Do Senior Professional Military Education Schools Produce Strategists?

[Ken White]

No question both strategies helped the country out of the economic low...

At the time.

[John T. Fishel]

the Policy Planning Staff, led by Paul Nitze, wrote the thing. (Sorry I missed the essence of your question) Agree about Louis Johnson. But, in the 1948 - 50 period there was no NSC staff to speak of and the concept was that State was the lead agency. The PPS was an innovation of SECSTATE George C. Marshall that, IMO, he created to replicate a planning component of a military staff. Today, that is the J5 staff section at the JS and all GCCs. And the PPS has significantly atrophied.

DOD, in that time was NOT the 800 pound gorilla - it was 3 services trying to become a unified department and fighting it all theway. The JS, such as it was, was very small; OSD was largely non-existent. I could go on.

You are right that Truman intially rejected - rather did not approve - NSC 68 because it was weak on resourcing. But as the document evloved over the course of 1950 the resource components were added - and before the N Kor attack (for the most part). The question of whether Congress would have approved w/o the push from the N Kor is problematic at best.

NDU press has published NSC 68 (in all its interations to include Pres Tuman's public EO) with discussion and commentary icluding an intro by Nitze. It's available online.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

DOD, in that time was NOT the 800 pound gorilla - it was 3 services trying to become a unified department and fighting it all theway. The JS, such as it was, was very small; OSD was largely non-existent. I could go on.

Yep, sure do. Remember it well, didn't read about it. Still, they were a 400 to 500 pound Gorilla even then, resource allocation wise. Scattered all over DC and the suburbs, too. Even in the old Temps on the Mall.

Though I would have said four services trying every way they could to avoid becoming a unified Department. Pity they didn't win. Not only am I not a Goldwater-Nichols believer, I'm not a fan of DoD. The Service bureaucracies were bad enough without adding an upper layer. See DHS and the DNI for current versions...

This, OTOH:

...and before the N Kor attack (for the most part).

Is not as I recall but it's really immaterial, I suppose...

[John T. Fishel]

perhaps, i should defer to your memory.

[Ken White]

Uh, what'd I say...

I'm not even sure why I'm in this room.

[Bob's World]

Well, according to (caution, name drop coming) John Gaddis, there were "grand strategies of containment," probably dovetails in with Ken's comments that each Pres had his own cut on how to operate within that construct, and each had his own unique challenges to deal with as well.

As to where the line lies between grand strategy and policy, I guess my take is: Does it really matter?

One man's grand strategy may be another's policy, but show me a nation with neither and I'll show you the United States over the past 20 years. Responding to Crisis, vs shaping a national destiny.

To me, an effective Grand Strategy does not require concensus, and it also does not need to be rooted in some threat; but it should be holistic enough that it guides decisions as broad as what to do in Pakistan, whether or not to bail our Chrysler, or what to say in my speech in Cairo.

Containment gave us context. It enabled us to take a tie in Korea, a loss in Vietnam and press on to a victory on the main objective. Sadly few things fail like success, so we have been continuing to cling to what worked for so long, even though it really just doesn't fit the globalized, post-cold war world.

We need a new policy, or a new grand strategy. I don't care which, just pick one and lets get moving forward together in a manner that allows us to know how relatively important the daily dramas really are.

[slapout9]

No question both strategies helped the country out of the economic low...

At the time.

Yes, he got it right and wrong. Cuba too. First the Bay of Pigs...oooopps not so good. Cuban missile crisis did it right....then turned right around and continued to support the assassination programs against Castro....which affected our legitimacy as an Honorable country after signing the agreement with the Soviet Union saying we wouldn't do this. Say what you mean and mean what you say.

But from another point of view Cuba was a credible threat, meaning they had the actual capability to strike the Continental United States both conventionally and later with nuclear weapons.....a clear threat that had to be dealt with in some way. Vietnam never was any of those things but look what we did

[Bob's World]

Sometimes we get so fixated on "capability" that we lose sight of "motive."

N. Korea is playing a dangerous game. A crazy guy with a gun in a crowded room is scary enough. A crazy man with a nuke in a crowded world? You can't negotiate with crazy, so here is a case where focusing on capability is probably appropriate.

Iran is another story. Here we need to lean toward policies that target their motive to develop and use such weapons, while at the same time taking positions with them that address their legitimate beliefs that they need such capabilities to achieve a regional influence that is appropriate to Iran's status in the middle east. Both the Israelies and the Saudis lead us to taking positions with Iran that are more in their national interests than ours, and we need to break free from that. It seems that the President understands that and is heading in the right direction.

