We still don't grasp the value of translators

[Ken White]

Ken, how exactly would soldiers and marines conduct COIN without competent interpreters?

you smart, better educated guys do it today but I can ask for beer and cigarettes in seven languages. I can get rudimentary military points across in in Hangul, Spanish and Viet Namese. Used to be able to do it in Mandarin and Farsi (the latter being the only one school trained). The ones I recall a bit of were combat related, the other two were not. Now that I have my smart ass answer to your smart ass question out of the way, I will ascend to a sensible and reasonably proper answer.

They would do it with difficulty. That's not the answer, that's a step on the ascension I promised and something I mentioned earlier.

You make (do not suggest, make) your troops learn and use a few words by attempting to converse with locals until you meet one that wants to practice English in return for teaching you the local vernacular -- then you test what he / she says with others to insure you aren't being told that Po ji in Hangul or Coño in Spanish means "Thank You" and not something else. This is how I found out that Salope in French does not mean thank you. Then you counsel any 'teacher' who steers you incorrectly. As I said, not impossible, just makes it more difficult.

Soldiers and Marines generally will do what their leaders do and /or tell them to do. They do not need extensive training to "conduct COIN" (weird phrase, that), they just need competent, capable well trained leaders willing to train them all day every day, in combat and out -- more and harder in combat (they'll bitch but they also know what's needed and they know who's supposed to make them do what's needed...). If the kids have that, they'll do okay no matter what the mission.

I would, as an aside, point out that Soldiers and Marines do not 'conduct' COIN and that as the US has no insurgents at this time, the Army and Marines are not doing COIN work. They are doing FID and SFA work and to do that, one need host nation support or accompaniment. If the host nation is not able to provide such support (as was true in OIF 1 and part of 2) then good units will just cope and hire the best interpreters they can if there is a need -- as you and Schemdlap apparently did.

Perhaps I don't understand the problem. I know I don't see one.

Question for you: What did you do to rectify the problem with the boot substitution? i.e. whose rear echelon tail was properly put in a sling over the swapping occurring due to lack of leadership and supervision?

[jmm99]

but something akin to the Urban Dictionary (e.g., "salope", which you won't find in my pocket Larousse, but in my pocket Cousin briefly), would seem useful for key words and phrases. Stan could be more intelligent on this than I.

[pjmunson]

Another thing about DLI... The regular classes refuse to teach any slang or dirty words because they say that the kids will use them in class, which is true. One of the Iraqi teachers, however, came up with a great list of insults and slang for a class to teach other Arabs to be translators in Iraq.

Why are slang and insults useful? Then you know when people are talking sh** to you and know that the situation is going south. I was walking in a crowded Arab city with a female officer, who had been to DLI. Two guys in a storefront said something about her "bzaz" (####) and turned to follow us. When I looked at them and they saw that I recognized what they were saying, they turned around. Only reason why I knew bzaz was because I had learned it from an Arab soldier after I left DLI.

[Schmedlap]

Another thing about DLI... The regular classes refuse to teach any slang or dirty words...

I would also add that it is useful because most people do not speak with textbook perfect grammar. I recall a team leader telling an interpreter to "tell that a-hole to get the f out of my face and start singing. We know this s*** is here. He can show us or we can turn the f-ing s-hole upside-down."

If English is not your first language, then you might have difficulty understanding what that means, especially if it is a tense situation and you're a little flustered.

[Brandon Friedman]

you smart, better educated guys do it today but I can ask for beer and cigarettes in seven languages. I can get rudimentary military points across in in Hangul, Spanish and Viet Namese. Used to be able to do it in Mandarin and Farsi (the latter being the only one school trained). The ones I recall a bit of were combat related, the other two were not. Now that I have my smart ass answer to your smart ass question out of the way, I will ascend to a sensible and reasonably proper answer.

They would do it with difficulty. That's not the answer, that's a step on the ascension I promised and something I mentioned earlier.

You make (do not suggest, make) your troops learn and use a few words by attempting to converse with locals until you meet one that wants to practice English in return for teaching you the local vernacular -- then you test what he / she says with others to insure you aren't being told that Po ji in Hangul or Coño in Spanish means "Thank You" and not something else. This is how I found out that Salope in French does not mean thank you. Then you counsel any 'teacher' who steers you incorrectly. As I said, not impossible, just makes it more difficult.

Ken, I'm not trying to smartass you, but what you're describing isn't realistic at all in Afghanistan. Getting "rudimentary military points across" is not enough. This isn't about being able to say "hello," "stop," or "thank you for the chai." Troops can already do that. It's about being able to sit down with a village leader in a man-to-man setting in order to get things straight. At those times, clear, detailed communication between U.S. troops and locals is an absolutely vital requirement in both Iraq and Afghanistan. And that's not something you can get from simply meeting people and learning some basic phrases like "what is your name" or "how much does this cost."

Question for you: What did you do to rectify the problem with the boot substitution? i.e. whose rear echelon tail was properly put in a sling over the swapping occurring due to lack of leadership and supervision?

Because it was during a period in which a lot of stuff was happening, I don't remember a whole lot about that episode, other than that I became nearly apoplectic when we opened the boxes. I showed the CO, who was similarly infuriated and we (this part is fuzzy now) got word of it to the battalion commander who made some calls. All I know is that a few days later we got some new boots. I would've gone down to the BSB personally, but we were located at a remote CP at Ayn Zalah when it happened (about 50 road miles northeast of the nearest brigade support units at the Tal Afar airfield).

[Ken White]

Ken, I'm not trying to smartass you, but what you're describing isn't realistic at all in Afghanistan.

