While I think your point is a valid one, I believe the stripping of vignettes and other historical material is part of the effort to reduce the size of manuals. I will ask the authors. What I was trying to ask for, however, was examples of poor history as the underpinnings of manuals, which is what I thought was meant by the earlier post. I know the authors did their historical homework for the manuals.
I've made my point, so I suggest some of the other participants that may be more widely read than I weigh in to try help answer your question about poorly written history.
I'm sure they did do their homework, and a bright and committed men.Originally Posted by Klugzilla
FM3 Chap 22-46. Irregular warfare differs from conventional operations dramatically in two aspects. First, it is warfare among and within the people. The conflict is waged not for military supremacy but for political power.
Military power can contribute to the resolution of this form of warfare, but it is not decisive. The effective application of military forces can create the conditions for the other instruments of national power to exert
their influence. Secondly, irregular warfare also differs from conventional warfare by its emphasis on the indirect approach.
That is a set of opinions. None of the statements contained therein are historically accurate, or supported by military history. FM3 also fails to use the widely accepted historical definition of Irregular Warfare, "warfare against an irregular opponent." - eg: Small Wars.
How many more examples do you wish for?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
In one of my posts yesterday I said that the initial draft (15 June 2009) of FM 6-0 had no quotes from key leaders past or present or any historical vignettes. I was wrong (this applies only to the 2009 drafts of FM 5-0 and FM 3-92). In fact the 2009 initial draft of FM 6-0 contains eight quotes and four historical vignettes. What I should have said is that the relative paucity of quotes and historical vignettes as compared to the published version, 11 August 2003, (which has some 28 quotes and 12 historical vignettes) is startling. As Klugzilla points out, the relative paucity of quotes and historical vignettes in the 2009 initial draft of FM 6-0 may be an artifact of the recent trend toward brevity (the published version has some 333 pages). I submit we should not sacrifice the historical underpinning of the principles contained in these doctrinal manuals (and the wisdom of those who have gone before) on the altar of brevity. That would be a false economy that could get us into trouble in the long run.
While I realize that "write doctrine" is arguably the principle task of the Regular force in peace; we need to ask who has the principle task of "read and employ doctrine," and tailor the doctrinal products to that audiance.
Mostly doctrine is for students and higher level staffs. While, as Ken points out, the bulk of the force is at BN and below; I doubt highly that that is the bulk of the doctrine audance.
What the guys and gals at that level need are usable products that convert doctrine to the environment that they will be expected to operate in. Pocket guides that help Platoon leaders and Squad leaders gain effectiveness through the experiences of others.
Could we use less doctrine? Undoubtedly.
Should we attempt to achieve this by stripping the life out of what is already dry reading to begin with, in some effort to make one size fit all? I think that would be a disaster.
Remember, the historic strength of the American warfighting force has always been that the warfighter himself was a draftee or volunteer brought on specifically to fight the war, and who had probably never been within 10 paces of a doctrinal manual. The regulars up at Division had those books and had taught them at places like Benning and Leavenworth. Doctrine shapes the operational construct, but it does not guide the fight.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Amen. In a speech delivered to the conservative backbench Foreign affairs committee, House of Commons, March 1936, Winston S. Churchill said in part:
"Those who are possessed of a definitive body of doctrine and of deeply rooted convictions upon it will be in a much better position to deal with the shifts and surprises of daily affairs than those who are merely taking the short views, and indulging their natural implses as they are evoked by what they read from day to day. The first thing is to decide where you want to go."
I personally like this quotation:
I am tempted to say that whatever doctrine the armed forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter…What does matter is their ability to get it right quickly, when the moment arrives.
—Sir Michael Howard
Regular vs irregular opponent
Serious question from this:
What is your understanding of which you speak - the definition which was rejected ?from Klugzilla
Next fun question: what is an irregular opponent? I understand it, the group who did the analysis for the first IW JOC considered using this as the basis for IW, but rejected it.
The reason for my question is that the distinction between regular and irregular combatants underlies the key issues (in LOAC); about which, I attempt to post with some semblence of professionalism.
This is a basic definition on which both military and legal have to occupy the same page.
Regards
Mike
Here is an example of what I was talking about. The Combat Leaders Field Guide....comes in big size and pocket size. As a PDF file you can print what you need or all of it, you add or delete as needed.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/clg.pdf
As I mentioned before, I too hate to see this happening; however, the actual appearance of quotes, vignettes, etc. does not necessarily mean that history does not underpin doctrine. That train has left the station.
Also, we have yet to settle on a format for the ATTP, which is where vignettes may have the most impact. I think this ties into the Bob's World post.
While I might personally agree with you that the U.S. definition of IW may not be the right one, you are comparing your interpretation of military history with another. Any history is interpretation based on fact. Yours differs from DOD policy, joint doctrine, and Army doctrine, as FM 3-0 is built to be consistent with DOD policy and joint doctrine. If you want to attack the way irregular warfare is treated, you'll have to start at the top. Next fun question: what is an irregular opponent? I understand it, the group who did the analysis for the first IW JOC considered using this as the basis for IW, but rejected it.
