Steve Metz has published a valuable article.

[Steve the Planner]

Wilf's comment holds the key:

"As far as I can see the "New COIN" and the Stabilisation strategy in general backs you into a place where you want to act Colonial, but not actually be Colonial.

Let's be honest. This is all about forcing countries to adopt policies acceptable to the Government of the US. - I have no problem with that, if that is what you want to do, but it does require behaviour that means your civilians tell their civilians what to do, - and if they do not do it, then there are definite consequences.

First, we are dancing around the issue of control: Are we there to sieze power and direct/redirect it to some purpose, and if so, how?

What exactly is our civilian purpose, basis, theory beyond military dominance? Is it just "expeditionary" in nature? Is it intentionally suppressive? Is it just to provide post-conflict stabilization, and minimal reconstruction, or to tinker with or expressly and substantively change the society and it's structures, operations and organizational principles

Second, do we have the resources and capability to sieze civilian power and direct/redirect it? Based on our history and effectiveness in Iraq and Afghanistan (to date), there is no evidence that we do, or that, at best, once we get the ball, we flub it..

Third, what are we directing/redirecting it to? In both countries, our big thrust was to create a new constitution, push for elections, then deal with the aftermath of those elections. Note that the Iraqi election are, due to list questions and Kurdish issues, on path to be, perhaps as contentious as the 2005 elections. If Iraq's ability to organize and complete a democratic election is still a "work in progress," what to make of Afghanistan's abilities?

If our purpose, once in occupation, was to actually effect a colonial administration, or dominate the civilian sector, we needed to provide civilian administartive and operational resources of a totally different type than we have.

By definition, an "expeditionary" civilian force is temporary, short-term, and, if staffed only by loaners from US national agencies, could not be expected to have the KSA's adequate for Colonial administration of an actual country, let alone a district.

Foreign service officers are trained for specific tasks, and administration/operation of civilian governments is not one of them. Diplomacy's limits do not reach into public administration, infrastructure repair and management, or the operation of essential services. Nor, in my view, should/could they.

The civilian resources needed for that are completely different, and are not contained within any permanent military or civilian framework we have applied to date.

I wholeheartedly agree with Ofthetroops recommendation that if troops in the field are going to be tasked for civilian missions (as they are), they should be provided with a framework and training to do a decent job off it.

But, right now, we have the worst of all worlds, and the results are inevitable. Foreign service officers without expertise in civilian administration being pressed into the mission of civilian administration and serious reconstruction and essential service problems, but only on a year-to-year assignment basis (next year, they will be stamping passports in Paris). Soldiers left on the ground to develop ad hoc solutions for immediate and serious problems they see on the ground, but with no training or support framework.

No offense, but what Steve Metz wrote was:

The problem, though, is bigger than Afghanistan. Much bigger. The foundation of current American security policy is stabilizing countries where extremists can use insurgency and other forms of violence to create terrorist sanctuaries. To be effective, this requires extensive assistance and large numbers of advisers with expertise in infrastructure development, financial and economic planning, education, governance, the cultivation of civil society, and law enforcement. Yet, after five years of speeches, workshops, and reports, we are no closer to having what we need.

The infrastructure development, financial and economic planning, education, etc... resources in Iraq's "civilian surge" were all temporary appointees on one-year assignments. They came, they went---and not to Afghanistan. And they were never properly integrated into the program to maximize their potential effectiveness.

If the US was serious about the civilian side, it would abandon the "expeditionary" and temporary staffing models for these folks, and create a structure that was, first, built around the credible expertise, and second, able to engage the situation and resources (even if soldiers on the ground), to achieve short, medium and long-term goals based on some reasoned expectations of what could be achieved in the civilian world.

Military or foreign policy folks set the civilian objectives, but implementation requires a completely different structure, staffing and resources than exists today. That dream team is just a dream.

My two cents.

Steve