McMaster on war (merged thread)

[Ken White]

...I don't disagree at all with the above. However, in the end, Saddam's attempts at an unconventional strategy and use of unconventional forces to defend Iraq and his regime failed spectacularly.

Did they? We're still there and I'm quite sure that was not the original US plan...

Col. McMaster is completely correct about the limits of surveillance and technology against unconventional forces, but they proved very useful against his conventional forces.

Well, I see no RMA invovled in any of that or Afghanistan -- or in Iran, come to that. Absolutely none. As for 'transformation' I see none, really; what I do see is technological progress at an accelerated rate (compared to historical change) being adapted -- and that not as well or as rapidly as I would wish. So I guess we have a definition discrepancy more than a disagreement.

Sure, but the case he points out was Iran - what force structure will help us coerce, deter them? One more focused on LIC/COIN or one more focused on HIC?

Any fight with Iran will absolutely require both and thus both capabilities would seem required to effectively deter.

Ironically, it was after what appeared to be the complete success of OIF in mid-2003 that Iran put forward a tentative offer for a grand rapprochement with the US.

One of many over the years. Having served in Iran long ago, i've watched it pretty closely over the years. They're as good as North Korea at playing the US and they constantly approach and scuttle away. They're good at it; haggling is national sport...

...And of course there was the political pressure to act sooner which, IMO, also helped push the plan toward using locals.

Too true, that.

[Entropy]

So I guess we have a definition discrepancy more than a disagreement.

Yes, I think you're right here. That's the trouble with so much Pentagon and think-tank speak.

[h2harris]

FCS, “Transformation” Wrong Path: Top Army Brain
By Greg Grant Wednesday, October 22nd, 2008 4:21 am
Posted in Land, Policy

Two distinct groups are emerging in the Army with quite different views on the nature of future wars the U.S. is likely to fight and the decisions the service should make about future force structure and weapons. The first group is the Title 10 side that urges the Army to embrace the troubled Future Combat Systems program and new operational concepts built around dominant battlefield intelligence. The other side is represented by officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan who think future wars will resemble the messy reality of the current ones.

In a new paper, Army Col. H.R. McMaster, definitely a member of the messy war group, calls for abandoning so-called transformation, which is intellectually rooted in the idea of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). McMaster, of 73 Easting and Tal Afar fame, is a highly influential soldier-scholar who is currently putting together a brain trust for Gen. David Petraeus to review U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Continuation at: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2008/10/22/fc...op-army-brain/

[Ron Humphrey]

I think Mr Collins had it right back in 85, As you get better in one type of fight the threshold for a different type of fight is lowered. Would seem to reason as wel for HIC/LIC, CONV/COIN, whatever as it did for Conv/Nuclear

In that that doesn't mean either type won't happen just seems that it's all the more important to figure out just what "Balanced" looks like and get to working on it.

[Entropy]

Was doing a bit of reading over at DID where they linked McMaster's article along with this one from 2006 that I hadn't read before and found quite interesting. It examines RMA and "transformation" developments during the inter-war years in Germany and France which I think are important to consider today. Some excerpts:

With the benefit of hindsight, France's preparations for war with Germany are an easy target of critique. It is another matter, however, to derive guidelines that might reliably help us avoid errors in our present efforts to envision future war and prepare for it. In fact, French planners conformed in a general way to dictums that are today supposed to help planners avoid obvious mistakes. They sought to "learn the lessons of the last war" and not prepare to re-fight it. But for the dominant clique in French leadership this meant resisting the "cult of the offensive" that had sent millions to their deaths against barbed wire and artillery during the Great War.

This disposition did not imply the abandonment of offensive capabilities and operations altogether. But it did place emphasis on defensive preparations and defensive operations in the opening stages of war as a way of buying time and setting the stage for a subsequent counter-offensive. This approach also accorded with the French leadership's assessment of what types of support it might expect from its allies, how much, when, and under what circumstances. In other words, France's strategic disposition reflected its view of its strategic circumstances.

Drawing useful lessons from the experience of interwar force developments and their subsequent application requires that we relinquish the privilege of hindsight. The question is: What might the historic players have done differently given what they knew at the time? And, moreover: Can their mistaken choices be structurally associated with predispositions that others might avoid? In other words, can we identify a "character flaw" in their planning or execution?

