Ivory Coast

[Dayuhan]

And this damage was caused only by the US? It takes two to tango.

If you look at Africa it was the ability of crackpots to play the West off against the Soviets that has left the legacy of destruction.

Do try to be balanced.

We didn't have to play that game, and in many places we initiated that game, and did a lot of damage in the process. We are not accountable for what the Soviets or their proxies did. We are accountable for what we and our proxies did, which was in many cases completely unnecessary. If we prop up every despot who calls his opponents "Communist" (as once seemed to be the case), we can always blame the despots for manipulating us... but we also have to wonder what made us so easy to manipulate, for so long. Yes, the crackpots played us, and that's their responsibility. We let ourselves be played, and that's ours.

It is entirely possible that I'm a bit biased from living in one of the more egregious examples of this sort of American malfeasance... but there's no shortage of other examples around. About 2/3 of Latin America, to start with.

[Stan]

If we prop up every despot who calls his opponents "Communist" (as once seemed to be the case), we can always blame the despots for manipulating us... but we also have to wonder what made us so easy to manipulate, for so long. Yes, the crackpots played us, and that's their responsibility. We let ourselves be played, and that's ours.

Makes me wonder why we wanted to save the Ivory Coast from the French in 99 when there was clearly a lack of commies. Maybe it was cocoa

[RTK]

I see four questions of paramount importance prior to commitment and intervention:

What is our ability, with partner forces, to intervene?

What vital interests are contained within Ivory Coast?

What opportunity is there to increase the quality of life to the people of Ivory Coast given the current situation?

What is the best outcome of intervention?

If one or more of these questions cannot be answered to the satisfaction of intervening parties risks must be weighed with rewards. If the default answer is genocide prevention, than what elevates this to a status above genocide activites where we did not intervene? I do not see satisfactory answers yet to any of these questions.

[Ken White]

It is our hoomaniterian duty to intervene. Everywhere. Everytime (unless it would really hurt, then we can let it slide...). Regardless of logic.

The fact that such foolishness almost invariably creates more problems than it solves is immaterial. The similar fact that it more often than not results in more casualties, long term, than the nominal crisis might produce is immaterial; we must be seen as doing 'good.'

Seldom are but it's the thought that counts...

As for Stan's very accurate comment on Clintonian installations or this one anyway -- there were others -- too true. Clintonia giveth and Clintonia taketh away, Indian giver be the name of the Clintonians.

Drop Somalia, Rwanda and Darfur (a case of a seminal event inhibiting reproduction leading to an abortion...). However, I'll see your Haiti and raise you a Kosovo.

[JMA]

It is our hoomaniterian duty to intervene. Everywhere. Everytime (unless it would really hurt, then we can let it slide...). Regardless of logic.

The fact that such foolishness almost invariably creates more problems than it solves is immaterial. The similar fact that it more often than not results in more casualties, long term, than the nominal crisis might produce is immaterial; we must be seen as doing 'good.'

Seldom are but it's the thought that counts...

Ken one should separate the motivation to intervene from the method of the intervention.

I can understand such a cynical attitude given the poor results track record but suggest that instead of turning one's back on humanitarian interventions the US should address the methodology.

While the US intervention in Libya has been a screw-up it is beneficial as a case study in a limited intervention without boots on the ground. If the US generals can't promise to improve on this poor performance next time then the US has a bigger problem than at first thought.

[Ken White]

Ken one should separate the motivation to intervene from the method of the intervention.

Sometimes possible, sometimes not. Sometimes driven by other factors not apparent to many. My point is simply that humanitarian interventions are rarely (read: almost never) successful, ergo they should be judged and /or entered into only very carefully. I'd also suggest the motivation no matter how altruistic to intervene can and usually will be hijacked to serve various other needs or desires and not just by the intervening party and / or those directly involved but by some nominal bystanders.

I can understand such a cynical attitude given the poor results track record but suggest that instead of turning one's back on humanitarian interventions the US should address the methodology.

It's not cynical, it's rejecting an illogical and proven failed concept.

I strongly disagree with humanitarian intervention in general and particularly think the US should avoid them. That for a variety of reasons including world attitude -- yours is typical -- toward the US which imposes significant US domestic and international constraints on types of action ans even impacts on where they might be helpful or harmful.

While the US intervention in Libya has been a screw-up it is beneficial as a case study in a limited intervention without boots on the ground. If the US generals can't promise to improve on this poor performance next time then the US has a bigger problem than at first thought.

You're mixing up your metaphors, as usual.

Not sure yet the US intervention in Libya is a screw up as viewed by you, we actually did a few things right on this one -- to include getting in and out quickly, getting Europe and the Arab League involved to at least an extent. Militarily unsound, politically quite well done.

The no boots on the ground (really silly term, that... ) was a political constraint imposed almost certainly by NATO consensus with UN connivance. So though your basic point -- that troops are required -- is correct, your rationale for why there are none is flawed as are many of your analyses which, as I've said before, are invariably militarily sound and politically naive.

Thus, the US and its Generals do not have a problem in this regard, both are really pretty good at doing what they should be doing -- I'll give you that they are not good at doing things they should not be doing.

Which is my point...

Humanitarian intervention by military force is an incongruous oxymoron.

