North Korea: 2012-2016

[Ron Humphrey]

is not so much about red lines and escalation so much as about retribution or lack there of.

Have any ideas on exactly where the Chinese whom you give such great importance in the what if's see the "too far" bar in relation to their reckless child to the souths hissy fits?

Seems like important information when determining how best to avoid "accidental" escalations which seems like everyone agrees wouldn't be good for all involved.

[JMA]

is not so much about red lines and escalation so much as about retribution or lack there of.

Have any ideas on exactly where the Chinese whom you give such great importance in the what if's see the "too far" bar in relation to their reckless child to the souths hissy fits?

Seems like important information when determining how best to avoid "accidental" escalations which seems like everyone agrees wouldn't be good for all involved.

First off the risk from NK is much higher because of their nuclear capability. So there is the first mistake from the weakness of the past.

Given the survival of the NK regime under the current sanctions China remains their source of all sanctions busting imports and probably finance as well. The power is total, "do as we say or we close the border."

China holds the key.

... oh yes, and tell the kids in SK to stop doing silly things unless they are will to step up to the plate and not just threaten to take action next time.

[Dayuhan]

First off the risk from NK is much higher because of their nuclear capability. So there is the first mistake from the weakness of the past.

How, short of war, could the north have been prevented from acquiring a nuclear capability?

[JMA]

How, short of war, could the north have been prevented from acquiring a nuclear capability?

Try to give it a little thought and see what you come up with.

[JMA]

From the Mail & Guardian:

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak accepted the resignation of his defence minister on Thursday, two days after an attack by North Korea and amid criticism that the South's response was too slow.

[Rex Brynen]

Have any ideas on exactly where the Chinese whom you give such great importance in the what if's see the "too far" bar in relation to their reckless child to the souths hissy fits?

I would also add that we should be careful not to assume that the Chinese always see these incidents in exactly the same way we do.

It isn't clear to me, for example, that Beijing is convinced that the ROKS Cheonan was necessarily sunk by a North Korean torpedo. Beijing may also agree with Pyongyang that ROK live-fire naval exercises just outside a disputed maritime boundary were provocative, and may even lend some credence to North Korean claims that the incident started when South Korean shells landed in Northern territory.

[Ron Humphrey]

I would also add that we should be careful not to assume that the Chinese always see these incidents in exactly the same way we do.

It isn't clear to me, for example, that Beijing is convinced that the ROKS Cheonan was necessarily sunk by a North Korean torpedo. Beijing may also agree with Pyongyang that ROK live-fire naval exercises just outside a disputed maritime boundary were provocative, and may even lend some credence to North Korean claims that the incident started when South Korean shells landed in Northern territory.

Exactly how does firing on civilian targets actually in South Korean territory fit within Chinese parameters of acceptability.

May just be me, but if they believed as you say wouldn't it seem like this particular action puts them in a rather tough position to say that the North was being unduly accused on the Cheonan.

And lets not forget that its the North who decided to walk someone through to get a look at their new toys just a little bit ago. Somehow the narrative here doesn't seem to help much with the Chinese pushing back against accusations of undue provocations by Kim and company.

[Ken White]

Exactly how does firing on civilian targets actually in South Korean territory fit within Chinese parameters of acceptability.

The demarcation line known informally as the '38th Parallel" or the De Militarized Zone doe not extend into the coastal waters on wither side of the Peninsula, both Notrt and South Korea -- for different reasons -- did not want that to occur at the time of the Truce.

The South did not want it because they effectively occupied many of the islands off both North Korean coasts; the North wanted them to fight over in the future...

The South has moved off many of those islands but still occupy those where the sinking of the Corvette and this artillery duel took place. The North contends they are NK territory, the South disagrees and the South does deliberately provoke things in that area -- and have done so since 1954.

The Chinese -- and the Koreans (both) do indeed look at this far differently than do we. The Chinese also look at differently than does North Korea.

[Ron Humphrey]

The Chinese -- and the Koreans (both) do indeed look at this far differently than do we. The Chinese also look at differently than does North Korea.

Seems awful undefined for such a heavily fortified and possibly explosive area.
Actually quite surprising in that it seems rather less predictable then the Chinese would usually prefer considering both their proximity and in larger terms the effects circumstances there can have on those countries close by.

[Rex Brynen]

Exactly how does firing on civilian targets actually in South Korean territory fit within Chinese parameters of acceptability.

I doubt the Chinese thought it was helpful. Equally, however, North Korea does not accept the current post-war border demarcation (the Northern Limit Line), a complicated issue on which I'm not sure that China has a definitive position. The Chinese may well feel that South Korean live fire exercises in a disputed area (and the alleged shelling of North Korean waters, according to Pyongyang) were provocative, even if the subsequent North Korean response was disproportionate.

My point is that we should not assume that China's perception of the conflict is always the same as ours.

* * *

Since I started writing this, five students have knocked on my door, and Ken has written pretty much the same thing.