Understanding the Enemy

[jcustis]

Yes Mike it really is that simple.

And better use of Voice of America, radio and TV, could help turn this whole war around.

We are talking psyops and better propaganda, which we have thus far done a punk job on.

I don't think so, and don't agree that better propaganda (via VoA) is the answer. Sometimes, folks see through that for the sham work that it is. Often, the simple fact remains that our ideas and constructs just don't translate over. Add to that the fact that within societies such as the tribal, Arab, and Islamic one we worked so hard to shape and control in Iraq, any message coming from us is going to be ignored and downplayed, and information operations can be a tall order.

Providing accurate facts that get ahead of jihadist information, is sometimes the best that we can do, methinks.

[ODB]

How we think we can:

a. Figure out another culture

b. Figure out why they do what they do

c. Figure out how to change them

When we can't even do it in our own country.

That just might be the problem, stop putting so much thought into, crush their "nuts" and eventually they'll get tired of it or run out of people......

[MikeF]

How we think we can:

a. Figure out another culture

b. Figure out why they do what they do

c. Figure out how to change them

When we can't even do it in our own country.

That just might be the problem, stop putting so much thought into, crush their "nuts" and eventually they'll get tired of it or run out of people......

That leads to the real questions we don't seem to want to ask...

1. What are we doing?

2. Is it possible for this to work?

3. Why are we doing this?



v/r

Mike

[jcustis]

That leads to the real questions we don't seem to want to ask...

1. What are we doing?

2. Is it possible for this to work?

3. Why are we doing this?



v/r

Mike

I think we often don't like to ask the questions because framing them the right way is hard, or permits a sense of weakness to invade...and finally we often do not like the answers that are likely to arise, even if they speak the truth.

[ODB]

That leads to the real questions we don't seem to want to ask...

1. What are we doing?

2. Is it possible for this to work?

3. Why are we doing this?



v/r

Mike

Unfortunately what works for one will not work for the next, but is there a common ground that can be exploited?

[MikeF]

the answers to those questions, but I don't.

However, my concern is if they are not asked, then we will continually do the same thing over and over again.

[marct]

That leads to the real questions we don't seem to want to ask...

1. What are we doing?
2. Is it possible for this to work?
3. Why are we doing this?

v/r
Mike

I think we often don't like to ask the questions because framing them the right way is hard, or permits a sense of weakness to invade...and finally we often do not like the answers that are likely to arise, even if they speak the truth.

Very good points, JC.

the answers to those questions, but I don't.

However, my concern is if they are not asked, then we will continually do the same thing over and over again.

Pulling off of JC's comments, and getting back to the original post, have you noticed that few in the US (or outside it) buy into the narrative offered? Most "answers", if they aren't of an "X=Y" form, tend to be implicit stories, i.e. they have a meaning, moral and story line attached to them. The story about bringing democracy to _____ (fill in the blank) isn't selling well, mainly because there is a lot of comptetition.

Will we do the same thing over and over? Probably... most cultures do.

[Ken White]

"Why are we doing this" holds the key to the other two.

If there is no good answer to that final question in the eyes of the beholder -- not in the eyes of he, she or they who made the commitment to do 'this' whatever it was -- then the other issues become clouded and people get confused.

For example, attacking Iraq made perfect sense to me on the basis that we had responded poorly or not at all to 22 years of provocations emanating from the ME. Having lived there for a while and thus having some small insights into the prevailing mentality there, I took it for what it was (to me and simplistically here stated); a massive response by the entire Tribe to numerous assaults on the dignity of the Tribe in the form of typical desert pin-prick raids which of themselves are not terribly effective or harmful but which do tend to erode the superior position of the Tribe. Thus, in my view, the attack was worthwhile and made a great deal of sense. I believe that my view was shared by some, particuarly in the ME (who none the less objected because they didn't like the precedent).

A more west-centric view would discard my thought process and opt for the belief that the attack was ill advised. IF the west-centric viewer in question was sorting out TTP or solutions to use in Iraq, the probability is that some bad decisions would be made simply because the 'why' quotient was not known or was misunderstood...

