Gun Control in Counterinsurgency

[jmm99]

They keep; I Know

from this:

from Dayuhan
The populace is heavily and illegally armed, but the weapons are not displayed. The police are local people and are not going to do a thing about it. Military forces know the guns are there but as long as the guns aren't used against them they pretend not to know: they've no desire to stick their heads back into that particular hornet's nest. So the deal is basically that the locals will keep the guns under wraps and not shoot soldiers as long as the soldiers stay low profile and avoid confronting civilians. It mostly works, though it's not ideal.

They are my police (I'm the district civil affairs officer) and indirectly my military. Now, if you're telling me that my cops and troopers won't tell me what they know, then we're into a different problem.

Sounds to me that what you have is a pretty good solution. The local population in effect is its own power center, with its own armed force, so that, at the least, it has something of a Mexican standoff (the Magnificant Seven x2) with both the government and insurgents.[*]

So, this district officer would not rock the boat, but would want to know as closely as possible what potentially harmful stuff is out there. Patience and time would yield those answers - the python who slithers, not the bull who stomps. It would also help if the district officer is at least something close to local - and not some knucklehead born and raised in the capital's suburbia.

Outsiders ?

Which takes me here:

from Dayuhan
To illustrate my point above... back in 1988 a group of drunk soldiers fired weapons in the town center here and killed 2 kids, one 2 years old, one 11. Nobody was prosecuted or punished. 20 years have not chilled that memory one bit. My wife still feels very uncomfortable in the presence of anyone from the Philippine military, and most of the populace feels the same way. If the people who shot your kids (it's a tribal society, the kids of one are the kids of all) come around wanting to know how many guns you have, will you tell them?

Were the soldiers (and their Os and NCOs) outsiders ? I could relate to that if a bunch of Trolls (them that live under the Bridge; it being the Mackinac Bridge) were sent up here to garrison us Yoopers. Obviously, my solution (as the fictional district officer) would be different (both preventative and reprobative) than what occured in your town in 1988.

I suggest that, where the folks that represent the government are "outsiders" (wherever the locals draw that line), those folks (1) are very similar to an occupying foreign force; and (2) are practicing what is in effect foreign COIN - as we did in Iraq, and are in Astan, by being the lead sled dog.

So, the ideal is to have locals involved, as Giap had in SVN ca. 1959-1965. By the end of that time, he'd run through about 100K of his Southern-born military and political cadres; and had to use more and more Northern-born PAVN. That did have an adverse effect on the VC (although other factors also entered the picture).

Interesting discussion for me (although I'm a poor fiction writer). I'd say our views are probably similar; but, of course, not in lockstep - which would be no fun at all.

Regards

Mike

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[*] Illustrating the practical effect of an armed citizenry, keeping and bearing arms - something that appeals to this libertarian for more than esoteric legal and political theories.

[Dayuhan]

Hopefully they'll come up with a pistol to their temple. This is the whole point of allowing the common man to be armed. All the farmer need do is present the weapon to said Taliban center-mass areas, pull the trigger, rinse, and repeat as necessary.

Unless village action is collective, large-scale, and sustained to the point that it deters future intimidation, using a personal weapon against the Taliban seems likely to result in larger-scale retribution. Indeed, from an insurgent point of view, it would be essential to make the point that "resistance is futile." Unless counter-insurgent forces have sufficient presence and response time to prevent it, the insurgents control the "escalatory ladder." (This is probably why some of the more successful cases of village self-defence in Afghanistan occur near coalition forces or where there are embedded SF teams.

I think Rex is right on this one. There are good and obvious reasons why an armed farmer wouldn’t want to bring his weapon along on his daily rounds. The Taliban get to show up where and when they choose, and if there are 5 or 10 or 20 armed Taliban and one armed farmer it’s not likely that the farmer would be presenting his weapon to the center-mass area of the Taliban. More likely the farmer would have to choose between contributing his weapon to the Taliban arsenal and fertilizing the field of his sons. The gun is likely to stay home, where it gives its owner the option of banding together with similarly armed neighbors to fight as a group if it’s necessary to do so.

Canada actually has somewhat higher levels of interpersonal trust than the US, suggesting that while we think you're less likely to use a handgun in a bad way, we are also less likely to think you should have one in the first place.

The desire of a populace to hold weapons is not necessarily proportional to perceived threat or trust. In some cultures it’s simply expected that a man will have weapons and know how to use them, whether or not there’s an immediate threat and whether or not police and security forces are generally adequate.

They are my police (I'm the district civil affairs officer) and indirectly my military. Now, if you're telling me that my cops and troopers won't tell me what they know, then we're into a different problem.

Again, based on the actual realities in areas with insurgency issues, that’s a problem you’re quite likely to have.

Again looking at my area, the cops and the military know there are plenty of guns out there, but they do not know exactly who has them or where they are… and they aren’t going to start asking, lest they find themselves on the receiving end of that well-stashed arsenal.

