cross-cutting (across bloodlines) allegiance system. Examples include secret societies, religions, "class consciousness" (although that tends to degenerate into alliance groups of bloodlines), fictive kinship systems and external enemies ("we either hang together or hang separately).

The latter, an external enemy, won't work in Haiti because it is what actually established a large part of the current culture in the first place (fear of invasion and re-enslavement, extensive militarization early on, invasion of the DR, etc.). Secret societies and fictive kinship systems are already a part of Haitian society and have a rather checkered past (tonton macoute anyone?); at any rate, they have tended to be too localized to effectively cross bloodlines unlike the lodge systems in west Africa, the north-west coast of BC or the Masons et alii.

This leaves us with religions (iffy) and class consciousness (quite fragmented and highly diverse). And, as a note, the type of class consciousness that operated to stabilize many of the western European countries was a fairly broad one with significant size in the population (look at the development of the middle class figures for western Europe in the 17th - 19th centuries), and most of them were formed around a pseudo-feudalist model which would have problems in Haiti.

One system that might work is some form of a cantonment system (think Switzerland in the mid-16th to mid-17th century with shades relating to France in the late 19th century) with cross-cuts for certain industries, religious groups and ideological groups. That, however, would require that the "national government", and pardon me while I laugh my guts out, agree to decentralize a large amount of its power and shift its electoral system. It would also require that development work be conducted at the canton level which for some groups would be fine, while others wouldn't get the necessary ROI to support their "deserving", lavish life style .

As I said, I can see some potential, but not much.

Cheers,

Marc

[Rex Brynen]

Which is all well and good. we saw exactly the same type of drop in child mortality 100 years ago in Nigeria, but what is not generally talked about is two things.

Rather less than a hundred years ago--by most measures, Nigeria's infant mortality rate is higher than Haiti's.

In any case, unless we're going to take a morally unsustainable Malthusian position that we'll let children die off en masse, we don't have much choice in the matter, do we?

First, is the drop brought about by permanent changes in the environment (e.g. swamp draining, massive but long last infrastructure, etc.) or is it brought about by external applications (e.g. vaccines)? The source of the change is crucial since external changes cannot be assumed to be lasting, while local changes, especially environmental, can be.

The evidence is. that vaccination, better access to primary health care, and education (especially female education) play key roles. However, these are both external (in that UNICEF, WHO, and others often play a key role in initial vaccination campaigns) and internal (in that these are almost always sustained over time by local governments).

The second key point is that there is a culture lag relating to perceptions of how many children are "acceptable" and "necessary", and this is where the time element in the changes leading to drops in infant mortality becomes critical.

Exactly the demographic transition I referred to earlier. In Haiti the fertility rate is high, but far from the highest in the developing world. There is some evidence that a slow demographic transition is underway, and as we know from other cases this is something that can be aided through support for family planning and especially female education and labour force participation.

Education may or may not be useful as an indicator, it depends on education for what and the quality of the education, and Tom's point about setting up a diasporic brain drain is well taken (consider the Canada - US relationship on this one, and when it flips).

I'm not sure of any country where increased primary/secondary school attendance and improved basic literacy rates can be considered a developmental negative. Yes, brain-drains are a problem--but less of a problem than an uneducated population. (I also wouldn't underestimate the very positive impact that diaspora remittances can have over multiple generations--Jordan, one of the proportionately highest exporters of semiskilled and skilled labour in the world--being a case in point.)

Consider, by way of example, the Muslim Brotherhood - well educated, fairly decent disposable income and a tendency to use it in kinetic terms, at least for the first 40-50 years of the operation. Nutrition, education and income do not automatically equate to a peaceful nation state .

Again, I'm not sure of the argument--that populations should be kept poor so that they won't do bad things with increased resources? (I would quibble in your characterization of the MB too--in general the movement has been quite peaceful, except where faced with massive state repression or foreign occupation.)

Tom touched on the slave country problem, and it really is at the root of a lot of the cultural problems Haiti is facing.

We don't do governance reform and rule-of-law well--its partly a cultural problem, but much more so a problem of entrenched interests and massive disparities of wealth and power, coupled with often inappropriate external models. Indeed, it is that context of years of exploitation, poverty, and inequality that help to shape Haitian political culture. There was, however, a broad consensus that (very gradual) progress was being made, pre-earthquake.