Thus, as Marc says, "most cultures do" make the same mistakes over and over because they do not do a good job of determining why they are doing what they are doing -- or of properly explaining why they are doing what they are doing. Proper understanding by all concerned of that last point is the factor that causes confusion on the answers to the other two questions.

That's why WW II got broad popular support (on both sides), the 'why we are doing this' was quite clear and unambiguous. Most wars since then have been poorly handled in most regards because even the fighters weren't sure why they were doing what they were doing. That, I suspect will get worse before it gets better.

[William F. Owen]

I don't think so, and don't agree that better propaganda (via VoA) is the answer. Sometimes, folks see through that for the sham work that it is. Often, the simple fact remains that our ideas and constructs just don't translate over. Add to that the fact that within societies such as the tribal, Arab, and Islamic one we worked so hard to shape and control in Iraq, any message coming from us is going to be ignored and downplayed, and information operations can be a tall order.

Providing accurate facts that get ahead of jihadist information, is sometimes the best that we can do, methinks.

Concur with all. Exactly right in my experience. No evidence you ever produce will convince most (not all) anti-western Arabs that the Israeli's didn't commit 911, and that the British SIS didn't murder Princess Diana.

Try and tell folks who believe in UFOs that they don't exist.

...and I don't think it is the job of any Army to alter beliefs. It's to make the cost of acting on those beliefs too high, for most people to risk.

[MikeF]

The current narrative is best defined by Abu Bakr Naji's The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through which the Umma will Pass.

It is the evolution of radical Islamic thought deriving from Sayyid Qutb's work long ago in an Egyptian cell. For some fringe movements, it lays out a methodical, rational explanation of the corruption and disenfranchisement and grievances provoked of western democracy and capitalism.

For Americans, this text is difficult to comprehend. Marc- please let me know if I'm off base with this. I believe it is simply how we think and actually process our thoughts.

For example, Americans think and read in terms of left to right, and our thought centers around I. I walked to school today. I visited small wars journal.

For Germans, thought and words are the direct opposite. It is how the world affects them not vice versa.

For Chinese, one-hundred and eleven is translated one, one, one.

I'm not sure how the Arab mind works besides understanding they read right to left, and they tend to think more romantically in verse rather than prose.

I think this insight is the distinction in our lack of communication. I'd enjoy y'alls feedback particularly if I'm off base.

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

in response to your post is: Yes, it's complex -- and we have to insure that in an effort to understand, we do not over simplify.

Some time ago in a thread not worth regurgitating; Wilf and 120mm contended that cultural differences were not significant, that people were, in effect, people. While there is a great deal of truth in that belief, as there is in your stated theories, I said then that I think the truth is far more nuanced. Still think that.

I lived and operated on the local economy (everything from where I lived, to all food, people I hung out with and to how I traveled throughout the country and indeed, the entire region -- with a couple of exceptions...) in Iran for a couple of years. That allowed me to arrive at some insights on Middle Eastern thought processes, particularly about military or combat things -- but I absolutely, positively did not become an 'expert.' So be skeptical.

I also have several years each in North and Southeast Asia but not that much time on the local economy. However I did learn a little about operating modes and local cultures. Less time in Europe and Latin America but I was struck in those two by far more similarities than differences. Anyway, I'm well traveled but am emphatically not a know-it-all. So with respect to what I say on the topic of cultural knowledge, be skeptical.

Since then and particularly in the last few years, I've read a great deal written by purported ME experts and I'll tell anyone this: The western 'experts' often get it really wrong for various reasons. Be skeptical.

The Middle Easterners who write in the west (in English) often tell it wrong and rarely tell all they know. Those of the ME in the ME will frequently write or say one thing in English (or any western tongue) and quite another in Arabic or Farsi. Everyone in the ME has an agenda and it will usually be concealed as it supposed to be (Zaher versus Batin). Be skeptical.

I do not believe it is possible for one raised in the west to really understand either Asian or ME thought processes other than superficially -- and I suspect the reverse is true. One can obtain some knowledge and use that knowledge. What I do not think can be done, other than in very few quite rare individuals of all races, is to truly understand another, very different culture.