Sounds to me that what you have is a pretty good solution. The local population in effect is its own power center, with its own armed force, so that, at the least, it has something of a Mexican standoff with both the government and insurgents.

It’s an adequate solution. Essentially the communities have agreed to accept the nominal authority of the national government, as long as that government doesn’t press to make that authority actual.

So, this district officer would not rock the boat, but would want to know as closely as possible what potentially harmful stuff is out there. Patience and time would yield those answers - the python who slithers, not the bull who stomps. It would also help if the district officer is at least something close to local - and not some knucklehead born and raised in the capital's suburbia.

In this case “as closely as possible” would mean accepting that there’s enough stuff around to make a major mess, that you don’t know where it is or who has it, and that you can’t find out without provoking a major mess. It helps in our case that the communities are tribal societies with effective methods for internal dispute resolution, which means there’s little likelihood of the guns being used unless the community as a whole sees itself as threatened.

Were the soldiers (and their Os and NCOs) outsiders ? I could relate to that if a bunch of Trolls (them that live under the Bridge; it being the Mackinac Bridge) were sent up here to garrison us Yoopers. Obviously, my solution (as the fictional district officer) would be different (both preventative and reprobative) than what occured in your town in 1988.

I suggest that, where the folks that represent the government are "outsiders" (wherever the locals draw that line), those folks (1) are very similar to an occupying foreign force; and (2) are practicing what is in effect foreign COIN - as we did in Iraq, and are in Astan, by being the lead sled dog.

Yes, they were outsiders, and you’re right, they were (and are) viewed largely as a foreign occupying force.

We don’t have district officers, of course; we have locally elected Mayors and Governors. Police and military forces are answerable to a national “outsider” chain of command, though in the case of the police, who are mostly locals, actual affinity in practical terms is more with traditional tribal governance. The military chain of command and the local power structure have a somewhat uneasy relationship.

I realize that in your hypothetical situation you would not condone or tolerate abuse of the populace. My point was that given the realities of most places with active insurgencies you would probably have to deal with the legacy of events that happened before you arrived… and that trust once broken is difficult to restore.

[jmm99]

No doubt:

from Dayuhan
I realize that in your hypothetical situation you would not condone or tolerate abuse of the populace. My point was that given the realities of most places with active insurgencies you would probably have to deal with the legacy of events that happened before you arrived… and that trust once broken is difficult to restore.

where the "legacy of events" shortly or long past (consider No. Ireland) determine the present; and that lack of trust (lack of "legitimacy") (lack of "good governance"), for whatever reason(s) and attribution or not of particular fault, underlie discontent growing into the level of violence that becomes unacceptable.

So what ? You still have to find an acceptable way to deal with the problem(s).

I suppose that one possible way would be to always walk away from the problem(s) - "Walk away, Dryden. Walk away. Always walking away, aren't you?"

So, what are your positive suggestions ?

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

So, what are your positive suggestions ?

And relinquish my role as eternal pessimist??

Ok, assuming your populace is armed and intends to remain armed, the real question is whether or not those arms pose an immediate threat to you and to your plans. If they do, my best suggestion would be to walk away or change sides. If not, I say agree to ignore. Let it be known quietly that as long as personal arms aren't used against you or in criminal activity, you're not interested.

Registration creates the impression of an intrusive presence that wants to hold the option of confiscation, and is likely to add to distrust and suspicion. It doesn't even gain much: the guns will still be out there, and the chances are the vast majority will never be registered, turning ordinary citizens into at least rule-breakers, if not outright criminals. I just don't see how it gets you anywhere.

[Ken White]

Getting involved in gun control efforts in another nation is wasted effort...

Ignore them (the guns in the hands of civilians). If they stay neutral, all's well. If they get turned on your opponents, you're ahead. If they get turned on you they are unlikely to do more than superficial damage and you can kill the shooters.

[Rifleman]

Getting involved in gun control efforts in another nation is wasted effort...

Ignore them (the guns in the hands of civilians). If they stay neutral, all's well. If they get turned on your opponents, you're ahead. If they get turned on you they are unlikely to do more than superficial damage and you can kill the shooters.

Best post of the thread.

[Backwards Observer]

It's becoming clear that Asimov's psychohistory reflects an undoubtable truth that all the world's different social networks interact in multiple ways to generate a single future. From people to corporations, cities to governments, all the pieces of society must mesh. What appears to be the madness of crowds must ultimately have a method, a method that science can discover.

From a brief article on Asimov's meshing of psychology and math in Foundation for those who have an interest.

Asimov's 'Foundation' theories on society move from fiction to academia - Jewish World Review, July 16, 2004.

[jmm99]

and makes no sense being an eternal optimist. [*]

Buying in part, not buying in part, as to this:

from Dayuhan
Ok, assuming your populace is armed and intends to remain armed, the real question is whether or not those arms pose an immediate threat to you and to your plans. [1] If they do, my best suggestion would be to walk away or change sides. [2] If not, I say agree to ignore. Let it be known quietly that as long as personal arms aren't used against you or in criminal activity, you're not interested.