We don't worry about England, or France, or Israel. Why? Plenty of capability, but no motive. Time to bring Iran into the circle of trust. I don't think that requires them to go nuke, but they will never believe that so long as they are outside the circle.

[slapout9]

BW, some good points. So let me ask you a question. The Mid-east region AO. First we invade one country then we invade two countries now we are talking about fighting in a 3rd country Pakistan. How many countries do you have to be fighting in before you have World War 3?

[Ken White]

Yes, he got it right and wrong. Cuba too. First the Bay of Pigs...oooopps not so good. Cuban missile crisis did it right....

Questionable. I'd say not really. He traded all our many IRBMs that were in Germany, Greece and Turkey for the few that the USSR had placed in Cuba. So, yeah, he got it done but at a net cost to US credibility -- he simply got out traded by Kruschev...

You said:

...Say what you mean and mean what you say.

I agree but most politicians cannot do that for a variety of reasons -- some understandable, some not. As an example

...a clear threat that had to be dealt with in some way. Vietnam never was any of those things but look what we did

We went to Viet Nam because Eisenhower unfortunately got persuaded by his SecState and against the advice of his Army Chief of Staff to sign a Mutual Support treaty with South Viet Nam. -- and then the brothers Kennedy, looking for a way to show how tough they were -- and boost a flagging US economy -- decided to use that treaty to fix both those problem...

That Administration and its idealists did this nation a lot of damage. Nor were they very good at either saying what they meant or doing what they said.

[jmm99]

perhaps a dangerous thing; but it does relate to part of the conversation here - and to any number of similar threads. The basic question presented is whether CvC got his "remarkable triangle" right or wrong in describing the primary characteristics of the people and the government.

This is not to question the concept of a triangle composed of the three elements: people, miltary and government; and that they must interface in deciding matters of peace and war. I'm suggesting that CvC got the primary characteristics of the people and the government ass-backwards - at least in the context of the US, past, present and future (if the future follows US history).

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Framework

Here is an example of where I am coming from re: CvC's concepts of the people and government. It simply sets the stage and framework for discussion.

MCDP 1-1 Strategy

pp.31-32

THE TRINITY

This chapter has described the nature of the strategic environment. This environment is defined by the nature of politics and the interactions of political entities that participate in the political process. The strategic environment is complex and subject to the interplay of dynamic and often contradictory factors. Some elements of politics and policy are rational, that is, the product of conscious thought and intent. Other aspects are governed by forces that defy rational explanation. We can discern certain factors that are at work in any strategic situation-the constants and norms-and use them as a framework to help understand what is occurring. At the same time, we realize that each strategic situation is unique and that in order to grasp its true nature, we must comprehend how the character and motivations of each of the antagonists will interact in these specific circumstances.

Summarizing the environment within which war and strategy are made, Clausewitz described it as being dominated by a “remarkable trinity” that is-

composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.[17]

Clausewitz concluded that the strategic environment is shaped by the disparate forces of emotion, chance, and rational thought. At any given moment, one of these forces may dominate, but the other two are always at work. The actual course of events is determined by the dynamic interplay among them. The effective strategist must master the meaning and the peculiarities of this environment.[18]

17. Clausewitz, p. 89. > 3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

18. See Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Parameters (Autumn 1995) pp. 9-19.

For present purposes, I will assume (since I am not an SME there) that his characterization of the military is acceptable.

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Discussion

Coming back to the key passage in CvC, with some inserts from his other passages in the same quote above:

... a “remarkable trinity” .... composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force [JMM: the people - emotion]; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam [JMM: the commander and his army - chance]; and of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone [JMM: the government - rational thought].

CvC obviously had a rather dim view of the people ("primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force"), who presumably were saved from barbaric savagery by government (the "instrument of policy ... subject to reason alone"). Perhaps, that was so in Europe of the early 19th century when he wrote - and during the 18th century which informed his view of the people and government. I doubt it; but that is not my primary argument.

I would suggest that the people are a more immutable segment than government; and that collectively over time are much more subject to reason in favor of the national interest than government. I suggest that, in looking at this segment of the "remarkable triangle", we look to what can be termed the National Character (examples in MCDP 1-1 at pp.23-25), and also its Organic Framework or even its Civil Religion. That Character encompasses, but is not limited to, its overall pattern of laws and customs (which I regard as informal law). The point is that, whatever you call it, the People's Character changes very slowly - measuring change in terms of decades or even centuries (e.g., in basic legal principles, for example; while COL Jones and I will differ in how to treat particular principles in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution, as to their interpretation and implementation in specific cases, we both agree that these are key expressions of the American Character).

