Operationalizing The Jones Model through COG

[Dayuhan]

To get power over them, you just have to terrify them. Insurgents can and do do this.

Governments do it too. It doesn't always work, and when it does work it's often only in the short run.

[William F. Owen]

Governments do it too. It doesn't always work, and when it does work it's often only in the short run.

Concur. Governments should not. It's dumb. Not doing dumb things is a given.

[Bob's World]

When the opposing armed force IS the populace, how do you leave them out of it at the same time you are merrily militarily crushing them?

I had an opportune discussion with Dr. Maria Stephan this morning, who's work is on nonviolent conflict. She has a book out on the topic, and handed me a short paper:

"Why Civil Resistance Works - The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict" International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008) pp.7-44.

We need to hope that AQ does not read her work. Her research shows how nonviolent campaigns achieve success 53% of the time, whereas violent movements only prevail26% of the time.

Key is that she recoginzes that violent tactics are a choice, and one that often harms the ability of the challenger to achieve legitimacy themselves, and that allows the despotic counterinsurgent to presume the moral highground and justify their violent crushing of their own populace.

When the resistance selects nonviolent means the roles reverse, and the despotic leadership loses credibility in responding with violence, and it is much more likely for governmental officals to go over to the other side.

I have often stated god help us if we merely crush AQ without also addressing the underlying causation for their movement; because if the organizaiton that comes behind them, and there will be one as sure as day follows night, and they adopt such nonviolent tactics such as Maria promotes; they will likely achieve all of their goals in short order.

At that point we will have to ask ourselves the wisdom of siding with the Despots over siding with the populaces of those same countries.

The Jones Model applies to both types of movements; and as Maria points out, those that chose the non-violent path are far more apt to prevail.

Jury is out as to what happens when the state choses the more non-violent path in the face of a resistance that has chosen violence.

[jcustis]

Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis

Great observations that play into my own struggle to define area denial. Reading your points brings home the fact that despite all the collections assets we have at our disposal, that harness military manpower, very few of them (at least that I can tell) are focused on identifying the root causes of why knuckleheads do what they do.

One place to start might be to question the knucklehead assumption.

Of course some of them may be exactly that: testosterone-addled young men just looking for a fight. In some cultures young men are expected to prove themselves by fighting, and it’s possible that some of them are fighting us just because we’re there, and if we weren’t there they’d be fighting the tribe on the other side of the hill.

There may be other factors involved also. I’ve said this before, but I think failure of government to deliver services or development is overrated as a cause of insurgency, especially in areas where people have very low expectations of government. People are more likely to fight because of anger or fear: either something has been done to them that they didn’t like, or they expect something to be done that they won’t like.

There’s also the foreigner factor. What would happen if some vastly superior power sent an army to our country, removed our government, installed a new one, and told us that it was henceforth our duty to support that government, and if we failed in that duty we would be called “insurgents”? I may be wrong, but I kind of suspect that a few of the people on this forum might be tempted in such circumstances to do a bit of fighting.

In any event, if we want to get people to stop fighting without having to kill them all, figuring out why they are fighting is a reasonable first step, and it’s also worth looking for divergence between the local narrative of resistance and the insurgent ideology.

After cruising through this thread more than once, I sat down with our task force's intelligence officer and began to ping him on this issue of why. We began to go around and around in response to my questions of why certain actors in the battlespace were doing what they were doing, and he quickly grew tired of me telling him that he was defining the symptons of the environment and the behaviors themselves, but very little of the true reason why it was happening.

After that, I tool a look at the priority intelligence requirements that are laid out. Not surprisingly, not a single PIR asked the question "why?"

I am pretty much smacking myself on the forehead with the realization that the only way we can actually attack the system and problem, comes from understanding that simple three-letter word.

[Dayuhan]

After that, I tool a look at the priority intelligence requirements that are laid out. Not surprisingly, not a single PIR asked the question "why?"

I am pretty much smacking myself on the forehead with the realization that the only way we can actually attack the system and problem, comes from understanding that simple three-letter word.

It's a tough question, especially since the answer can vary from place to place and person to person... that doesn't make it any less important!

[Chris jM]

Jury is out as to what happens when the state choses the more non-violent path in the face of a resistance that has chosen violence.

Doesn't the very identity, ideology and purpose of AQ demand violence, though? Establishing the caliphate is, from my limited readings, a necessarily violent process according to the fundamentalist Islamic view of the world.