Again, I'm certainly not painting a rosy picture--I think the odds of disappointing results are quite high. However, so have the odds of a great many human endeavors!

[Tom Kratman]

Again, I'm certainly not painting a rosy picture--I think the odds of disappointing results are quite high. However, so have the odds of a great many human endeavors!

Let's try this; give us a plan. What has to be done? What force must we apply? What ROE? Who do we need to kill or terrorize, at least in general? Where is the consensus for applying that society-changing force? (Note: We appear to lack the fortitude even to shoot looters.) Who shall exercise sovereignty over the place and why will that work better? How will we keep the brain drain from occurring if we try to educate them? What will they do for money? Why, in this case, can we expect that most or nearly all aid will not simply be stolen or embezzled? (I am often quite amazed at the degree to which the people who object to trickle-down economics tacitly accept trickle-down aid.) How do we keep farmers employed farming when they cannot compete with free food? What is the reason to believe that, this time, the west will have the sticktoitiveness to keep any such effort going? And if none, or none that are credible, why bother?

[Rex Brynen]

Let's try this; give us a plan. What has to be done? What force must we apply? What ROE? Who do we need to kill or terrorize, at least in general?

Sheesh, Tom--we're talking about an aid-to-civil-powers, post-disaster reconstruction and development effort here. As a general rule, killing and terrorizing large groups of folks isn't what we're trying to do.

[marct]

Hi Rex,

In any case, unless we're going to take a morally unsustainable Malthusian position that we'll let children die off en masse, we don't have much choice in the matter, do we?

Much as I hate to say it, and believe me I do hate to say it, "we" have already accepted the moral position to let children die off in a Malthusian fashion. Let me expand on this one....

Foreign aid and development work can, indeed, lower the infant mortality rate; no questions there. In every case that I am aware of where this has happened, however (including Western Europe), the birth rate has only gradually dropped over a 60-70 period. I think we both agree on that and on the existence of a culture lag.

That's all fine and dandy, but what it tends to mean is that the increase in population brought about as a result of the reduction in infant mortality has several, macro-level demographic effects. First, it creates a population skewed to the lower age groups, so your population pyramid is quite wide. Second, infrastructural changes, say along the lines of the great sanitation engineering projects of the mid-19th century in Europe, also drop the mortality rate amongst all ages thereby significantly increasing the number of child bearing age people and their life expectancies.

This increase in general population leads to another cultural strain that shows up in many areas but, especially, in the economic divisions of labour. For example, male and female cultural expectations on types of employment, expectations on childrens employment, etc. This produces another round of cultural, hmmm, let's call it "negotiation" that actually tends to last longer than the family size one does. When you say something like

There is some evidence that a slow demographic transition is underway, and as we know from other cases this is something that can be aided through support for family planning and especially female education and labour force participation.

you are quite right; it can, but only at the expense of increased cultural instability centered around gender and age grade roles in the society.

I'm not sure of any country where increased primary/secondary school attendance and improved basic literacy rates can be considered a developmental negative. Yes, brain-drains are a problem--but less of a problem than an uneducated population. (I also wouldn't underestimate the very positive impact that diaspora remittances can have over multiple generations--Jordan, one of the proportionately highest exporters of semiskilled and skilled labour in the world--being a case in point.)

The problem comes about, in part, because of that culture lag issue. "Education", in the West, is a status marker that has managed to retain some of its equation with probable economic benefits despite the continued devaluation of educational credentials (in terms of actual "learning) of the past, say 100 years. For the US and Canada at least, we were incredibly lucky that the boom in educational opportunities also coincided with an economic boom and, when that started to go sour (late 1968 actually, but it doesn't really hit until the 1970's), educational attainment became a gatekeeper function that made it a necessary albeit insufficient condition for achieving economic success.

The same is not true in all cultures and/or societies. In crass, Keynesian terms, what is the value of a "product" when the supply is rapidly inflated? It tends to devalue the product, which is what we have seen happening time and time again with degrees. Now, the key here lies in one distinction that is not usually made, and that is the content of the education rather than the marker of the education, which is why I say that "education" is not a good marker. You can improve literacy rates, which I am all in favour of, but what are they going to read? School attendance? I'm sure that you have had students who just can't make the grade no matter how often they show up for class, I know I have.

