The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[slapout9]

Let me try one more time...

Rewind to before we decided that using airpower as a means to establish a no-fly zone was the proper course of action regardles of where it lead...

What SHOULD have been done to try to reconcile the competing desired end-states the various participants had (have)? Is it the US gets to pick becasue we have the most toys? Should Italy becasue Libya used to be Italy's? France because its "neutral"?

I don't know what should have been done, but I do know it needed to be done before the military option was decided on. The Political Objective (what kind of peace do you want) has to be decided by politicians not the miltary. And you need to do it before hand. My personal opinion is this is all about Oil and the US should get out of the entire region! and concentrate everything we can to achieve total Independence on foreign oil.

What if there is no singular desired end-state but a range of possible outcomes that can all have a pro-adversary tint to them or a pro- good guys tint to them?

Again that is the political arrangement that has to be decide by the politicians before the military option is chosen.

Do you acknowledge a dichotomy in strategic method MIGHT exist?

No, I acknowledge a dichotomy in "Grand Strategic" method exist.

You keep inserting things in the discussion that we are not disagreeing on in response to what we do disagree on.

Sorry, will try not to do that anymore.

[Marc]

Let me try one more time...

Rewind to before we decided that using airpower as a means to establish a no-fly zone was the proper course of action regardles of where it lead...

What SHOULD have been done to try to reconcile the competing desired end-states the various participants had (have)? Is it the US gets to pick becasue we have the most toys? Should Italy becasue Libya used to be Italy's? France because its "neutral"?

What if there is no singular desired end-state but a range of possible outcomes that can all have a pro-adversary tint to them or a pro- good guys tint to them?

Do you acknowledge a dichotmy in strategic method MIGHT exist?

Again the issue is not airpowers importance or effectiveness. I read Col Owens book on Deliberate Force. The take away was that it took WAY longer and was WAYYY more expensive than the Air Force predicted, but Airpower (with a little bit of pressure from a marginally effective KLA ground force...) did come through in the end.

You kep inserting things in the discussion that we are not disagreeing on in response to what we do disagree on.

pvebber,

It is always difficult to argue with a true believer. However, the quote below explains why.

I agree it doesn't answer the question which is why the Libya situation is probably not going to end well. We just jumped in with Airpower and think this will make it OK, probably want. Which again is Warden's point Strategy has to come first before you decide on the means, whatever it may be. We have never defined what we (US) really want except for Daffy to be gone, whatever that means. Until that is clearly defined it dosen't matter how good your Airpower,Groundpower,or Seapower is, it is a mission with no end. Which from the most recent reports I have seen is exactly what it is turning into.

The quote means that Warden and his strategy are right and that the politicians are wrong. This statement is smart. Two things can happen: ONE: airpower can force Qadhafi to his knees. In that case, Warden is right because his strategy worked. TWO: airpower can fail to force Qadhafi to his knees. In that case, Warden is right but the politicians failed to apply his strategy in the right way.

The trick to counter a true believer's circular argument is to find inconsistencies in Warden's text itself. That inconsistency is stated in Warden's original article:

All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment. In World War II the United States and her Allies imposed widespread destruction and civilian casualties on Japan and Germany; prior to the Gulf War, a new political climate meant that a proposal to impose similar damage on Iraq would have met overwhelming opposition from American and coalition political leaders.

In other words, a strategist cannot blame a politician for a failure in strategy to deliver the expected results. It is the strategist's job to come up with a strategy within the limitations of politics. It is not the politician's job to make realities fit the strategy.

Marc

[pvebber]

I don't know what should have been done, but I do know it needed to be done before the military option was decided on. The Political Objective (what kind of peace do you want) has to be decided by politicians not the miltary. And you need to do it before hand. My personal opinion is this is all about Oil and the US should get out of the entire region! and concentrate everything we can to achieve total Independence on foreign oil.

What I'm looking for is the connection between Warden's desire for airmen to decide strategy as part of a direct connection from sortie to strategic end-state, and the reality that currently politicians do that and in generall can't come to consensus on it before the politically motivated desire to act overcomes the desire to think the whole problme through beofre acting (which may preclude action, because consensus at that level may never occur.)