I'm not sure I am. I don't view Military history as a buffet bar to be raided selectively in support of doctrine. If it is, then that forgives all the stupidity you see in armies today! Military history does layout clear lessons, and the context of those lessons is critical. The US IW definition is not founded in any historical fact. It is a definition used to support doctrine, when it should be the opposite.
An irregular opponent is one that is not part of a regular army. Regular armies have a defined set of legal, social and organisational characteristics, generally lacking in irregulars.Next fun question: what is an irregular opponent? I understand it, the group who did the analysis for the first IW JOC considered using this as the basis for IW, but rejected it.
That the JOC rejected it, is not evidence that we should. The JOC came up with "hybrid," which is a clumsy forcing mechanisms to try and short cut real military education.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I don't view military history as a buffet, but you have to survey all of the appropriate facts and establish a hypothesis. The authors of the IW JOC surveyed the historical facts and established a hypothesis. While you may not agree with their hypothesis, and I’m not sure I’m completely sold either, there is historical fact that supports the current IW definition. And the definition for IW was first established in the JOC and then doctrine was written for that paradigm, not the other way around. From writing several recent doctrinal manuals, I can say that the manuals flow from theory and terminology. For example, how you define insurgency drives COIN doctrine.
Please elaborate on the defined set of legal, social, and organizational characteristics—that is the hard part. Although this material will not appear in the definition itself, it will have to be discussed in some detail in support of the definition. This discussion tends to quickly become mired in mirror imaging and cultural bias. And “generally lacking in irregulars” is circular.
I beg to differ. I think the doctrine often drives the definitions. The very fact that you wanted to develop a "COIN Doctrine" instead of a broad guide to conduct of Irregular Warfare is symptomatic of that.
Not sure I understand the question. Define an irregular enemy? That depends on your define a regular.Please elaborate on the defined set of legal, social, and organisational characteristics—that is the hard part.
Regular Forces are, trained, paid and organised as declared and defined instruments of state power - all others are irregular.
So for example, regular soldiers have pay books, ID papers etc, and thus even US Special Forces are very regular soldiers.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I personally wanted to write an IW JP and have advocated writing an Army IW FM, so please don't assume that I personally just leaped to writing a COIN JP. Developing or not developing a joint publication is not one individual author's choice, although they certainly can make recommendations. Irregular warfare is covered in higher JPs, although I personally think it needs more detail and development, and the joint community wanted IW to permeate all joint doctrine rather have reside in one pub, so it was decided not to develop an IW pub.
As far as the COIN manual goes, there was a gap in joint doctrine with respect to COIN and the Army therefore proposed that we develop a COIN JP. This proposal had to be consistent with policy and approved by the voting members (Services, Joint Staff J-7, ALSA, GCCs, and FCCs). In this case, the members voted unanimously to develop a COIN JP. There are similar considerations for FMs.
Emphasis on "generally". Much of the weakness of your statement is in that single word.
Examples:
* East India Companies
* European 15th-17th century mercs.
* Japanese warrior monks.
* Boers
It's also difficult to use "irregular" in context of mixed opposition (VC/NVA, Mercs among soldiers in Iraq/AFG, Palestina campaign 1917).
By the way; what's a "regular" army and what not? That's another weak spot of your definition.
Some armies of the world include(d) militias and even partisans. The Russians would likely field many para-military, non-regular "army" troops in a future conflict (troops of ministry of interior, KGB successor troops, border patrol).
Germany gives combatant status to its border police (meant for WW3), while much of France's police is (para)military Gendarmerie. About 10% of the German Eastern front army in 1942-1945 were ex-Soviet troops ("Hilfswillige", people willing to help) who were employed with rudimentary markings and unarmed. They weren't officially subject to martial courts and such. Were these men irregulars?
What about Soviet Red Army troops who were overrun and turned to partisan warfare? Regulars or irregulars?
A 95% definition is no useful definition.
edit: I forgot to add Austrian-Hungarian border settlers, Russian Cossacks, letter of marque,
Last edited by Fuchs; 08-24-2009 at 08:42 PM.
Well I strongly disagree. 95% is certainly good enough. No definition in warfare can be perfect. EG:
What is a Tank? CV-120? CVR-T?
Define a mortar, bearing in mind there are breach loading, rifled, direct fire mortar systems.
Some definitions of regular and irregular are going to be very context specific, so yes the context will provide a dimension so....
Examples:
* East India Companies - Regular in the context of whom they are contracted to, and used against
* European 15th-17th century mercs.- same as above
* Japanese warrior monks. - Serving the Emperor and fighting against whom?
* Boers - very definitely irregular.
Native Americans fighting Native Americans, is State v State Warfare or Nation v Nation. - context.
My definition is not to serve a general theory of war, but to provide the basis for teaching/discussion for Western/NATO armies in the early 21st century.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The Japanese warrior monks had "a defined set of legal, social and organisational characteristics".
Yet, they didn't serve a state, army, emperor or whatsoever. They were essentially sects that reached the proficiency and degree of organization of regular armies, albeit differently.
Your 95% definition doesn't tell for sure in any case whether a crowd is a regular or irregular force. Your exception ("generally lacking") is too unspecific.
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