"Occupation by Policy" - How Victors Inadvertantly Provoke Resistance Insurgency

[Dayuhan]

How about that? A 104 word (approximately, I only counted once) version of 'If you can't do everything, you shouldn't do anything.' Or...Why or what purpose would it serve to do anything if you couldn't do everything else?

Misunderstood you have. Try again I will.

Granting preferential access to US support or refuge on the basis of religious affiliation would be incompatible with American tradition and policy, would send a thoroughly atrocious message to the rest of the world, and would be construed (legitimately) as caving in to our own fundamentalist fringe.

Bit of a dead horse anyway, since it's not gonna happen.

Burma's Rohingya Muslims are among the most thoroughly oppressed and persecuted minorities of the planet. The US couldn't care less. Why are they less deserving of support or refuge? I'm not suggesting that if if you can't help them all, you shouldn't help anyone, I'm pointing out that religious affiliation is not a reasonable basis for setting priorities on who gets help.

[Dayuhan]

AQ wages UW. UW requires conditions of insurgency to work. AQ is probably best thought of as a non-state political action group dedicated to the removal of overt Western influence in the Middle East along with those Regimes in the region who have become corrupted by some mix of wealth, power or Western influence, with the Saudis being #1 on that list. They also wish to create a coalition of Muslim states to once again have sufficient power to not have to worry about such external exploitation.

I think it would be more accurate to say that AQ seeks to take power in the Middle East and as much of the Muslim world as possible. It's less about what they want to remove than about what they want to install: themselves.

Where do you think AQ's power comes from? They have no population of their own, they must borrow populations from others. The only populations interested in what they are selling are those who are Sunni Muslim and that perceive their own governance to need to change, or that perceive external Western influence to be a corrupting factor that once removed will allow their governance to return to what they see as appropriate.

How do you reconcile the idea that "The only populations interested in what they are selling are those who are Sunni Muslim and that perceive their own governance to need to change" with the observed reality that Gulf populaces are willing to support AQ wholeheartedly as long as AQ is fighting the West somewhere else, but that support drops to near zero when AQ tries to rock the boat in their own countries? How do you reconcile that statement with the observed fact that AQ's predecessor organizations rallied enormous support for their effort to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan, even though that conflict had no bearing at all on domestic governance?

AQ draws support from a whole lot of motivators. Some comes from anger over the historical decline of Islam and the rise of the Christian West, and a desire to restore the romanticized days of Muslim ascendancy. Some comes from the affront to Muslim manliness posed by the dismal performance of Muslim armies against non-Muslim foes: even many Arabs who loathed and feared Saddam felt a bit disheartened at the ease with which the US rolled over Saddam's "mighty army". There's a great deal of generic resentment over non-Muslim occupation of "Muslim land", anywhere, even where it has zero bearing on domestic conditions. As Outlaw points out, there's anger over Israel and the Palestinians, exacerbated again by repeated military victories on the Israeli side. There's resentment over the colonial and neocolonial meddlings of the past... even Sunnis who loathe the Ayatollahs will point to the Anglo-American overthrow of Mossadegh as an example of what they hate about the West. All of this rolls into what Bernard Lewis called "aggressive self-pity": an overwhelming sense that Muslims are generically oppressed and beat up and a general tendency to support any Muslim who is sticking it to the West, anywhere, whetehr or not there is any actual or perceived impact on local conditions. There is, as mentioned above, a general preference, especially in the Gulf, for the sticking it to the West to take place someplace else, not at home where the resultant mess might land in the front yard. They want to watch it on Al-Jazeerah, not in the town square.

You live in SEA, have you ever wondered why AQ's message falls flat there? The nations there are proudly sovereign, having thrown off inappropriate and illegitimate Western influence during the course of the Cold War. They have no occupation by policy drivers of resistance effects toward the West. Do they have internal revolutionary pressures still, and do some of those revolutionaries accept help from AQ? Yes.

What is the difference between the ME and SEA? Primarily the fact that the ME was held static politically as a major battle ground of our Cold War containment, and because frankly communism/land reform does not resonate among non-agrarian and non-industrialized populations. But in SEA communism/land reform resonated widely among tenant farmers weary of scratching out a scant living for some Western Colonial master or some local mixed breed elite caste master as Spain left behind everyplace they colonized. So SEA Muslims largely addressed these issues and have moved on. Now it is time for those in the ME to do the same. But we are too fixated on the symptoms and how it affects us to see the problem clearly.

