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Old 06-18-2007   #1
SteveMetz
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Default Military Support to SSTRO JOC

I realize I'm a latecomer here and you may have discussed this when it came out, but I was just reading the December 2006 Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept. I was particularly struck by the list of "risks" and "mitigations." I wondered what others thought of them:

•The American public and its elected representatives will not allow the United States to get involved in a major SSTR operation, or should such involvement be permitted, will prove unwilling to sustain their support for the conduct of a lengthy, costly SSTR campaign. (high risk)

The recommended mitigation strategy focuses on having DOD and its IA partners develop the rapidly deployable and sustainable capabilities that will be needed to rapidly initiate effective operations within and across the MMEs of a major SSTR operation. These capabilities will include strategic communication strategies and means that complement other SSTR operations. SSTR strategic communication strategies must include a strong focus on keeping the American public accurately informed prior to and during the course of the SSTR operation.

•The U.S. interagency community will not develop sufficient amounts of the kinds of deployable civilian capabilities needed to conduct an extended SSTR campaign. (high risk)

The recommended mitigation strategy involves working with the National Security Council, as well as other applicable U.S. departments and agencies, and with the Congress to gain the support needed to build SSTR-related civilian capabilities in the interagency.

•DOD force structure and force management policies will not facilitate the recruitment, development, rotation, and sustainment of sufficient military personnel for extended duration and manpower intensive SSTR operations. (medium risk)

The recommended mitigation strategy involves the development and experimentation of innovative concepts that enable the Joint Force to conduct SSTR operations without a dramatic increase in manpower, e.g., the development of niche and surge capabilities within the Total Force, longer tours to maintain force structure, and on-the-ground expertise.

•In the coming years, the U.S. military will abandon the very significant new approaches that have recently been implemented to prepare American military forces to effectively conduct multi-dimensional SSTR operations. (low risk)

The recommended mitigation strategy is to ensure that U.S. military personnel are taught at all levels during their training and Professional Military Education (PME) to understand the importance of SSTR operations for U.S. national security and to recognize these operations as one of their most important and challenging missions.

•Multiple external actors, including the U.S. military and interagency elements, will prove unable to integrate their efforts across the SSTR operation’s multidimensional mission elements with those of the existing or new host nation government during a high end SSTR operation and thus the operation will not succeed in creating the new domestic order or a viable peace. (low risk)

The recommended mitigation strategy is to give priority to developing and exercising integration mechanisms for the planning and conduct of SSTR operations.



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Old 06-18-2007   #2
TROUFION
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Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
•The U.S. interagency community will not develop sufficient amounts of the kinds of deployable civilian capabilities needed to conduct an extended SSTR campaign. (high risk)

The recommended mitigation strategy involves working with the National Security Council, as well as other applicable U.S. departments and agencies, and with the Congress to gain the support needed to build SSTR-related civilian capabilities in the interagency.

•DOD force structure and force management policies will not facilitate the recruitment, development, rotation, and sustainment of sufficient military personnel for extended duration and manpower intensive SSTR operations. (medium risk)

The recommended mitigation strategy involves the development and experimentation of innovative concepts that enable the Joint Force to conduct SSTR operations without a dramatic increase in manpower, e.g., the development of niche and surge capabilities within the Total Force, longer tours to maintain force structure, and on-the-ground expertise.

[/I]
The Military has been embedding Officers into Internship jobs in Fortune 500 companies for a while now. Why not create internships with the FBI, Border Patrol, NYPD, etc for learning skills involving detection, handling informants and case building. Internships could cover many different skill sets (not just LE, but humanitarian and DOS), it would be a great way to develop liaison and reach back capabilities. There will never be enough civilians wanting to ride shotgun on Military Intervention.
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Old 06-18-2007   #3
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Originally Posted by TROUFION View Post
The Military has been embedding Officers into Internship jobs in Fortune 500 companies for a while now. Why not create internships with the FBI, Border Patrol, NYPD, etc for learning skills involving detection, handling informants and case building. Internships could cover many different skill sets (not just LE, but humanitarian and DOS), it would be a great way to develop liaison and reach back capabilities. There will never be enough civilians wanting to ride shotgun on Military Intervention.
I think the internships are a great idea. Though I look at them more as an opportunity for all involved to learn about each other.

