War Tactics?
Sorry, this reported experiment in Rio is not an application of "new" COIN war tactics. This is a tried and tested police tactic, which lives under all manner of names: sector policing, neighbourhood policing etc. IIRC this method has appeared in the USA, the snag was keeping the assigned officers living in their patrol base.
davidbfpo
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
Absolutely correct.
In several western states to this day Deputy Sheriffs officers live in their communities as a requirement of the job. Though that is starting to wane as a technique of controlling crime.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
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The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
Agree, but
Dave, I agree it isn't new, but I do think you can make an argument that it is under utilized, and that most "modern" police forces are not equipped or trained to do this. I believe there are still several neighborhoods in the U.S. alone (as compared to globally) that are controlled by gangs, and in these areas the police at most do drive by policing or respond to 911 calls.
The way the article read, it sounds like they established a combat outpost (with the emphasis on combat) in the heart of bad guy turf in order to get control of the turf. They had to fight their way in, then put in sufficient force to hold. Makes you wonder where the bad guys went, and if the next fight will be harder. I'm not a law enforcement expert, but I haven't read about too many cases where police have done this type of operations before. I think the NYC police did some surge operations, and used large buses as their police outposts?
Anyway I thought it was of interest for a few reasons, one you captured, the other is nature and degree of the criminal threat in many places.
I read something about this... Oh yes. Carl Von Clausewitz. On War.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
From different aspects it is a fairly common tactics of United States domestic law enforcement. Often called emphasis patrols or similar catchy titles (my favorite is wolf packs). Emphasis patrols can be sweeps for prostitution, drugs, or juvenile (gang) campaigns. Emphasis patrols usually last a few weeks at most. They usually sweep up some percentage of the criminal target population, and then create dislocation of some percentage, and some percentage hibernates until the sweep is done.
The problems with long term emphasis patrols is that the justice system has a single input, various storage mechanisms, and various outputs. Hundreds of cops arresting hundreds of crooks all process through just a few judges and courts. So anything like a "surge" (ick) in domestic law enforcement won't work for very long. Law enforcement is not a military operation regardless of all those M4 toting SWAT teams who keep trying to "wage war" on crime.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
Can the ink spot really work?
Selil, I had my doubts about the ink spot for other reasons, but your thoughts just added to my doubts. In many countries (ours included) the court and detention system is overwhelmed, so even if we're successful on the COP, surge, end of the problem, we eventually (sooner rather than later) come a point where this strategy collapses upon itself.The problems with long term emphasis patrols is that the justice system has a single input, various storage mechanisms, and various outputs. Hundreds of cops arresting hundreds of crooks all process through just a few judges and courts. So anything like a "surge" (ick) in domestic law enforcement won't work for very long. Law enforcement is not a military operation regardless of all those M4 toting SWAT teams who keep trying to "wage war" on crime.
The concept of the ink blot strategy is to pacify one area at a time, and then push out to an adjacent area and pacify it. To enable this to work we need a legal system (and ideally a rehabilitation system) that can handle this surge of detentions, which will probably be the long pole in the tent. If it is only one gang in one area, then this strategy will probably work, but the problem in Brazil is large scale.
It is easier to deal with an insurgency usng this strategy where you can mobilize the nation's resources, employ the military, etc. to deal with what we hope will be a relatively temporary problem.
If there is a lesson here, then it appears to be nipping the problem in the butt before it gets to this level. Goes back to the broken glass theory of law enforcement. It will be interesting to see how this play out over the next few months.
I'm not a law enforcement expert either, but I would offer that the situation is Rio is a bit different than in the US, even in some of the very bad parts of the US.
Most of the slums in Rio are like de facto independent fiefdoms run by the gangs. It goes beyond being the gang's "turf" where they represent just a physical danger to officers. It most cases they are not only the "government," but they also provide services, administer justice, charge rent, etc... Some members of the police have formed their own extralegal militias that seize territory and administer the favelas in much the same way, but without (official) government support.
I understand there is no fine line, but knowing some folks who are cops in some dangerous areas of the US and having spent some a number of months in Rio I think there are probably some elements of COIN not present in US community policing. Especially if we are talking about the Mexico situation being a small war, which I think probably has more in common here.
