McMaster on war (merged thread)

[Ken White]

...Fighting under conditions of uncertainty seems more like a mindset problem than a force structure problem to me, provided one has a full-spectrum force. His comments on uncertainty seems to argue for a full-spectrum force (something I support) - is that what he's calling for? I couldn't really tell.

Can't answer for him but that's the way I took it.

I also think his comments on RMA and transformation are a bit too critical and it seems he might want to throw the baby out with the bathwater in that regard...

Although I agree the concepts of RMA and transformation were oversold as a grand-unified-theory of warfare, they should not be simply abandoned because they still have utility in certain kinds of conflict. RMA and transformation concepts should be kept in those areas where they work and discarded in those areas where they don't.

I'm inclined to throw out the whole caboodle. I'm also curious. Where do you think they might work?

Personally, I see this more as a political problem than a force structure problem. Differences in force structure are not going to matter much in terms of deterring or coercing states that utilize proxies - it's ultimately political will to hold a state accountable for what proxies do that matters. History seems to show that such political will rarely exists which is why proxies are so effective.

True but force structure has a significant effect on what your forces can be successfully committed to do.

He's right about surveillance, but the reason there was a lack of ground forces was the inability to rapidly deploy and sustain a more adequate force quickly. These limitations were what drove planners toward using locals as a proxy ground force.

I think there's much more to it. Planning failures and command disconnects (regrettably to include some parochialism...) were also involved.

Finally, I strongly agree with Ron's comments regarding the relationship between strategy and resources.

True -- and that's why force structure has significant impact and that's why we must have full spectrum forces.

[Entropy]

I'm also curious. Where do you think they might work?

They seemed to work pretty well in phases I-III of OIF and even Col. McMaster concedes the point to some extent several times in his essay. One example:

The major offensive operation that quickly toppled the Hussein regime in Iraq clearly demonstrated the possibilities associated with new technology, as well as the effects that improved speed, knowledge, and precision can have in the context of a large-scale offensive operation.
However, the initial phases of the operation also revealed important continuities in warfare that lie beyond the reach of technology. Unconventional forces will continue to evade detection from even the most advanced surveillance capabilities. Moreover, what commanders most needed to know about enemy forces, such as their degree of competence and motivation, lay completely outside the reach of technology.

I don't disagree at all with the above. However, in the end, Saddam's attempts at an unconventional strategy and use of unconventional forces to defend Iraq and his regime failed spectacularly. Col. McMaster is completely correct about the limits of surveillance and technology against unconventional forces, but they proved very useful against his conventional forces.

True but force structure has a significant effect on what your forces can be successfully committed to do.

Sure, but the case he points out was Iran - what force structure will help us coerce, deter them? One more focused on LIC/COIN or one more focused on HIC? Ironically, it was after what appeared to be the complete success of OIF in mid-2003 that Iran put forward a tentative offer for a grand rapprochement with the US.

I think there's much more to it. Planning failures and command disconnects (regrettably to include some parochialism...) were also involved.

Oh I agree - there is always more to the story and I agree with your points, but the fundamental problem of putting forces into and sustaining them in a landlocked country with no infrastructure remained. And of course there was the political pressure to act sooner which, IMO, also helped push the plan toward using locals.

[Ken White]

...I don't disagree at all with the above. However, in the end, Saddam's attempts at an unconventional strategy and use of unconventional forces to defend Iraq and his regime failed spectacularly.

Did they? We're still there and I'm quite sure that was not the original US plan...

Col. McMaster is completely correct about the limits of surveillance and technology against unconventional forces, but they proved very useful against his conventional forces.

Well, I see no RMA invovled in any of that or Afghanistan -- or in Iran, come to that. Absolutely none. As for 'transformation' I see none, really; what I do see is technological progress at an accelerated rate (compared to historical change) being adapted -- and that not as well or as rapidly as I would wish. So I guess we have a definition discrepancy more than a disagreement.

Sure, but the case he points out was Iran - what force structure will help us coerce, deter them? One more focused on LIC/COIN or one more focused on HIC?

Any fight with Iran will absolutely require both and thus both capabilities would seem required to effectively deter.

Ironically, it was after what appeared to be the complete success of OIF in mid-2003 that Iran put forward a tentative offer for a grand rapprochement with the US.

One of many over the years. Having served in Iran long ago, i've watched it pretty closely over the years. They're as good as North Korea at playing the US and they constantly approach and scuttle away. They're good at it; haggling is national sport...

...And of course there was the political pressure to act sooner which, IMO, also helped push the plan toward using locals.

Too true, that.

[Entropy]

So I guess we have a definition discrepancy more than a disagreement.

Yes, I think you're right here. That's the trouble with so much Pentagon and think-tank speak.