With respect to civilian involvement in military interventions, I think you might be surprised how much civilian support you would get if there was a good system set up to deal with it. Things right now are too ad hoc. In addition, I think Iraq is making civilian support more difficult for a variety of reasons. I would guess that many of our current and future interventions are/will be different than Iraq and with with a solid system for deployment, more enticing to civilians.

Take care,
Brian
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Old 06-18-2007   #4
Ken White
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Default Have not seen that JOC, still going through

the IW and JUO JOCs.

Based on the quotes, I think the stated risks are accurate as, mostly, are the levels of risk assigned. However, I believe the proposed mitigation efforts are likely to be only marginally successful if at all.

The "One Third" and "Two Year" rules apply. About a third of Americans will support most efforts, about a third will be opposed for one reason or another (all too frequently for domestic political reasons) and the remaining third will be ambivalent -- they will be supportive if the effort works, object if it appears to be in trouble.

That condition will prevail for about two years; after that the vacillating third will become firmly opposed. This has been true throughout our history from Jenkins Ear forward and is true today. Given the vastly improved ability to communicate, the trends toward societal "liberalization" (not precise but a shorthand word), the current fad of pols hewing to polls as opposed to doing their job, the likelihood of the recommended mitigation for gaining acceptance of an SSTR campaign is slim.

Further, those factors will likely preclude the interagency cooperation desired -- and that is severely exacerbated by the way Congress doles out funds, the budget competition flatly discourages cooperation.

The various parochial fiefs within the Armed forces have proven over and over that they are not prepared to adopt sensible and meaningful personnel and training policies -- and Congress wouldn't let them do so even if they wished to. Congress will fund hardware produced in multiple Districts; it will not adequately fund training, particularly contingency based individual training. Congress has and will continue to also intrude on recruitment and force levels -- they're mildly supportive now but after we draw down in Iraq and as Afghanistan improves, that 'support' will evaporate. Add to that the fact that we are unwilling to routinely screen potential accessions for psychological adapability, unwilling to (and unlikely to convince the American voter of the desirability of) stop paying people a bonus for being married as opposed to a bonus for staying single (ideal) or at least a marriage neutral pay system, unable in peacetime to really train new entrants, enlisted or commissioned, to the levels needed and the Force Structure problem is at best medium risk -- possibly, given the penchant of many today in the target recruitment pool for a life of relative ease, even high risk. Given that the JOC will ikely rule, Troufion has a good suggestion

Longer tours are highly desirable and should have been implemented in 2002 IMO (Yeah, I know, I'm out now so that's easy to say but my son who is in and most of his friends agree. They also agree that the practice of assigning returning units to different AOs or even nations is not terribly smart ). This too will require a culture change and Congress is likely to intrude unless the case is very well presented.

The last item in the quote, re: the host nation is a probability, it also is likely to be of higher risk than the JOC presumes; the host nation will have a great deal to say about said integration and our history in many nations from the early 20th Century forward in this regard is not conducive to optimism. Unfortunately, we spend big bucks on FAOs and then ignore them and our egos and perceived arrogance coupled with a lack of cultural knowledge continually have done us little good in this respect.

Hopefully we will in fact "ensure that U.S. military personnel are taught at all levels during their training and Professional Military Education (PME) to understand the importance of SSTR operations for U.S. national security and to recognize these operations as one of their most important and challenging missions."

We certainly blew that post Viet Nam (post WW II for that matter) and one can only hope we're a little smarter now.

We should play to our strengths; we are an impatient results oriented bunch. Nation building as a low key, low risk and small commitment operation is acceptable to Congress and the voters. If a larger commitment is required -- and it sometimes will be -- Congress, the voters and the majority of nations in the world who like to see the big guy stumble (and many of whom are willing to throw banana peels on the walk...) are likely to be less than supportive. We should fix our Intel community to better provide early warning so that low key efforts can be undertaken

If a larger commitment short of total war is required, we should design our Forces, in this context, to slam in, remove the problem and/or totally defeat or incapacitate the opposition and then pay someone else to clean up the mess. Not nice, I know; war seldom is.