Government, particularly as we know it in a democracy, is scarcely immutable. It is subject to the election cycles - and a complete change-over can occur in a 6-year period (an effective change-over in less time). While it is true that the people may go off half-cocked (or become quite insane, as in the French Revolution), the charge is invariably led by politicians who become the new government. One should note that, in the later stages of the French Revolution, the people in effect had enough; thereby allowing Napoleon to re-institute the ancien regime with a new facade (more acceptable to the by-then accepted concepts of liberty, fraternity and equality - but not too much of them).

However, beyond the mutable nature of democratic government in time, another feature of politics and politicians interferes with the concept that government acts with reason and rational thought re: the national interests. This feature is as or more important than governmental rate of change. Politicians tend to act with reason and rational thought - re: their own self-interests - there are exceptions, but I believe they prove the rule.

If I am correct in this line of thought, following CvC's view of the people and government is based on his false premises as to the character of them - and will often yield lousy results, since one will be looking in the wrong place for rationality re: the national interest. Populace-centric formation of strategy ?

[Ken White]

I believe CvC was in his time and place correct in his placement but that many years and a different developmental process have caused the very real mutation which you astutely divined.

People who vote -- or an inordinate fear of them -- cause strange ripples to the governmental process in all democracies. Our errors occur when we try to emulate Europe. Nice folks but we aren't Europeans, there is a slightly different mindset here. Not better, not worse -- just a little different on some things.

Germans are also nice people and a lot of Americans are of German extraction -- no insult to any of them when I say that I have long wished and said that the nascent US should have adopted fewer European ideas and more of the Hodenosaunee or Iroquois governmental practices. Even more so than they did -- particularly that bit wherein the Sachems had to consider the effect of their laws and rulings on to the seventh future generation (though the mind boggles at most of the folks we elect to Congress trying to do that)...

And how much better off we might have been had Thayendanega been the senior instructor at Valley Forge rather then Von Steuben.

(Yes, I know the Revolution would have lasted a bit longer -- but it would've ended the same way. Then the US army might not then have adopted most of European Army bad practice and ignored their good practices which is effectively what we have done...)

[Surferbeetle]

Von Steuben from Wikipedia:

Steuben's training technique was to create a "model company", a group of 120 chosen men who in turn successively trained other personnel at Regimental and Brigade levels. Steuben's eclectic personality greatly enhanced his mystique. He trained the soldiers, who at this point were greatly lacking in proper clothing themselves, in full military dress uniform, swearing and yelling at them up and down in German and French. When that was no longer successful, he recruited Captain Benjamin Walker, his French-speaking aide, to curse at them for him in English. Steuben introduced a system of progressive training, beginning with the school of the soldier, with and without arms, and going through the school of the regiment. This corrected the previous policy of simply assigning personnel to regiments. Each company commander was made responsible for the training of new men, but actual instruction was done by selected sergeants, the best obtainable.

Another program developed by Steuben was camp sanitation. He established standards of sanitation and camp layouts that would still be standard a century and a half later. There had previously been no set arrangement of tents and huts. Men relieved themselves where they wished and when an animal died, it was stripped of its meat and the rest was left to rot where it lay. Steuben laid out a plan to have rows for command, officers and enlisted men. Kitchens and latrines were on opposite sides of the camp, with latrines on the downhill side. There was the familiar arrangement of company and regimental streets.

Perhaps Steuben's biggest contribution to the American Revolution was training in the use of the bayonet. Since the Battle of Bunker Hill, Americans had been mainly dependent upon using their ammunition to win battles. Throughout the early course of the war, Americans used the bayonet mostly as a cooking skewer or tool rather than as a fighting instrument. Steuben's introduction of effective bayonet charges became crucial. In the Battle of Stony Point, American soldiers attacked with unloaded rifles and won the battle solely on Steuben's bayonet training.

Again from wikipedia, Thayendanegea

Thayendanegea or Joseph Brant (c. 1743 – 24 November 1807) was a Mohawk leader and British military officer during the American Revolution. Brant was perhaps the most well-known North American Indian of his generation. He met many of the most significant people of the age, including George Washington and King George III. The American folk image emphasized the wartime atrocities his forces committed against settlers in the Mohawk Valley; in Canada, he was remembered for his efforts to regain land for the Mohawk people.