Further, I would suggest that a non-violent fundamentalist Islamic movement would be exactly what we are after - in a war of ideas and words, we have nothing to fear. Fundamentalism will inevitably lose to modernity.

Jury is out as to what happens when the state choses the more non-violent path in the face of a resistance that has chosen violence.

Is this even possible? I can't think of any historical situations where the ruling power has the ability to choice non-violence to a violent opposition, probably for good reason. Your concept of 'good governance' specifically states that legitimacy is required. How can a government be legitimate if it allows violent opposition to it to go unchecked? Perhaps I'm being overly classical and old-fashioned in my views here, but a government that loses it's ability to protect it's own people and interests is on the brink if not the very definition of a failed government. Of course this term (good governance) is relative, as has been pointed out before, however failing to provide the accepted or expected level of security, both tangible (physical security from violence) and intangible (economic security, amongst others) loses crucial amounts of legitimacy with it's polis. I would argue that, by accepting non-violence in the face of violence, a government would surrender it's mandate to monopolise force in the interests of the people and thus lose any right to govern immediately.

Wilf, you no doubt agree that the vast majority of us/them out there have differing and incorrect views of both military employment and the meaning of the CoG. However, would you agree that an inefficient strategy pursued with great vigor and resolve immediately is better than constant strategic re-orientation and indecision?

I ask this as I agree with you in every point you make, but once I try and frame the course of action I would follow were I king I keep compromising the lofty visions of a military specialising in force-on-force solutions. Sure, pop-centric COIN may be horribly inefficient and ineffective, but if the US and her allies have a strong, developed pop-COIN capability inclusive of people, doctrine and equipment, is it not better to throw support onto this course than find as-of-now-elusive alternatives?

Also, have you considered the fact that pop-centric COIN is quite possible the most reliable method we have of finding insurgents in the Afghan environment? There is no point throwing a military capability against an enemy if they cannot complete the first core function of 'find'. Even though COIN-specific forces are horribly inefficient in the job of destroying and deterring, is it possible that the COIN focus is absolutely necessary to identify those we want to employ force against?

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, you no doubt agree that the vast majority of us/them out there have differing and incorrect views of both military employment and the meaning of the CoG. However, would you agree that an inefficient strategy pursued with great vigor and resolve immediately is better than constant strategic re-orientation and indecision?

Strategy is not right or wrong. It's better or worse, and the cost can be more more than you are willing to pay. It's about judgement, and skill.
The military contribution to strategy is violence. Strategy, is this context, is using force to gain what you want. If you are not using violence, you are using politics and diplomacy. You may use both. The real point about strategy is having one.

I ask this as I agree with you in every point you make, but once I try and frame the course of action I would follow were I king I keep compromising the lofty visions of a military specialising in force-on-force solutions.

Well I can't guess at the context, but it all depends on the policy. Most people confuse policy with strategy. It doesn't matter how good your strategy is, if the policy cannot be implemented by the means employed, or the cost required.
Policy is politics.
If you believe that developing A'Stan into a stable nation is the right thing to do, then this is personal belief. It is not dependent on logic, evidence and least of all strategy.

Does this help?

[Dayuhan]

The military contribution to strategy is violence.

What if the instruction given to the military force by its government is to solve the problem by any available means? Shouldn't that force be considering all means, both violent and non-violent, that might have a bearing on solving the problem?

Why should this discussion avoid political devices that might have a bearing on the problem. or be confined to the use of violence?

[William F. Owen]

To simply say violence is war, and war is a military matter, and the military's job is to crush said violence is the same supervicial analysis from the perspective of the Despot that has lead to many a long, drawnout struggle between a populace and its failed governance.

That is an over simplification of my position. Rebels seek to alter the distribution of power by violence - and other means. The job of the military is to counter that violence. How skilfully that is done pretty much defines how effective it is.

Better instead for Governance to see such movements as the clearest of metrics, the most accurate of polls, and to modify their behavior to the degree practicable to resolve their failures short of simply ramping up the oppression.

That view assumes that the Rebels always have a legitimate point that matches a position the government could take if it wished. That is almost never the case, nor is it ever likely to be.
Rebels rarely, if ever, have a legitimate cause in the eyes of the Government. That is the problem! - Moreover who is to judge legitimacy for the "Jones Model."
The primary purpose of Government is defence of the state. You have a Government so as people cannot set forth policy using violence against the state.
Rebels seek power via violence. You prevent them gaining it, via violence.

