View Poll Results: Evaluate Kilcullen's work on counterinsurgency

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  • Brilliant, useful

    26 45.61%
  • Interesting, perhaps useful

    26 45.61%
  • Of little utility, not practical

    1 1.75%
  • Delusional

    4 7.02%
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Thread: The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

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  1. #1
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I'd see that 100% in reverse. 3-24 is a "COIN" manual, and that is why it is a woeful publication. It views COIN as a distinct form of military/non-military activity. That is rubbish.
    An Irregular Warfare manual, would be useful and would be written in an entirely different way. 3-24 is not an "Irregular Warfare" manual by any stretch.
    So called "COIN" manuals have to be theatre specific. -which is why the UK never issued one, until they tried to copy the US, and wrote one.
    Woeful compared to what? At the time it meet the need for Iraq and is a big step up from other 'COIN" pubs from the same time e.g. those from Canada and Australia.

    Distinct from what? The mil/non-mil mix is more disitnct in COIN/CIT/CIA than it is conventional force-on-force conflict e.g. the good old Fulda gap. I'm not sure which COIN campaigns you have been following but which did not have a strong mil/non-mil mix? Possibly the Soviet ones in Hungary and Czechoslovakia which were, admittedly successful...

    Irregular Warfare is not COIN and vice versa...if anything they might be different sides of the same coin (no pun intended) - that manual that Slap posted is a good read and may serve to illustrate the difference. 3-24 never attempted to present itself as an IW manual and nor should it because it is not - there, we agree on something perhaps...

    Yes, there should be theatre/campaign-specific manual produced for each campaign/conflict (uh-oh, agreement again) - our rule of thumb was/is that this should be produced no later than the force generation for the first rotation force to relieve the initial intervention/lodgement force (don't think you can count on the lead time to have this ready before the first lodgement). But that each campaign will have its own unique characteristics does not mean that a more generic higher level, broader focus COIN/CIT/CIA (perhaps all three in a perfect world) manual can not and should not be produced. If nothing else it could start by detailing the differences between COIN/CIT/CIA and the conventional force on force state v state conflict most of us were brought up to deal with, at least until those who were the coy and bn commanders in 03/04 are the 2 and 3 stars of the future.

    The UK did produce COIN manuals and quite good ones well before FM 3-24 every appeared on the scene - I don't have my notes to hand so can't real them off but some of them were part of the Review, as was some Aussie 60s doctrine derived from the UK that was pretty fine as well - supporting the statement elsewhere in this thread that way we wrote about these topics 40-50 years ago was at least as good and possibly better than how we do it now.

  2. #2
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by SJPONeill View Post
    Woeful compared to what? At the time it meet the need for Iraq and is a big step up from other 'COIN" pubs from the same time e.g. those from Canada and Australia.
    Woeful as in not needed, overly long, complicated and not useful.
    Distinct from what? The mil/non-mil mix is more disitnct in COIN/CIT/CIA than it is conventional force-on-force conflict e.g. the good old Fulda gap.
    COIN is not a distinct form or warfare. Fighting an insurgency requires the application of military force. How that force is applied is in the context of Irregular War, not in a "COIN" context. It is very doubtful if the idea of "COIN" as it is currently touted actually withstands any rigour at all.
    The UK did produce COIN manuals and quite good ones well before FM 3-24 every appeared on the scene - .
    Yes, but they were theatre specific. The CATOM for example was for use only in Malaya. -which is why Kitson was forced to write "Low Intensity Operations" in September 1970, precisely because the UK Staff Collage lacked a viable publication on the issue.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  3. #3
    Council Member Chris jM's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Woeful as in not needed, overly long, complicated and not useful.
    Would you extend this description to FM3-24.2 Tactics In Counter-Insurgency, as well?

    http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cointacticsfm.pdf
    '...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
    Donald Kagan

  4. #4
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Chris jM View Post
    Would you extend this description to FM3-24.2 Tactics In Counter-Insurgency, as well?

    http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cointacticsfm.pdf
    Still flawed, but its a great deal more useful. It has to be asked, how come it's a different manual?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  5. #5
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    It has to be asked, how come it's a different manual?
    for 'doctrine writers.' Plus it beefs up the printing, warehousing, distribution and other staffing and budgeting arguments...

    We now do process. Not products.

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