Nation-Building Elevated

[M-A Lagrange]

Many years ago on Mindanao (the eastern side, not the Muslim area) a foreign aid agency funded a road, which was intended to traverse a quite remote area. The project was sold as a farm-to-market road, though it was generally understood that it would also make it easier for the military to gain access and deny the area to the NPA.

The farmers in the area opposed the road vigorously, sabotaging equipment, shooting at workers, causing all kinds of problems and eventually stalling the project. The foreigners involved couldn't understand it. One of them, almost in tears at the collapse of his project, moaned to me at length over how the farmers were such fools to fall for the commie propaganda, how the road would benefit them, etc etc... it took some doing to get it through his damn fool head that none of those farmers had legal title to the land they were tilling, that they'd been left alone because their land was remote and inaccessible, and that when that road was complete their land would become valuable, and when it became valuable men with guns would come and drive them off it so somebody with money and power could take over. This was the conclusion the farmers had reached, and they were absolutely right.

This is the perfect example for "do no harm" but basically the "what not to do"!
Do No Harm is just an approach that is based on the fact that the aim of humanitarian action is aimed to protect people.
Here we are talking about a Civil Affaires/Development-Humanitarian structure which via internet will provide advices to people on the ground.
In the example proposed by Dayuhan the Do No Harm doctrine tells you that you have to take in consideration the effect of the road on security before looking at the apparent economical benefits.
A good approach would have been to look at the consequences (legal, security…) and first propose to the farmer assistance to get legal ownership of their land (immediate access in exchange of the road can be done with "extremely good willing politicians"), then support their production and transformation technique for them to have a better product to sell… Then support transport (not road: trucks) for them to sell their products and once they were more rich (less poor if you want). And then propose to build a road that they would have support because it would be more economically beneficial than security threat.
Guts guess duration: at the best 2 years before getting the idea of a road in the farmer priorities pipe.
But that's a field driven approach.
For the security: basing a small group of 3 to 5 people with a radio, with open hours for the population to talk to relatives, would have been my first solution. (A pure COIN population centric solution if I may.)

Villages tend to be conservative places. Change can be perceived as a threat, especially if one faction is perceived to be working the situation to drive changes that benefit them. Aid that is delivered without full awareness of internal rivalries and issues can destabilize a situation and provoke conflict.

In development there is an analogy which is often use:
If people use a rope to climb a mountain: do not install an elevator even if it is cheaper, safer and easier. Just build a stair they can use and be secure by keeping their rope in hand.
Took me some years to figure out what it was about but it's damn right. Don't go too fast or too fancy. Just go with the people step by step.

In fact, it was the women of the village. Once the well was put in, their one good excuse to get out of the house to go and interact with other women away from the contol of men at a distant community well had been taken away. Women's centers have been a big hit for this very reason, as they provide a safe place where women can be with other women.

Basic rule: always listen to the women first, especially in countries as Afghanistan. The Pula (Nomadic Muslim/animist tribe in South Sahara) say: the beard always does what the locks are dictating at night…

But we are already discussing virtual problematic of virtual villages through a virtual network…
It's no more SWJ it's the Matrix in action.

So now, about a Le Expérience pilot project:

Several thoughts crossed my mind.

1) First, we said that we are client oriented. So we need to know who our clients are. Civilian (NGO, development agencies…), military (CIMIC, ?...), host government (cf Steve article…), people (local CBO, local authorities…). Once we have figured out who our clients are (They can be NGO + CIMIC + Host Government/research centers), then we will know what kind of network we need: virtual, virtual + field relay…

2) But also we need to figure out what is our target area to build our product.
Many opportunities there: Afghanistan, Haiti… Haiti seems to be a more easy training experiment field than Astan and less deadly if me make mistakes. Also Steve point on French reading is to be taken in account (I'm talking in my name only). My Pashto is at a much lower level than my Klingon for example. (And my Klingon is limited.) But good sources in English are available on Astan. We need to make a choice or to develop a 2 sub products of a 1 main package (virtual community advice for Civil Affaires/Development work + COIN Advices).