AQ only has real influence where certain conditions exist. Address those conditions and they will rapidly fade into irrelevance. But those conditions are political, not ideological or purely economic.

Here I think you stray from the path.

In general, you can divide SEA Muslims into two groups: those who live in Muslim-dominated countries (Indonesia, Malaysia) and those who live in Muslim-minority countries (southern Thailand, southern Philippines, Burma).

By your model, southern Thailand and the southern Philippines should be ideal for AQ: Muslim minorities have been for generations marginalized, denied self-determination, oppressed, and generally kicked around by US-allied governments. In actual fact, while groups in these areas have taken assistance from (and provided refuge to) AQ and allied groups, the message has gained very little traction. Populaces in these areas are not concerned with pan-Islamic issues and not moved by an Arab-dominated and Middle East-centric message. Their concerns are local, and they see little connection between the message and their struggle.

In Indonesia, on the other hand, the larger AQ and JI message does have a good deal of popular support, though (as in many places) there's very little support for action campaigns that kill local people or rock the local boat. The message gains traction not because of a perception of oppression by their own government, but because of greater identification with a larger Muslim whole, and greater sympathy with pan-Islamic issues and that eagerness to restore Muslim prestige and self-perceived potency by driving the West out of whatever Muslim land they happen to occupy (again, the farther from home the better).

In short, I don't think the actual dynamics of popular acceptance of the AQ and allied group message in SEA supports your theory at all.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

Great questions! We really do see the same facts, but where we differ is in our training, background and experience (both substantial, but both different) and how we interpret those facts.

I may miss a few, but I will try, not to convince you to think like me, but to see a bit more clearly why I think the way I do.

I think it would be more accurate to say that AQ seeks to take power in the Middle East and as much of the Muslim world as possible. It's less about what they want to remove than about what they want to install: themselves.

Personally I think AQ has a snowball's chance in Saudi Arabia of ever being in charge of even a single country, yet alone a coalition of countries. Much more moderate organizations and individuals will follow the trail they have helped to break to fill those roles. This yet one more reason the West needs to back off of their irrational fear of AQ. The Intel community and the ideologues take the most extreme statements AQ makes for propaganda purposes as gospel, are rarely seems to apply a little common sense. They are far to radical and violent for the average Sunni. That same "average Sunni" may cheer their actions or even donate to charities who they fully appreciate are supporting AQ and similar movements. Many see the value of AQ, but few want them to be in charge of anything.

(On a side note, if AQ ever gained a state or formed a Caliphate they would lose their greatest sanctuary - their status as a non-state actor. NSAs frustrate great state powers, but we eat weak states for breakfast. AQ has to know that even if we forget. The are doomed to NSA status forever.)

How do you reconcile the idea that "The only populations interested in what they are selling are those who are Sunni Muslim and that perceive their own governance to need to change" with the observed reality that Gulf populaces are willing to support AQ wholeheartedly as long as AQ is fighting the West somewhere else, but that support drops to near zero when AQ tries to rock the boat in their own countries?

This is exactly what the concept this thread is exploring is all about. There are two broad types of insurgency, Resistance and Revolution. The first is a continuation of war and caused by illegal, inappropriate, foreign occupation; the second is a civil emergency and is caused by perceptions of poor governance that lead some segment of a population to believe they must act out illegally to force poltical change upon their own government. Often both occur in the same place, but as they are very distinct, can appear in very different degrees.

In Afghanistan the base insurgency is the revolutionary one between those who had patronage power under the Taliban (and who were dispossessed of that power by the US UW campaign and subsequent occupation and political meddling), with a resistance insurgency layered upon top of that provoked by our ever increasing efforts to suppress the rapidly growing revolutionary insurgency following the disastrous elections and constitution of 2003/4. The more we "countered" the revolution, the more the resistance grew. Once we leave and stop out political meddling (physical and policy occupation) the resistance should rapidly wane. Only after the de facto illegitimacy of the Northern Alliance monopoly of the current government is resolved will the current revolution die down. Afghanistan being Afghanistan, it will probably be another 180 flip, and the next revolution will begin.