Consider a couple of quotes ....
from the OP article.
A bit light on the "insurgent-counterinsurgent ratio", but as David correctly states, this was more of a police than a military operation (with favorable geography, to boot).from OP link
About 10,000 people live in Santa Marta, a warren of 1,000 to 2,000 shoddy houses threaded with narrow concrete paths and perched on a hillside so steep that many residents ride a tram to get up the slope. About 50 to 60 drug dealers operate here, residents estimate, and the graffiti of the gang in charge -- "CV" for Comando Vermelho, or Red Command -- scar walls. Those are modest numbers, given the scope of the sprawling city -- an advantage for a police operation that employed just 150 men in the initial push. The small favela also has few entrances and is bordered by jungle, rather than blending into other slums.
More important than the manpower ratio is the question of how long the government is inclined to keep the police presence - 10 months, 10 years, etc. In the long run, will Santa Marta become a pacified colonia ? - after all, even Colchester had its down before its ups, as David can attest better than I.
At least to some inhabitants, the police effort has survived its authoritarian phase, but has yet to win over them - perhaps, a question of valuation of principles in Bob's World terms.
Nothing new here - we've heard it here so many times in regard to "real" armed conflicts.from OP link
Nata Maravilha Nael, 48, a school security guard who grew up in City of God, said even the residents who want the officers in the neighborhood describe such police excesses as speeding through the narrow streets in armored vehicles, screaming at residents and demanding bribes.
"It's an abuse of power," he said. "They're like criminals themselves."
The police have shut down popular dance parties, and several residents said they do not feel comfortable being outside after dark anymore, because of the risk of being accused of criminal activity.
"It's going backward. They're acting aggressively against normal people," Nael said. "When the criminals were here, they didn't mess with normal people."
It seemed to me to be an illustration of how the counterinsurgent's values (reduction of principles to practice) become the governing criteria for success or failure.
Good points
Gringo Malandro, I wasn't trying to compare the situation in Rio as parallel to a gang controlled neighborhood in Philly or Las Vegas, but simply illustrate there are several neighborhoods in the developing and modern world that are controlled by thugs, not by the police. I agree with all your points, except perhaps downplaying the relevance of this article.
Perhaps it is a school of thought versus a principle, but I believe you have to control the populace to defeat an insurgency, so any articles I find on the government attempting to re-establish control I tend to think they're important. During an insurgeny either the police, military or a combination there of may be employed to control the populace, so I think the tactics being employed by the police are relevant (unfortunately as jmm99 points out, as an example to avoid) to both mlitary and police.
jmm99 points out that legitimacy is the main issue, perhaps the center of gravity, and it is clear that the police are not legitimate to the relevant populace in this case, so it will be interesting to see how this plays out over time.
David please cite a couple of examples when you have tiime. Also how realistic is it to expect a police officer with a family to actually live in a depressed neighborhood, send his kids to the gang infested schools, etc.?IIRC this method has appeared in the USA, the snag was keeping the assigned officers living in their patrol base.
While I agree in principle, I think there is a limit to what we should expect. Perhaps bringing in a national level law enforcement force for 4 to 6 months at a time (without moving their families) might be acceptable? Thoughts?
If you hire locals, then they are vulnerable to having their families threatened. I think this all ties into how we plan to address long term stability issues in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It may be a different apple, but it is still an apple.
Short answer for Bill
Bill and others,
I recall when in Washington DC, at least fifteen years ago, that Metro PD had tried deplaying resident officers to a few neighbourhood; it worked well at first, but the officers - often IIRC - were newly recruited and after sometime wanted to buy their own homes. (Bear with me, I will ask two friends closer to the scene).
Deploying a national LE unit for a short period is really a band-aid and few national forces are culturally / organisationally suited.
Hiring locals and related vulnerability issues. Yes, valid. A galaxy of issues and solutions. Difficult and in Afghanistan? I'll not comment.
Possibly an one illustration; locally there have always been Irish-born / descended police officers and throughout 'The Troubles' a large minority in the then Special Branch anecdote indicates were Irish (mainly from the south). Loyalty was not an issue.
Hope that helps as an early answer over breakfast.
davidbfpo
Having a mixture of local and non-local helps. Alongside moving people on when promoted, at least for a few years before returning.
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