Gun Control in Counterinsurgency

[40below]

I'm just getting a kick out of the idea that an Afghan farmer could consistently (or even once) hit centre mass on a group of armed Taliban using a handgun. Like they're on the range every other day getting expert training and painstakingly maintain their personal weapon. I've watched the ANA/ANP shoot AKs, and they couldn't hit centre mass on No Drug Mountain from 20 metres out, and they're supposedly the ones with training. I don't think handguns are the solution to the problem, unless the problem is that there are too many Aghan villagers.

[Rex Brynen]

I'm just getting a kick out of the idea that an Afghan farmer could consistently (or even once) hit centre mass on a group of armed Taliban using a handgun. Like they're on the range every other day getting expert training and painstakingly maintain their personal weapon. I've watched the ANA/ANP shoot AKs, and they couldn't hit centre mass on No Drug Mountain from 20 metres out, and they're supposedly the ones with training. I don't think handguns are the solution to the problem, unless the problem is that there are too many Aghan villagers.

You've got to stop letting reality intrude on the discussions here, 40below.

[jmm99]

cuz I ain't Isaac Asimov. I do better on analysing a given data set, present or historical.

from you

JMM: What are the reasons for the central government to be so interested in this area - so that it has to deal with insurgents, criminals and concerns about firearms and munitions ?

JMM: What reasons (if any) are there for the central government and the local population to cooperate on issues - if so what are the co-operative areas (what are the win-wins) ?

If we're talking about my neighborhood, I could tell you

Obviously what I'm looking for are any useable "bridges" from the central government to your "Obstinentinians", but also what "dams" separate the central government from them.

As I see the scenario, your large, neutral unless gored, armed group is the political key to the area. The armed insurgents are not in the mobile warfare phase, but can bite. I'm also including some renegade criminal gangs (you might not have them; but they were in the SF author's OP scenario and could be expected in an area of unrest) that can bite. I'm positing that the insurgents and criminals are part of your population group; and that whatever problems they present will be finally resolved only if your population group is involved.

An historical example (which provides no cookbook answers; and your population might not like some of the recipes actually used), on a macro level, of a new national government (saddled with excess baggage from the past) having to deal with armed insurgents, armed criminals and armed semi-autonomists, was SVN ca. 1955. Briefly, over 100K of the Viet Minh military and political cadres had gone North (temporarily) as regroupees, leaving perhaps 10-15K cadres in the South. Diem's initial problems were the Saigon Mafia and two well-armed religiious sects near Saigon (Wiki):

Diệm's position at the time was weak; Bảo Đại disliked Diệm and appointed him mainly to political imperatives. The French saw him as hostile and hoped that his rule would collapse. At the time, the French Expeditionary Corps was the most powerful military force in the south; Diệm's Vietnamese National Army was essentially organised and trained by the French. Its officers were installed by the French and the chief of staff General Nguyen Van Hinh was a French citizen; Hinh loathed Diệm and frequently disobeyed him.

Diệm also had to contend with two religious sects, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, who wielded private armies in the Mekong Delta, with the Cao Dai estimated to have 25,000 men.

The Vietminh was also estimated to have control over a third of the country.

The situation was worse in the capital, where the Binh Xuyen organised crime syndicate boasted an army of 40,000 and controlled a vice empire of brothels, casinos, extortion rackets, and opium factories unparalleled in Asia. Bảo Đại had given the Binh Xuyen control of the national police for 1.25 m USD, creating a situation that the Americans likened to Chicago under Al Capone in the 1920s.

In effect, Diệm's control did not extend beyond his palace.

So, nothing new under the sun - the problem of firearms and munitions "control" (over groups not overtly "enemies") has been, is and will be with us in "small wars" in many guises.

Two other adds to the scenario.

1. The local population has members in the police (how about the higher grades, "Os" and "NCOs"), but apparently not in the military. Reasons for that ?

2. What is the relationship between the local population elites and the national power elites ? E.g. (not saying it's this), semi-feudal, neo-colonialist, comprador bourgeoisie (as one type), or something different.

Feel free to ruminate.

Mike

[AdamG]

Relevant
http://niqash.org/content.php?conten...id=2181&lang=0

Niqash: What government procedures are in place to maintain control over awakening councils and people committees in the future? Aren’t you afraid that these councils may turn against the government and prevent it from implementing policies which may not be in line with the tribal vision?

