Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World,

Given the realities of our own border security efforts we are already more like them than we care to admit, and the hypocrisy is not lost on many. We really need to evolve in our definitions of what "success" looks like, as our current metrics don't fare well under the harsh light of day.

Just an observation and a dynamic that I find interesting.

Our borders are as secure as they need to be in general. Afghanistan's isn't. Striving for perfection is a goal that I hope we never achieve in our country because we'll be in a permanent police state if we do, but we need the ability to surge security during an emergency and we have that. That is legitimacy, something you're generally pushing except when you make counter points about your own arguments. It really doesn't matter to our national security if a few thousand illegals come into the U.S. to work.

On the other hand we need the intelligence and means to stop the cartels from coming across. Read my comments carefully, I didn't say to focus on every person crossing the border illegally. Some things simply aren't important, you want to narrow your efforts on what is perceived as a threat to your State (our mission is still focused on Afghanistan the State, not Afghanistan the place with no borders, no government, no economy, etc.). Borders were not invented in the West, but unfortunately the West is responsible for drawing some very illogical borders. That is two separate things.

It took time, but when the drug trade was identified as a threat (depending on your point of view) to national security we significantly enhanced our ability to slow that trade down over time (it won't happen tomorrow), without stopping Mexican families from coming across to .

Target your border security on specific threats.

I think we have done a good job of keeping most undesirables out with our watch list also. Again no system is perfect, but to simply throw your hands up and pretend this that Afghanistan is practicing an advanced stage of globalism is defeatism. I'm getting concerned because you're starting to sound like a typical mainland European. They're always come up with some pseudointellectual rubbish as an excuse on why something can't be done. 99% of their execuses don't stand up to cross examination.

You're a lawyer man, tighten up on your arguments!

[carl]

3. As to what really sets them off, I suspect it is much more HOW they were removed from power, and then the subsequent government that was formed and protected by us that is designed to prevent them from ever regaining power in legal fashion. We can surely all appreciate how we'd feel in our own respective countries if some foreign power came in, and through sheer overwhelming military power enabled the minority opposition party to sweep into power; and then stayed and protected that party as they established a government around a man selected by that foreign power and helped him to create a constitution that vested virtually all power in that man and blocked any legal recourse for blackballed leaders to rise up on the back of popular support. Who helped that minority party recruit and train a "national" police and military that was recruited 95% from their ranks, and then sent out into the region of the party that was thrown out to suppress those who dared to act out illegally to complain about the same.

I don't know if the Taliban are quite the wide-eyed innocents you make them seem (exaggeration for effect alert). They lost their power in the same way they gained it and the same way they are trying to regain it, through violence. They were hosting AQ before 9-11 and AQ attacked us several time before 9-11. They knew that and should hardly have been surprised if the foreign power got fed up and came in to attack them and their "guests". If they are miffed because the legalities weren't honored, they aren't the hard cases they appear to be.

The Taliban were not and are not the enemy. They were just between us and what we needed to do to get at AQ. They hesitated in helping us, and we weren't in a mood to wait and talk about it at the time.

The didn't hesitate in helping us. They refused. And the ISI encouraged them to refuse. At the time all those bodies were still moldering in the wreck of the World Trade Center. You bet we weren't in any mood to wait for them to get back to us.

Despite our recent faux pas, we still have the power and credibility to step into a neutral role, call for a cease fire and provide a security bubble for a new Constitutional Loya Jirga to take place within.

I am still skeptical that any of this would work but you may be right, it might be worth a try, especially if it could be worked in such a way to peel off part of Taliban & company from the Pak Army/ISI. What kind of security bubble do you envision, where and who would be allowed into it?

[Bob's World]

I didn't say they were innocents, merely that they are not our enemy. As to how they came to power, that is not dissimilar to how the U.S. came to power as well. If legal means are denied, then illegal means become the only recourse. Currently, Illegal means are the only recourse to any who have issue with the Karzai regime as well.