Even if we achieve total oil independence, would not a bloodbath by Gaddafi while we sit on the sidelines and watch totally undermine our "strategy" of fostering democracy in the emerging world? I don't we care nearly as much about the oil in Libya as Fina Total (France) and Eni (Italy).

No, I acknowledge a dichotomy in "Grand Strategic" method exist.

What is your notion of the difference between "desired endstate" in Warden's mind and "grand strategic political objective"?

What about the construct I've outlined differentiating between situations where you work back from a sigular desired endstate and those when you evolve forward toward maximizing the benefit under a range of potential endstates? Is that "grand strategy" not "strategy"? Why would it only apply to "Grand Strategy" and not just "strategy".

Given one is the basic mindset of airpower advocates and the other the basic mindset of landforce advocates, it represents a dichotomy in "military strategy" not "Grand Strategy".

Warden's argument that I most strongly disagree with is to claim that only the former is "proper military strategy" and that if you must resort to the other, then you should reject military options.

Would you agree with that?

[slapout9]

pvebber,have to go now, but will respond later.

[pvebber]

The trick to counter a true believer's circular argument is to find inconsistencies in Warden's text itself. That inconsistency is stated in Warden's original article:

I know I'm not going to convert Slap

I'm trying to understand the mindset he has (know thine enemy ) and why he is a "true beleiver" in the controversial ideas?

The controvertial issues raised by Warden's article being:

Why must we

expunge the words fighting, battle, shape the battlefield, battlespace, and the war fighter from our vocabulary,

in order to:

relegate the “means” of war to the last thing we think about, and to elevate the “end” to the pedestal of our consideration.

Regardless of airpower’s potential, it can never realize its real capability so long as it remains bound to an anachronistic view of war with an anachronistic vocabulary.

What is airppower's "true capability"? What is this "new vocabulary"?

If this is to happen, the operators of airpower must understand, believe, and teach end-game strategy as the foundation of airpower.

How is this relevant if politicians determine the end-game strategy, or a concensus as to what it is cannot be achieved before a requirement to act occurs?

To succeed, airpower advocates must stop trying to use airpower as a substitute for its military predecessors, connect it directly to strategic end-games, adopt a new vocabulary to match airpower’s promise, and become serious promoters not of machines but of ideas.

What are these ideas?

Airpower enables us to think about conflict from a future-back,
end-game-first perspective as opposed to one based on the battle obsession
of Clausewitz and his followers. It also opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.

What is it about airpower that will remove the "unknown unknowns" that create "unplanned destruction or shedding of blood". How do we become so cocksure that our plan is going to work?


How can you create a desired end-state and a causally-linked set of events that attain it with a high probability in cases where you are dealing with a complex system (where by definition there is no discernable causal nexus between events.)?

What is it that makes the notion of working back from a single desired end-state and evolving toward maximizing the "goodness" over a range of potential endstates incompatible? Why does one have to "win" over the other? Why can't we use the one that aplys best to a given situation and get the best of both worlds?

[Cliff]

Because adjusted for inflation, a F-4 bought today would cost $13 million, not $140 million and counting with planned upgrades coming for F-22. Plus, AH-64Ds save lives daily in two conflicts. Have yet to hear of an F-22 providing CAS in Afghanistan or Iraq...or Libya. Perhaps the fact that they fly at 60,000 feet and have no EO/IR targeting capability is part of the explanation, not to mention maintenance expense in a desert environment.

So we should only organize/train/equip for the current fight?

With such capable and expensive aircraft, few threat nations can buy more than a few dozen less capable, and less stealthy Russian and Chinese attempts at stealth. In terms of annual defense budget, with the exception of China and Russia deterred by MAD, go all the way to Iran at 23rd to find the first potential foe, with a sub $10 billion annual defense budget and sanctions in place prohibiting them from buying modern aircraft. Ditto for North Korea with a similarly small defense budget. Libya's air force WAS a joke and doubt much remains. Twenty of the top 22 defense budgets are allies or ourselves to help deter Russia and China.

Not arguing with the budget comparison. Nevertheless, China's budget goes a lot farther... because their weapons are being made by Chinese, who get payed a lot less than the average American defense worker.