But in the Gulf, it is probably a fairly small percentage of the domestic population who want to "remove the apostate regimes." From what I see most want modest evolution of governance, not revolution of governance. Calls for slightly greater women's rights (in the context of their own culture, not the "radical" US women's rights we call for), or a judiciary not controlled by the King. I think they see the benefit of the growing fear of internal unrest, as Jordan is making true changes, and the Gulf states are expanding perqs. I think Jordan is doing the best, and making real change. The Gulf states are simply trying to appease their populations with bribes, I don't know how long that will continue to work. But to your point, causation for revolutionary insurgency remains lower than in surrounding states because the governments there have the ability to "buy it down."

Resistance insurgency against western policies, however, is high, and I believe growing due to the perceived inappropriateness of how the US has been responding to the attacks of 9/11. So many who may not be willing to conduct violent revolutionary insurgency to coerce or overthrow government at home, are willing to travel to conduct violent resistance insurgency elsewhere in an effort to coerce the US to back off of the polices they see as being anti-Islamic, inappropriately violent and invasive, empowering of the Shia threat, and protective of their current governments stubborn refusal to listen to the people and reasonably evolve.

By your model, southern Thailand and the southern Philippines should be ideal for AQ: Muslim minorities have been for generations marginalized, denied self-determination, oppressed, and generally kicked around by US-allied governments. In actual fact, while groups in these areas have taken assistance from (and provided refuge to) AQ and allied groups, the message has gained very little traction

No, by AQ's model they should be, but by my model I recognize what AQ does not: They (SEA Muslims) do not blame the US for their plights to that degree, so there is little policy-based resistance, but high internal revolutionary energy against domestic regimes. Certainly some of the US's greatest shame is in how we treated the Muslim populations of southern Philippines (ok, most Americans are ignorant of what we did there, so do not feel shame, but they should). But ultimately we left and have respected Philippine sovereignty over the past several decades. I doubt many Muslims in the Philippines blame the US for the governance that impacts their lives in revolutionary-provocative ways. Likewise in Thailand. Thailand has always been fiercely independent. I have never felt that we ever had much sway over their governance, and have always felt that Americans were well regarded there. Ultimately it comes down to "how do the people feel, and who do they blame." The feelings and blame in Thailand are simply different than they are in much of the Middle East.

In Indonesia, on the other hand, the larger AQ and JI message does have a good deal of popular support, though (as in many places) there's very little support for action campaigns that kill local people or rock the local boat. The message gains traction not because of a perception of oppression by their own government, but because of greater identification with a larger Muslim whole, and greater sympathy with pan-Islamic issues and that eagerness to restore Muslim prestige and self-perceived potency by driving the West out of whatever Muslim land they happen to occupy (again, the farther from home the better).

Indonesia is indeed the most populous Muslim country in the world. It is also geographically a huge, diverse, and dispersed collection of cultures and societies under a relatively new nationalist identity. They suffer growing pains, and that is very natural, as they develop as an independent and sovereign nation. I don't see a tremendous transnational terrorist threat coming out of Indonesia toward the US. Certainly they support the nationalist insurgencies in the Southern Philippines, but I see these are primarily revolutionary energy sources.

You know the deal, when one is a revolutionary, one usually needs external help, and one rarely can be picky about where one gets it. Accepting help from France did not mean that revolutionary Americans wanted to be French. Accepting help from Russia did not mean that revolutionary Vietnamese wanted to be Russian; and equally, accepting help from AQ does not mean that revolutionary Thais, or Indonesians or Filippinos buy into the resistance against Western polices in the Middle East aspect of AQ's dogma.

As I said, the nations of SEA earned their sovereignty from the West during the Cold War, but the nations of the ME were manipulated by powerful external forces and largely held static in conditions designed meet the desires of those Western powers rather than the desires of the people who lived there. Now those people are actively moving to rectify that situation. Their era of revolution was delayed, but will not be denied.

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert--your last response brings up an interesting issue---Muslims in India-- and why they have not had the problems of say Pakistan, the ME, Syria, or Lebanon.