But as to your last question, who would one exclude? As many wars are began at the peace table, as are ended; typically through the moralistic condemnations of the victor over the vanquished. We should remember that in this case, there are no victors or vanquished. How would the U.S. feel if it were us that were excluded? That actually makes more sense than excluding senior reps from Haqqani or the Taliban; but any exclusions would create distrust and de-legitimize the output, so I'd not exclude anyone with standing, and I would not allow GIROA to exclude anyone with standing either. There are the official parties, GIROA, the Coalition, and concerned neighbors with shared borders and populaces that all need a seat. So too reps from all of the formal opposition groups. Also ethnic, tribal, family, regional, and religious representatives as well. After a long, circus-like series of meetings that may well last days; a principle output would be the selection of the representatives to participate, advise or observe the Constitutional Loya Jirga.

This follow-on Jirga would be much smaller and focused on getting to a workable form of governance. This could last months. (Their own "Summer of 1787" to hash things out). I would ban the U.S. from taking any positions as to type of governance or the role of religion in governance; but to instead focus on the protections of rights, and the establishment of process, roles, procedures, etc that prevent they types of abuses of government that cause such insurgencies. All of this tailored for this culture, these people. Also there would need to be referees to step in when power is abused to push some self-serving agenda. Once they have a product that no one is happy with, but everyone can live with, they will be close to what right looks like.

While all of this were going on, similar Shuras of smaller scale would be going on in each of RC AORS, with scheduled development projects being reassessed, and refined to ensure that they serve the entire populace. Similarly service contracts currently pouring the vast majority of cash into the pockets of the Karzai network would be reassessed as we learned more clearly who was being excluded from participation and sought more equitable distributions.

I would also recommend a new coalition be formed to oversee the fragile peace, that is far less Western than the current Coalition. Iran and Pakistan would have prominent roles, China and India less so. I'd bring in Russia and reduce the US role. A new balance of interested stakeholders. Allowing them to keep an eye on each other as much as anything else, to help temper their own behind the scenes manipulations.


Otherwise, I have my own biases.

I think that District officials should be selected by the citizens of that district through a process that they have trust in; and that those officials should owe their patronage to those people.

The same at the Province level. Tear down the Ponzi scene of the current system where every official at all levels owes his patronage to the President.

I'd vastly reduce the National security forces, with quotas established by region for the Tashkils of the ANA, ANP, ANCOP, etc. I would move those Tashkils down to the province and district level for state and local police; and to the Province level for the ANA to form an Afghan National Guard that would make up 1/2 to 3/4 of the Afghan Army. All recruited locally, and employed locally with Province Governors as their commanders in chief. All federally funded (and controlled through that funding) by the central government.

I would consider a system similar to that in Lebanon to guarantee percentages of key interest groups in key positions. Perhaps with a 100 year expiration date. Key being to forge systems one can trust in, even when no one trusts anyone in the system.

None of this, of course is soldier business. And that, of course is our current problem. We've given a governmental problem to the military and the military has quite naturally militarized it. We gave a South Asia problem to the West, and the West quite naturally Westernized it. This would be very hard, and it could easily fall apart. But it could work as well, and it offers a much more enduring solution than continuing our current course seems to offer.

[Dayuhan]

I didn't say they were innocents, merely that they are not our enemy. As to how they came to power, that is not dissimilar to how the U.S. came to power as well. If legal means are denied, then illegal means become the only recourse. Currently, Illegal means are the only recourse to any who have issue with the Karzai regime as well.

I don't see how this is about "legal" or "illegal". It wasn't when the Taliban took power, nor was it when the Taliban lost power. It still isn't. It's just about power and the means by which power is taken. "Legal" is just what the people who have power at any given time happen to want.

This whole idea of a Constitution as the answer and a grand inclusive Constitutional Loya Jirga as the road to the answer sounds wonderful to the western ear... but do Afghans see a Constitution as the answer? Where is this idea coming from; where is the impetus coming from? If it's from us, what chance does it have of succeeding?

[Bob's World]

This is less "western" than one might think. Besides, it is the content that makes something western or Asian, or whatever, not the package. Governance exists everywhere in some form, it varies in nature and extent. A Constitution is a guide to governance that creates structures that protect rights and build trust.