Al-Bakhati: There are many procedures in place to control all forms of non-state militias, and we have no problems with people committees because they are still under control. In regard to the awakening councils, there are tribal parties who coordinate between the councils and the prime ministry, keeping disagreements contained within limits. We do not want to transform the country into a power struggle between armed groups. We are seeking to put weapons under the exclusive control of the state, and to respond to all demands through dialogue.

[jmm99]

and also this:

Niqash: Does this mean that people committees and awakening councils were armed despite government objections?

Al-Bakhati: Yes, the tribes were armed despite government objections. U.S. troops insisted on arming the tribes, and on giving them a role in the security dossier, despite the opposition expressed by many political factions. We prefer limits to this, otherwise the official security establishment in the country would be badly compromised.

but one must distinguish between the tribes and awakening councils:

Niqash: You always try to distinguish between the tribes and awakening councils, and you tend to separate one from the other. What are your reasons?

Al-Bakhati: There is a clear difference between the two. Not all the tribes are members of awakening councils, and there are many tribes that support government policies. However, there are tribe members of awakening councils that oppose these policies. In reality, the awakening councils represent a part of the tribes but not all of the tribes.

Overall, the interview is a clear statement by a central government in favor of total weapons control - although the initial impact seems aimed at a limited (disfavored by the central government) group.

Question for those in the know about Iraq and awakening councils: if I am a member of an awakening council, should I be nervous about my future well-being ?

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

cuz I ain't Isaac Asimov. I do better on analysing a given data set, present or historical.

I'm trying to think of a way to present the local data set without writing a book. It's actually more relevant as a case study of a degraded but still present insurgency than as an example of management of arms in civilian hands... the "we'll conceal if you ignore" compromise seems pretty effective.

More ground reality, though...

There are local people in the army, but they are spread out. The police have long had a policy of staffing this area only with officers from this area. The army does not, so the locals in the army are all over the country and diffuse.

The police and courts in this area actually don't do much. Disputes within villages are generally settled by village elders. If the dispute is between two villages or parties from different villages the elders of those villages try to sort it out. If they fail, violence sometimes ensues. A few years back a village in my town got to shooting with a village over the hill... people from one had built rice terraces on the other side of the ridge, which was seen as territorial intrusion and water poaching. Police, army, and insurgents stayed out; local gov mediated and a settlement was reached.

Local elders and elected local government overlap; effectively the local gov is composed of those elders elected to deal with the outside. "Elder" doesn't necessarily mean old, just a person who has earned trust by demonstrating competence. No tradition of inherited power.

Obviously what I'm looking for are any useable "bridges" from the central government to your "Obstinentinians", but also what "dams" separate the central government from them.

"Dams" is appropriate. The national government wants to exploit the region's extensive forest, mineral, and hydroelectric resources. The locals don't like the idea. At this point the locals have pretty much won that fight, though every once in a while some Manila politician will vocally wonder why they let a bunch of primitive tribes keep them from getting all that valuable stuff.

As I see the scenario, your large, neutral unless gored, armed group is the political key to the area. The armed insurgents are not in the mobile warfare phase, but can bite.

They are the area. In Kankanaey-speaking areas the populace is probably 97% Kankanaey. In the Kalinga heartland it's effectively 99.9% Kalinga, almost no outsiders at all. The Isneg/Tingguian areas north and west are a bit different... the tribes are less militant and less organized and the river valleys are wider and more open. They've had a lot of lowland intrusion; the town centers along the river valleys are dominated by lowland immigrants, and they control municipal governments. The highland villages are tribal. The lowlanders want outside investment and see the tribes as primitives obstructing progress, the tribes see the lowlanders as invaders. Not surprisingly, this is where the insurgents are strongest. They do come over the mountains (the area between these tribal zones is an almost uninhabited wilderness) to try to exploit residual sympathy, sometimes staging an ambush. The goal as far as I can see is to force the military to escalate its presence, hoping they will create incidents that bring the larger and more aggressive tribes into cooperating with the insurgents.

I'm also including some renegade criminal gangs (you might not have them; but they were in the SF author's OP scenario and could be expected in an area of unrest) that can bite.