India has if the census numbers are anywhere close say 147M Muslims or which some say 30M Shia (the second largest Shia population outside Iran) so say then the remaining 117M are Sunni with a small Sufi population making them the largest Muslin minority percentage wise outside of the ME.

So if one looks at the mixed population the question arises ---why has there not been the heated infighting between the Shia and Sunni in India that we have seen elsewhere in the world---followed by the second question why is there no AQ influence at all in India and it is interesting in that AQ affiliates have actually attacked India but from the outside not inside.

A third question might be why is it that Iran has not exported it's fundamentalism to India-----30M Shia is a sizable number in one country?

So historically speaking what happened in India that has not happened elsewhere?

Indian Sunni and Shia development is something that has been largely overlooked in the last 12 years.

[Bob's World]

Outlaw,

You know the answer to your own question. It is about governance, not religion.

You've seen the movie Gandhi, and how the illegitimate external (resistance insurgency) influence of Britain was removed, and how Muslims and Hindu then worked a subsequent split that gave all a chance to live in a country dominated by governance of one flavor or the other. Do Pakistan, India and Bangladesh all still wrestle with internal revolutionary issues? Certainly they do. But AQ's Saudi-centric revolutionary message does not resonate in that region, nor in Afghanistan for that matter.

It isn't about ideology. It isn't about religion. It is about governance and it is about the higher order aspects of Maslow's hierarchy. People under governance they believe has no right to govern them (illegitimacy); people under governance that acts in a manner seen as inappropriate in their culture (exceeding sovereignty); people under a rule of law they do not perceive as just (injustice); people treated differently than other similarly situated populations (disrespect); and populations who perceive they have no effective legal means available to them to seek the changes to fix any or all of the above (disempowered).

As JFK said: "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible, will make violent revolution inevitable."

Equally, those who are perceived as helping to sustain in power or enable those who make peaceful revolution impossible, will find themselves confronted with acts of transnational terrorism.

It is that simple.

[carl]

Misunderstood you have. Try again I will.

Granting preferential access to US support or refuge on the basis of religious affiliation would be incompatible with American tradition and policy, would send a thoroughly atrocious message to the rest of the world, and would be construed (legitimately) as caving in to our own fundamentalist fringe.

Bit of a dead horse anyway, since it's not gonna happen.

Burma's Rohingya Muslims are among the most thoroughly oppressed and persecuted minorities of the planet. The US couldn't care less. Why are they less deserving of support or refuge? I'm not suggesting that if if you can't help them all, you shouldn't help anyone, I'm pointing out that religious affiliation is not a reasonable basis for setting priorities on who gets help.

Misunderstood I have not. This one looks like an about 208 word version of 'If you can't do everything, you shouldn't do anything' or rather 'If you can't do everything, you shouldn't do anything or somebody somewhere might criticize you and better some people die than you open yourself up to criticism.' I can't be sure of 208 words, I didn't count this time.

Remember the MS St. Louis? We didn't give any preferential treatment on that one.

[carl]

In Afghanistan the base insurgency is the revolutionary one between those who had patronage power under the Taliban (and who were dispossessed of that power by the US UW campaign and subsequent occupation and political meddling), with a resistance insurgency layered upon top of that provoked by our ever increasing efforts to suppress the rapidly growing revolutionary insurgency following the disastrous elections and constitution of 2003/4. The more we "countered" the revolution, the more the resistance grew. Once we leave and stop out political meddling (physical and policy occupation) the resistance should rapidly wane. Only after the de facto illegitimacy of the Northern Alliance monopoly of the current government is resolved will the current revolution die down. Afghanistan being Afghanistan, it will probably be another 180 flip, and the next revolution will begin.

I noted before that you tend to ignore fact, historical and now contemporary, if noting that fact makes your arguments untidy. This is another example of you doing that. This time you mentioned not at all the pernicious influence of the Pak Army/ISI. Commenting upon the conflict in Afghanistan without mentioning that pack of murdering General Sahibs is like talking about airplanes without mentioning wings. It is not a serious comment.

