Tentative Guidelines for building partner armies post conflict

[Colin Robinson]

JohnT: My criteria for 'non-Western' is non US, Europe to NATO boundary line inc Baltics, White Commonwealth (NZ/Aust/SA/Canada, basically ABCA+), and, without thinking much about it, yes Latin America. Basically on Latin America the Portuguese and Spanish built it their way, industrialised = Western.

My level of knowledge on Latin America is low, but I would argue the Argentinians in the Falklands proved they knew the Western way of war, just weren't very good at it (...all arguments about Falklands flow.. conscripts vs Brit regulars etc) War of the Pacific was a 'conventional' war, Arg/Chilean standoff is 'conventional' etc. Uruguayans do OK in the DRC with MONUC - better than Ukrainians/Russians in Bosnia!!

Dayuhan I've just run your lat/long coordinates, and I realise I really need to reread American Caesar again. Then we could have a long discussion about the readiness level of the Phil National Guard and McArthur's decision to prioritise the Guard over the regulars up to 41. But sticking on topic, yes, I'm looking for people from all over and thus am very grateful to get an Asian expert.

Your 'rant' is bang on topic. It reflects my brief and sketchy research on the origins of professionalism in the US and British Armies... Upton's reforms (thankyou Samuel Huntingdon & Soldier & the State) and the abolition of purchase of commissions in the British Army. Even so, Isby suggests that only the Wehrmacht was really competent in 1939, and we (the World War II Western alliance, headed by US and UK) our armies had to learn from the way the Germans did things. Apparently the British Army officer selection system was copied off the Germans after the end of the Second World War by British psychologists.

So states have to evolve.. and we can't do it for them. Thus the question is, does it all come down to the slow evolution of indigenous democratisation?
And what the flying f*** does that mean for our agenda in the worst case, the DR Congo?

[marct]

Hi Colin,

So states have to evolve.. and we can't do it for them. Thus the question is, does it all come down to the slow evolution of indigenous democratisation?

Why assume that governance structures will flow towards democratization in any form? Democracies have a lot of functional requirements (education, leisure time hence decent economy, fairly open communications) and they are stricter for the modern democracies (universally applicable legal system, large bureaucracy hence an even more productive economy to support it). Democracies also have a fairly lousy track record of lasting in any efficient form, usually devolving into mobocracies (Athens, Syracuse), oligarchies (Rome and, possibly, the US), bureaucratic oligarchies (Byzantium, China, Canada & the EU).

And what the flying f*** does that mean for our agenda in the worst case, the DR Congo?

Don't try to create a "Western state" or a "western" army; build a force that matches the stablest state form achievable, which may be a mutated form of a tribal confederacy, albeit with the mandatory democratic trappings.

A lot of this goes back to working with, rather than against, the local culture both civil and military.

Cheers,

Marc

[Old Eagle]

Colin --
I wrote a paper here somewhere giving the "Reader's Digest (r)" version of some of the issues you discuss.

My BOG experience is in Afghanistan and Estonia, although I have done security assistance work elsewhere at the staff level.

I began my experience with SFA as a non-believer. Formal SA and FID were "good enough". However, as I dug into the issue, I became a rabid convert, zealous to the point of St. Paul.

A coupla observations.
1. When you say armies, I believe that you are talking about joint forces in US parlance. Even with this expansion, SFA has to eventually expand to other security forces -- police, constabulary, ICE, etc. This was one of our failings in the past. By focusing on the military, we sometimes created conditions that were not sustainable in a "western" context, e.g. civilian control of the military, military fighting (or deterring wars), police enforcing laws, etc.

2. I believe that Korea is an example of things working well over time. When the north invaded in 1950, ROKA forces with their American advisors did not perform well. By 1967, the ROKA had defensive responsibility for the entire de-militarized zone with the north, with the exception of a relatively narrow front along MSR 1. Additionally, they were able to send 2 divisions to Vietnam, Tiger and White Horse if memory serves (it often doesn't, so look everything up). Now the US plays no real tactical role there at all.

3. By focusing on military forces, we sometimes neglected the infrastructure it takes to sustain the effort. Training and equipping tactical units turns into a never-ending process. Somewhere along the line, sustaining organizations and capabilities need to be added to the mix -- manning, training, equipping, maintaining, etc.

4. By focusing on military forces, we sometimes set up conditions for military dictatorships, some under the guise of pseudo-democracies. This occasionally became an embarassment, especially in Latin America.

Now, you can expand all of the above, implement vigorously, and still be unsuccessful. Why? I would submit that many of the resulting shortcomings are the product of inadequate advisor development and lack of deep enough engagement with the host nation/organization. There are probably others.

SFA is a powerful weapon, but it is not fire and forget.

Bring it on.

[Stan]

Hey Colin,
Thanks for the emails and interesting read !

