Hi Wilf,

Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
Yet read the military discussions of late 19th Century and you see how military men have got their heads around steam power, new weapons, railways, telegraph and most of everything else. They are applying what they know for certain and not attempting to hypothesise or guess at what they do not. What wrong foots everyone in 1914 is not the technology, but the vast scale of the endeavour both in numbers and duration - none of which could have been reasonably predicted.
Bein' in a somewhat picky mood since the seminar I came up to the university for got cancelled with no notice, I do want to make a couple of observations.... Sorry, Wilf, it's just me taking out frustrations

Steam power - 1687 in England with the Newcomen Engine, 177r with the Watts;
"new" weapons - breechloaders, simple design first produced in 1774 (I think or thereabouts) and mass deployed by the Prussians in the 1860's.

Railways - 1827 in the UK

Telegraph - 1847 (I think; this is off the top of my head) with the first oceanic cable in 1857

If they bloody well didn't have it down by the end of the 19th century, they should have all been taken out and shot as hopeless incompetents!

Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
Point being, what is it that we do no get or have evidence for? Why extrapolate beyond what we are certain of? "Just stop it!"
We have to extrapolate beyond "certainty" because the only thing certain is that we don't have it perfect - isn't that an old military saying ?

I choose airpower as the analog, but I could have also pointed to the armour debates on the 1920's as well, or the debates over crossbows and longbows back in the 14th century. The point I was trying to make with that analog was that it is at the start of the familiarity curve.

Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
I would urge no deferring on any ones part. All the evidence is there, if you look for it. One of the key lessons of the Lebanon War - and one ALWAYS ignored - is how was it possible for the IDF to have such an extensive knowledge of Hezbollah - which they did - and not be able to employ that knowledge in a way that allowed effective preparation (lack of money/Leadership?) or for consistently successful operations once the fighting started. (EBO/SOD?)
So, knowledge without understanding? I think there is a really good warning lesson there .