By the way, good point about the Muslim population in India. I never thought about that.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob,

It isn't about ideology. It isn't about religion. It is about governance and it is about the higher order aspects of Maslow's hierarchy. People under governance they believe has no right to govern them (illegitimacy); people under governance that acts in a manner seen as inappropriate in their culture (exceeding sovereignty); people under a rule of law they do not perceive as just (injustice); people treated differently than other similarly situated populations (disrespect); and populations who perceive they have no effective legal means available to them to seek the changes to fix any or all of the above (disempowered).

While much of your model is a useful lens to view conflicts through as long as one doesn't get blinded by it to other aspects that influence the conflict. I still think you have failed to make a case that ideology and religion don't play a determinant role. Shia's fighting Sunnis is certainly about religion, just as the 30 year war in Europe was largely about religion. To claim good governance would have prevented this is out in left field. Ideology also certainly plays a role, many governments govern by ideology, the U.S. included. The Cold War was largely an ideological conflict. Governments are seen as wrong, not necessarily illegitimate, if they conform to a particular ideology those opposing the government believe in. Ideological forms provide resistance with ideas for an alternative future. Again it is ideas and ideology that rocks the world, nothing else.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

lets not mix types of conflicts. Absolutely Shia vs Sunni writ large is about religion; but shia vs Sunni internal to Iraq, Bahrain, KSA, or Syria is about a government dominated by one sect using that authority to oppress the other.

The wars of the reformation, to include the 30 Years War were about throwing off the rule of the Holy Roman Empire, a rule that had grown to being seen as illegitimate by many Europeans, and a rule that used Catholicism as a single ideology to control the populace. Within a few years of Martin Luther posting his edict, it was hijacked by politically motivated insurgents who saw the power of the ideology for rallying the masses to join the revolt.

invariably political oppression comes first, revolutionary leaders second, ideology third.

IMO you are dead wrong, and you have the facts of your examples wrong.

Only example I can think of that fits your theory is the Pied Piper - and that is a fairy tale.

[Dayuhan]

The Cold War was largely an ideological conflict. Governments are seen as wrong, not necessarily illegitimate, if they conform to a particular ideology those opposing the government believe in. Ideological forms provide resistance with ideas for an alternative future. Again it is ideas and ideology that rocks the world, nothing else.

I'm not so sure the Cold War was an ideological conflict. Between the US and the Soviet Union, perhaps. But the Cold War really wasn't cold at all... just as there's no such thing as a low intensity bullet, there's no such thing as a cold bullet. The hot part of the Cold War was fought by proxy, in the developing world, and involved dozens of different conflicts. Those conflicts may have been perceived as ideological by Americans and Soviets, but for those who actually did the fighting they were often anything but ideological. Many of those who fought for or against Communism in those proxy wars wouldn't have known Karl from Groucho, and hadn't a clue about the ideological baskets in which faraway governments framed their domestic conflicts.

[Dayuhan]

This one looks like an about 208 word version of 'If you can't do everything, you shouldn't do anything' or rather 'If you can't do everything, you shouldn't do anything or somebody somewhere might criticize you and better some people die than you open yourself up to criticism.'

Since you can't do everything, you have to prioritize. Prioritizing on the basis of religious affiliation and putting Christians on a preferred salvation list simply because they are Christians would be... just unacceptable in every way, or any other negative adjective in the book. Wrong, if you will. On every level.

[Dayuhan]

Personally I think AQ has a snowball's chance in Saudi Arabia of ever being in charge of even a single country, yet alone a coalition of countries.

Agreed. They won't get what they want, but that's still what they want.

This yet one more reason the West needs to back off of their irrational fear of AQ.

Outside of the most paranoid quarters, I don't think "the West" is really that concerned that AQ and allied groups will re-establish the Caliphate. There is substantial concern over the possibility of significant attacks on the West, which is not so misplaced. As the US winds down its engagement in Afghanistan I expect that risk to increase, as AQ will need to provoke another American incursion to justify their own existence.

There's also some concern, not entirely misplaced, over the possibility of AQ and related extremist groups gaining substantial influence, if not complete control, in a state or significant part of a state, which is also not entirely unreasonable and could be a real problem, especially if the state involved is Pakistan.

Many see the value of AQ, but few want them to be in charge of anything.