So states have to evolve.. and we can't do it for them. Thus the question is, does it all come down to the slow evolution of indigenous democratisation?
And what the flying f*** does that mean for our agenda in the worst case, the DR Congo?

The only thing I can add at this point similar to our correspondence is, Western technology and ideals will never fix the DRC. If the Africans don't do it on their own terms and time, it will never happen.

IMO, the single most common denominator in all our failures is our lack of understanding...

Hi Colin,
Don't try to create a "Western state" or a "western" army;...
A lot of this goes back to working with, rather than against, the local culture both civil and military.

For more than a decade I watched millions dumped into a bottomless pit and the results were as follows...

4. By focusing on military forces, we sometimes set up conditions for military dictatorships, some under the guise of pseudo-democracies. This occasionally became an embarrassment...

You'd make a good Army NCO

Regards, Stan

[marct]

Hey Stan,

What can I say? I've been reading Tom Kratman's latest !

Leaving that aside (totally unpaid advert, but The Lotus Eaters is worth it!), the idea that we can go in and "fix" a culture is just laughable to me. F&#k it up, yeah, but turn it into something like us? NFW. I just wish that some of my PC colleagues would realize that free will (and free choice) means that people can choose to live as they like rather than how some ideologue supposes that they should.

TTFN

Marc

ps. Stan, wish you had been in Ottawa a couple of weeks back, Absolute kick-ass concert; Victoria 1605 Requiem, Allegri's Miserie mei, plus other "stuff". You would have loved it.

[Stan]

Hey Marc !

Hey Stan,

What can I say? I've been reading Tom Kratman's latest !

ps. Stan, wish you had been in Ottawa a couple of weeks back, Absolute kick-ass concert; Victoria 1605 Requiem, Allegri's Miserie mei, plus other "stuff". You would have loved it.

I hate you - As I pine away with a balmy 5 degrees of Estonian Spring listening to renditions of the Grateful Dead on the radio Sounds like something I would have indeed enjoyed ! Seems Tom Kratman (and Odom) has disappeared and no doubt on another journey.

Hey Colin,

Stan - voice with multiple years of rubber-hits-the-road experience in a very bad place welcome. My time in Kinshasa and Kisangani was limited to two weeks. Would like to go back some time. Question, for the East, is French or Swahili better? And where would be best, if Swahili is best, to learn Swahili?

As you already have French under your belt (and would have to be retaught Belgian French to comprehend the Zairois (and truly infuriate the real French) ), I would recommend Lingala over Swahili regardless of the region. Even in Rwanda I got by with Lingala. I learned Lingala mostly by default working with the military in Gbadolite and Kinshasa, but it came in handy all over. You may have also noticed that even with Lingala or Swahili, they still use much of the French language merely to borrow words especially during bartering. I know some humanitarian deminers that found they were lost with just French and began learning Lingala too.

BTW, a General in DIA call Zaire "one of the most inhospitable places on earth". I often referred to the country in message traffic as it was always known --- The Heart of Darkness.

I have read through the thread, but have we not missed those countries where post-conflict and post-intervention there has been a long term relationship between the West (generally) and the national military?

David's got a good point. We have some post-intervention success stories that rarely make the press. Makes me wonder what recipe we used then, that obviously aren't working now.

[Colin Robinson]

Thanks all.
David, the reason that I haven't been looking at those type of armies is my case restriction for the PhD - basically post 1990 and after UN and other intervention forces. My 14 + 1 case studies are: Zimbabwe 1980 -, Nambia (UNTAG) 1990, Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 1993 -, South Africa (nobody/BMATT), 1994 -, Bosnia-Herzegovina (1, MPRI, 2, Defence Reform Commission etc), 1996-, East Timor (INTERFET) 1999, Sierra Leone (British & UNAMSIL) around 1998-99 -, Afghanistan (OEF) (2002 - ), DR Congo (2003 - ) Iraq (2003 - ), Liberia (UNMIL) (2004-), S Sudan (2005-), Nepal (2006) -, and Kosovo (KFOR) (2008-). The key question is how to provide security for development, with an African bias because Africa is usually under-examined.

Thus places like Korea are not included because they're Cold War and now developed. That does not mean that there are not valuable lessons to draw.

Stan, thanks. But what about Lingala in N Kivu / S Kivu? Still applies? The thing is that if one goes as a English-language teacher / foreign language student, which is one of the things I'm idly considering, Tanzania is much easier and safer to learn Swahili in. Never mind, these possibilities are years away - but good to get views on the options.

[davidbfpo]

Colin,

Thanks for the clarification, which was what I suspected.

How about Rwanda? I am aware that the RPF was Uganda-based and after victory became the new RPA. I know the UK has been involved in SSR there, although without any details.

A long time ago the UK had a small BMATT in Uganda, IIRC after Idi Amin's fall and they may not have stayed for long - due to the lack of security.

