Afghanistan ROE Change

[Ken White]

And an excellent idea you also have. You're more energetic than I am; I'm off to Krispy Kreme ®.

[jmm99]

the BBC transcript (with the audio feed):

The deputy commander of Nato-led forces in Afghanistan, Jim Dutton, said a "fundamental mindset change" had been taking place for some time and was now being reinforced under Gen McChrystal.

"If you are in a situation where you are under fire from the enemy... if there is any chance of creating civilian casualties or if you don't know whether you will create civilian casualties, if you can withdraw from that situation without firing, then you must do so," he told the BBC.

Just before this, Dutton outlined the problem of creating guidelines for troops from 42 nations, etc. He also noted that the rules (RUFs do seem more appropriate a designation, though he used neither ROEs nor RUFs expressly) were intended to address the primary problems of air and indirect fires. However, his quote above encompasses direct fires as well.

[Blackjack]

I wonder if AQ has a Micromanagement/Risk Aversion/Lawfare Exploitation cell? If is does it is probably working overtime right now.

“If you are in a situation where you are under fire from the enemy... if there is any chance of creating civilian casualties or if you don't know whether you will create civilian casualties, if you can withdraw from that situation without firing, then you must do so".

As I have said several times, I agree with a lot of the members here about the use of air strikes and indirect fires. However, it is fairly obvious the general is speaking of direct fires as well. General Dutton made that abundantly clear as to the commander's intent of these changes. The problem is the overuse of air strikes and arty, yet the change according to General Dutton is clear that the policy applies to direct fires as well. This is precisely why I used the wording I did in previous statements. It went from a suggestion to a lawful order just like that.

All of this has left me with a few more questions like:

Could the fact that there is potential for civilians to be injured or killed in any built up area, this could effectively put build up areas off limits?

How is this going to effect commanders and NCOs? Will we start seeing a more timid form of engagement, unwillingness to engage in the first place if for no other reson than avoiding a lot of investigations, or murder charges?

How long is it going to take for the Taliban and other insurgent groups to exploit these changes and game the system like they usually do?

[AnalyticType]

[...]How long is it going to take for the Taliban and other insurgent groups to exploit these changes and game the system like they usually do?

About two hours after they have knowledge of the ROE's details and that it's in effect.

Just my 2psi

But as was brought up previously, it is possible that this publicly-broadcast change is for Talibani consumption. They watch CNN too.

[Blackjack]

Yes, that is very possible, and the same British General that spoke is speaking of ramping up operations this summer. I still have my doubts, but I will know more by the end of September, as we all will. Hopefully the airstrikes bit is not a play though.

[lobo]

About two hours after they have knowledge of the ROE's details and that it's in effect.

Just my 2psi

But as was brought up previously, it is possible that this publicly-broadcast change is for Talibani consumption. They watch CNN too.

true, that is a point to consider. But I can also see certain members of our political leadership and the media screaming that they were used in tricking the enemy and that we need to play by the rules.... *snort*

Lobo
"We few, we happy few, we band of brothers. For he today that sheds his blood with me shall be my brother...."
William Shakespeare, Henry V

[Greyhawk]

Niel (if you're still tracking)
Heard, understood, appreciate your previous comments here.

In a slightly different scenario, I wonder how application would have impacted an event like the battle of Sufia, in terms of conduct of the battle and the decision process to engage in the first place. (Would you hesitate to send in ground troops knowing airpower could be denied?) I contend the significance of that event is still under-appreciated in terms of impact on subsequent events in Iraq, but that's a side issue.

I'm talking rotary vice fixed wing here, but much of the discussion I've seen above seems to have fixed wing in mind - I've seen no indication that "the rule" (aka the elephant we haven't seen) will make that distinction.

[jmm99]

for linking SWC and this thread at Mudville.

Also, thank you in advance for taking the time (at your convenience) to fill out your About Me. Not needed for today - since the SWJ Blog feed takes us to your webpage, etc.; but for future posts (hopefully many), the lack of background will cause readers to say "Who is that guy ?"

[jmm99]

the Captain's Journal (please read the About), which is linked from Greyhawk's Mudville (I've visited both sites before) and which has two commentaries on this topic, and many links in the commentaries:

Update on ROE Changes for Afghanistan (opinion piece)

Changes to the Rules of Engagement for Afghanistan (analysis piece, mostly; cites this thread )

Links to some sources (in latter link; and some caveats about the sources linked - "lesson learned" - check for updated sources)

standing rules of engagement (at fas; these are the 2000 version, completely revised in 2005 - especially as to SRUF, which is the basic issue here. So, these show what SROEs look like - that's it. Google up what has been released in 2005 and since; much of them are classified).

theater-specific rules of engagement for Iraq (from Wikileaks. Without getting too violent, classified should mean that - beyond the legalisms; and a leaked classified document has no good means of validation, anyway. End discussion; except to remind that discussion of specific ROE/RUF are potential OpSec man traps).

rules on the use of force (at dtic; again a 2000 version - this particular RUF, as revised, was part of the 2005 SRUFs package, of which Enclosure L was intentionally unclassified to provide a discussion point for LE input).

