Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
More difficult quite probably, but more complex I do not think so. Essentially we are doing the same thing in conventional warfare as we are in COIN except with emphasis on different parts of the system.
I'm not sure even that distinction is meaningful, let alone real. Sure, there's this very lengthy framework with lots of new diagrams purporting to be models, but application devolves into applying scheme and or mass "as the situation requires" (in view of the planner and his commander), which is essentially what happens in conventional formations today and in...well...pretty much every other formation in the past. More concretely, what passes for models connecting to COIN principles uniquely to disposition and equipment of the army, her movement, and rules of engagement also appear to be ad hoc. Consequently, there's no way to tell simply based on principle or resultant model whether any of this stuff actually works, let alone draw boundaries between COIN and non-COIN types of operations.

Digressing slightly, but on the difficulty side; I wonder if we put two evenly matched opponents (in terms of military capability) against each other whether thay would find conventional ops any more difficult then COIN ops? Of the 'find, fix, strike and exploit' elements; in COIN none of them leap out as any more difficult to do then in conventional ops, less I think 'exploit'.

With COIN the insurgent has an assymetric advantage in 'find, fix, strike., exploit' but we tend to regard conventional ops as easier because historically in the mid-late 20th century we've had the advantage in 'find - strike'.
How does a military's advantage in intelligence and firepower confer an inherent advantage to insurgents in fixing and scheming?