Steve,
Have you seen the SO JOC? It's 4 cases are much broader than anything you envision.
Stabops Joc
Steve,
Have you seen the SO JOC? It's 4 cases are much broader than anything you envision.
Originally Posted by Old Eagle
Check. In a way, that follows the ideas I'm trying to make--that we think more in terms of stability ops/peacekeeping than in terms of warfighting. What I'm struggling with is that our current conceptualization of counterinsurgency sees it as a variant of warfighting, meaning that the strategic objective is "victory." What I'm trying to say is that victory requires reengineering a flawed society, and we're not willing to pay the cost to do that. So we've put ourselves in a situation where we can't attain our own strategic objectives.
Stability ops are different because the strategic objectives are not necessarily "victory." Stability I think we can attain.
Couldn't agree more. I'd also suggest that we
toss words around that feed perceptions that are inimical to what we want to do.
Leaving aside the 'heroes,' 'warfighter' and such cinematic or media excesses, I'll also reluctantly forebear commenting on the current fad for naming operations in grandiose and vastly overstated terms (OEF, OIF) which themselves send a bad message subject to manipulation.
Instead, let me just suggest that the very term 'war' applied to a counterinsurgency sends bad messages and the use of words like victory, defeat and such in the context of such an effort where the best outcome can only be an acceptable conclusion sends a terrible message that can and will be used, domestically (regardless of which party is where) and internationally to our detriment.
You are correct IMO in that we in the US are not prepared to pay the price -- or be patient enough, some of both I think -- to wage a successful counterinsurgency in the classic mode. Stability ops are possible and we should head that way.
I have never subscribed to the "American's don't want casualties" routine. While it's certainly true in a relative sense, it has been used as a propaganda tool by many and is vastly misunderstood. There is no question that some Americans do not want any casualties and that some relatives of those hurt or killed will be angry but they are a small minority, most Americans will accept high casualties as long as the goals are clear and the operation(s) are successful. Failure, bungling and sloppy work turn off more Americans than do body bags. As we have seen...
A military capability is required, no question but it needs to be focussed and far better trained to be effective and quick. We have the capability, the potential is there but Congress is a big part of the problem.
Simply put, big hardware items that bring benefit to multiple States and Districts are a better sell in Congress then are a few small high end pieces of materiel from small suppliers and in small quantities for smash and grab raids or the cost of training to get the 'conventional' forces to a level of capability required to perform the operations that can be effective. This tends, unfortunately, to drive the Army in a quest for a bigger budget to go where the money is.
Put most but not all of the heavy and medium stuff in the ArNG, congress will buy that and you can have the best of both worlds.
Removing SF and CA from SOCom and putting them to work on their primary designed missions while leaving, even expanding, JSOC would be helpful. However, a well trained Infantry Battalion can ride helicopters, fast rope and kick doors as well as those guys can. The MEU-SOC effort worked but can be improved and the Army is equally capable of doing it. We are going to be confronted with a high number of second and third term enlisted guys who are Grunts and they'll have some good experience. The key is in the training; it is good now -- it can be better.
Whoops. Inadvertent lie, there. The Key is in getting the 'senior leadership' to adapt. ALL of them...
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