[JMA]

Sometimes possible, sometimes not. Sometimes driven by other factors not apparent to many. My point is simply that humanitarian interventions are rarely (read: almost never) successful, ergo they should be judged and /or entered into only very carefully. I'd also suggest the motivation no matter how altruistic to intervene can and usually will be hijacked to serve various other needs or desires and not just by the intervening party and / or those directly involved but by some nominal bystanders.It's not cynical, it's rejecting an illogical and proven failed concept.

It is not only possible to separate the motivation to intervene from the operational method but essential. The military commander needs to receive his mission with any limitations to plan the operation.

It is interesting that in Woodward's book "Obama's Wars" he mentions that the chiefs seemed to stand up to the politicians in terms of the Afghanistan surge in that they apparently said there is but one option and were unwilling to provide a range of options for the politicians to dither over. A bit of spine at last?

Probably the main reason why humanitarian interventions don't seem to work is that they are only implemented when there is a major humanitarian crisis already. It takes this to spur them into action - except in Libya where it is true Obama did not wait until the mass graves were filling (but then faltered on the implementation which has led to the French and British calling for a more agressive approach from NATO.)

So in the case of the Ivory Coast the UN with troops already on the ground dithers and the country slips back into civil war. Unable to get Gbagbo out of his palace the Northern forces state that they will starve him out... until the French take them by the hand and show them just how easy it is to get him alive when you have a handful of trained soldiers to do the business.

In great fear of having shown their colonial hand the French immediately announce that they will be pulling most of their troops out of the Ivory Coast and are going to throw in hundreds of millions in aid and allow the Ouattara forces to claim that they in fact arrested Gbagbo.

So yes while it would have been militarily easy to remove Gbagbo from office many months ago and deter the military from taking his side right back in the beginning politically it was impossible for the French. The UN forces would claim they had no mandate to support the will of the people and did not until resolution 1975 have the authority to protect the civilians with any means necessary. There are lessons to be learned from all this.

Interesting to note that supposedly under the guise of going after heavy weapons they (the French and rthe UN) did in fact target Gbagbo as I'm certain that the French if no one else realised that they needed to go for the head of the snake... and they did and had in the end to intervene to bring Gbagbo in.

So I say again that the problems with humanitarian interventions is that the timing is mostly too late and the methodology leaves much to be desired.

The Somalia case study where what started as a humanitarian intervention ended up with a get Aideed dead or alive. So yes without the first principle of war being followed - the selection and maintenance of the aim - matters can soon get out of control.

etc etc

[Stan]

I see four questions of paramount importance prior to commitment and intervention:

What is our ability, with partner forces, to intervene?

IMO the time to act effectively is long over. But, as some have pointed out, we are not capable of responding before an upheaval or civil war becomes reality. Since we somehow decided that the Ivory Coast needed democracy and the ability to freely vote for whomever, we should have been in the hot seat ready to cover our words of wisdom with firepower. A sad disconnect from what I believe is State’s ultimate goal with foreign relations and our wiliness to get more involved when the goal has no backup plan for the “what ifs”.

What vital interests are contained within Ivory Coast?

We barely have any strategic interests other than coffee and cocoa. Well, there is that slight problem with jamming democracy down their throats with no balls to back up our language. Sorry, I don’t have a clear answer to that one.

What opportunity is there to increase the quality of life to the people of Ivory Coast given the current situation?

Significant depending on our budget: We could target all the trends or indicators of quality of life such as infant mortality, GDP and literacy, but the Ivory Coast is similar to typical Sub-Saharan State and success rates are limited. If we’re ready for a decade of funding and policing, then the programs would have a slight chance. Doesn't this question belong with the first such as: Why are we getting involved and what is our exit strategy?

What is the best outcome of intervention?

A bleak outlook - Years of PKO with the UN. We blew the chance to save a lot of people and preclude a humanitarian crisis that will ultimately cost us much more. A least we don't have to demine the place

If one or more of these questions cannot be answered to the satisfaction of intervening parties risks must be weighed with rewards. If the default answer is genocide prevention, than what elevates this to a status above genocide activites where we did not intervene? I do not see satisfactory answers yet to any of these questions.

I didn’t then nor now see genocide in its true sense taking place in the Ivory Coast, but I do see an endless civil war and humanitarian effort. Is the G word the only way to get the West moving effectively in Africa ? We already witnessed what happens when we sit back and watch the kettle boil over - bad idea !

[JMA]

I see four questions of paramount importance prior to commitment and intervention:

What is our ability, with partner forces, to intervene?

What vital interests are contained within Ivory Coast?

What opportunity is there to increase the quality of life to the people of Ivory Coast given the current situation?

What is the best outcome of intervention?

If one or more of these questions cannot be answered to the satisfaction of intervening parties risks must be weighed with rewards. If the default answer is genocide prevention, than what elevates this to a status above genocide activites where we did not intervene? I do not see satisfactory answers yet to any of these questions.

Out of this exercise should come the level or degree of intervention needed to address the problem. Risk in terms of casualties may also be a factor.

Those debating against interventions tend to allude to a Iraq situation which is a exaggeration (and clearly intellectually dishonest) while those for such humanitarian interventions fail to peg what the limits should be.

My position has been to target the "problem" people as soon the politicians can get the stage set. If Gbagbo and his "loyal" military had been targeted early and effectively a lot of grief would have been avoided.

I would have thought the military part of targeting the bad guys was the easy part but I learn from Libya that even the most seemingly simple of tasks can get screwed up. We will no doubt find out how this happened in the fullness of time.