It wasn't realistic in Viet Nam either. One does what one has to do. My son has two Infantry tours in Afghanistan, he doesn't seem to see it as a major problem.

At those times, clear, detailed communication between U.S. troops and locals is an absolutely vital requirement in both Iraq and Afghanistan. And that's not something you can get from simply meeting people and learning some basic phrases like "what is your name" or "how much does this cost."

In reverse order, the basic phrase bit was in response to your comment:

"Ken, how exactly would soldiers and marines conduct COIN without competent interpreters?"

You said Soldiers and Marines and I responded at that level.

Had I known you really meant "how can Companies and Battalions effectively communicate with the village Maliks or elders," I would've responded differently. That is indeed a different Ball game. My son had no big problems with interpreters at that level in either Afghanistan or in Iraq. I had and saw no problems at that level in Viet Nam as an Interpreter was made available or we could borrow one from the nearest SF Camp. While 'terp quality can certainly vary, I find it hard to believe that a Battalion cannot get a couple of really good ones and send them where needed. Ideally, we'd have US nationals, in the service, who are good enough but that is never going to happen in your lifetime, not in adequate numbers or with the educational system in the US.

In any event, after a couple of years in the ME, I'll note that whatever gets said by the folks in the village during those meetings is highly likely to be nonoperative as soon as you leave.

But, then, you know that -- and, seriously, I know it doesn't mean you don't have to try.

I showed the CO, who was similarly infuriated and we (this part is fuzzy now) got word of it to the battalion commander who made some calls...All I know is that a few days later we got some new boots.

I figured as much; so something got done about it which was the important thing. Whether the Support unit fixed their internal problem can never be known; we can only hope...

My solution to that problem is to transfer the poor performers in the rear to a line unit for a while. Actually, not mine, a Regimental Commander in the 1st MarDiv -- it really worked; after about three of those; support improved by several orders of magnitude. That also has been done recently in Iraq on a back scratching deal between two Colonel commanders from different branches...

[Brandon Friedman]

One does what one has to do. My son has two Infantry tours in Afghanistan, he doesn't seem to see it as a major problem.

We're not succeeding there, either. We'd be doing much better if we could communicate more effectively.

In reverse order, the basic phrase bit was in response to your comment:You said Soldiers and Marines and I responded at that level.

Had I known you really meant "how can Companies and Battalions effectively communicate with the village Maliks or elders," I would've responded differently. That is indeed a different Ball game. My son had no big problems with interpreters at that level in either Afghanistan or in Iraq. I had and saw no problems at that level in Viet Nam as an Interpreter was made available or we could borrow one from the nearest SF Camp. While 'terp quality can certainly vary, I find it hard to believe that a Battalion cannot get a couple of really good ones and send them where needed.

Ken, these meetings with village elders aren't necessarily taking place at the company or battalion level. Much (if not most) of the day-to-day coordinations/check-ins/negotiations with locals are done at the platoon level. Companies and battalions are spread over vast areas and platoons often have their own CPs (like at Wanat). I was out of Afghanistan before it was set up like that there, but in Iraq, my battalion was responsible for covering a 600 square-mile area (20 miles X 30 miles). As I mentioned above, at one point, my 100-man company was responsible for a rural 100 square-mile sector. We had one platoon--along with the company CP--at Ayn Zalah, we had another platoon located in the village of Bardiyah, and a third platoon in the town of Zumar--all miles apart. These platoons patrolled, met with local leaders, and, most importantly, cultivated relationships daily. Each platoon had one interpreter--the ones we'd hired and brought along from Baghdad earlier in the year--and it still wasn't enough. And the reason it wasn't enough was because patrolling squads needed an interpreter, while at the same time, the platoon CP needed one to deal with locals who approached with issues. I don't imagine it's much different from that today in Afghanistan.

[Ken White]

As it always is. Unfortunately, I doubt there will be much improvement for a host of reasons, some good and some not. I understand the dispersion factor in Iraq and know, as you do, that the two theaters are very different. The Son was in a Rifle Platoon and had an interpreter; they worked away from the company more often than not.

However, on this, re: Afghanistan:

We're not succeeding there, either. We'd be doing much better if we could communicate more effectively.

I'm not sure on the 'succeeding' and I suspect that is very much dependent on one's perception of how success in Afghanistan will look. I also believe that it'll take a few months to determine how well or how badly we're doing.

My personal belief -- and that of a few recent returnees and some there now or on the way back -- is that better communication in the sense you mean would make little real or long term difference though I acknowledge short term gains might be had. In the long term, we are highly unlikely to get some of the things all can agree would be nice and that we claim to be working toward. The Afghans from any of the ethnic or language groups with whom one converses with will be polite and very accommodating -- and really just want us and the the sagerdan gone. Both. With all allies. Next month. Today would be better...

Good COIN technique is not a ticket to success; lack of it is bad, no question, and we certainly need to know more, train better and work at it a bit -- but the best practitioner in the world is not going to beat a stacked deck. Iraq just had a couple of Jokers in there -- the 'Stan is a stacked deck.

In any event, we aren't going to solve the problem and I acknowledge the issue is problematic and also agree it should be less a problem.

[goesh]

"It's about being able to sit down with a village leader in a man-to-man setting in order to get things straight." Brandon Friedman

Do any of these sit-downs ever occur in their mosques? If not, why not?
Do A-ghans ever invite us into their mosques for talks? Do we ever ask to talk with them in their mosques? It can be an edge - off with the boots, tell
'em there is but 1 god for all and there must be truth spoken in a holy place between men, of course they will know fast if one is a serious agnostic or simply not a believer, can't fake this with them