The entire ME, for example spent many years under the domination of one or another Persian Empires (and the Iraniha recall this, yes, they do...) and thus many mores and attitudes are derived from the Persian ( to include Zaher and Batin and, very importantly, the concept of Class and a pecking order, Ta'arof). Other than Iran, they were later dominated by the Desert Arab tribes and acquired some added ideas (not least of escalating small raids as an economy of force measure). Then they were ruled by the Turks accumulating still more and different ideas (including personal bravery and manipulating reports). That was followed by western intrusion (introducing greed and selfishness as well as geopolitical manipulation) and the City dwellers took over from the rural Tribes (bringing deviousness and haggling to new heights). Oh and don't forget the Greeks and the Romans also puttered around, dropping seed and whatever -- unless one has all those sometimes complimentary (but different) ideas and competing ideas inculcated from birth, one is highly likely to get the cultural milieu wrong if one tries too hard.

Pay attention to the big things and try to get them right while accepting that you're unlikely to ever fully understand the finer things. That usually will be okay. Above all and always -- be skeptical.

[jmm99]

I've managed to read through it up to p.107.

Here are some initial thoughts.

Some background on "Abu Bakr Naji" - apparently a covert and clandestine personality.

Sayyeed Abdul A'la Maududi, "Jihad in Islam"; Sayyid Qutb, "Milestones"; Abdullah Azzam, "Defense of the Muslim Lands"; Ayman al-Zawahiri, "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner"; and the AQ statements in the Al Qaeda Reader, are useful background.

Modern Western readers will find several features foreign to modern "Western Constructs" governing political action and military action:

1. Belief in the real presence of God and Satin, with religious principles governing all aspects of the Umma's life and its relationahip to others (a theonomy; last seen in Western polity in the Middle Ages). This construct was not foreign to Westerners of the past, even after the Middle Ages (e.g., the Jesuit Relations); but today, secularism and the concept of church-state separation make it seem quite foreign.

2. Non-acceptance of Western constructs, such as the UN and the GCs. That is not to say that rules similar to the GCs will not be applied in specific situations; but, in other sitauations, rules contrary to the GCs will be applied (I've touched on that elsewhere). These folks have their own JAG officers !

3. Political action and military action are not intersections of two coins, or the flip sides of the same coin; but are the face of the same coin:

(p.85, 86-87 .pdf)
We urge that most of the leaders of the Islamic movement be military leaders or have the ability to fight in the ranks, at the very least. Likewise, we also urge that those leaders work to master political science just as they would work to master military science.
....
The interest in understanding the rules of the political game and the political reality of the enemies and their fellow travelers and then mastering disciplined political action through sharia politics and opposing this reality is not less than the importance of military action, especially if we consider that the moment of gathering the fruit—a moment which is considered the recompense for the sacrifices offered by the mujahids during long decades—is a moment resulting from a political strike and a decisive political decision. Of course, military strikes preceded and even accompanied it; but the final moment and the fate (of the movement) depends on skillful political management. Even the whole course of fighting requires good political managment so that the best results will be achieved. Additionally, there is a very important point: The meaning of every reference in this paragraph to political management is that the political decision issues from the military leader, but the entire political administration or most of it should be made up of warriors from among the assistants of the military leaders and their troops. Those are the people who should take an interest in studying the political dimension. The battle is their battle before it is the battle of others, so one should emphasize the danger of leaving the political decision in the hands of those who do not engage in military battles for any reason.

The concept is that war is too important to be left to the politicians - I'm getting close to being too cute by half; but that is what it boils down to.

A corollary is that any operation involving violence (small, medium or large) is considered part of the military wing - in short, the operators are deemed to be soldiers, regardless of whether we accept or reject that definition.

Naji's construct involves three stages; but they seem to be somewhat different from those of Mao, etc. More of that in the rest of the book, which I have to finish reading.

[MikeF]

Excellent posts by all. Thanks for the input. Here is a cross-post from Goesh that seems to fit inside this thread. Give it some thought.