Here is a recent opinion piece from the region on this topic. Granted, this writer has his own strong biases, but it is one of many windows into this issue that we need to look into.

http://www.opinion-maker.org/2011/01...-constitution/

It highlights the lack of trust the people have in government and the fact that too much power is already in Karzai. That alone is enough to flunk a constitution as failed in doing what it most needs to do.

As I say, the Afghans did as Americans did with our articles of Confederation: They created a document to prevent what they hated/feared about the previous government, not what they needed to move forward as a nation. Such evolution is probably necessary, as it was really an act of insurgency (illegal politics) when the team assembled to update the articles instead set out in secret to produce an entirely new system of government. It is time in Afghanistan for a similar evolution in governance. To avoid it, is to mire in revolution instead.

Besides, what else do we have to offer the Taliban in exchange for them withdrawing their sanctuary to AQ?

As Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once said, "if we desire respect for the law, we must first make the law respectable."

[slapout9]

I don't see how this is about "legal" or "illegal". It wasn't when the Taliban took power, nor was it when the Taliban lost power. It still isn't. It's just about power and the means by which power is taken. "Legal" is just what the people who have power at any given time happen to want.

Agree 100%. Power and who has it,is the only fact of reality that matters right now.

[Bob's World]

Agree 100%. Power and who has it,is the only fact of reality that matters right now.

Insurgency is no more and no less than the Illegal challenge for leadership. If our only concern is who is most powerful (which has seemed to be a trend in US foreign policy of late), then we need only step back and see who that is.

Our presence only artificially tips that scale toward GIROA. Let's just go, and come back once the dust settles to work with whoever the "most powerful" turns out to be.

"Might" may well allow one to do as they wish, but Might does not alone make what one does right.

Power is often illusory, and always temporal. True power lies in the people, and the people will always get the final vote; but such unconstrained pursuits of power are typically deemed barbaric and unacceptable in modern society.

Better to impose just constraints of law within which to balance the distribution of power more equitably among the people. This is not impossible, it's just hard. And again, the military's role is a supporting one.

[slapout9]

Better to impose just constraints of law within which to balance the distribution of power more equitably among the people. This is not impossible, it's just hard. And again, the military's role is a supporting one.

1-What is just constraint of law? By who's definition?

2-How is law enforced? sooner or later it's guns and money.

[Bill Moore]

Power is often illusory, and always temporal. True power lies in the people, and the people will always get the final vote; but such unconstrained pursuits of power are typically deemed barbaric and unacceptable in modern society.

There are some similiarities here to the Philippines when we were supporting Marcos, a corrupt tyrant that most of us who worked in the Philippines at the time hated. Most of agreed we would probably be communist insurgents if we lived in the villages and the government only took from the people and gave nothing back in return.

The arguments for continued support to Marcos were the old school arguments. Yes he's a bastard but he is our bastard. He is anti-communist. He supports the U.S. bases (although we had to pay through our nose and the Philippine people didn't see much of that money. If he leaves the communists will take over and the world will end as we know it, etc.

Real progress against the communists didn't start until Marcos was removed from power by the people. The bases closed for several reasons, they were too expensive, they were unpopular with the Filipinos, and the volcano laid waste to them anyway.

I know we're digressing from the safe haven thread, but Bob always does that to us. My point is a good part of our effort appears to be making Karsai successful, much as we did Marcos. In hindsight supporting Marcos was the wrong answer, he may have been our bastard, but he was the wrong bastard for the Philippine people no matter how much money we threw at him.

Assuming it is even possible to disengage from Karzai, what would happen if we stopped supporting him? How would it play out over time? If he was replaced by a popular uprising or a military coup would it make matters worse, or start the real process of recovery? Are there any potential leaders on the near horizon who could do better?

[slapout9]

Assuming it is even possible to disengage from Karzai, what would happen if we stopped supporting him? How would it play out over time? If he was replaced by a popular uprising or a military coup would it make matters worse, or start the real process of recovery? Are there any potential leaders on the near horizon who could do better?