No real criminal gangs, certainly none preying on the local populace, who are not very attractive to predators. Maybe by the standards of the outside government there could be. There are clusters of villages that grow a lot of weed, but that's locally seen as cash-crop agriculture, not crime. There's a group some ways north that's officially wanted, first for killing a group of lowlanders who dissed the boss, second for killing a group of Manila cops who came up "undercover" (imagine Godzilla trying to make a covert entrance into Tokyo) in an attempt to arrest them and claim the reward. They are locally seen as good folk who stand up for their rights, and are not at all in hiding, though it wouldn't be wise to go looking for them.

I'm positing that the insurgents and criminals are part of your population group; and that whatever problems they present will be finally resolved only if your population group is involved.

Very true.

You have an area with extremely difficult mountain terrain. Very limited road net, and the locals are quite willing to deny themselves road mobility if they need to deny it to an enemy. They will close the roads and keep them closed if pressed.

The people are habituated to very unfriendly terrain; they build terraced fields onto mountains to plant crops. You could call them the Philippine equivalent of Sherpas; or Gurkhas. They are very tough, practical, resourceful people, also very clannish and very suspicious of outsiders. They don't like to be told what to do. It's always been a warrior culture; there are still living veterans of headhunting raids in Kalinga. The standard of education in much of the area is quite high, a legacy of American Episcopalian missionaries; there's a large professional class and many locals working abroad in good positions.

The men all grow up hunting, especially those outside the town centers (most). Level of woodcraft is very high; they know the mountains. Very good with all kinds of traps and snares, the kids make beautiful intricate tiny snares for birds and rodents and the adults run trap lines for wild pigs and deer. The standard of marksmanship is fairly good, not fantastic but better than the Philippine military. Particularly in Kalinga, they have embraced the designated marksman idea: the best shots all carry Garands, which they prefer for range and penetration. No optics, but they can do aimed fire at 600-800 meters. Not precision sniping, but aimed fire. They tend to harass from range and try to bait antagonists into chasing them into prepared ambushes in dense mossy forest areas. The intel net is superb, they always know where everybody is and what they're doing.

People from this area have been highly sought after for generations for work in mining and road construction; they are very good with rock. As a result of this, there are lots of guys around who are familiar with and fond of explosives, and one way or another they've managed to stash a goodly bit of stuff for a rainy day.

All in all it's a populace one would prefer not to antagonize; they are peaceful enough if you don't push them but if pushed they will push back. They don't like the government but they aren't really all that fond of the NPA either. They worked with the insurgents when the government was actively pressing them, on the "enemy of my enemy" concept, but the insurgent leadership are also lowlanders and outsiders and not inherently trusted. As I said above, the insurgents are still getting some traction out of the lowland settler/indigenous highlander conflict northwest of here.

There's a larger data set; analyze as you will. My preferred solution for the Government side (and I'm biased, being in the middle of it) is to leave the people alone, let them run their own show, and ignore the fact that they have lots of illegal weapons and explosives.

[jmm99]

Aguinaldo country; and you have mining company issues. The hunters like Garands with iron sights; and you have mining company issues.

Have to learn some more by stumbling about the Net.

Cheers

Mike

[Dayuhan]

Aguinaldo passed through this area - he'd have passed down the road in front of my house - on his way from Tirad Pass to Palanan, but didn't stick around. He and his people were lowlanders and didn't much enjoy the mountains.

The mining companies have pretty much lost interest and given up, not really much of an issue any more. Just too much trouble... deterrence works in all sorts of environments!

[Bob's World]

Perspectives on gun control may well match with how one sees the issue of Populace Control as well.

Many in the COIN business speak of the need of government to "control the populace." Personally, I see populace control as a noun rather than a verb. Government should not set out to implement measures designed to control the populace (verb), rather, that government that does its job properly will serve a populace that is under control (noun). Its fall in the same bin with reintegration in that regard. If government is on track, it will just happen as a by product. Insurgents will reintegrate into society and the populace will be controlled Both, for that reason, actually far better metrics for COIN success than they do programs intended to produce COIN success.

Similarly, if one thinks the role of government is to exert control over the populace one is also probably more apt to believe that exerting control over firearms is a important aspect of the larger issue of controlling the populace. The problem with taking this path is two fold. No populace likes to be "controlled", and efforts to take away firearms will logically raise issues of trust among the populace as well. The COIN effects are apt to be the opposite of what is desired. And then there is always the critical issue of if one has rendered the populace powerless, who then is left to ensure that the government remains under control as well?