FOB Keating attack repulsed

[MikeF]

Mike,

You and I had very similar experiences in Iraq. I had a patrol base in a very bad area attacked VBIED which wounded four only 48h after establishing it. We established a second (structure was unsat after the bomb) nearby and carried forward. Two months later sector was secure - zero attacks. So my initial reaction was the same as yours. I would normally agree but my studies have led me to conclude that these are very different contexts.

I've been reading about and talking to lots of guys stationed in this area - here's the difference:

1) Locals are Afghan equivilants of hillbillies who don't like *any* foreigners. These are not urbane, (comparitively) civilized Iraqis of Diyala.

2) We don't posess enough force to be credible. It would take many more troops to even begin to impose our will on the population. The police were obviously unable to stand up for themselves and more importantly we couldn't protect them. Even if we did have the force, right now the pressing need is to turn the tide in places like Khost, Gardez, Herat, and Kandahar, where the Taliban is threatening once completely safe areas.

3) The only way to operate here is by CH-47 resuppy at night - because of the threat. Wedidn't face a (significantly) vulnerable supply line in Iraq, where a well planned enemy attack could negate your ability to CASEVAC and resuppy.

4) Taliban has freedom of movement and family ties in the population. This is home turf. Unlike Iraq, the insurgents aren't unpopular or bringing a foreign ideology. In Iraq the majority of people wanted return to "normal" - meaning security. The Afghans in this area just want us the hell out and to be left alone. Big difference.

5) The amount of force required to "fight it out" there is an opportunity cost. Even if we apply extra support and succeed - the population there isn't decisive to the overall campaign in any way - it doesn't influence or move any other group. Security in Nuristan won't likely have spillover effects anywhere else because of physical and logistical isolation from the rest of the country. It would be similar to expecting the security/perception of NYC to be changed based on how well you did COIN in West Virginia. No linkages to the center of Afghanistan. If the goal is to keep AQIZ attritted, there are better ways to do that than operating out of fixed, vulnerable outposts.

Given that the major cities are under heavy threat, the resources (in my opinion) dedicated to maintaining these outposts would be better applied in more strategically vital area than endless battle in an area with very little (if any) prospects of success.

I think the location/culture/context of this particular place and area make it different, from my current understanding. As always, I stand ready to be challenged.

Niel,

You maybe right. I'm suggesting holding it through the winter. Here's my thoughts (double-tapping from the front page). As far as resourcing goes, I'm sure we could muster 500 soldiers from the Green Beans, internet cafes, and gyms of the Big FOBs.

During the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), then COL Bruce Clark arrived at St. Vith, a key junction for track and motorized units, to find an American Army confused, panicking, and some retreating. He took charge, assembling infantrymen, tankers, cooks, and mechanics, establishing a hasty defense, he held St. Vith for several days until Patton's 3rd Army showed up. His actions proved decisive in the overall battle.

I think his actions apply- here's why.

In one of the articles I read (Foust I think), shadow governments, training camps, and denied areas were suggested. Additionally, we know it's a gateway for fighters coming from Pakistan. (Nuristan could be more important than we think).

If we leave now, then we're likely to return to an area scorched by Taliban reprisals. In some areas, entire villages will be wiped out. The locals will never forgive us.

If we stay and reinforce for another two months, we achieve victory as we head into the winter months and large-scale offensives are minimized until spring. We can use that time to dismantle the local shadow gov't and training camps AND muster support from the locals.

Then, we can re-evaluate the situation and determine if the area requires more or less force. If we need to reposition, we can leave proclaiming the Taliban/AQ were too cowardly to fight.

v/r

Mike