Quote Originally Posted by MattC86 View Post
To what extent, if any, are people making distinctions between two pairs of issues:

(1) COIN as urban-warfare/kinetic ops rather than peacekeeping and policing

(2) Ability of soldiers and Marines, given proper training, to conduct both missions vs. service doctrine, procurement, training, etc., becoming focused on COIN to the detriment of potential developing situations

That is, for #1, I would certainly agree that troops are more than capable of conducting the kinetic side of COIN ops or engaging in high-intensity maneuver warfare, but you guys wouldn't agree that we've seen some issues in Iraq and Afghanistan with units having serious adjustments from kinetic combat ops to more policing-based stability ops?

Additionally, the example of the IDF and Lebanon in 2006 is a bit of a frightening precedent.

As for #2; the personnel themselves will be able to conduct themselves in either environment, but is there not a danger of gearing the Army's "tail" systems too exclusively for COIN?

And yes, I certainly see the irony in suggesting that after years of ignoring the problem we may now be too exclusively prepared for COIN. . .

Regards,

Matt
Good post. Although from the little I've read on Lebanon in 2006, it looks like the Israelis had a host of leadership and organizational problems that can't simply be explained away as the result of decades of West Bank and Gaza service.

Seems to me that procurement is the big elephant in the room. I saw General Sir Rupert Smith speak last year, and while it was a good talk, he repeatedly said "I'm not here to talk about equipment, it is how that equipment is used that has changed", which struck me as evasive. Ultimately, with a finite amount of money to spend (and maybe less and less, the financial shape we're in) choices need to be made. Not to turn this into another F-22 thread, but we can't invest in more light infantry, and spend a lot more on recruiting, retention, professional military education, etc., if we're buying tons of new fighter planes and destroyers at hundreds of millions of dollars a pop.