Brant acted as a tireless negotiator for the Six Nations to control their land without crown oversight or control. He used British fears of his dealings with the Americans and the French to extract concessions. His conflicts with British administrators in Canada regarding tribal land claims were exacerbated by his relations with the American leaders.

Brant was a war chief, and not a hereditary Mohawk sachem. His decisions could and were sometimes overruled by the sachems and clan matrons. However, his natural ability, his early education, and the connections he was able to form made him one of the great leaders of his people and of his time. The situation of the Six Nations on the Grand River was better than that of the Iroquois who remained in New York. His lifelong mission was to help the Indian to survive the transition from one culture to another, transcending the political, social and economic challenges of one the most volatile, dynamic periods of American history. He put his loyalty to the Six Nations before loyalty to the British. His life cannot be summed up in terms of success or failure, although he had known both. More than anything, Brant's life was marked by frustration and struggle.

His attempt to create pan-tribal unity proved unsuccessful, though his efforts would be taken up a generation later by the Shawnee leader Tecumseh.

[Ken White]

than is contained in the quotes or the Wiki articles. I'm also aware of the the fact that Washington elected to fight the British on their own terms and thus Von Steuben was beneficial -- and that Thayendanega was an Indian and they had difficulties with group discipline (but not, more importantly, with self discipline once they were pointed in the right direction). He sided with the British but that was as much due to American intransigence as his earlier relationships.

In any event, that allegory was not really aimed at the persons but at the fact that we adopted European models for many things we do and those were possibly not the best approach for a very independent people.

Way off thread here, to get back on, one could make the case that Indian Strategy was not good, as they sort of lost -- but when one considers the time period involved and the raw numbers on both sides, they really did quite well. My reason for mentioning the Von Steuben / Thayendanega contrast was to make the VonS / CvC link and the point that a lot of German ideas permeated the early US and not all were beneficial. OTOH, Thayendanega was as American as one could possibly be, he took care of his people and he was a smart and principled guy. I believe a happy medium between those two poles -- Europe / Indian -- would have better served us. However, we didn't go that route...

We for years have adopted European strategic concepts and patterns as well as a Eurocentric strategy and I agree with Bob's World that these patterns have not done us any favors.

And JMM has a good dissection of one reason this is possibly so.

[William F. Owen]

If I am correct in this line of thought, following CvC's view of the people and government is based on his false premises as to the character of them - and will often yield lousy results, since one will be looking in the wrong place for rationality re: the national interest. Populace-centric formation of strategy ?

Be a bit careful of jumping to that conclusion. CvC was pretty sceptical of democracy and/or republics, as he saw them work in practice. Best to look back at Thucydides as a strong influence on Clausewitz, were the forces that drive nations or peoples to war, were Fear, Honour, and/or Interest.

CvC was describing the process as an observer. He saw no evidence that people, governments or armies were guided by rational thought - which is why he did not have much time for democracy!

He also had a number of trinities, and they were all context specific. Passion, reason and chance, for example are those he uses to describe the social nature of war.

I would submit that US Foreign Policy post -911 shows CvCs observation, as being correct.

[Ken White]

I would submit that US Foreign Policy post -911 shows CvCs observation, as being correct.

even a scintilla of rational thought to same before 911 -- a highly suspect proposition...

CvC was right, democracies aren't rational -- but Winston was also correct, "“It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.”"

Really, though, that lack of rationality bit is somewhat suspect; I think Democracies are as if not more rational than other forms of government (lacking a particularly wise benevolent ruler) but they do not react as rapidly as do other governmental types and that time lag can give the impression of dithering when it is actually simply time consumed to reach consensus. Regardless, CvC was correct on trinities -- and they are inherently unstable.

And I think JMM is on to something...

[jmm99]

not the Bermuda Triangle (which captured my initial try at this post when at home - and sent it into the ether); but this one:

from Wilf
He also had a number of trinities, and they were all context specific. Passion, reason and chance, for example are those he uses to describe the social nature of war.

which is exactly the "remarkable trinity" quoted in MCDP 1-1 Strategy, and in any number of US doctrinal publications on strategy.

In that "remarkable trinity", the characteristics (using your terms) are primarily associated as follows: "passion" (people), "reason" (government) and "chance" (armies). Or, in CvC's own terms (Howard & Paret translation, which I quoted in my prior post and here numbered for absolute clarity):

... composed [1] of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; [2] of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and [3] of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.