Concur completely that AQ is not an insurgent organization. After all, they have no populace, and they have no state.

Yet AQ seeks the re-distribution of power via violence. They have a policy, they aspire to a state, and they conform to a Clausewitian trinity - they do have a populace. People support them. People fund them.
They are clearly strategically inept, so I wonder why we worry so much about them.

What if the instruction given to the military force by its government is to solve the problem by any available means? Shouldn't that force be considering all means, both violent and non-violent, that might have a bearing on solving the problem?

Why should this discussion avoid political devices that might have a bearing on the problem. or be confined to the use of violence?

Well if anyone ever says "solve the problem by any available means" then they are an idiot, because that is not a setting forth of policy. That is the opposite of Strategy. You have to have a policy! That policy set conditions for the employment of force.

In Oman the Sultan, said "defeat the rebels, - so that development can begin."
In most UK insurgencies the basic guidance was "defeat the rebels - so as we can organise the peaceful transfer of power to a democratic political process."

Yes, all instrument of power should be used, but the primary aim should be ending the rebellion, by getting the rebels to give up. Then the politics can kick in.

[William F. Owen]

When the opposing armed force IS the populace, how do you leave them out of it at the same time you are merrily militarily crushing them?

Because they oppose your setting forth of policy, and the the opposing armed force is a minute percentage of the population in exactly the same way your army is. - it's called the armed force, not the population.

I had an opportune discussion with Dr. Maria Stephan this morning, who's work is on nonviolent conflict. She has a book out on the topic, and handed me a short paper:

"Why Civil Resistance Works - The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict" International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008) pp.7-44.

We need to hope that AQ does not read her work. Her research shows how nonviolent campaigns achieve success 53% of the time, whereas violent movements only prevail26% of the time.

So politics works 53% of the time... wow... I will read with interest.

Key is that she recoginzes that violent tactics are a choice, and one that often harms the ability of the challenger to achieve legitimacy themselves, and that allows the despotic counterinsurgent to presume the moral highground and justify their violent crushing of their own populace.

Ends, Ways and Means. This has been said many, many time before.
Non-violence does not stop the bad guys killing your family. Achieving policy goal by non-violence IS politics.

[Bob's World]

Because they oppose your setting forth of policy, and the the opposing armed force is a minute percentage of the population in exactly the same way your army is. - it's called the armed force, not the population.


So politics works 53% of the time... wow... I will read with interest.

Ends, Ways and Means. This has been said many, many time before.
Non-violence does not stop the bad guys killing your family. Achieving policy goal by non-violence IS politics.

I will instead refer you to page 9 of the document you felt you free to deride without the benefit of a quick scan first to see how it might measure up to your dogma:

"Nonviolent resistance is a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, phychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence. It includes acts of omission, acts of commission, or a combination of both. Scholars have identified hundreds of nonviolent methods - including symbolic protests, economic boycotts, labor strikes, political and social non-cooperation and nonviolent intervention - that groups have used to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries' sources of power. Nonviolent struggle takes place outside traditional political channels, making it distinct from other nonviolent political processes such as lobbying, electioneering, and legislating.

[Ken White]

...............

[William F. Owen]

I will instead refer you to page 9 of the document you felt you free to deride without the benefit of a quick scan first to see how it might measure up to your dogma:

I did not deride the document. I merely expressed surprise at the conclusion as stated, because it did not seem insightful. Thus-

"Nonviolent resistance is a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, phychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence.

No threat of violence - thus politics in the truest sense of the word.

It includes acts of omission, acts of commission, or a combination of both. Scholars have identified hundreds of nonviolent methods - including symbolic protests, economic boycotts, labor strikes, political and social non-cooperation and nonviolent intervention - that groups have used to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries' sources of power.

Again, all political instruments. None of this should be the concern of anyone in uniform - bar Policeman.

Nonviolent struggle takes place outside traditional political channels, making it distinct from other nonviolent political processes such as lobbying, electioneering, and legislating.

And? This statement attempts to draw a false distinction between formal political processes and real politics in the wider sense. Poll Tax Riots? Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament? Greenham Common? These are all well tracked and well understood aspects of politics since time began.

Sorry Bob, I full confess to not getting it. I grew up with Protests, Strikes and Boycotts. They pure politics in one of it's most unambiguous forms.

