"compression of time and space"?Originally Posted by Taiko
Back on deck for the Asia-Pacific Century. I volunteer to go on point
Question: What impact has the compression of time and space had on the level and intensity of violence during and between wars in the past/present/future.
Are you talking about space travel or warfare?
Primarily warfare at the operational level, specifically the time/space/assets it takes to break the will of the opposing forces to fight eg: cabinet warfare->napoleonic warfare->nuclear warfare->sub-state warfare etc.
Space is a little more difficult to define, eg: cyberspace, sub-orbital space, all the way down to geographical space (urban/rural) and how our understanding/conceptualization of time/space has changed as a part of the history of war and warfare.
I'm in the process of understanding/explaining how/if this compression of time and space has any impact on the level and intensity of violence during and between wars:
- Warfare defined as the use of violence/force to break the will of an opponent to fight/resist.
- the role of social-media/cyber-space in Syria or Burma for example.
- World War 2 Vs the Cold War in understanding the effects of the compression of time and space on the level and intensity of violence.
- WOT (Iraq/Afghan) sub-state warfare is almost the inverse of the Cold War's compression of time and space.
- Cyber/Sub-orbital space warfare is the most prominent, in so far as it does not require the physical presence of armed forces and the potential effect is instantaneous (based on future projections on the possible lethality of both cyber/sub-orbital warfare in 20-30 years time).
- Cyber/Sub-orbital space warfare almost looks like it has the potential to be a evolution in siege warfare if you take Nth Korea, China or Iran as an example.
I've finished my theoretical model/general theory on explaining why the level and intensity of violence oscillates during and between wars. Now I'm trying to get a better grasp on warfare as it is today and a 20-30 year future projection on how warfare will change. Thus far in my research the compression and utilization of time and space is starting to become the prime candidate for being the most significant dependent variable on warfare for the foreseeable future.
Last edited by Taiko; 01-05-2013 at 05:44 AM.
I'm still not sure I know what you mean, and my time is short now.
I advise you to read
"Blitzkrieg: The Myth of Blitz"
by (then) Captain Thomas T. Smith
Infantry (Journal) July/August 1990
It should be accessible online. In worst case PM me, I obviously have a copy.
In short, World War 2 lasted from September 18 1931 to September 2 1945. At the peak of the Cold War it would have taken less than a day to destroy the entire planet. This is what I mean by the compression of time and space in warfare and its impact on the level and intensity of violence during and between war.
One of the main selling points of network centric warfare was the ability to compress time and space via the use of technology, it was also described as a 'force multiplyer'. The same with over the horizon technology, it provided a means to compress time and space. It gave the user the ability to process threat information at a speed that was not available before the technology was developed.
It is the same with the development of cyberwarfare and drone technology, for example. I'm trying to gauge how this can further compress time and space, the tempo of warfare if you will, and what impact this will have, if any, on the level and intensity of violence in future wars. A cyber attack on a countries main infrastructure is all but instantaneous eg: Russia and Georgia War is a clear example of the use of cyberwarfare to compress time and space.
Thanks for the blitzkrieg article, what I am trying to get my head around is a little different to the decisive battle theory, from what I can work out the concept is closer to deterrence. I'll keep researching. I can understand what it is that I am looking at, it's just a matter of finding the right definition/terminology/conceptual framework to better explain it to others. This is made even more difficult when trying to analyse war/warfare 20-40 years in the future, as there are no readily available conceptual frameworks to explain what is to come eg: singularity.
Last edited by Taiko; 01-05-2013 at 10:52 AM.
Future foresight.
The future signal to noise ratio: compression of time and space/drones/cyberwarfare/sub-orbital space warfare/human biomechanical evolution/human biological evolution/targeted assassination/deterrence/taking a state whole/singularity/total war/GOES solar x-ray flux weaponisation/spectrum
The frustrating thing is that I can see it and understand it, but not in a way that can be readily or easily translated into current conceptual frameworks. I neither have the time nor finances to try and separate the signal from the noise anymore.
Last edited by Taiko; 01-05-2013 at 11:52 AM.
WW3 is theory, not warfare. Even if practice, it would not have been warfare, but top-down suicide.
alleged ability at most.One of the main selling points of network centric warfare was the ability to compress time and space via the use of technology,
Seriously, nobody can compress time or space. What you're talking about is being quicker. The article I supposed and the clumsy Western staffs should make quite clear that quickness is hardly a chief advance.
