Patrol Base Density and Proximity - Too many and too close?

[Red Rat]

Happy birthday Marine! Always nice when there is a new kid on the block!!!

Speaking as a Brit I think that where we got it wrong is that we established a large number of patrol bases to dominate the ground with the purpose of securing the population. But we over-extended. We dominated the ground and in turn secured the population (eventually), but we fixed ourselves in PBs and at unit and formation level lost the ability to flex combat power around the AO to disrupt and attrit the enemy. We ended up establishing a semi-secure zone (little overt enemy activity) and established a recognisable FLET (Forward Line Enemy Troops), but with little ability to flex beyond the FLET. That ceded at local level a degree of initiative and freedom of manoeuvre to the enemy that was unhelpful in many ways.

I think it boils down to planning. When you establish a PB you need troops to secure the PB and dominate the ground around it, but you also need to maintain the ability to keep the enemy on the backfoot. In AFG I think greater synchronisation (although I believe it is better now) with ANSF so as ISAF pushes the security bubble out ANSF fill the space behind is the key. This enables ISAF (or ANSF, does not really matter) to continue to conduct offensive operations.

Successful COIN operations require many things, not least mass time and presence to 'secure the population', but it also requires effective manoeuvre operations to strike the enemy. I think we lost the ability to do that for a wee while because we overextended. It is a lesson that has been recognised.

Lastly to quote a Law Enforcement analogy I recently heard: "It is not police stations that make people feel safe, but policemen on the beat".

[Red Rat]

And another thing!

The questions is not necessarily 'how many patrol bases and how close', but 'what do I want to achieve and what is the best way of achieving it?' It is just possible we became fixated by the US surge success and 'living among the people' in Iraq and tried to translate it to Afghanistan, without really understanding what happened in Iraq and what was happening in Afghanistan.

Things continually change and move on, so must we.

[Ken White]

The questions is not necessarily 'how many patrol bases and how close', but 'what do I want to achieve and what is the best way of achieving it?' It is just possible we became fixated by the US surge success and 'living among the people' in Iraq and tried to translate it to Afghanistan, without really understanding what happened in Iraq and what was happening in Afghanistan.

Absolutely correct on the first item, and certainly seem correct on the second. The ego of the person who had been in Iraq (whoever or whatever he or she was...) was destined to rule what was done in a later tour to Afghanistan. Two very different wars and sets of terrain and people...

Things continually change and move on, so must we.

True - some do that well, many more have difficulty with it.

Pete:Yep. He learned it from Samuel Nicholas.

[Infanteer]

1. I think there are a few more factors that need to be added to the equation of "population / counter-insurgents = force ratio and/or "bed-down" density. These are:

a. As Tom mentioned, the cultural factor. There certainly is a "too much", this is probably based on (b);

b. What your forces are doing in said bases; and

c. The relationship of static to mobile forces. Putting all your forces into static bases doesn't give you much room to flex.

2. More on (b) above; what you're doing is based off your mission. I think, at the tactical level, if you use "secure the populace" as your mission, you're setting yourself up for the fall.

3.

we established a large number of patrol bases to dominate the ground with the purpose of securing the population. But we over-extended. We dominated the ground and in turn secured the population (eventually), but we fixed ourselves in PBs and at unit and formation level lost the ability to flex combat power around the AO to disrupt and attrit the enemy. We ended up establishing a semi-secure zone (little overt enemy activity) and established a recognisable FLET (Forward Line Enemy Troops), but with little ability to flex beyond the FLET. That ceded at local level a degree of initiative and freedom of manoeuvre to the enemy that was unhelpful in many ways.

Hey, sounds like my tour!