I haven't an online link to Enclosure L of the 2005 SRUFs - if someone has one, a link would be appreciated.

-----------------------------
Also from the Captain's Journal:

Concerning Snipers, Rules of Engagement and General Kearney (21 Sep 2007) - dealing with UCMJ (and potential War Crimes) charges vs Soldiers and Marines for alleged ROE/RUF violations. Many links (at bottom of page) to Mr Smith's commentaries (11 in all) on ROE/RUF issues.

For the most part, I've stayed with what JMM believes the "Law is", rather than what the "Law should be" - I think I've been doctrinal, but if not please correct me.

(start IMO)

We shoot ourselves in the foot ("suicide by Lawfare") when we turn ROE/RUFs into iron-clad, restrictive, legislative and legalistic tight boxes.

We also have to remember the source differences for ROEs (Laws of War aka LOAC, international law and relations) and RUFs (Rule of Law, domestic constitution and laws of some jurisdiction - ICONUS: US Constitution, Federal and state laws).

We also have to remember that the default under SROE/SRUF is based on the conduct, not status, of the target. Under SROE, NCA (or an authorized CCOM) can define a "hostile group" allowing its members to be killed or captured based on that status. So, in the sniper example (unarmed Taliban), a conduct-based rule = murder and war crime; a status-based rule = no charge.

So far as I know (please correct me, if I an doctrinally incorrect), SRUF themselves are solely conduct-based (classified portions and mixed ROE/RUF combos aside - which may be what the upcoming rules will turn out to be). So, the differences between ROEs and RUFs are more than semantic (as Niel stated), but also can have horrible consequences to the Soldier or Marine who gets on the wrong side of restrictive and legalistic rules.

In War Crimes (and elsewhere), I have commented on my preference for status-based rules in an armed conflict - as allowed by the 2001 AUMF and the GCs accepted by the US, as so far interpreted by SCOTUS and the lower Federal courts.

That is not to say that an unlimited "hunting license" should exist. Carefully defined command guidance should outline the parameters and provide for specific education and training in real-life situations on an on-going basis - training, training & training (and not reams of paper).

In short, they should be permissive, non-legislative and non-legalistic (the average shooter is not a U of Mich Law grad).

(end IMO).

[Greyhawk]

...24 years, 2x Iraq (04/05, 07) last as SWO to 3CAB/3ID (and part of EASOG) - which is pertinent to discussion here but hopefully in no way shape or form apparent from reading Mudville, which has always been an effort separate from that role.

But enough about me... /

[Cavguy]

JMM,

Here's my amateur take on ROE vs. RUF and a response to Greyhawk:

Violating ROE usually is a Law of Armed Conflict violation, that can get you sent to jail. e.g. Shoot an unarmed civilian.

Violating RUF is a UCMJ violation, disobeying (or failure to follow) a direct order. That said, I think there is some leeway in RUF, situation dependent, and commander dependent. e.g. utilizing force that while within ROE violates rules imposed by the command.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but this is my take.

Greyhawk (welcome!) uses our Sofia battle as an example. He asks the impact of the new rules on that. Here are my observations as the guy who managed the BCT level fight:

1) We didn't fire indirect into populated areas, because of standing RUF rules.

2) We utilized aircraft "shows of force" to scare the insurgents away from the populated areas, as well as artillery fired into empty nearby fields.

3) We waited until the insurgents were "in the open" to engage and destroy them.

Now, the obvious danger is that the insurgents didn't necessarily know we couldn't engage them with the aircraft and artillery in their engagement against the tribe. However, if that had been the situation I think we could have rapidly gotten permission to use other assets. I can't go into what our restrictions were on weapons employment in public but let's say most of our larger strikes required 2-star level approval, which usually could be had in less than 10 minutes. I think tactical flexibility could be granted rapidly as well. The broader point is that even if we hadn't had the restrictions, attempting to separate the enemy from the populace was the right thing to do. Leveling the Soda tribe area wouldn't have helped the awakening to get at the AQ guys.