But let me return to this content point for a moment since it is the foundation of a lot of my concerns. Our Western belief that education and economic success are tied together creates a set of expectations in our cultures, the current incarnation of which is the Gen X "sense of entitlement". What happens when the expectations run head on into the realities? The Gen X phenomenon is being met by a rather large deployment of "training seminars" for managers to learn to deal with Gen X'ers; it's a multi-million dollar business. How about what happens when these expectations hit in a society which does not have the same socially acceptable options (no, I'm not going to go into Merton's strain theory, but it's a good model).

You mentioned remittances, and that is certainly one option that reduces social strain. You get people who develop enough competence and/or the right set of requirements to enable them to succeed in an extra-social economy. They leave, thereby reducing the local strain on the social fabric, and yet at the same time they send hard money back into the local economy. It's a win-win situation in some ways .

But it has a cost at the local level by draining off local talent and, to some degree, capital. Over a decent time interval, say 50 years or so, it can work out very well as 2nd gen members of the diaspora communities go to their "native" country and invest in it - American Samoa is actually a great example of that. On the down side, during those 50+ years or so, it actually reduces the talent in the country as well as hardening the social structure.

Again, I'm not sure of the argument--that populations should be kept poor so that they won't do bad things with increased resources?

That's not where I'm going with the argument. What I'm trying to argue is that there are consequences for social choices and that one of the primary trade-offs is stability vs. dynamism/change. I'm not marking a moral or ethical argument .

We don't do governance reform and rule-of-law well--its partly a cultural problem, but much more so a problem of entrenched interests and massive disparities of wealth and power, coupled with often inappropriate external models. Indeed, it is that context of years of exploitation, poverty, and inequality that help to shape Haitian political culture. There was, however, a broad consensus that (very gradual) progress was being made, pre-earthquake.

Agreed, and that is, IMHO, part of the problem. Let me try and pull that out in evolutionary terms and at a very general level (i.e. not Haiti specific)....

When "we" decided to get out of the imposed governance business (aka de-colonization plus an entire attitude / culture change towards "imperialism"), our leaving withdrew one of the key factors leading to stability - the external "Other". Many places which got their "independence" (in quotes because it was political at the nation state level, but usually not economic), tended to fracture along long suppressed, and sometimes artificially imposed, lines.

[satirical tone]This created an opportunity for a number of organizations that had been in the "feel good" business, especially since the 19th and early 20th century style moral entrepreneurial content was now considered to be passe. You can no longer sell the London Missionary Society version of the White Man's Burden but, instead, have to recast it into a more palatable version which, coincidentally, is just helped along by all of these conveniently located failing states (many of which "we" "created" in the first place). The old Indulgences con is, once again, in full swing but this time it is backed by unprecedented media access, and one has to wonder what moral entrepreneur wants to actually get rid of the problems that allow them to live in the style to which they have rapidly become accustomed?[/satirical tone]

Okay, I'll drop the satirical tone, but if you look at the actual amount of money that reached the people it was raised to help, it tends to be a very sobering experience. I've known several groups in the aid / development business who I actually do consider quite ethical, and they all had less than a 10% administration overhead, and at least one had a 0% overhead. I'll be very interested to see what the overhead charges on on the recent Haiti telethons Those groups were actually working to solve local problems.

If we compare that with the admin overheads from some of the other groups, you have to wonder. I believe that one of the most egregious examples, since corrected to some degree, was UNICEF with an 80% overhead (or somewhere in that area) and who, by the 1990's, appear to have been spending the vast majority of their money on conferences and symposia (cf. Chattering International: How UNICEF Fails the World’s Poorest Children, James Le Fenu, 1993).

Was progress being made? Certainly everything I had heard said that it was, albeit very slowly (which, BTW, I consider to be quite promising ). I hope that progress in Haiti can continue to be made.

Cheers,

Marc

[Stan]

Hey Marc and Rex !

Hi Rex,

Foreign aid and development work can, indeed, lower the infant mortality rate; no questions there. In every case that I am aware of where this has happened, however (including Western Europe), the birth rate has only gradually dropped over a 60-70 period. I think we both agree on that and on the existence of a culture lag.

I recall the CDC and USAID performing studies in the early 80s in Sub-Sahara and the general target was infant mortality. At first I found that odd until I realized exactly what they were after.

Seems most African families were huge - 3 or even 4 generations under a single roof. The elders concluded that "more than half will die anyway" and the best approach was to make more (babies). The cultural spin there was simple, the children would eventually take care of their parents and so on.