I suggest the foregoing rather clearly establishes that reason ("rational thought" in your words; "rationality" in mine) was associated by CvC with governments - in his theoretical construct, reason cannot be associated with the people who are moved by "blind natural force" - "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity". Nor can "reason" be relied on in the case of commanders and armies because of the element of chance (query: why chaos and complexity theory would not be applicable to peoples and governments as well, but that is a subject matter for another thread).

No doubt that CvC's view of governments was informed by the European governments in place when he wrote (a product of Metternich and Vienna, so quite conservative in tidy boxes) - and those which had shaped Europe since Westphalia. In that construct, the Sovereign was co-terminous with Sovereignty - then, in a very real sense, the ruler was the state. Not that many years before, Louis XIV had stated exactly that.

The salient point of all that is that the government (the ruler and his cabinet) was necessarily composed of statesmen because their objectives and courses of action were the state's objectives and courses of action. The government was the state and defined the national interests. A very simple construct, justified by the realities ca. 1831 Europe.

CvC was also informed (perhaps a better word is "uninformed") as you say:

CvC was pretty sceptical of democracy and/or republics, as he saw them work in practice. Best to look back at Thucydides as a strong influence on Clausewitz, were the forces that drive nations or peoples to war, were Fear, Honour, and/or Interest.

as to which, the first point is simply that the Athenian and Spartan systems of governance were not informative when it came to the system of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Democratic-Republicanism then developing in the US; or to the parliamentary system of democracy developed in the UK after George III lost his grip. The Greek systems are even less informative when it comes to the evolved systems of governance in either the US or UK. In short, CvC was no SME when it came to the interplay between the people, government and the military in modern democracies like the US and UK.

The second point deals with the Thucydidean construct of "fear, honour and/or interest" as factors leading to wars. In CvC's time, whose "fear, honour and/or interests" were critical to the decisions to make war ? The only answer is the ""fears, honour and/or interests" of the statesmen, since they (not the people) decided on the national interests that include those factors.

Now, use of the term "statesmen" has everything to do with those folks being the "deciders" when it came to what they believed was in the national interest. It has nothing to do with whether those statesmen (by the Grace of God, etc.) were competent or not in making those decisions. Since CvC had the decisions of Louis XIV, XV and XVI in front of him, we can fairly infer that he did not believe that all statesmen and their governments were competent.

Moving this up to the present, and back to my initial point, is that there have been substantive changes in US politics since the era of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Democratic-Republicanism (which CvC would have viewed with some distain is a good probability). Crudely stated, we are much more likely to find politicians, rather than statesmen, making national policy decisions.

To introduce some rigor in my terms, by "politicians" I mean persons who practice "politics", the art of getting elected to and remaining in office - often by log rolling legislation and policies which enhance the latter objective. While this has always been true to some extent in US politics, the present practicalities of the election cycles and fund-raising efforts require politicians to be just that - leaving little room for consideration (much less implementation) of the national interests. The vastly quickened media cycle has also added up to politicians being more and more politicians.

Even beyond that, we have seen more and more "professional politicians" in office. That is, the guy or gal who perhaps went to law school (let's say with very high grades, etc.), but then got into politics at the grassroots (say, in community organizing) or by marrying into the governor's mansion. Those folks are indeed SMEs in politics - that is a serious comment; they are good at it and know their profession as well as any professional. But, that does not make them "statespersons".

They, at the highest level, do end up with that mission - to be statespersons faithfully representing the national interests (the "peoples' business" as they are so fond of saying) - until the next election cycle, etc. Perhaps, I am naive, but I believe that Pres. Bush then, and Pres. Obama now, felt and feel that they represented and represent the national interests - as they saw and see them. That situation is, however, qualitatively different from the situation that CvC wrote about.

My suggestion is that the People, collectively and over a longer timeframe, are more likely to get the national interests right, than transitory politicians.

Entirely too long, and somewhat political; but the subject matter of the discussion seemed to require some political sidebars.

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Wilf, this ...

I would submit that US Foreign Policy post -911 shows CvCs observation, as being correct.

looks like an argument heading in a brief. Please feel free to complete the brief; but tell me what CvC observation you are suggesting (he must have made 100s or 1000s of observations); and the facts tying that observation into post-9/11 US foreign policy.

Cheers

Mike