[Bob's World]

I did not deride the document. I merely expressed surprise at the conclusion as stated, because it did not seem insightful. Thus-

No threat of violence - thus politics in the truest sense of the word.

Again, all political instruments. None of this should be the concern of anyone in uniform - bar Policeman.

And? This statement attempts to draw a false distinction between formal political processes and real politics in the wider sense. Poll Tax Riots? Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament? Greenham Common? These are all well tracked and well understood aspects of politics since time began.

Sorry Bob, I full confess to not getting it. I grew up with Protests, Strikes and Boycotts. They pure politics in one of it's most unambiguous forms.

There is a good chance your persistent posts consisting of "I disagree" or "I don't understand" don't lend much to the SWJ community. There are dozens of other threads on this site where your comments typically add very much indeed. Post where you please, obviously, but I for one am not benefiting from what you are posting here.

[Entropy]

Col. Jones,

This discussion brought up a couple of questions in my mind:

1. Based on all the discussion of "good governance," I get the impression that the responsibility for the condition of "good governance" rests solely on whomever is trying to govern. This suggests that a population's motivations for entering into insurgency are always reasonable and therefore should be accommodated. Is this the case? If not, then how exactly do populations fit into your theory, especially in cases where the goals for two populations are mutually exclusive or are unreasonable?

2. Where does a state's capacity to provide a credible monopoly on violence fit in? I would argue that a credible monopoly on violence is part and parcel of legitimacy for a number or reasons. Justice is a good example. It's not enough to simply provide justice for a population - one must also prevent competing systems of justice from forming (consider, for example, white supremacist "justice" against African-Americans in the south). The point being is that legitimacy isn't enough - it must be backed by a credible monopoly of force both for enforcement as well as deterrence. It seems to me that the deterrent effect from a government's credible monopoly of violence is likely to cause disaffected populations to more seriously consider non-violent means for change. Do you disagree? If so, how so?

JCustis,

After that, I tool a look at the priority intelligence requirements that are laid out. Not surprisingly, not a single PIR asked the question "why?"

I am pretty much smacking myself on the forehead with the realization that the only way we can actually attack the system and problem, comes from understanding that simple three-letter word.

Amen to that. I've been banging on PIR's for quite a long time now.

[Dayuhan]

We need to hope that AQ does not read her work. Her research shows how nonviolent campaigns achieve success 53% of the time, whereas violent movements only prevail26% of the time.

I'd be curious to see how those percentages were obtained, and what sort of "campaign" qualifies for consideration. Nonviolent tactics can be extremely effective if you have the support base to sustain them. Nonviolent campaigns that can't raise the necessary support to apply meaningful pressure don't generally achieve much beyond making noise.

I have often stated god help us if we merely crush AQ without also addressing the underlying causation for their movement; because if the organizaiton that comes behind them, and there will be one as sure as day follows night, and they adopt such nonviolent tactics such as Maria promotes; they will likely achieve all of their goals in short order.

At that point we will have to ask ourselves the wisdom of siding with the Despots over siding with the populaces of those same countries.

This assumption rests on a questionable assessment of AQ's causation. AQ is not an insurgency, has no populace, and did not arise as a reaction to despotism. It has never managed to raise sufficient popular support to threaten a government by nonviolent means. If we try to shoehorn AQ into a Cold War paradigm or resistance to oppressive despotism we do ourselves a disservice: it doesn't fit there.

It's worth noting that the "insurgencies" in Iraq and Afghanistan are not reactions to indigenous despotism, but reactions to a foreign power's misplaced confidence in its own ability to create acceptable governance for other countries. Insurgency certainly can be a response to despotism, but it is not always a response to despotism.

Certainly there are violent insurgencies in the world today that would be more effective if they worked through nonviolent tactics: I've long believed that the Palestinians need a Gandhi. Like all other tactics, though, nonviolent resistance requires certain conditions to succeed, and broad popular support is one of them. Calling a strike gets you nowhere if nobody heeds the call, a demonstration is ineffective if nobody shows up. Mass action won't work without mass. Groups turn to violence and terror precisely because they haven't the mass to operate any other way.

[slapout9]

It's worth noting that the "insurgencies" in Iraq and Afghanistan are not reactions to indigenous despotism, but reactions to a foreign power's misplaced confidence in its own ability to create acceptable governance for other countries. Insurgency certainly can be a response to despotism, but it is not always a response to despotism.

That is some strategic stuff there.