Karzai, why not say he needs to retire due to health reason and then get somebody that can rally the laregest part of the population?

[Bill Moore]

Slap,

My point is to disengage from "their" politics, and stop being obstacle to political change. Let the Afghans form their own government and evolve it as "they" see fit.

[slapout9]

Slap,

My point is to disengage from "their" politics, and stop being obstacle to political change. Let the Afghans form their own government and evolve it as "they" see fit.

I am following. I should have said let "them" get somebody they can rally behind. Let karzia retire was/is a nice way for us to disengage from the whole thing, let him keep the money he stole and go retire somewhere and then we should but out.

[Fuchs]

I am following. I should have said let "them" get somebody they can rally behind. Let karzia retire was/is a nice way for us to disengage from the whole thing, let him keep the money he stole and go retire somewhere and then we should but out.

... and don't forget to tell the intelligence services to earn some of their pay by taking the fortune away from the corrupt Exiles.

[Bob's World]

All,

I didn't mean to move the conversation away from sanctuary, but rather to point out what I see as a better route to get to denial of the sanctuary we are missioned to deal with. The Taliban hold the keys to AQ's sanctuary, not any state actor. It takes a non-state, outlaw to deal with a non-state outlaw, I guess. The key to Taliban leadership is in giving them legal venue to participate in governance. the key to that is to provide safeguards for all involved to be able to work together and move forward. Once that is addressed, pay, motivation and foreign presence all decrease and thereby resolve the resistance insurgency being dealt with in the rural areas. We must clear this problem from the top down; as all we can do at the bottom is suppression of the symptoms.

[Dayuhan]

This is less "western" than one might think. Besides, it is the content that makes something western or Asian, or whatever, not the package. Governance exists everywhere in some form, it varies in nature and extent. A Constitution is a guide to governance that creates structures that protect rights and build trust.

The notion that governance is built around a document is Western, not Afghan.

A Constitution codifies elements of consensus within a society. It cannot be stronger than the consensus that it codifies. No consensus, no Constitution; at least no Constitution that means anything.

It highlights the lack of trust the people have in government and the fact that too much power is already in Karzai. That alone is enough to flunk a constitution as failed in doing what it most needs to do.

Do Afghans believe that the problem can be solved with a new document, or do they want a new leader?

As I say, the Afghans did as Americans did with our articles of Confederation: They created a document to prevent what they hated/feared about the previous government, not what they needed to move forward as a nation.

To what extent, really, was that process initiated and managed by "The Afghans"? If a society runs through a sequence of Constitutions in short order, it may mean that the documents are flawed... or at may simply mean that there's not enough consensus within that society to be meaningfully codified.

Besides, what else do we have to offer the Taliban in exchange for them withdrawing their sanctuary to AQ?

If that's all we have, we have nothing... that's the whole problem with the idea of trying to persuade the Taliban to withdraw sanctuary.

Insurgency is no more and no less than the Illegal challenge for leadership.

Here we are again with "illegal". Do the Taliban see their insurgency as "illegal"? I doubt it... their law is shariah and pashtunwali, not some piece of paper in Kabul. In much of the world "legal" is what the guy with the gun wants. When you have power you make law. You get power by throwing out whoever has it, and you keep it by killing whoever wants to throw you out. I don't see a Constitution changing that.

Our presence only artificially tips that scale toward GIROA. Let's just go, and come back once the dust settles to work with whoever the "most powerful" turns out to be.

Let it be, and see who wins... didn't we do that once before? The Taliban won. They might again. If they do, they won't work with us; why should they?

Better to impose just constraints of law within which to balance the distribution of power more equitably among the people. This is not impossible, it's just hard. And again, the military's role is a supporting one.

Are you suggesting that the US needs to "impose just constraints of law within which to balance the distribution of power more equitably among the people" in Afghanistan? If that's not impossible, what is? And what business do we have trying to "impose just constraints of law" or even decide what "just constraints of law" are in Afghanistan? How is the Afghan distribution of power our business? Seems to be our business is to make sure they don't attack us or our allies, or harbor those who do. If we let the mission creep up to an attempt to restructure Afghan law and governance we're biting off more than we can chew, and we're likely to choke on it.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

I see little merit in any of your arguments to counter my proposal, but I'm open, what do you suggest?