What has been the impact on Kenya of a continuing UK military presence since independence? The presence is ostensibly for the training of UK troops and as the US Embassy attack showed there was a UK engineer capability available. I understand there is often an infantry battalion in country all year.

Another aspect is the deployment of 'new' armies in UN / AU peacekeeping, what impact does that have on a national military? Three African countries on your list have participated: Namibia, Zimbabwe and RSA (I include the DRC World War).

Just a few thoughts.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan, I hear what you are saying and all too often you are right. But what I mean by advice - and this is the way I practiced it as a civilian USG type, soldier, and free lance researcher - is that my advice to my counterparts was just my best guess as to what would work to achieve their goals. I never claimed to have a monopoly on truth and I always listened to their views. Sometimes their views would come out on top; sometimes mine; most often some amalgam of both brought out by mutually respectful discussion during which there was quite a bit of disagreement.

I agree that's the ideal way to do it... i just feel that our approach often makes that ideal more difficult to attain. The perception that "shared goals" are a precondition to US support creates an incentive for our partners to conceal goals that may not be shared and exaggerate those that are. At the same time, Americans often assume that our goals are universal and of self-evident virtue, and may not perceive that the other party may have divergent goals.

Disagreement, in these cases, is a good thing and one to be encouraged: it means that the goal divergences are out in the open and being discussed, and can likely be managed. If there's no disagreement, either everyone is on exactly the same page and pulling in exactly the same direction (yeah, right) or the goal divergences are not being recognized, which is not so good: they've a way of emerging to bite us on the ass at critical moments.

Of course there are times when there's outright manipulation. Lots of people wistfully remember the good old days (for them) when the word "communist" was the key to the US treasury. Then that stopped working, and all of a sudden here's the word "terrorist".... ka-ching. Of course that's not always the case, but it's something that we need to be alert to, and in general I'd say our people need to be more aware of the reality of divergent goals and the need to address and manage them.

If there's one piece of advice I'd give an adviser-to-be it would be this...

If you see people doing things that make no sense to you, don't assume they're stupid, irrational, or deranged. Assume that there is some factor in the picture that you don't see - because there always is.

A one year tour is simply too short to get a solid grounding in all the situational and personality quirks. Two years would be much better with, generally, return to the same area after going home for "reblueing."

With this I'd agree completely, but would add an additional concern with rapid turnover: Americans are typically comfortable with institutional relationships, but many of the cultures we work with think in more personal terms, and a relationship with one individual may not be inherited by a successor simply because they both represent the same institution. Of course rotation is inevitable, but we need to be more aware that a counterpart may see their relationship as one with an individual, not with the US Government, and this may take time to rebuild.

The key question is how to provide security for development, with an African bias because Africa is usually under-examined.

That of course brings us to the question of what development is, and how to provide it, which is often even thornier than the problem of achieving security! Hopefully you don't have to deal with that one...

[Tom Kratman]

Nah, I'm still around, but if I have nothing to say on a given subject then there's no sense saying it.

Hey Marc !



I hate you - As I pine away with a balmy 5 degrees of Estonian Spring listening to renditions of the Grateful Dead on the radio Sounds like something I would have indeed enjoyed ! Seems Tom Kratman (and Odom) has disappeared and no doubt on another journey.

Hey Colin,



As you already have French under your belt (and would have to be retaught Belgian French to comprehend the Zairois (and truly infuriate the real French) ), I would recommend Lingala over Swahili regardless of the region. Even in Rwanda I got by with Lingala. I learned Lingala mostly by default working with the military in Gbadolite and Kinshasa, but it came in handy all over. You may have also noticed that even with Lingala or Swahili, they still use much of the French language merely to borrow words especially during bartering. I know some humanitarian deminers that found they were lost with just French and began learning Lingala too.

BTW, a General in DIA call Zaire "one of the most inhospitable places on earth". I often referred to the country in message traffic as it was always known --- The Heart of Darkness.



David's got a good point. We have some post-intervention success stories that rarely make the press. Makes me wonder what recipe we used then, that obviously aren't working now.

[Stan]

Hey Tom,

Nah, I'm still around, but if I have nothing to say on a given subject then there's no sense saying it.

Jeez, for someone with nothing to say herein... can't wait for your interest to peak

Then there's always professional help available...

Well, it's all in the coding ! Sometimes, I just cheat and use wordpad....

Stan, thanks. But what about Lingala in N Kivu / S Kivu? Still applies? The thing is that if one goes as a English-language teacher / foreign language student, which is one of the things I'm idly considering, Tanzania is much easier and safer to learn Swahili in. Never mind, these possibilities are years away - but good to get views on the options.