Your argument that MAD is sufficient for deterring China and Russia is a slippery slope... As we found out with the New Look, this severely constrains your options, and probably isn't a good idea. If China decides to start cutting off Japanese oil over a dispute, are we willing to threaten them with nukes? If the answer is no, then MAD is probably sufficient to insure US national survival, but not protect our national interests.

How long would it take Iran or North Korea to buy 180+ Russian or Chinese "stealth" aircraft at nearly $100 million each? 18 years if they could finance 10 per year at a billion a year...highly unlikely during which time we and allies also field thousands of stealthy F-35s, bombers, and unmanned aircraft.

A long time. Like I said above, they won't have to pay $100 million... because the folks making Chinese or Russian airplanes don't get payed as much as US workers. Again, China and Russia are more the issues, with Iran and NK being more manageable.

Flying at night with F-22 and F-35 escorts, what are the odds of Chinese or Russian "stealth" aircraft even finding our aircraft let alone fighting air-to-air? Stealth cruise missiles and JASSM-ER fired from B-52H and B-1B don't need an escort.

The odds are not 0. B-2s need to be protected if fighters are present. I'll leave it at that.

And again, you can argue all you want about not having a crystal ball but defense budgets don't lie. All realistic threats spend well under $10 billion a year which will never fund either a large air force, naval response, or IADS. We have ample air and seapower planned and programmed. You could easily argue that one or two less CVNs (6 of which typically sit vulnerable in just two U.S. ports) would finance the additional air and seapower without cannibalizing the Army.

According to the unclass 2010 report to Congress on China, the Chinese Air Force has over 327 fourth generation fighters... all of which are very capable. They have 252 advanced SAM systems... neither of these numbers include naval systems. I would submit that we currently have the minimum force required- in fact, it was classified as "moderate risk" in congressional testimony.

That said, you seem to miss my point. I'm not arguing for gutting the Army to buy more F-22s. I would have liked to have seen us buy the 40 more that were in the budget originally to give us a viable/sustainable force - but we didn't, and we're not going to get more. We need new tankers, new CSAR helos and the new bomber more, frankly. The big problem will be our F-16s and F-15s wearing out before we can actually buy F-35s (if and when we get to buy some).

As Secretary Gates said, another large land conflict is unlikely for multiple reasons. Based on the extreme distaste for "boots on the ground", I think the Libya model is much more likely to be the model. I would expect that SOF and adviser forces will be heavily used as well.

Given all of that, we do not have too large an Air Force - we have one that is just large enough to give us a moderate-high level of risk based on our stated national strategy. It is going to get smaller due to attrition and airframes aging out- and that is not a good thing.

As I have said before on this blog, the job of the USAF and USN is to make sure our wars stay small by being so good that they can't be beat. If we can't deter folks conventionally, we're left with nukes, as you mentioned...

I heard an analyst/General admit that Northern Watch was more effective than Southern Watch. Shiites were targeted with WMD and remained oppressed. The Oil for Food program robbed the world of an oil source, just as the Libya no fly zone may eventually. It may have satisfied a stated objective. It did not solve the primary problem.

Saddam used chems on Halabja in Kurdistan in 1988, as well as on the Iranians. There is evidence of his using Mi-8s to drop Sarin on Karbala in March of 1991. Again, all of this was PRIOR to the no-fly zones being enforced- they were established AFTER Saddam attacked the Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the South.

You are now changing the argument... ONW and OSW fulfilled their objectives at a relatively low cost relative to what troops on the ground would have cost. If the objective was regime change, that's a different story.

As I said above, I think we have more NFZs/No drive zones in our future - it is a (relatively) cheap way of stopping dictators from using their high-end military to slaughter their people, and doesn't have the stigma of boots on the ground. Sudan is a good example of a place where we might use this same strategy.

If you disagree with the political objectives, as others have pointed out that's a different story.

V/R,

Cliff

[Cliff]

I've been a bit busy and am behind the power curve as usual.

Before I start, I want to say that I would not classify myself as a "Wardenista" in the sense that I don't think that the 5 rings model is all powerful and usable in any situation. As Col Warden pointed out, sometimes airpower won't be able to be used in some situations.