When CDC finally brought cholera and malaria down to a "treatable illness" the locals began to see less of a need for 6 or 8 children. Even my local guard stopped at 3 kids (although he continued to steal my malaria prophylactics ).

That was nearly 15 years of research and money. Sadly, following civil wars and social upheaval the system died.

That's all fine and dandy, but what it tends to mean is that the increase in population brought about as a result of the reduction in infant mortality has several, macro-level demographic effects. First, it creates a population skewed to the lower age groups, so your population pyramid is quite wide. Second, infrastructural changes, say along the lines of the great sanitation engineering projects of the mid-19th century in Europe, also drop the mortality rate amongst all ages thereby significantly increasing the number of child bearing age people and their life expectancies.

This increase in general population leads to another cultural strain that shows up in many areas but, especially, in the economic divisions of labour. For example, male and female cultural expectations on types of employment, expectations on childrens employment, etc. This produces another round of cultural, hmmm, let's call it "negotiation" that actually tends to last longer than the family size one does.
Cheers,

Marc

Indeed a dilemma of major proportions. Children being sold, or worse, turned into soldiers. The school system couldn't handle the "influx" and many children ended up on the streets supporting their families.

Regards, Stan

[Tom Kratman]

Was progress being made? Certainly everything I had heard said that it was, albeit very slowly (which, BTW, I consider to be quite promising ). I hope that progress in Haiti can continue to be made.

Cheers,

Marc

Marc:

Progress? Hmmm.

It has been said that one should never underestimate the ability of an armed force to make a bad idea seem good through sheer weight of effort and duplicity practiced on an heroic scale. I can't think of any reason to believe the armed forces are unique in this.

Do we have any reason to believe that the people reporting progress weren't cherry picking? Or that their information gatherers weren't "finding" the information their superiors most wanted to be found? Perhaps even massaging it a bit, here and there? Or that they didn't, humanly and understandably, turn away from indicators that they were failing?

I mean, can you imagine the following TV ad, replete with pictures of starving children: "Hi, I represent Save the Children. We want your money and we want it even though the majority of what you give us will be siphoned off by kleptocrats and the little that remains will do no good whatsoever except to ensure that there will be a few more children starving in ten years than there are today. Trust us; you'll feel better after you write that check."

Nah.

So color me skeptical that there has been any real progress in places where the objective realities say there ought not be and where sundry NGOs stand to make a fair chunk of change from disseminating that there has been progress.

To go back to Haiti, for example, is there any evidence that the average age for beginning sexual activity has gone up from 12 to, oh, I dunno, maybe 12 and a half? That would be real, grassroots progress, and on a truly key matter affecting the long term prospects of the place. Don't think it happened. Have the police and bureaucrats become more honest? Can't imagine how they'd measure that one. "Ah, oui, monsieur; I have reduced my schedule of bribes by 43% under the influence of your wonderful NGO/MTT/the bribes your organization paid me." We've had evidence here (the police taking off at 16:30 while the looters did not) that the police are fundamentally indifferent to meeting their core function. What's that say about them? And what does what it says about them say about the rest of the society? How, indeed, do we measure that they became more self-reliant? Why would we expect it when they're under the influence of organizations for whom it would be corporate death if they ever actually became self-reliant?

There's another old Army saying: All the really measureable things aren't very important and all the really important things aren't very measureable. I think it's true.

There is an analogy I've had cause to use from time to time on the subject. Imagine a jungle, the real triple canopy deal. Almost nothing grows at ground level except very large trees. Those trees have been there a long time. Their branches are intergrown and intertwined. What happens when you cut a tree down at the base? Nothing soon, because it is held up by the others with which it has intertwined. Okay, but imagine you have somehow gotten rid of the tree; what happens? Another one grows in about the same spot and, under the influence of the other trees, to about the same shape as the previous one. In short, you can't change the jungle piecemeal; rather, you must raze a very large section of it and, even then, there are objective factors - soil, sun, rain, terrain - that made it a jungle in the first place and about which you can do precisely nothing. And the moment you stop cutting, the jungle begins its return.

By comparison, human societies are much more complex than mere jungles, and much harder to change. Moreover, while the jungle is non-sentient - the trees will not actively and cleverly thwart you - the people who make up societies, and are doing fairly well in their own, are sentient and will thwart you.