What Was Old Becomes New
When I look at the image in the link below I can't imagine why TRADOC would be averse to the idea of presenting more instruction on the construction of field fortifications. If I recall correctly the original Fort Monroe was designed by a French officer of engineers who found himself unemployed after the battle of Waterloo.
http://lh5.ggpht.com/_vXzyHAWg2g8/Ry...ian+Aerial.gif
Building fortifications are sort of what our combatt engineers are for, eh?Originally Posted by Pete
When I look at the image in the link below I can't imagine why TRADOC would be averse to the idea of presenting more instruction on the construction of field fortifications. If I recall correctly the original Fort Monroe was designed by a French officer of engineers who found himself unemployed after the battle of Waterloo.
http://lh5.ggpht.com/_vXzyHAWg2g8/Ry...ian+Aerial.gif
Let's say a COP is built That affords proximity to a village/town of a few kilometers. What does it really do for us, the counterinsurgent?
Last edited by jcustis; 02-07-2010 at 04:39 AM.
Jon, my posting of that image was a bit of horsing around on my part--it's Fort Monroe, Virginia, the current headquarters of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The old fort was designed by a French engineer officer, Simon Bernard, who had earlier been Napoleon's aide-de-camp. The Army will soon vacate the installation and the old fort will be taken over by the National Park Service.
The building of fortifications is indeed a combat engineer mission, but the decision on whether or not to build them and site selection are made by maneuver commanders. What these outposts do as a minimum is provide a relatively safe place for soldiers to sleep in when they're not out patrolling as well as provide a location for command and control and the storage of supplies and equipment. In the real world most of the construction is often done by the unit that will be occupying the position, so it would make sense if fundamentals like good fields of fire and observation were taken into account before positions are dug. That's why I think a few hours of instruction on the basic principles of field fortification would be a good idea in schools for junior officers.
Last edited by Pete; 02-07-2010 at 06:09 AM. Reason: Reword a sentence
PeteNot something you can learn in a few hours, but training and education in this subject is essential and always has been.That's why I think a few hours of instruction on the basic principles of field fortification would be a good idea in schools for junior officers.
How long does it take to train a Mortar Platoon Commander? Well learning how to site and construct FOBs/COPs takes way more skill than commanding a mortar platoon. Siting and construction is really something that should include formation level staffs.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
You're right, Wilf, but as I said a bit earlier in the thread defensive operations seem to go against the American way of war. Field fortification is a relatively neglected subject outside of combat engineer circles.
I am scratching my head right now because I am not seeing all the difficulty of which you guys are speaking.
If I'm going to position a COP, I conduct a leader's reconnaissance with ASCOPE in mind for the "C" in METT-TC, look at the task requirements (is it a laager for patrols only, a semi-permanent site for PRT and USAID enablers, etc.?) and consider the basic defensive position requirements. inherent in any static defense.
It is not like were are making water here guys, but rather more along the lines of constructing a patrol harbor site with direct fire barriers and some IDF protection, but that's pretty much it. What is so difficult that a basically trained officer can't open a pub with a few technical drawings detailing dimensions, and get started, even if he is not an engineer?
Engineers can tell us the calculated time to construct a COP based on soil composition and HESCO fill rates, but once you work a few barriers, the rest are really very easy to deal with.
Now, if I had to incorporate a Taco Bell Express into the site, that might take a bit more work, but it appears that Gen McChrystal has taken care of that with a directive that the AAFES oxygen-stealing largesse of chain restaurant crap in Afghanistan is bring terminated within the next 90 days.
Jon, it ain't rocket science, but the engagements at COP Keating and Wanat as well as the photos Ken White posted above show that some of these fortifications leave a lot to be desired. By the way, did you attend Bates College? I ran across your name on a college newsletter when I Googled your fire team article. I have family in the Bangor area.
Last edited by Pete; 02-07-2010 at 07:15 AM.
Yup, they left a lot to be desired, and I would offer the counterpoint that despite any knowledge base, a degree of give a f*ck and follow-through is still required to make designs, hopes, and wishes a reality. Either that or there was a striking reliance on fire superiority to win the day should any attack come.
A brief review of youtube videos posted by the various units to rotate through COP Keating show some pretty impressive displays of firepower being sprayed into the hills, but to what effect?
With just a little bit more coordination and smarts in a few areas, the bad guys are going to start to really negate our advantages in air-delivered fires. It's a tangent, but watching those videos made me sit back and rub my chin. Due to the mission behind COP Keating (locating the local PRT, from what I have read IIRC), there were probably few other suitable locations in the first place, so the answer seems to lie less in what they should have done to improve the position, and more in what could have been done to mitigate the inherent limitations. A lot more troops dedicate to patrolling the surroundings immediately come to mind.
And yes, I did attend Bates. Batman doesn't normally reveal the location to the Bat Cave, but you guys are slowly whittling down what anonymity does exist out there for me. ; )
Last edited by jcustis; 02-07-2010 at 07:29 AM.
Thank you. You are either well-sited or you aren't. If you aren't well sited for whatever reason (as Wilf alludes to) then you best take measures to offset that disadvantage (an OP comes to mind).
Really - good to hear, although you wouldn't know it from wandering around KAF. The TGI Fridays - a sit-down restaurant for 300 people - just opened and they have something else going up beside it.Now, if I had to incorporate a Taco Bell Express into the site, that might take a bit more work, but it appears that Gen McChrystal has taken care of that with a directive that the AAFES oxygen-stealing largesse of chain restaurant crap in Afghanistan is bring terminated within the next 90 days.
I think that's only half the equation. Galula mentioned "Mobile Forces" and "Static Forces" and the requirement for both. Having freedom to maneuver (the "Heat" principle of never getting involved with anything that you can't get away from in 5 minutes - that movie rocked) and being a roving death machine is cool, but it doesn't get you far with the population you are trying to "counterinsurge" when they know you'll be gone in 24 hours and the insurgent will be back with his knives out when you leave.Truth in lending...I do not support the notion that distributed COPs are the answer, and tend to side with the idea that we can do better with temporary coils when re-arm/refit is required, but keep our forces highly mobile and at a state of alert and readiness that allows for fast response to any threats that might cause surprise. Operations should be centered around patrolling as the active measure of defense, not as much as digging in. Pick the coil up and move it to another patch of dirt the next night, and so on. I think this can fit portions of the Afghanistan terrain fairly well, and can be sustained indefinitely, regardless whether it is LAV, HMMWV, MRAp (ugh...) or dismounted based.
Is this what General Sherman was talking about?
From The Times, London, March 30, 2010:
To read the entire article click here.No longer will the fighter pilots at Bagram or Kandahar airfields be able to ring Pizza Hut to deliver. Once General McChrystal has his way, the Whoppers will be off the menu: Burger Kings at both locations are to close. Even the newly opened TGI Friday’s on the boardwalk in Kandahar is to close its doors once its contract expires.
“This is a war zone, not an amusement park,” wrote Command Sergeant-Major Michael T. Hall in a military blog.
I don't follow the logic here. Why should military men in a war zone not have access to some good old junk food and the odd beer at the appropriate time? Any fool can be and make others uncomfortable. I would ask these people to provide three or even one good reason why this has a negative impact on military performance. We came back to a warm shower, a beer and a plate for hot food. Now if we had the choice as to whether we wanted a burger or whatever it would have made it a whole lot better.
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