Yeah, almost everything was already. Even canteen designs.it was also described as a 'force multiplyer'.
Nope. There would be lots of physics Nobel prizes awarded for it if that ability was ever available.The same with over the horizon technology, it provided a means to compress time and space.
First and foremost, it multiplied the ability of users to drown in data and yawn in meetings. There are some nice cases of theoretical or even practical acceleration of processes, but I doubt the overall effect has been such.It gave the user the ability to process threat information at a speed that was not available before the technology was developed.
Radio nets have grown and been digitised and traffic increased. The ability to process data with technical means has increased exponentially, the ability to understand twhat the data means did not evolve a bit.
Humans are psychologically very defective and often outright stupid.
We cannot cope with the growth of technical performance, and as a consequence cannot exploit the technical potential at all.
It's educating about such grandiose effect ideas to look at the history of air warfare in WW2 and the history of the EMP fear since the 70's. The Y2K story should also help.It is the same with the development of cyberwarfare and drone technology, for example. I'm trying to gauge how this can further compress time and space, the tempo of warfare if you will, and what impact this will have, if any, on the level and intensity of violence in future wars. A cyber attack on a countries main infrastructure is all but instantaneous eg: Russia and Georgia War is a clear example of the use of cyberwarfare to compress time and space.
Generally I would advice to take it seriously, to expect people/institutions to adapt rather well and to keep friction and generally imperfections in mind. Nobody is going to shut down th electrical grid for more than once for two days with mere software, for example. The sum of undetected, unspectacular efforts are much more likely to be reqally influential (this being essentially an application of Luttwak).
I suppose our take on an interest in military theory is so much different I won't be any more helpful to your effort.Thanks for the blitzkrieg article, what I am trying to get my head around is a little different to the decisive battle theory, from what I can work out the concept is closer to deterrence. I'll keep researching. I can understand what it is that I am looking at, it's just a matter of finding the right definition/terminology/conceptual framework to better explain it to others. This is made even more difficult when trying to analyse war/warfare 20-40 years in the future, as there are no readily available conceptual frameworks to explain what is to come eg: singularity.
To me, technological change isn't what determines military performance, but something which provokes adaptations - and I appear to assume a much lesser degree of exploitation of technical potential than you do.
Take the article as an example; compare the cruise speed of a horse with the cruise speed of a WW2 tank (~20-30 kph) and imagine what you would have written about the increase of operational advance speeds thanks to mechanisation. Then compare with what really happened (the article misses Manstein's dash to the Duna river, though).
Also, you should raise your awareness for how easily people stop listening or reading when they encounter a shipload of buzzwords.
At times, I was considering you're trying to prank us with your buzzword avalanches.
In case you're really into buzzwords; maybe I can help you with an observation about what seems to turn into a buzzword these days: "clandestine".
Clearly the ability to deliver a massive, punishing attack has become faster and easier with nuclear weapons, and now the growth of reliance on vulnerable cyber-based systems.
But how does that change the speed of war?
To attack an opponent is not to defeat an opponent. One must still occupy and hold ground and the skies above that ground. One must secure passage across the seas and skies to reach that ground. And even if one accomplishes all of those things, one must then force the people living on that ground to submit to their newly imposed system of governance.
As the US has demonstrated (too often of late), if one has the relative advantage of resources and technology, yes, the initial aspects of that can be fairly quick and easy. But forcing a people to submit? The only "easy" way is genocide, coupled with the destruction and replacement of the existing culture with that of the invader. Plenty of historic examples of that, some fairly recent. Are nuclear weapons spread across a populace faster than a Sharps rifle directed at the primary source of food and culture? No, not if one takes into account how soon that place is occupiable by the invading element.
But yes, punitive attacks are easier, faster, and now something that individuals and non-state actors can conduct at levels once the sole realm of powerful states (with far less risk of consequence, and thus outside our current concepts of deterrence). But to conduct an act of war is different than waging war, just as throwing a punch is different than a fight.
Countries such as the US will increasingly need to absorb the occasional sucker punch and not be distracted from the business of being a powerful state. Retaliation and prevention cannot be an all-consuming extravaganza such as we have put on for the past decade or so, but rather must be a small, quiet, but deadly certain capability. No massive deployments, no public chest-thumping when enemies fall, just cold hard business of being a state in the modern age.
Last edited by Bob's World; 01-05-2013 at 02:40 PM.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
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