Bob

[Dayuhan]

I see little merit in any of your arguments to counter my proposal

Well, I see little merit and great danger in the belief that the US can impose "just constraints of law" on people whose idea of law and justice is utterly different from ours and who are notoriously ill disposed toward imposition. I see little merit and grave danger in the idea that we can balance another country's disposition of power in a way that suits us. I see little merit and grave danger in the assumption that social consensus is created by a Constitution, rather than the other way round.

what do you suggest

Two things to start"

1. Reverse mission creep. Get back to the core reason why we are there, and focus on what we can do to accomplish that.

2. Accept our limitations. We cannot govern Afghanistan, nor can we dictate how it is to be governed. We shouldn't try.

Unfortunately, we've taken the opposite route for too many years and it will be difficult to reverse that. At this point we've painted ourselves deep into a most unpleasant corner and we face a difficult exercise in damage control. I don't see any magic formula here, we strive for the least bad outcome and hopefully learn some lessons.

If we negotiate with the Taliban, we should have nothing to say about law, justice, and governance. That's not our business. I could see making a simple offer: they turn over OBL, Omar, and their entire inner circle, and we pack up and go home. That's something we can offer. We can't offer to build them into the Afghan government, because we can't build the Afghan government. It's not ours to build.

[Fuchs]

I could see making a simple offer: they turn over OBL, Omar, and their entire inner circle, and we pack up and go home. That's something we can offer. We can't offer to build them into the Afghan government, because we can't build the Afghan government. It's not ours to build.

So to whom would you make that offer if not to those who would need to sacrifice themselves?

Wouldn't it make more sense to simply demand twenty top AQ guys, to be handed over in a fashion that allows them (TB) to save their face (= officially unrelated to the agreement, handing them over to a third party or after some discrediting move against AQ)?

[Dayuhan]

So to whom would you make that offer if not to those who would need to sacrifice themselves?

To the various factions of the Taliban, and to the Afghan populace in general. Could be a quite simple equation: you don't want us here, we don't want to be here; turn over the people who attacked us and we're gone. Make sure they don't come back, and we stay gone.

Wouldn't it make more sense to simply demand twenty top AQ guys, to be handed over in a fashion that allows them (TB) to save their face (= officially unrelated to the agreement, handing them over to a third party or after some discrediting move against AQ)?

Officially unrelated to what agreement? What agreement are we able to make, other than to leave Afghanistan in exchange for the destruction of AQ in the Taliban areas of operation. We control whether we stay or go, so we can offer to go or threaten to stay. We don't control Afghan governance and we shouldn't try; how can we offer to rearrange what isn't ours to rearrange?

Why should we be concerned with their face? The causative relationships have to be clear: harbor our enemies and you don't get what you want. Keep our enemies out and you do get what you want. No more of this nonsense about transforming Afghan governance and society: they don't want it and we can't do it.

It would have been much more effective if we'd taken this position right after the Taliban were driven out of power, but that's water under the bridge.

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

It's not often I find anything you say in need of substantial questions.

Bob, perhaps, does not fully appreciate that in some Pakistani circles, it is justice to stone female blasphemers to death, and martyrdom to kill a person who does not agree. This is a very tough culture for US folks to absorb.

But this idea of us actually coming to possess OBL troubles me. Better to leave him in his spider hole, IMO. If we have him, and we administer our "justice" to him, we will be in the same troublesome spot to many other audiences as the progressive Pakistani governor arguing to drop the blesphemer sentence. Jesus may have advised putting the stones down, but more than one was thrown in his name.

I'm all for leaving OBL in his spider hole. If something unofficial (virtual natural causes) occurred to him, that is one thing. I personally don't want him in US custody subject to US prosecution, just because, at some point, we could do without a next wave of Jihadis chasing a revived martyr.