3) Then comes the product:

"Digital Civil Affairs/Development Work" is a concept unfamiliar to me... what exactly are we trying to accomplish here? What problem are we trying to solve? Is this a COIN scenario or a sort of virtual Peace Corps small-scale development effort?

This will be clarified once we have figured out what are our clients and the area we want to experiment in. Please see point 2.

4) Finally the means: who when how… the practical/engineering part that needs to be solved out to have the machine working. This includes the doctrine applied, the area of competency…

In resume: define an objective; identify the target; locate it; select a team and baboum!


Mike,

So, we look to 3 levels: funds, coordination and field, don't we ? Indeed, at times, you are the son of a scorpion. And, I thought I was the only one descended from François Villon & La Grosse Margot.

If only I could… I'm dreaming of myself being a deadly breed of Richelieu and Talleyrand… But reality keeps dragging me back to the normal average man that I am.

Steve,

I'll be looking at the links you posted. Some thoughts to be developed late at night on this.

[Dayuhan]

In the example proposed by Dayuhan the Do No Harm doctrine tells you that you have to take in consideration the effect of the road on security before looking at the apparent economical benefits.
A good approach would have been to look at the consequences (legal, security…) and first propose to the farmer assistance to get legal ownership of their land (immediate access in exchange of the road can be done with "extremely good willing politicians"), then support their production and transformation technique for them to have a better product to sell… Then support transport (not road: trucks) for them to sell their products and once they were more rich (less poor if you want). And then propose to build a road that they would have support because it would be more economically beneficial than security threat.
Guts guess duration: at the best 2 years before getting the idea of a road in the farmer priorities pipe.

I think that gut guess is wrong, and I don't think this program would work. There's an important point being missed. When I said that the farmers were resisting because they knew their land would be taken by people with power and money... who do you think those people were? They were the local political powers, of course, and individuals close to them. As soon as they knew the road project would be funded (and well before it was announced) they were already muscling in, acquiring legal rights to land and positioning themselves to profit from the road. The government would never have allowed those farmers to get legal title to the land in question because the people in charge wanted it for themselves.

When you see a miserable status quo enduring without change, the chances are that it's not enduring because people lack initiative, or lack the right machine, or lack infrastructure, or lack capital. People have natural initiative and they will make a way... it may be slower and less efficient than it would be with more resources, but they will make one. When nobody's making a way and the status quo is dragging on and on, there's a pretty good chance that the status quo is dragging on because somebody wants it to. There's a pretty good chance that the somebody in question has both legal power and armed force, and is willing to use that power to slap down initiatives that threaten his dominance or to derail any initiatives that do not promote his interests.

Sometimes the best way to promote development is not to look for ways to help people move forward, but to identify and help remove the obstacles that are holding them back. Of course that gets political, and can get very complicated... but it's tough to promote development apolitically in an environment where the primary obstacles to development are political.

[Surferbeetle]

Sometimes the best way to promote development is not to look for ways to help people move forward, but to identify and help remove the obstacles that are holding them back. Of course that gets political, and can get very complicated... but it's tough to promote development apolitically in an environment where the primary obstacles to development are political.

Top down strategies are part of a solution, but limiting oneself to just one axis of attack or line of operation is similar to investing in just one stock. Good for you if you hit it out of the park, however empirical work on concepts such as efficient market theory, mean variance portfolio theory, capital asset pricing model, value at risk, etc. seem to suggest that there are greater benefits to be had via diversification when problem solving.

From FP, a 22 Jan 2010 post on Tom Rick's blog the Best Defense, Haiti watch (III): A role for retired Special Forces?

By Robert Maguire

Best Defense Haiti correspondent

In 1994/95, following the US-led, UN-sponsored intervention that restored elected government to Haiti after three years of rapacious rule by the Haitian military and its allies, US Special Forces played a critical role throughout the Haitian countryside in restoring order and assisting local officials move forward with the always enormous task of providing services to citizens at the local and municipal levels. Much was written about this, but I recall it most clearly through a documentary produced by CNN called "Guardian Warriors." I recall from that documentary -- which I recorded on a VRC (it was that long ago) and is now stowed away somewhere on video tape -- that small Special Forces units around Haiti were playing a very positive role in this regard -- working with mayors; interfacing with local populations; providing technical and resource assistance. These men (I do not recall seeing any women) were portrayed as sensitive to local people and their culture and were finding ways to work within existing paradigms -- even broken ones. They were also very welcome by the local populations with which they worked.