By no means am I a scholar or academic despite having a Masters Degree and one (1) year of postgraduate work under my belt. Having never been in Iraq, my opinions are simply that. My involvement in a 3rd world war, Viet Nam and direct living experience with two (2) other groups of 3rd worlders, one of which was Muslim, gives me pause to suggest that "the wicked problem" is by no means unique and distinctive to Iraq. We are collectively the wicked problem and always have been and each generation views their predicament as the most intense and difficult ever. I would suggest that our Western linear thinking heightens our sensitivity, at times to the point of compulsive thinking but this is not to deny that a 'mess' exists in Iraq, or for that matter East Lost Angeles or South side Chicago or rural Appalachia or the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation - talk about disparate culture clashes and wicked problems, they are with us everywhere, vibrant, transgenerational and immune to any fix our logic and rationality can come up with.

After hanging around here for a couple of years or so and being exposed to so many professional and experienced people, I believe COIN's existence centers on four (4) principles: understanding the cultures, respecting the cultures, adopting the cultures and generating meaningful employment for those capable of bearing arms against us. We have failed with the latter two principles hence we remain in a twilight zone of being neither the occupier nor the enabler.

The most successful COIN operatives in our history were the free trappers, the mountain men operating in a 14 year period of time from 1820-1834, the rise and fall of the beaver trade. They went in small numbers hundreds of miles into uknown territory and at times lethal territory without any logistics and Intel. They successfully implemented the 4 COIN principles and survived and it can be argued they even thrived. The analogy applicable for our current dilemma would be if at the time of the invasion, separate squads of grunts dispersed from Basra and walked to Fallujah and up to Kurd land, passing through Baghdad, all done with no communication and no backup, just their packs and rifles. 60% of them would have returned south alive in 14 years using Arabic as often as English, half their attire would be Iraqi style clothing, they would have fathered some children, they would prefer a lot of Iraqi type food over American fare and they would feel a bit of a connection to Allah.

That is the core of the wicked problem, an inability to mingle and adopt. The only real shot we had at adopting was language but how many boots on the ground have basic communication skills and see any merit to speaking Arabic other than using it as a tactical tool? Secondly, and to resort to the mountain man analogy, we haven't traded for beaver pelts with young men capable of bearing arms against us. Sure, jobs have been created; Green Zone type jobs, camp followers abound but not so at the grass roots level. We could have and should have given temporary economic fixes/employment using the principles developed in our own great economic crisis, the Great Depression of the 1930s, namely the Public Works programs and Civilian Conservation Corps. Some people quickly realized back then that idle young men can easily become very discontented. How many unemployed young Iraqi males have been in at least one fire fight or provided services to those thus engaged? We will never know. Very early on, I noted via TV thousands of young Iraqi males standing idle and tens of thousands of tons of rubble - it was work waiting to be done and I presume the rubble still abounds. I'm not suggesting this was/is the solution but it was/is a most viable option for developing relationships and enabling/nurturing. What unemployed family man would have turned down good wages for 8-10-14-20 months of steady labor? 1 truck, 6 men with leather gloves, water, the noon MRE meal and cash at the end of the day and you don't have 6 enemies or potential enemies. If the reader can't envision this, then he is locked into glitches and obstacles and thinking linear while being involved in a circular environment.

Our forces and leadership are to be commended for the understanding and respect of Iraqi cultures that has been fostered and grown with remarkable speed and this at least is keeping us in the ball game. A big tip of the hat to General P. and his crew. I recall in Viet Nam a guy building a house and I inquired as to when he thought he might have it completed. He responded that his sons or grandkids would finish the job and so it is with the world's wicked problems that will require our blood and resources.

[MikeF]

Concur with all. Exactly right in my experience. No evidence you ever produce will convince most (not all) anti-western Arabs that the Israeli's didn't commit 911, and that the British SIS didn't murder Princess Diana.

Try and tell folks who believe in UFOs that they don't exist.

...and I don't think it is the job of any Army to alter beliefs. It's to make the cost of acting on those beliefs too high, for most people to risk.

With Wilf's valid insight and Goesh's suggestion, where do we go?

Here's how I describe it...

If everything is interconnected and intertwined, all we have to do is connect the dots to comprehend.

Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism expresses the crux of American Intervention mirrored in the self-denial conflicted with an internal desire to evangelize. Democracy works for us. Freedom isn’t free. Thus, we must free others with democracy. As good Christians, it is our duty to fix everyone else. One plus one equals three. The ghost of scarlet letters resounds in the western version of Wahabists Shar’iah law, yet we pretend it is not religious. Parables of Pharisees provoked thou screamest loudest as if you know truth. Jesus wept. John joins in joint justification.

In Vietnam, we propped up an artificial government in the hopes that they
would conform. Unfortunately, they only conformed to the corruption. Corrosion of conformity, our opportunity to assist a Vietnam in transition failed when we discarded Ho Chi Minh to salvage our relationship with France.

In Iraq, we tried Maliki.

Today, we strive to save Afghanistan. What are we attempting to save it from? Itself? To what effect? Is Hamid Karzai our friend? We assume that because he dresses well in tailored suits and speaks the Queen’s English that he shares our values, beliefs, and norms. In truth, he may be using us as a comparative advantage to unbalance the balanced opposition much as the Taliban uses al Qaeda.

Twenty years ago, we allied with the Taliban to defeat the Soviets in a marriage of convenience. After the Bear fell, we left. The Taliban did not forget. Kipling echoed for naught, yet we rationalize in the hopes of a natural gas pipeline emerging from the ashes. Phoenix is in Arizona not Kabul. A tendency of good war is oxymoron.

No doubt I weep for the deprived women of Afghanistan, but I must accept that I did not cause their suffering. It existed long before my birth. All I can control is the parameters of my family and closest friends. All I can help are those that first inquire to help themselves. I am neither an isolationist nor anti-war. That reasoning is as foolish as pretending that I am not man. I am simply taking a moment to consider our passion in some form of analysis lest we continue along the foreboding path that shadows and conforms.

Maybe it is time to leave well enough alone.

I am by no means trying to make policy statements. In all actuality, as Schmedlap voices in other threads, I'm sorting through my own personal decision matrix....I would be the first to volunteer for Goesh's expedition....

Ok, with that said, and all the politics aside, what do you think?

There is much validity in Wilf's crushing the enemy as there is in Mortenson's building schools. Where is the intersection point?

All I submit that it is better to discuss the issue rather than remaining stuck. Or rather, as Ken suggest, I'm skeptical of any translation.

Let me know if I've simplified matters too far.

In true detail to other cultures, I'd submit that we must add music...this seems appropriate

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DhtcaRRngcw

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

Or even try to do so.

Viet Nam wasn't that simple. Of course Karzai is using us -- anyone in the west who thinks he is our -- Generic western collective our -- friend is a fool. Afghanistan 20 years ago was also not that simple.

I can't say you've simplified it too far though I do believe that in trying to understand things, many use the technique of trying to identify component bits, an effort that IMO generally leads to excessive fragmentation. Micro views do not solve or lead to solutions for macro problems. I offer the US Army's Tasks, condition and standards approach as an excellent example of how not to do it.

Is the task at issue your definition of that task, the other guys definition or that of a third (or greater) party? Or are there three or more different tasks being worked by many people, some known and some unknown with respect to the same time, location and issue?

Are the conditions you unilaterally impose universal or context dependent; if the latter, who or what determines the context -- you, the enemy, the weather, the terrain all of the preceding. Or does someone or something else determine the condition...

I won't even discuss the vagaries of a standard -- suffice to say that Hamid Karzai in his role does not operate with the understanding that I would were I in that role, thus his standard -- and that of most Afghan males -- of treatment of females differs considerably from mine. Since he is nominally a leader of Afghans, his standard is probably more pragmatically correct than mine would be. That means, whether I like it or not, that in that regard, on that topic, he's a better man for that job than I would be.

That's okay with me. He does not have to like or agree with me nor I with him for us to work together for mutual benefit. Either or both of us should back off if it's determined that the benefits are skewed or not mutual. We do not have to be friends. Probably could not be for many reasons. That's okay as well. It's okay because it has to be, that's reality.