[h2harris]

FCS, “Transformation” Wrong Path: Top Army Brain
By Greg Grant Wednesday, October 22nd, 2008 4:21 am
Posted in Land, Policy

Two distinct groups are emerging in the Army with quite different views on the nature of future wars the U.S. is likely to fight and the decisions the service should make about future force structure and weapons. The first group is the Title 10 side that urges the Army to embrace the troubled Future Combat Systems program and new operational concepts built around dominant battlefield intelligence. The other side is represented by officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan who think future wars will resemble the messy reality of the current ones.

In a new paper, Army Col. H.R. McMaster, definitely a member of the messy war group, calls for abandoning so-called transformation, which is intellectually rooted in the idea of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). McMaster, of 73 Easting and Tal Afar fame, is a highly influential soldier-scholar who is currently putting together a brain trust for Gen. David Petraeus to review U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Continuation at: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2008/10/22/fc...op-army-brain/

[Ron Humphrey]

I think Mr Collins had it right back in 85, As you get better in one type of fight the threshold for a different type of fight is lowered. Would seem to reason as wel for HIC/LIC, CONV/COIN, whatever as it did for Conv/Nuclear

In that that doesn't mean either type won't happen just seems that it's all the more important to figure out just what "Balanced" looks like and get to working on it.

[Entropy]

Was doing a bit of reading over at DID where they linked McMaster's article along with this one from 2006 that I hadn't read before and found quite interesting. It examines RMA and "transformation" developments during the inter-war years in Germany and France which I think are important to consider today. Some excerpts:

With the benefit of hindsight, France's preparations for war with Germany are an easy target of critique. It is another matter, however, to derive guidelines that might reliably help us avoid errors in our present efforts to envision future war and prepare for it. In fact, French planners conformed in a general way to dictums that are today supposed to help planners avoid obvious mistakes. They sought to "learn the lessons of the last war" and not prepare to re-fight it. But for the dominant clique in French leadership this meant resisting the "cult of the offensive" that had sent millions to their deaths against barbed wire and artillery during the Great War.

This disposition did not imply the abandonment of offensive capabilities and operations altogether. But it did place emphasis on defensive preparations and defensive operations in the opening stages of war as a way of buying time and setting the stage for a subsequent counter-offensive. This approach also accorded with the French leadership's assessment of what types of support it might expect from its allies, how much, when, and under what circumstances. In other words, France's strategic disposition reflected its view of its strategic circumstances.

Drawing useful lessons from the experience of interwar force developments and their subsequent application requires that we relinquish the privilege of hindsight. The question is: What might the historic players have done differently given what they knew at the time? And, moreover: Can their mistaken choices be structurally associated with predispositions that others might avoid? In other words, can we identify a "character flaw" in their planning or execution?

As noted above, the case of the French air force warns against the politicalization of RMA efforts, while also suggesting that service interests can distort RMA development. The troubled experience of French ground force development illustrates how tying an RMA vision closely to a particular strategic disposition (as though one entails the other), can cloud the appreciation of operational opportunities.

The German case points to how a nation's strategic disposition can disable the perception of operational limits. The contours of the new synthesis in land warfare were not fully drawn until Kursk. Before this, what the Germans saw was how a particular instantiation of the new synthesis might resolve, at least temporarily, a particular operational impasse. What the Russians saw subsequently was how the synthesis might be applied to spoil the German solution. What the French saw was neither.

None of the provisos outlined above promise a way to reliably surmount the problem of RMA uncertainty, of course. At best, they flag some predispositions that can distort the development and application of new capabilities. As always, the real challenge is applying the precepts to entirely novel circumstances.

The entire thing is well worth a read.

[wm]

Forces ought to be designed explicitly to fight under conditions of uncertainty and to achieve effectiveness rather than efficiency. This will entail tolerating a higher degree of redundancy.

I suspect that the above provides the meat of McMaster's article.
I see his "conditions of uncertainty" as another way of describing risk. The level of risk is a factor of the degree of damage caused times the probability of occurence. Risk can be mitigated but it cannot be eliminated. Force design is (or ought to be) a function of trying to mitigate risk in the attainment of assigned missions. One way to mitigate risk is to overdesign for contingencies. This is what McMaster seems to espouse with his desire "to achieve effectiveness rather than efficiency." However, force developers must also recognize that not every mission has an equal probability of being assigned. So, the force structure must be such as to be able to handle the missions whose risk (consequences of failure times probability of occurence) is highest, within availalble resource constraints.

The real issue is whether those who drive the budget process are willing to appropriate the funds needed to allow the military to mitigate a larger portion of the perceived risk. Dollars drive the procurement actions (to include military personnel and their training) that produce a balanced (or out of balance) joint force.

In order to change the attitudes of those who approve budgets, the military needs to do a better job of identifying the spectrum of risk that various funding levels engender. As McMaster points out, the business notion of waste (as found in LEAN thinking) does not apply as directly to the military. A larger, balanced force structure inventory than immediately necessary (one that is able to handle more than just the short term, quick and dirty deployment, but not so large as to win WWIII within a week, a month, or perhaps even a year) is really a cost avoidance strategy, not waste. This is what needs to be made apparent to those who apportion Federal funding.