Tom Rick's also provides a link to an applied GIS website about Haiti.

Wilf,

The GIS website allows one to examine/focus upon security concerns...

[jmm99]

in light of this:

from Dayuhan
When I said that the farmers were resisting because they knew their land would be taken by people with power and money... who do you think those people were? They were the local political powers, of course, and individuals close to them. As soon as they knew the road project would be funded (and well before it was announced) they were already muscling in, acquiring legal rights to land and positioning themselves to profit from the road. The government would never have allowed those farmers to get legal title to the land in question because the people in charge wanted it for themselves.

Blazing Saddles. Never thought of that as a treatise in revolutionarty warfare, but its script is written above. And who can beat the ending.

Keep going, folks - looks like it's heading somewhere.

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

I think that gut guess is wrong, and I don't think this program would work. There's an important point being missed. When I said that the farmers were resisting because they knew their land would be taken by people with power and money... who do you think those people were? They were the local political powers, of course, and individuals close to them. As soon as they knew the road project would be funded (and well before it was announced) they were already muscling in, acquiring legal rights to land and positioning themselves to profit from the road. The government would never have allowed those farmers to get legal title to the land in question because the people in charge wanted it for themselves.

Dayuhan,

You're so right! Unfortunately this is one of the too often encountered problems with development projects.

Just prove us that back ground, context, creative solutions are the best. Only limit being: you cannot expect having non political policies in development.
And trying to change the political environment seems a little out of our range.

Tom Rick's also provides a link to an applied GIS website about Haiti.

Wilf,

The GIS website allows one to examine/focus upon security concerns...

So, we did figure out our location: seems we are going for Haiti, don't we?
The local politic may be as harsh as in the Pashto valleys. And the use of violence as necessary as in Astan.
Many reports of gangs killing people to get food and aid monopole and destroyed countries are wild wild West by definition.

Now, let's respond to the question to whom do we want to address it?
Are we trying to give a hand to US troops? To NGO? (who do not care about us by the way) To CIMIC?
My first feeling goes to CIMIC people. Most of those I now are good people who just would like to help, are seeking for advices but get bounced by NGO because they wear uniforms.
Here the advantage is that you no one will judge you on that.
They also are much more sensitive to security/development integrated projects.

[Dayuhan]

Unfortunately this is one of the too often encountered problems with development projects.

Just prove us that back ground, context, creative solutions are the best. Only limit being: you cannot expect having non political policies in development.
And trying to change the political environment seems a little out of our range.

Sometimes you need to just look the local authorities in the eye and say "no, we will not fund that project". If the circumstances on the ground are not conducive to development tossing money into ill-conceived projects is not going to accomplish anything.

There's a difference between "humanitarian aid" and "development aid". Humanitarian aid is about keeping people alive in extreme conditions; it's what we're trying to do in Haiti and in parts of Africa. Often in these conditions it's simply not possible to bring development aid into play effectively. Development aid to me is something that has to be carefully applied and used in plces and times where there's an opportunity. Tossing it around loosely ends up with the old paradigm of "poor people in rich countries giving money to rich people in poor countries", which is not what we want to do.

Steve, when I ask "what's the goal, I guess the core of the question is this: are we working toward recovery after a disaster? Are we trying to mitigate an existing insurgency situation or prevent a potential one? Or is it a pure development problem? It will make a huge difference in how we proceed...

[Surferbeetle]

Steve, when I ask "what's the goal, I guess the core of the question is this: are we working toward recovery after a disaster? Are we trying to mitigate an existing insurgency situation or prevent a potential one? Or is it a pure development problem? It will make a huge difference in how we proceed...

Hey Dayuhan,

Our geographic choice drives our problem and solution sets. Afghanistan, although a mosaic situationally, could be generalized as trending towards COIN TTP. Haiti, although presently needing aid TTP, may trend towards development as info operations continue. Haiti seems to be more accesible for our purposes.