That said, I think his points about starting at endstate and making that the focus of your efforts are very valid. I also think that trying to do this in the most efficient way possible as quickly as possible is also a good idea. I happen to think that airpower can get the job done in many cases... and I agree with Col Warden that we should be trying to make airpower more effective rather than adapting it and limiting it to what traditional thought would have it be.

I know I'm not going to convert Slap

I'm trying to understand the mindset he has (know thine enemy ) and why he is a "true believer" in the controversial ideas?

The controvertial issues raised by Warden's article being:

What is airppower's "true capability"? What is this "new vocabulary"?

I think Warden would say: The capability to act at the strategic level by bypassing fielded forces and directly affecting multiple centers of gravity in parallel. The new vocabulary is essentially focusing on ends and not battles.

How is this relevant if politicians determine the end-game strategy, or a consensus as to what it is cannot be achieved before a requirement to act occurs?

I assume that you mean politicians can't determine the end game.

I don't think we don't have an end game in mind in Libya. We surely do. Just because we can't talk about it publicly doesn't mean it's not there. I agree on the difficulty of defining the end state, but again I think that's for public consumption... I think the folks involved all have the same end state in mind, they just can't say it.

That said, if there is no end state, then I would argue we wouldn't get involved, as there's nothing to change.

If instead you mean that the long term endstate is undefined -IE we're not sure what we want Libya to look like, but we want to stop the slaughter- then I would argue that stopping the slaughter is still an end state. Refer back to ONW/OSW for a good example of ways to do this. OBTW, those campaigns did use elements of Warden's theory to achieve their limited ends - and they worked out pretty well - 0 US losses over 12 years, and the civilians protected.

What are these ideas?

The ideas Col Warden talks about in his paper. IE, end-state centric, parallel, affect COGs.

What is it about airpower that will remove the "unknown unknowns" that create "unplanned destruction or shedding of blood". How do we become so cocksure that our plan is going to work?

We continue to improve airpower theory, capabilities, and targeting and try to minimize collateral damage.

How can you create a desired end-state and a causally-linked set of events that attain it with a high probability in cases where you are dealing with a complex system (where by definition there is no discernible causal nexus between events.)?

pvebber, I think that it's very rare in human events for there to be no discernible casual nexus, especially in conflict. I agree that systems are complex, and casuality is not certain, but again I think that you are always calculating the most likely response when you talk about military force. Otherwise we would simply throw up our hands and give up on the whole business. The weather is not predictable with high accuracy beyond 24-48 hours.... but we still spend billions to get to a good-enough forecast. We also haven't stopped trying to improve our understanding or models. Why should something arguably just as important (using force to get our way) receive the same attention?

What is it that makes the notion of working back from a single desired end-state and evolving toward maximizing the "goodness" over a range of potential endstates incompatible? Why does one have to "win" over the other? Why can't we use the one that aplys best to a given situation and get the best of both worlds?

Warden is not saying that we can't... in fact, he says that we may be forced to. He is arguing that we should continually strive to to improve our means of reaching our desired endstate with minimum bloodshed.

I think this horse is about dead... you love complex systems theory and feel that nothing is predictable in human behavior. Essentially that means that you're relegated to a completely trial and error process. I am saying that we should continue to try and improve our ability to define an end state and reach it.

Slap pointed out 1942 as an example. Think about how far we've come since then... our ability to affect the enemy as a system is vastly improved- one B-2 can have the same effect as several hundred B-17s. Our intel has also improved massively. Is it perfect? Nope. But does that mean we should freeze things as they are and accept the status quo? I would hope not.

V/R,

Cliff

[pvebber]

I think this horse is about dead... you love complex systems theory and feel that nothing is predictable in human behavior. Essentially that means that you're relegated to a completely trial and error process. I am saying that we should continue to try and improve our ability to define an end state and reach it.

NO!!!!

I'm arguing, as I've reiterated twice - that there are times when Warden's theory is applicable and times when it is not. Once again, I agree that airpower and airpower theory is necessary. We SHOULD improve airpower and airpower theory. Just not at the expense of giving up any and all alternatives.

I can't understand why one strategic method "has to" be the ONLY one we would want to use, or why airpower needs this manifest destiny to be the dominant means to use force in any and all situations.