I have spent a fair amount of time trying to export US missionary zeal in various climes and terrains on three continents -- most of those times, the entire operation was fouled up partly due to said zeal overriding common sense, partly because we did not understand the major defining facets of the culture we were operating in, partly as a generic result of inadequate training and education precipitating strategic, operational and really dumb tactical errors -- and once we were there partly because people expended a lot of angst over the minutia of cultural differences that they were never going to really understand -- and did not need to...

Occasionally, though it all worked -- and every time that was the case, it did so because of the right Commander, sheer professional competence of most involved and adequate as opposed to excessive and unnecessary cultural knowledge. Those successful efforts, by the way ran the full spectrum of combat from simple SFA to COIN to HIC.

Adequate cultural knowledge is not simple but it is easy, just recall everything learned in Kindergarten and apply common sense, read a bit, ask sensible questions and learn and heed the big issues -- realizing that one cannot ever answer some questions and does not need to do so.

Long way of answering your question; "With Wilf's valid insight and Goesh's suggestion, where do we go?"

Can't say. People are too different to provide an answer to that question, though it can certainly be asked. There are probably almost as many answers as there are people and that should be acceptable. Ideally, anyway -- because that degree of complexity of the human condition is unlikely to change.

To get to the root of this Thread --I believe it is futile to try to understand an enemy from a different culture; the more different, the more futile. You can learn his operating modes and define his TTP -- and you must do that. If it's assistance to another nation, you must learn the major cultural factors and must heed the local rules with local people. There is absolutely no need to try to get inside their heads and I believe that attempting to do so will only lead to great frustration and due to excessive simplification and / or inability to completely understand all the nuances of very complex human emotions and imperatives can actually cause harm.

[MikeF]

I'm no expert; I'm just trying to provoke conversation...

Direction and azimuth as I look on the map I suppose....

We've discussed this in private- people are people and you cannot control hearts and minds...

As always, I'll take it to an extreme so everyone else can realize that the sky is not falling down...Lest we presume that our straights are more dire than our parents...


If I had the answers, then we wouldn't have to run around in circles

And BTW Ken, well said...Bottom line is that we will employ the policy that our civilian's master.

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

As always, I'll take it to an extreme so everyone else can realize that the sky is not falling down...Lest we presume that our straights are more dire than our parents...

I'm not sure that everyone else thinks that. In fact, I don't think they do. Nor am I at all sure what that has to do with Understanding the Enemy -- but then I'm old and slow...

If I had the answers, then we wouldn't have to run around in circles

I'm not running around in circles, nor do I think many are -- but then, I could've missed something. I do that a lot.

[MikeF]

And that's why I had to turn off my TV.

Eight years after 9/11, I simply started questioning...I don't have any answers...I'll lead point- just tell me where you want to go.

v/r

Mike

[Bill Moore]

That leads to the real questions we don't seem to want to ask...

1. What are we doing?

2. Is it possible for this to work?

3. Why are we doing this?

After being lectured and after several discussions with several in our diplomatic community, I now believe that the Dept of State and perhaps the non-kinetic side of our military is more offensive than our air power and infantry could ever be. The diplomats and psychological operatives want to challenge the very essence of a culture's belief system. We're not looking for ways to co-exist acceptably, we want them to embrace our religion of democracy and free markets and embrace the Judeo-Christian value system. We don't simply want to win the war, we want to alter their society. When two extremists go to battle there is very little room for pragmatic compromise.

I think, as do many others, that we can defeat Al Qaeda's extreme ideology relatively easily if we quit attempting to "radically" alter everyone's social norms. We need to focus more on simply providing the promised bread and butter and peace, than preaching the benefits of democracy. We co-existed in relative peace before Al Qaeda surfaced, we can still live with Muslim States that don't embrace democracy, free markets, and Judeo-Christian values in the future. They'll evolve into the modern world at their own pace and in their own way.

I am as much as idealist as anyone else, but there are limits to our power. We need to focus on defeating the threats to our national interests (using realism not idealism). Longer term we continue to provide a model State for the world to look up to. Hopefully our model will provide a goal to other States to strive for, and when a people "desire" help because they are ready to make the step to democracy and more effective economic models, then we reach out to help. We can't force it down the throats of those who are not receptive to these ideas.

[Ken White]

All true -- I believe that translates as 'know and accept your limitations.'