Airpower Jumping Off In Syria

[AmericanPride]

Slapout,

The problem with systems approaches, including Warden, is that systems are incredibly resilient and once untethered from their known foundations (i.e. assumptions), respond (and escalate) in unpredictable ways. Systems usually are not destroyed outright but instead adapt to changing circumstances. And even when systems appear to be destroyed, they manifest or express themselves in surprising forms. This necessarily results in repeated reciprocal escalatory actions that quickly test (or break) the parameters of the political object defining the conflict.

We (the U.S.) should be considering how to bring the conflict to a close (read: the exit strategy) rather than embarking on open-ended campaigns with limited results and unpredictable end-states. The U.S. counter-terrorism strategy is very effective at killing terrorists (and those in their immediate vicinity) but not so much in reducing the long-term threat of terrorism. This is the percent increase from 2006 to 2012 in terrorist attacks per country from Global Terrorism Database:

Afghanistan: 420.21% (282 to 1,467)
Iraq: 71.80% (837 to 1,438)
Syria: 17,500% (1 to 176)
Yemen: 6,140% (5 to 307)

How will exclusive use of air power reverse this trend?

[slapout9]

Slapout,

The problem with systems approaches, including Warden, is that systems are incredibly resilient and once untethered from their known foundations (i.e. assumptions), respond (and escalate) in unpredictable ways. Systems usually are not destroyed outright but instead adapt to changing circumstances. And even when systems appear to be destroyed, they manifest or express themselves in surprising forms. This necessarily results in repeated reciprocal escalatory actions that quickly test (or break) the parameters of the political object defining the conflict.

We (the U.S.) should be considering how to bring the conflict to a close (read: the exit strategy) rather than embarking on open-ended campaigns with limited results and unpredictable end-states. The U.S. counter-terrorism strategy is very effective at killing terrorists (and those in their immediate vicinity) but not so much in reducing the long-term threat of terrorism. This is the percent increase from 2006 to 2012 in terrorist attacks per country from Global Terrorism Database:

Afghanistan: 420.21% (282 to 1,467)
Iraq: 71.80% (837 to 1,438)
Syria: 17,500% (1 to 176)
Yemen: 6,140% (5 to 307)

How will exclusive use of air power reverse this trend?

AP,
I had to do a double take to see who this was at first. Warden calls this the Hysteresis effect, which means...... well exactly what you said and he consistently pounds that point home when he talks about the whole system of war planning.
As for the answer to your question of course it can. The Rhodesian Fire Force is an excellent example. People of confuse Air power with an Airplane or Air Force which is understandable but it is not the same.

Here is a good example of the Army Air power!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjBSJV0yHA8

[AmericanPride]

Slap,

I think the point of divergence is determinng whether this strategy is good policy or good politics. I think it's good politics but bad policy - and not because airpower does not have a legitimate role in warfare, but that airpower in this circumstance will be insufficient for the high bar the U.S. has set for its political goals. And for this reason, the U.S. has once again fallen into a commitment trap: because of the bad policy, it will become good politics to increase U.S. commitment when it's apparent the policy is not working.

So I think this is less about airpower's legitimacy and more about policy selection and decision-making. And when we combine this approach with our theoretical understandings of resistence movements, interstate conflict, it becomes quickly evident that there are very few 'good' policies available to the U.S.

[slapout9]

Slap,

I think the point of divergence is determinng whether this strategy is good policy or good politics. I think it's good politics but bad policy - and not because airpower does not have a legitimate role in warfare, but that airpower in this circumstance will be insufficient for the high bar the U.S. has set for its political goals. And for this reason, the U.S. has once again fallen into a commitment trap: because of the bad policy, it will become good politics to increase U.S. commitment when it's apparent the policy is not working.

So I think this is less about airpower's legitimacy and more about policy selection and decision-making. And when we combine this approach with our theoretical understandings of resistence movements, interstate conflict, it becomes quickly evident that there are very few 'good' policies available to the U.S.

I don't think we are diverging at all. The more I find out the more I think you are correct.