Why can't we acknowledge that the more tools we have in our kitbag the better? Airpower will always have its limits, as will the "ends drives the means" strategic method. Land and seapower have their limits as does the "trail and error" approach to "wicked problems" and the maritime strategy focus on engagement to prevent problems before they become conflict.

All have their place, and their value. None are superior to the other in all cases and each needs to be the "supported" methodology when appropriate.

To do otherwise is to remove options and limits our ability to defend our nation and her interests abroad.

[Fuchs]

What's lacking - at least in published form - is a theory that guides a decisionmaker in his strategy development in ANY scenario (including scenarios for inferior air powers).

Such a theory would need to take into account
- geography (distances mostly)
- blue and red strength (and ranges)
- blue and red material, political and cultural setup
- blue and red political intent and political leadership (and its preferences)

It should reliably tell when (any why) a certain approach will fail.

The much-hyped air power theories such as Warden's can at most become building blocks in such a general theory. I suspect he has no clue about several really important forks that such a general theory would have. His stuff represents only one perspective on the problem, and way too many people have fixated their view on the very same perspective.

[Steve Blair]

NO!!!!

I'm arguing, as I've reiterated twice - that there are times when Warden's theory is applicable and times when it is not. Once again, I agree that airpower and airpower theory is necessary. We SHOULD improve airpower and airpower theory. Just not at the expense of giving up any and all alternatives.

I can't understand why one strategic method "has to" be the ONLY one we would want to use, or why airpower needs this manifest destiny to be the dominant means to use force in any and all situations.

Why can't we acknowledge that the more tools we have in our kitbag the better? Airpower will always have its limits, as will the "ends drives the means" strategic method. Land and seapower have their limits as does the "trail and error" approach to "wicked problems" and the maritime strategy focus on engagement to prevent problems before they become conflict.

All have their place, and their value. None are superior to the other in all cases and each needs to be the "supported" methodology when appropriate.

To do otherwise is to remove options and limits our ability to defend our nation and her interests abroad.

Very much agree!

[slapout9]

NO!!!!

I'm arguing, as I've reiterated twice - that there are times when Warden's theory is applicable and times when it is not. Once again, I agree that airpower and airpower theory is necessary. We SHOULD improve airpower and airpower theory. Just not at the expense of giving up any and all alternatives.

I can't understand why one strategic method "has to" be the ONLY one we would want to use, or why airpower needs this manifest destiny to be the dominant means to use force in any and all situations.

Why can't we acknowledge that the more tools we have in our kitbag the better? Airpower will always have its limits, as will the "ends drives the means" strategic method. Land and seapower have their limits as does the "trail and error" approach to "wicked problems" and the maritime strategy focus on engagement to prevent problems before they become conflict.

All have their place, and their value. None are superior to the other in all cases and each needs to be the "supported" methodology when appropriate.

To do otherwise is to remove options and limits our ability to defend our nation and her interests abroad.

My schedule is still busy, so not much time. I will go into detail later. Strategy as Warden describes it is service independent! It works for the Ground,Sea or Air. Guerrillas seem to understand it instinctively. Also Warden talks about establishing the "Key" force which is just like what the Marines talk about as establishing the main effort and it very well could be the GROUND force but it all goes back to the political objective. If you want to Colonize a country and Warden has said this himself you will need a large Army, but he also cations about doing this because it will be very difficult,and expensive and in the end you may not get you to final political objective because you will create such hatred in the indigenous population that.......well it is just better not to do it. Gotta go but keep thinking and asking questions, on the whole they are very good and they do have answers.

[Fuchs]

If you want to Colonize a country and Warden has said this himself you will need a large Army, but he also cations about doing this because it will be very difficult,and expensive and in the end you may not get you to final political objective because you will create such hatred in the indigenous population that.......well it is just better not to do it.

Somehow I cannot resist the impression that this ranks among the least relevant arguments against an attempt to colonise a country.

Likewise, discussing it sounds to me like discussing how running against a wall is a bad idea because it damages the wall.


I wonder what it takes to care about such entirely irrelevant aspects of bad moves instead of about the really relevant ones?
The answer is probably not pretty.

[pvebber]

Strategy as Warden describes it is service independent!