As noted above, the case of the French air force warns against the politicalization of RMA efforts, while also suggesting that service interests can distort RMA development. The troubled experience of French ground force development illustrates how tying an RMA vision closely to a particular strategic disposition (as though one entails the other), can cloud the appreciation of operational opportunities.

The German case points to how a nation's strategic disposition can disable the perception of operational limits. The contours of the new synthesis in land warfare were not fully drawn until Kursk. Before this, what the Germans saw was how a particular instantiation of the new synthesis might resolve, at least temporarily, a particular operational impasse. What the Russians saw subsequently was how the synthesis might be applied to spoil the German solution. What the French saw was neither.

None of the provisos outlined above promise a way to reliably surmount the problem of RMA uncertainty, of course. At best, they flag some predispositions that can distort the development and application of new capabilities. As always, the real challenge is applying the precepts to entirely novel circumstances.

The entire thing is well worth a read.

[Ken White]

This, in particular is worthy of being burned in the memories of many people:

First, we can somewhat mitigate RMA uncertainty by means of extensive, independent, and competitive experimentation, field trials, and exercises - both single service and joint. We also can seek to sharpen the debate among competing RMA schools, service visions, and branch perspectives - while insulating these from partisan politics and commercial interests.

Second, despite our best efforts, a substantial degree of uncertainty will persist; the only decisive test of vision is war. This humbling fact argues for avoiding over-commitment during periods of great strategic uncertainty, retaining flexibility, and developing our facilities for rapid adaptation. Adaptation is best served by substantial equipment and unit prototyping, which would offer multiple potential paths of development. Also useful is modularization of capabilities, units, and training regimes - an approach that allows rapid change through "add-ons" and supplemental training. (emphasis added, both / kw)

Third, pervasive uncertainty tends to strengthen the position of the status quo, especially during periods of significant strategic change. For institutional reasons, the default position may be to extend the status quo into the future. However, this is not a neutral position. When the world is changing rapidly the preservation (or recapitalization) of the status quo involves a "future vision" as risky and open to question as any - if not more so.

Finally, "uncertainty" by itself does not constitute a strong rationale for either sitting still or moving decisively down a new path. It lends positive support only to efforts to reduce uncertainty or improve our capacity to react, recover, and respond to surprise (that is, to adapt).

All simple basic common sense -- and all far too often ignored totally due to egos and agendas.

That I underlined is harsh reality, that I placed in bold type is the only way to preclude not being prepared for that reality; one or the other will not work -- we have to be able to do either/or. Or even 'whatever'...

[Bill Moore]

Policy and Strategy Must Determine Force Development
U.S. force development should be driven by how our forces might be employed to protect vital national interests. Prior to 9/11, “capabilities-based” defense analysis reinforced shallow thinking about war and disconnected war from policy and strategy. The belief that surveillance and information technology could lift the fog of war elevated a desired military capability to the level of strategy. After 9/11, military operations were not clearly subordinated to comprehensive plans that aimed to achieve policy goals and objectives.

I think this excerpt from BG McMaster's article captured the essence of the problem. This article combined with Robert Jone's article in SWJ, "Populace Centric Engagement" help paint a picture that points to one Sun Tzu's cautions, "tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008...engagement.php

We are not struggling in this conflict due to the technological gains resulting of RMA, but rather because we tended to perceive war in a new way, or more simply we tried to model conflict to fit our preconceived technological solutions to it. Quite simply we created a lie. The technological gains have allowed us to be wildly successful at the tactical level, but tactical successes do not always equate to strategic success. BG McMaster's assessment that the capabilities approach to RMA reinforced shallow thinking about war and disconnected it from policy is spot on. RMA methodology has reinforced myths about war, but the question remains is a capabilities approach the wrong approach to drive technological evolution of our military forces? I don't think we know what the future will look like, and developing capabilities to address a wide range of potential threats is prudent, but a capability is not a strategy, it is simply a tool in the tool box. Perhaps the only revolution we need is in our military professional develop curriculum?