Here are some more water centric tech support thoughts.

Infiltration flows may be an issue for both water and wastewater piping systems depending upon their current condition, baseline + earthquake damage. *Crosscontamination (fecal) and the introduction of anthropogenic sources (chemical etc.) are a concern for treated water that is being piped. *Wastewater quantities to be treated may increase due to infiltration. *An additional caveat to wastewater treatment quantities would be a combined sewer system. *In this instance both wastewater and stormwater are carried by the system and quantities to be treated are greater than those resulting from a system limited to just wastewater.

The appropriateness of a CMOC or CIMIC is not addressed in this note but I would like to come back to that in later post. In this note I have crossed from aid to development and assume that local inhabitants are in the lead of that effort, again, we are functioning in a tech support role.

Once the water systems have been triaged project management skills will be needed to rehabiltate things. *We have touched upon how Walt Whitman Rostow's linear evolutionary development model has echos in maturity models employed by business and engineering communities. *However, for us, things start to get a bit nonlinear for the next portions of solution development. *Using the water system assessment a work breakdown system, which describes tasks, roles, and responsibilities would be developed. *A cost estimate (often close hold) project schedule, statement of work (operations order), specifications, and design are developed in concert with a variety of professions to include maintenance personnel, planners, legal personnel, community members, NGO, IO, and military - aka the CIMIC - something in between the hood of a truck and a facility.

[Steve the Planner]

Dahayun:

"As soon as they knew the road project would be funded (and well before it was announced) they were already muscling in, acquiring legal rights to land and positioning themselves to profit from the road. The government would never have allowed those farmers to get legal title to the land in question because the people in charge wanted it for themselves."

I've done quite a few taking projects in the US for major roads, rail, and airports. Same thing in the US and anywhere. How did the guys on the "State Road Commissions" all get rich and powerful? Inside info oin where the highway was headed and land was going to be needed, and valuable (both for the road, and the subsequent uses adjacent to it.

In Blazing Saddles, they are trying to build the railroad, and get the land. The Governor says to his henchman: "All that stands between us and that valuable land are the rightful owners."

Same diff everywhere. A basic rule of the road for projects.

In Iraq, a lot of the technical types in 2008 were furiously opposed to provincial projects using national funds that were coming up through the US Sheik's Counsels and PRDCs/PRTs.

They knew that, too often, the schools or clinics being proposed were on some shiek's land (with rent or taking claims to follow), or were just poorly concieved, unstaffable, and un-necessary. From my review, many were like that, and their reason to delay/deny the projects were firmly grounded.

That's what always concerns me about projects.

[Steve the Planner]

Lessons Learned

So many of these COIN, Civ/Mil Manuals use bullets, jargon, and slogans for civ/mil stuff, but contain little practical information about specific how tos that somebody could use in the field when facing the same identical development/project problems over-and-over again.

Just a simple, dumb handbook (like the new ag field guide) would be a huge leap in effectiveness. What to consider when assigned to a rural village? What to consider when faced with a road or school project?

Big, dumb stuff.

Is our more effective contribution to just collect up the big dumb stuff that so overwhelmingly and colorfully gets demonstrated on SWJ's pages?

[M-A Lagrange]

They knew that, too often, the schools or clinics being proposed were on some shiek's land (with rent or taking claims to follow), or were just poorly concieved, unstaffable, and un-necessary. From my review, many were like that, and their reason to delay/deny the projects were firmly grounded.

That's what always concerns me about projects.

We all have the same concern. It's all the same everywhere. I have to manage peace projects and initiate reconsciliation conferences because some dummy minister is making sure his useless village gets all the projects.
The worst being the Un agencies heads who do not see where the problem is because they have to spend all the money they asked for without knowing how to spend it.

Just a simple, dumb handbook (like the new ag field guide) would be a huge leap in effectiveness. What to consider when assigned to a rural village? What to consider when faced with a road or school project?

Big, dumb stuff.

State Building for the dummy? We have here a best seller!