That, BTW, is not a simplistic solution. It is possibly harder than the JOC proposals but it is also more likely to be achieved. As the guy said, people are the problem...

Last edited by Ken White; 06-18-2007 at 05:44 PM. Reason: Lost sentence iadded, last in paragraph 5.
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Old 06-18-2007   #5
Rob Thornton
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It sounds allot like the realization that Inter-Agency SSTR capabilities of the needed quantity and quality are too far off to count on, so we are recommending what we are in fact doing on the ground at the tactical level - generating the bulk of those capabilities out of hide. The realization has some interseting force structure implications. Since we are acknowledging that there is a capabilities gap, the question is how effectively or efficiently will we address it?

Steve, Bill Lord gave us a great lecture down in BSAP today where spent almost all 3 hours discussing this or related subjects. I think LTC Nagl's proposal is a great vehicle to talk about how we spend our money in terms of the Force Increase.
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Old 06-18-2007   #6
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It sounds allot like the realization that Inter-Agency SSTR capabilities of the needed quantity and quality are too far off to count on, so we are recommending what we are in fact doing on the ground at the tactical level - generating the bulk of those capabilities out of hide. The realization has some interseting force structure implications. Since we are acknowledging that there is a capabilities gap, the question is how effectively or efficiently will we address it?
I think this is the right question to be asking. Of course, I don't have an answer for the short term tactical problem. However, I think with some leadership on the civilian side, a medium term solution could be found and certainly a long term solution needs to be developed for future crisis.

Many civilians I've spoken to about deploying to support military ops are against the idea of going to Iraq, but would be open to supporting other operations. No scientific methods or anything here, but I found the conversations interesting. Basically, many don't want to put their lives on the line for a screwed up mission they feel the military/administration left them out of and ultimately screwed up(I'm not making any statements on the validity of their position, but that's the position I've heard). Not sure that we can overcome such feelings for Iraq.

Brian

Last edited by Steve Blair; 06-18-2007 at 07:49 PM. Reason: fixed quote
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Old 06-19-2007   #7
Rob Thornton
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Hey Brian,
Did the folks you talked to express any interest in serving in other locations? I'm just curious on what their thoughts might be about other places.
Thanks, Rob
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Old 06-20-2007   #8
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Default Strategic communications would include...

Quote:
Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
I was just reading the December 2006 Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept.

[I]•The American public and its elected representatives will not allow the United States to get involved in a major SSTR operation, or should such involvement be permitted, will prove unwilling to sustain their support for the conduct of a lengthy, costly SSTR campaign. (high risk)

The recommended mitigation strategy focuses on having DOD and its IA partners develop the rapidly deployable and sustainable capabilities that will be needed to rapidly initiate effective operations within and across the MMEs of a major SSTR operation. These capabilities will include strategic communication strategies and means that complement other SSTR operations. SSTR strategic communication strategies must include a strong focus on keeping the American public accurately informed prior to and during the course of the SSTR operation.
First of all, is there a link to this document? I'd like to hear them expand on these mitigation strategies.

Take the first one. In plain English. They assert that the American public and politicians won't support a long and costly SSTR effort. I guess they are basing this on what has happened in Iraq. I wouldn't say that Americans won't support such a fight, period. You have to include something along the lines of "where they see little chance of victory (however vaguely defined), or their estimation of the likely outcome not being worth the cost of achieving it."

The mitigation strategy says get this thing moving fast. You don't have decades to pull this off, but just a few years to show significant results to the publiic. Well, I guess having a sense of urgency is good. Just about everything else in life works that way. But merely saying that we are going to get this show on the road pronto next time sort of assumes away the problems they have demonstrated to this point. How do they propose to do this better in the future? Just acknowledging you are battling an insurgency seems to be a big hurdle to overcome based on what we've seen

They talk about strategic communication strategies and the need to keep the public well informed. If you think you aren't communicating to the public well, I'd suggest they rethink their communications style, first of all. They seem to want to walk a general out on a podium to speak to reporters who speaks in an emotionless robotic manner, using some military lingo. Do they not understand that in these press conferences they have an opportunity to speak to the American public? This communications style isn't connecting with the public, if that is indeed their goal. More of the same will not suffice.