Hi Colin,
I think there's more than 100 examples of Peace Corps workers doing the exact same thing in Kivu. For that matter, my time in Goma and Bukavu went relatively well with Lingala. Let's not forget that much like any trading border, there's little if any language barriers. In the late 80s I traveled to the bitter end of Lake Tanganyika with a bunch of Brits and Lingala worked much better than French (well, if you've ever heard a Brit speak French, you'd be inclined to learn Lingala too ).

[Dayuhan]

And what the flying f*** does that mean for our agenda in the worst case, the DR Congo?

An obvious starting point would be to ask what exactly is our agenda in the DR Congo, or anywhere else we contemplate involvement. What exactly are we trying to accomplish, and why? Are these goals achievable with the resources we have available for the task?

Fairly obvious questions, but they need to be asked and realistically answered.

I really need to reread American Caesar again. Then we could have a long discussion about the readiness level of the Phil National Guard and McArthur's decision to prioritise the Guard over the regulars up to 41.

Well, since tomorrow is the anniversary of the Bataan surrender (national holiday here)... you could argue that MacArthur's involvement with the Philippine Commonwealth was an early example of an American advisory relationship, and thus that it's relevant to the discussion. Beyond that, of course it's a difficult slice of history to examine clearly, especially based on secondary sources... hard to tell where the legend and the ego leave off and the reality begins. There are certainly many criticisms that can be aimed at MacArthur's preparations (I've been known to make them myself), but the underestimation of Japanese capacity was hardly limited to MacArthur, and it's by no means clear that other courses of action would have had materially better results, given the available time and resources.

Another interesting early attempt at the advisory role would be the relationship between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-Shek... again, one where it is easy to criticize and difficult to convincingly establish that another approach would have done better.

To relate that tangent to the DR Congo... selecting unachievable goals is an excellent prescription for failure. If we insist on sending someone out to ride a unicycle up Mt Everest we shouldn't expect a triumphant return.

[Colin Robinson]

Thanks guys.. lots of stuff to chew through.
MarcT: Great stuff.. fantastic for my conclusions thinking. My prospective external examiner writes on democratisation and security, so these extra perspectives are great.
Old Eagle - one small point, I understand most of the acronyms and figured out BOG, but not ICE unless we're talking modifications to German F-4s which I believe we are not. What is ICE? No, my thesis specifically focuses on armies as armed state land forces, not joint Air/Land/Navy/Marines/SOF, or other security forces. Could you point me at your paper - it would be really useful. What's the title? I have incorporated the need for institutions etc, maint/logs, it's one of the main points from Zimbabwe from 1980 onwards. I have noticed the tendency of the United States to focus on building up armies and armed forces as opposed to police, health, other government departments etc. Can someone fill me in on why the US focuses on the army and armed forces so much? As a Kiwi yes I'd believe that often the army is the wrong institution to start with.
Stan - voice with multiple years of rubber-hits-the-road experience in a very bad place welcome. My time in Kinshasa and Kisangani was limited to two weeks. Would like to go back some time. Question, for the East, is French or Swahili better? And where would be best, if Swahili is best, to learn Swahili?
Dayuhan - as ADP 1 Land Operations puts it, Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. Always important

[William F. Owen]

Apparently the British Army officer selection system was copied off the Germans after the end of the Second World War by British psychologists.

I'd take all that with a huge pinch of salt. Based on some years of study I'd attribute German tactical skill to the devolvement of mission success to the lowest possible level (individuals) and giving them very simple conceptual tools with which to work. It really is that simple.

Training world class infantry (and thus Armies) is easy to do. What stops us doing that is all the stuff folks think is important, rather than what we know is. A lot of what folks things makes good armies and good training is faith-based.

There is good evidence that Armies built on Individual Responsibility, Merit and Shame and that prize results over process are usually a lot better than those that do not.

[John T. Fishel]

know about "an officer and a gentleman by Act of Congress." We (the US) borrow a whole lot from the Brits but have modified it in any number of ways. The American military officer corps has always seen itself in larg part as a vocation but that view is complicated by the militia, the Volunteers (1845 - 1900), and the Reserve (and Nasty Guard). What is interesting about the American military in this regard is that there is no way you can tell by looking at a soldier, sailor, airman, Marine (or officer in any of those services) whether one is regular or reserve component.

What does any of this have to do with what Colin is talking about? Well, culture matters both in terms of what we perceive and what our counterparts perceive. Our SF in el Salvador saw a failure on the part of the ESAF to have an effective first line management which they attributed to a lack of a professional NCO corps. But an NCO corps was seen by the ESAF as a threat tot their officer corps so they resisted that as the solution. BTW, we never solved that problem, although given time, intensity of focus, and consistency of players, we might have come up with an answer as long as it met Salvadoran perceived needs.

Finally, I like Wilf's notion of merit + with the qualification that it adopting such a system must fit within the frame of reference of the host.

Cheers

JohnT