[rationale for 2] Registration creates the impression of an intrusive presence that wants to hold the option of confiscation, and is likely to add to distrust and suspicion. It doesn't even gain much: the guns will still be out there, and the chances are the vast majority will never be registered, turning ordinary citizens into at least rule-breakers, if not outright criminals. I just don't see how it gets you anywhere.

Taking point [1], if an armed force poses an immediate threat to me and if I have the means to overcome that armed force, my morals and ethics (as well as law) suggests that, all else being equal, shoot center mass - and there will no longer be an immediate threat. There may be reasons (besides my inferiority in opposing force) to withdraw in the face of an immediate hostile armed force, but I better have worked that out before the immediate threat develops.

From how you describe the community, it will remain neutral so long as its semi-autonomy is respected. OK with me; so long as the neutrality is genuine and I am not dealing with a Laos-Cambodia situation on my flanks (which is somewhat akin to what Jon Custis described with his villagers).

So, situation [1] (an immediate hostile armed force) is not likely to come from your community, but from either the insurgents or criminals.

I can't argue with your [rationale for 2] cuz I believe pretty much the same thing. Someone else will have to dispute that point. BTW: Knowing who has what firearms and/or munitions does not have to involve a formal, overt process.

Now how would you go about getting information about the firearms and/or munitions held by the insurgents and criminals, who are very likely to be an immediate hostile armed force against me (and possibly against the otherwise neutral community) ?

Regards

Mike

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[*]

If you're not a commie at age 20,
you have no heart.
If you're still a commie at age 30,
you have no brain.

[Dayuhan]

Buying in part, not buying in part, as to this:

Taking point [1], if an armed force poses an immediate threat to me and if I have the means to overcome that armed force, my morals and ethics (as well as law) suggests that, all else being equal, shoot center mass - and there will no longer be an immediate threat. There may be reasons (besides my inferiority in opposing force) to withdraw in the face of an immediate hostile armed force, but I better have worked that out before the immediate threat develops.

Minor misunderstanding... when I said this:

assuming your populace is armed and intends to remain armed, the real question is whether or not those arms pose an immediate threat to you and to your plans. If they do, my best suggestion would be to walk away or change sides.

I meant that if the armed populace is a hostile force, better to not be there. If you assume an armed force external to the populace, the situation changes... but that would not require you to manage arms held by the populace.

From how you describe the community, it will remain neutral so long as its semi-autonomy is respected. OK with me; so long as the neutrality is genuine and I am not dealing with a Laos-Cambodia situation on my flanks (which is somewhat akin to what Jon Custis described with his villagers).

The degree of neutrality may be difficult to assess, but trying to collect or register community-held weapons is likely to tip that balance in favor of your opponent.

BTW: Knowing who has what firearms and/or munitions does not have to involve a formal, overt process.

Possibly not... but my guess is that as soon as you start asking questions, everybody is going to know, and that doing it covertly may raise more suspicion than doing it overtly.

Now how would you go about getting information about the firearms and/or munitions held by the insurgents and criminals, who are very likely to be an immediate hostile armed force against me (and possibly against the otherwise neutral community) ?

Assuming that the insurgent or criminal force is external to the community, that's a completely different problem, no? More an intel issue than a community relations issue, posing a whole different set of problems with solutions entirely dependent on local context. If we want to keep focused on arms held by the populace, I have to agree with Ken's comment:

Ignore them (the guns in the hands of civilians). If they stay neutral, all's well. If they get turned on your opponents, you're ahead. If they get turned on you they are unlikely to do more than superficial damage and you can kill the shooters.

You will have to accept that some members of the community may be sympathetic to the insurgents, or may be insurgents. Given your original scenario:

My district is a contested district, with insurgent main forces neutralized (killed, captured or converted*) or split into smaller size groups which can be handled by paramilitary police units.

it would seem that the insurgency is in a state of decline, and it would seem to me that your best move would be to try and sustain the rate of decline, rather than trying to stomp out the remaining insurgency all at once by tracking down insurgents or sympathizers and going all kinetic on them, which might easily just get things flaring up again. That would mean fighting armed core insurgents when you can find them outside of population centers, while simultaneously trying to address the root causes of the insurgency and provide incentives for part time insurgents to give up the fight.


*converted insurgents, managed carefully, would likely be your best source of intel on the remaining insurgents.

[jmm99]

survives the first round, even if it's a blank.

What has been added is a large population, armed but nominally neutral unless its ox is gored by someone. They seem not to be sheep. If they present a problem, it would seem to be a political problem; that is, they don't want the central government there.

The insurgents and criminals would be fringe elements, presenting a military or paramilitary problem only to whoever has to deal with them.

What are the reasons for the central government to be so interested in this area - so that it has to deal with insurgents, criminals and concerns about firearms and munitions ?

What reasons (if any) are there for the central government and the local population to cooperate on issues - if so what are the co-operative areas (what are the win-wins) ?

I'm a lousy fiction writer.

Cheers

Mike