Yes, accepted into evidence. My prior characterization of an "airpower" strategic method and "landpower" strategic method are service independant also. In fact the labels in quotes only serve to highlight the source, not to limit applicability.

Why does that make the "ends drives the means" method better than all other strategic methods?

Why should we only have one strategic method?

An example of a problem set where an "ends drives means" approach won't work:

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/12/4252237/

The current Libya situation is one where the drive for action precludes taking the time to form concensus on the desired end state, so we are forced to use "trial and error" ("muddling thorugh" in the authors terms). The author argues this is the normal state of things, not the exception.

Should Adm Mullen has stuck to his guns when he said that establishing a no fly-zone over Libya was "too hard"?

What should his response have been to being dressed down by Sen McCain something to the effect of "We spend 700B$ a year on the military and it can't establish a no fly zone to ground a couple dozen POS aircraft over a tin pot third world dicator's third world country????"

"I would be derelict in my duty, Senator, to engage in such an endeavor without a clear vision of a desired endstate."

I don't think so...

[Marc]

If you want to Colonize a country and Warden has said this himself you will need a large Army, but he also cations about doing this because it will be very difficult,and expensive and in the end you may not get you to final political objective because you will create such hatred in the indigenous population that.......well it is just better not to do it.

Still the same circular argument. Circular reasoning seems to be inherent in the defence of airpower. Warden's new article also contains a good example:

Very simply, whether in war or business, our normal approach to the time element is exactly backward: we ask ourselves how long something will take rather than decide how long it should take in order to create parallel effects and succeed at an acceptable cost. So important is this concept that we can use it to help determine whether or not we want to go to war. If we cannot or will not operate in the parallel domain, then we should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

The circular reasoning is the following: If we can win the war by applying Warden's strategy (creating parallel effects to put the enemy in a state of system paralysis), we should do so by using airpower and airpower only. Conversely, if we cannot win the war by applying Warden's strategy, we should avoid war altogether.

Let me give some examples:

There is a security and drugs problem in Colombia. The FARC destabilizes the country. Colombian cocaine is sold all over the country and even in front of the White House. What should we do? Well, let's ask John A. Warden. John A. Warden will probably say that the five-ring model does not apply to the FARC and that precision bombardements won't work. His answer will be:

We should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

Another example: There is a terrorist threat in the Philippines. The Abu Sayyaf Group, related to Al Qaeda threathens security in the entire region. What should we do? Well, let's ask John A. Warden. John A. Warden will probably say that the five-ring model does not apply to the Abu Sayyaf Group and that precision bombardements won't work. His answer will be:

We should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

One more example: Thanks to Warden's strategy, we were able to overthrow Saddam Hussain. Unfortunately, several emerging terrorist movements in Iraq do not embrace the concept of democracy. What should we do? Well, let's ask John A. Warden. John A. Warden will probably say that the five-ring model does not apply to the Al Zarqawi and Muqtada Al Sadr and that precision bombardements won't work. His answer will be:

We should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

Unfortunately, we are already at war. Then John A. Warden will probably shut up and wait until an army general like Petraeus comes up with an army-centric strategy that works. After that, he will wait even more until the Americans withdraw from Iraq. Once that is achieved, he will wait still a little bit longer until people forget about Petraeus' successful strategy. Then, finally, he will write an article saying that:

Very simply, whether in war or business, our normal approach to the time element is exactly backward: we ask ourselves how long something will take rather than decide how long it should take in order to create parallel effects and succeed at an acceptable cost. So important is this concept that we can use it to help determine whether or not we want to go to war. If we cannot or will not operate in the parallel domain, then we should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

I don't buy it. Do you?... Really?

[pvebber]

The current Libya situation is one where the drive for action precludes taking the time to form concensus on the desired end state, so we are forced to use "trial and error" ("muddling thorugh" in the authors terms). The author argues this is the normal state of things, not the exception.

I left out the link to the other articles:

On Grand Strategy and Libya

and

on muddling through

[slapout9]

Why does that make the "ends drives the means" method better than all other strategic methods?

It avoids the Alice In Wonderland situation. If you don't know where you are going anyroad will take you there.

Why should we only have one strategic method?