And then there is the Cavguy solution. If you're on the ground, and the right and obvious thing to do is staring you in the face, just do it, and take the consequences. That's actually what we did that day of the video. My army experiences tell me well considered violations of rules/guidance is generally underwritten by most commanders, especially if conditions warrant.

Niel

[slapout9]

rules on the use of force (at dtic; again a 2000 version - this particular RUF, as revised, was part of the 2005 SRUFs package, of which Enclosure L was intentionally unclassified to provide a discussion point for LE input).

I haven't an online link to Enclosure L of the 2005 SRUFs - if someone has one, a link would be appreciated.

-----------------------------
(end IMO).

JMM, Tennesse vs. Garner is the standard I was taught for use of deadly force. It requires the Bad Actor to have Ability-Opportunity-Jeporady (the LE Holy trinity). If you can review it and give us a battlefield opinion of how to apply it

[Greyhawk]

Niel,
Thanks for the response.

"...attempting to separate the enemy from the populace was the right thing to do. Leveling the Soda tribe area wouldn't have helped the awakening to get at the AQ guys."

100% concur.

And "the Cavguy solution" as described is where we will win or lose any war we are ever unfortunate enough to fight. (Revisiting the training piece, written or not those oughta be the concluding words in any training session.)

[Greyhawk]

"the insurgents didn't necessarily know we couldn't engage them"

aye - there's the rub. Headlines (accurate or not) to that effect don't help. (I tip my hat again to the "Cavguy solution".)

[Ken White]

"...well considered violations of rules/guidance is generally underwritten by most commanders, especially if conditions warrant."

Mine also with some emphasis on the 'well considered' (i.e. you have to know the rules so you know where they can be bent) and the caveat added -- as long as a reasonably acceptable outcome was obtained...

Doesn't have to be superb or even all that good but it cannot be a disaster.

[jmm99]

from Cavguy
Violating ROE usually is a Law of Armed Conflict violation, that can get you sent to jail. e.g. Shoot an unarmed civilian.

Violating RUF is a UCMJ violation, disobeying (or failure to follow) a direct order. That said, I think there is some leeway in RUF, situation dependent, and commander dependent. e.g. utilizing force that while within ROE violates rules imposed by the command.

Not quite (though in the right direction) - we have to work on this. Ruby Ridge, BTW, is a good case study - that is, without getting into its politics.

from Slap
Tennesse vs. Garner

Yup, gold standard (there are some later cases); but I don't like some of the language, which depending on how far you push interpretation puts too heavy a burden on LE.

Niel's battle - great factual scenario (leaving out specific rules). The 2-star ref. reminds me of the "Ultimate Aircraft Stack" as visualized by the PL on the ground (a friend who was a SSG, PSG and sometimes acting PL, in Vietnam):

AirForce 1 - LBJ
DoD 707 - MacNamara
chopper MACV - Westy
chopper DIV - MG
chopper BDE - COL
chopper BN - LTC
chopper COY - CPT

Wish I were a cartoonist.

I'll look at the first two items - to find some consise sources. But later, I'm existing so far today on coffee - got engrossed in this forum.

[slapout9]

Has the Air Force ever tried dropping inert munitions? As in Concrete Practice Bombs? They can be GPS guided but do not produce a Blast effect which generally causes the most injury and damage.

[Greyhawk]

Mine also with some emphasis on the 'well considered' (i.e. you have to know the rules so you know where they can be bent) and the caveat added -- as long as a reasonably acceptable outcome was obtained...

Doesn't have to be superb or even all that good but it cannot be a disaster.

I think Sun Tzu said "if you know the enemy and know yourself, your survival is not at risk.

"If you know the rules and you know your commander, the victory is complete".

Or something like that...

[Greyhawk]

...it doesn't take a psychic to expect that at some point we will do something in Afghanistan that appears to be (as in 'is reported as') a violation of this (still as yet unseen) rule. The question becomes "how fast can a (senior enough) commander make an accurate and definitive public response?" ("We're investigating" doesn't count.)

The answer to date has been "not fast enough." I know there are corporate (and legal) reasons for that, but unless there's some sort of "incident qrf" to deal with such things (emphasis on "q") the truth won't matter, and we lose.

This is not new (stomp foot, provide other subtle visual emphasis here), but given publicized "new rules" it will be infinitely more important.

[Uboat509]

What I have been wondering is, is this policy really General McChrystal's? Or is something that has been quietly dictated to him by someone higher in the COC? Civilian casualties aren't just a liability to our operations in Afghanistan, they are a political liability to our elected officials. Airstrikes in particular look bad on TV. Perhaps it is my cynicism speaking but this could be an attempt to become a more effective COIN force or it could be political expediency.

SFC W