Contrast these with how General Eisenhower met with the press, for example. Ike seemed like a regular guy that the public could relate to. When I see old clips of him on the History Channel talking with reporters or the troops, I still stop to hear what he had to say. What works in some staff meeting back at Ft.Riley may not be what works with the folks back home. Monty, Ike, Patton (not so sure about McArthur), these guys were actually popular with the public, people connected with them.

I'll have to think more about how to articulate my point on this. I just realize that when I am flipping through the channels and some general is speaking on C-Span to some reporters or Congress, it feels like I've just had a double dose of Nyquil. Gen. Schwarzkopf had a knack for talking to Americans, too. When he was talking, I remember people in a bar or airport lounge actually listening. Can't say I have noticed that lately in any bars or airports.
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Old 06-20-2007   #9
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Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
Hey Brian,
Did the folks you talked to express any interest in serving in other locations? I'm just curious on what their thoughts might be about other places.
Thanks, Rob

Rob,

They all seemed to be open to other locations, many had already been to other locations for various agencies (not as part of a military intervention though). My sense was they were specifically against going to Iraq. Of course, this could have all just been talk on their part, but it is something to consider as we look to the future.

Take care,
Brian
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Old 11-22-2007   #10
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RAND, 21 Nov 07: Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues
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U.S. participation in SSTR operations is likely to remain a persistent feature of U.S. defense policy. Whatever the term used to describe these types of operations, the United States, throughout its history, has used its power in a way currently referred to as SSTR operations and these operations can determine the success or failure of the larger U.S. objectives in the conflict. In this context, developing greater interagency capacity for SSTR operations is an overall goal that will retain resonance. What we identify as the four pillars2 of the current process to rethink the whole approach to SSTR operations set the stage for a more comprehensive way to plan, coordinate, and execute SSTR operations with the full involvement of U.S. civilian agencies and departments. As the main land force provider, the Army is a major stakeholder in the process.

Through our examination of the evolving Army doctrine on stability operations, we have identified the areas where the Army can become more compatible with the emerging interagency thinking on SSTR operations. Modifying Army doctrine in line with the ETM and preparing Army personnel for dealing with the proposed civilian teams will improve interagency effectiveness in potential future SSTR operations as well as give the Army greater input in the interagency process. Doctrinal change is essential as it will drive changes in training and the other dimensions of DOTMLPF.....
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Old 01-10-2008   #11
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SSI, 8 Jan 08: Interagency and COIN Warfare: Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in SSTR Ops
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The interagency process was the focus of a Capstone project and Research Symposium at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University during the 2006-07 academic year. The Bush School’s Capstone seminar is a semester-long graduate course in the Master’s Program in International Affairs that provides a research experience for students in the final semester of the 2-year program. As part of their leadership development, the students operate in teams to address an important policy issue (under the direction of a faculty member) and in support of a client. In this case, the client was the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. Our thanks to Colonel Richard Lacquement and Dr. Janine Davidson for sponsoring our Capstone interagency project.

The Capstone was entitled “The Interagency Process in Support & Stability Operations: Integrating and Aligning the Roles and Missions of Military and Civilian Agencies in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments”. With topics ranging from provisional reconstruction teams in Afghanistan to strategic communication to leadership education, the student papers are included in this monograph, making valuable contributions to this critical dialogue.

In concert with the Capstone interagency project, the Bush School and the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute sponsored a research symposium to outline interagency policy issues and craft recommendations. The symposium, entitled “The Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations: The Integration and Alignment of Military and Civilian Roles and Missions”, was held on April 5-6, 2007, at Texas A&M University. Present were more than two dozen military officers, national security scholars, and practitioners who have been on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, all of whom are heavily involved in interagency analysis. The majority of the concerns, questions, and ideas discussed during the symposium are articulated and expanded upon in the following chapters.....

Last edited by Jedburgh; 01-10-2008 at 08:09 PM.
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