Not sure I understand the question but it is a single process that will produce multiple Strategic options, a very good thing IMO when you are dealing with those pesky Complex systems you talk about.

An example of a problem set where an "ends drives means" approach won't work:

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/12/4252237/

I have been following the Design debate on the Blog. IMO they are going down the road of EBO. They will end up with something so complicated that it will end up being useless.

The current Libya situation is one where the drive for action precludes taking the time to form concensus on the desired end state, so we are forced to use "trial and error" ("muddling thorugh" in the authors terms). The author argues this is the normal state of things, not the exception.

That is not a desription of a wicked problem, it is a description of a mistake IMO.

Should Adm Mullen has stuck to his guns when he said that establishing a no fly-zone over Libya was "too hard"?

No he should have said in his professional military opinion that a No Fly zone will not accomplish the mission. But if the political objective is to protect the population he would do his sworn duty and create a Strategy to accomplish that mission and present it before him when completed.

What should his response have been to being dressed down by Sen McCain something to the effect of "We spend 700B$ a year on the military and it can't establish a no fly zone to ground a couple dozen POS aircraft over a tin pot third world dicator's third world country????"

The response should have been "Tell It To The Marines"

"I would be derelict in my duty, Senator, to engage in such an endeavor without a clear vision of a desired endstate."

I don't think so...

See all the above

[pvebber]

It avoids the Alice In Wonderland situation. If you don't know where you are going anyroad will take you there.

The most recent movie version being an excellent counter-example. The desired end-state may not be about "being anywhere", but what you believe your capability to act is when you decide to accept the role of protangonist in a confrontation. You may not have a clear understanding of what the outcome of the confrontation may be, just a moral understanding that if you do not decide to act, bad things will happen.

Warden appears to be saying that taking no action in such circumstatnces is preferrable to taking action that is not directly linked to achieving a desired end-state. In a moral vacuum this may be the most efficient, but the world does not exist in a moral vacuum.

In other words, building on your analogy (always dangerous ) the Warden theory presupposes a known destination, a map, and the existance of roads that take you from where you are to where you want to be. That is indeed one subset of military problem. But it is not the totality of military (or policy) problems in general. The paper on "mudlding through" (above) explains this quite well. Sometimes there is only a vast desert and the knowledge that if you stay where you are, you will likely die. Going ANYWHERE is preferable to going nowhere.

(with an interesting anecdote in tax policy in the case of Reagan lowering taxes and getting a beneficial economic result and Clinton raising taxes and getting a benficial economic result. One view is that the act of making a decision in each case bouyed public confidence well above what the economic mechanics of the specifc decision would indicate.)

Not sure I understand the question but it is a single process that will produce multiple Strategic options, a very good thing IMO when you are dealing with those pesky Complex systems you talk about.

The question is: "given that the 'ends drives the means' is only one of many strategic methods, why should all others be ignored?"

Other methods provide multiple options as well, arguably superior ones when the "end" or the "problem" is not clearly defined (the pesky complex or 'wicked' problems).

What evidence is there for ruling the others out?

I have been following the Design debate on the Blog. IMO they are going down the road of EBO. They will end up with something so complicated that it will end up being useless.

EBO is a direct application of Wardens methodology, though with some pathologies introduced that are not attributable to his theory.

Design theories actually leave open the possibility of applying a Warden-like methodology, if it is appropriate. The key aspect design methods add (that some argue convincingly are already a part of 'regular' mission analysis and assessment) is a thorough examination of the problem and what sort of problem-solving strategies are amenable to it. It also has a direct impact on battle rhythm that is not sufficiently articulated, and potential the "difference-maker" in its application.

Key areas where it conflicts with Warden's theory are:

Questioning the validity of assumptions and implict knowledge.

Design methods treat assumptions and implicit knowledge as variables, not constants. Warden's theory has implict roots in bayesian inference - that you can "fill in" for missing information by making assumptions and applying a beleif metric to them. If you don't know something for sure, but belive something is true, you assign a confidence level to how strongly you believe it and that you now have a substitute for actual information.

This is a planning pathology arising from the common practice of "assuming your superiors assumptions are facts" for the purpose of lower level planning. This is the number 1 problem with EVERY actual instance of EBO I've seen utilized and is "hard-coded" into most of the EBO and EBO-based assessment tools I've evaluated. A good friend of mine from the Naval War College has made great strides, particularly withthe USMC, in fixing this, but with the unfortunate result of convincing senior officers that there are times they must say "we don't know" rather than "turning the Bayesian inference crank" on numbers with meaningless confidence and presenting them as "best approximation to truth" (but essentially known to be incorrect).

The key is to accept that you don't know what you don't know, and that much of what you think you know is actually wrong. Warden's theory leads one to use what they have and act on the assumption it is true and develop a single "transfer function" from current state to a single desired end-state.


Using multiple hypotheses for how a system can change (resulting in multiple potneital endstates) rather than a single one derived from "working backwards" from a single desired endstate.

Design admits that multiple perceptions of reality exist and that multiple hypotheses (transfer functions) may act on the current state to create a multitude of possible endstates and that artificially reducing that to a single case exposes you to serious cases of unintended consequences.

This requires the identification of desirable and undesirable characteristics of possible end-states, but accepts the reality that in many cases, you do not have sufficent control over all the variables in play to drive the system to a single desired end-state. You instead evaluate a number of characterisitcs, and try t increase the desirable ones nad decrease the undesirable ones, but in most systems any action will have a mixed effect that is dynamic over time. While not random "trial and error", it similarly can't simply "dial the good up and the bad down".


The construction of a "theory of action" for how those hypotheses can be evaluated over time, potentially reducing the number of potential endstates "in play" and increasing the proability of locking out undesirable ones and locking in desirable ones.

Wardens Rings are categories of things and while it is easy to place targets into the rings categorically, it is extremely difficult to establish the realitionships between the things within a ring, and even more difficult to establlish the realtionships between rings. The construction of a "theory of action" involves looking at flows among entities - information, materiel, personnel etc. to ascertain centers of gravity not based on what ring they occupy, but what the broader realtionship within the system is. THis is indeed a more complicated thing to accomplish than simply placiing tagets in categories and looking for "weak sisters" - but it is the level of detail needed to make systems theory "actionable" in more than a broad brush way. This level of detail is what gets you from Col Warden's statement that the only way to stop Iran's nuclear program was to "shut down their electrical grid" to the Stuxtnet viirus - an extremely precisly targeted attack on a very specific "flaw in the deathstar" that somebody likely spent years developing the required information to achive.


One is constantly reavaluating the problem framework and solution space to assess whether the planning process has been "overtaken by events" and a fresh look at the situation needs to be initiated.

Rather than artificially constrain yourself to short timelines becasue "its cheaper" design approches engage a problem over time to see if the an initial desirable outcome "has legs". It helps avoid a "mission accomplished moment" that the Warden methodology of going for quick success and declaring victory leaves one open to.

That is not a desription of a wicked problem, it is a description of a mistake IMO.

It was not meant as an example of a "wicked problem" but an example of a "common problem". (in fact a realtively "simple" one - but which is still highly politically problemmatic.

No he should have said in his professional military opinion that a No Fly zone will not accomplish the mission. But if the political objective is to protect the population he would do his sworn duty and create a Strategy to accomplish that mission and present it before him when completed.

What mission? In this case establishing the no-fly zone WAS 'the mission'. That the politicians have not yet reached concensus on the 'desired endstate' is immaterial to the military which is supposed to give a "jolly aye-aye and how high" when politicians give them a job to do.

You are basically saying that the military should tell their civilian bosses to go stick it when the task they are given does not meet a very narrow set of criteria. That violates our cherished tradtion of civilian control of the military.

The response should have been "Tell It To The Marines"

Really? REALLY?!?!?

[Fuchs]

Related resources:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/apty/aptytoc.htm

[slapout9]

Really? REALLY?!?!?

After typing for about 20 minutes I hit the wrong button so unitl later it can all be summed up by Detective Joe Friday-from Dragnet fame.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P6zrG...eature=related

[pvebber]

To paraphrase an old boss of mine: "This systems analysis stuff would be so much easier if the systems analysts would just stay the heck out of it".

What systems analysts are good for


I wish I had a nickel for every time that happened to me and I promise to do my replies in wordpad and copy and paste them in...but I never do it more than once...