I think what you need to convincingly demonstrate is that the value perceived in AQ lies in ability to weaken foreign support for domestic governments and make them more open to reform. I just can't see much evidence to support that contention. It seems to me that the perceived value in AQ, especially in the Gulf, lies in the idealization of AQ as the noble Islamic warriors fighting infidel intrusion in conveniently faraway places, rather than in any impact AQ is expected to have on domestic governance.

In Afghanistan the base insurgency is the revolutionary one between those who had patronage power under the Taliban (and who were dispossessed of that power by the US UW campaign and subsequent occupation and political meddling), with a resistance insurgency layered upon top of that provoked by our ever increasing efforts to suppress the rapidly growing revolutionary insurgency following the disastrous elections and constitution of 2003/4. The more we "countered" the revolution, the more the resistance grew. Once we leave and stop out political meddling (physical and policy occupation) the resistance should rapidly wane. Only after the de facto illegitimacy of the Northern Alliance monopoly of the current government is resolved will the current revolution die down. Afghanistan being Afghanistan, it will probably be another 180 flip, and the next revolution will begin.

Yes, that cycle will go on, but the only relevance that cycle has to AQ is its ability to attract foreign intervention, which then allows AQ to rally support from Gulf Arabs who can pat themselves on the back for supporting those noble warriors resisting infidel intrusion in the lands of the faithful without exposing themselves to any real risk. The movement AQ represents needs direct foreign intrusion to justify itself. One question I raised that you failed to address revolved around the enormous support the AQ movement (same in all but name) raised for its jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. That surely had nothing at all to do with any expected impact on domestic politics in the Gulf.

It seems to me that the mantra driving AQ's popularity is not "weaken American support for the apostate regimes", but "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful", and to a less effective extent "carry the Sunni banner against the Shi'a". "Expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" works best, and that's why I think the risk of terrorist attack will increase as American exposure in Afghanistan decreases. AQ needs a foreign intruder to resist. Without one, they are lost.

Resistance insurgency against western policies, however, is high, and I believe growing due to the perceived inappropriateness of how the US has been responding to the attacks of 9/11. So many who may not be willing to conduct violent revolutionary insurgency to coerce or overthrow government at home, are willing to travel to conduct violent resistance insurgency elsewhere in an effort to coerce the US to back off of the polices they see as being anti-Islamic, inappropriately violent and invasive, empowering of the Shia threat, and protective of their current governments stubborn refusal to listen to the people and reasonably evolve.

I'm not sure that resistance against Western policies in the Middle East can be reasonably classified as "insurgency". I also have serious doubts about the extent to which fighters travel (or financiers send resources) in order have an impact on governance conditions at home. Interview-based studies of foreign fighter motivation, for one thing, provide no basis for for that belief.

I doubt many Muslims in the Philippines blame the US for the governance that impacts their lives in revolutionary-provocative ways. Likewise in Thailand. Thailand has always been fiercely independent. I have never felt that we ever had much sway over their governance, and have always felt that Americans were well regarded there. Ultimately it comes down to "how do the people feel, and who do they blame." The feelings and blame in Thailand are simply different than they are in much of the Middle East.

I don't think Muslims in the Gulf blame the US for their governance conditions either, to any significant extent. Maybe in the Saudi Arabia of the 1990s, to a much greater extent, but that was a different world.

Indonesia is indeed the most populous Muslim country in the world. It is also geographically a huge, diverse, and dispersed collection of cultures and societies under a relatively new nationalist identity. They suffer growing pains, and that is very natural, as they develop as an independent and sovereign nation. I don't see a tremendous transnational terrorist threat coming out of Indonesia toward the US. Certainly they support the nationalist insurgencies in the Southern Philippines, but I see these are primarily revolutionary energy sources.

I also don't see a great threat to the US coming out of Indonesia. There's a great deal of emotional support for the idea of AQ as jihadi, as long as they fight the foreign intruder somewhere. People wave the flag and express devotion to the cause. Direct action is a little more difficult, as they have a dearth of accessible targets and local action gets very little domestic support. It's more about approval than direct support, a function largely of distance. Indonesian Muslims do (overall, obviously there's much variance) I believe have greater identification with pan-Islamic causes and ideas than their counterparts in the Philippines or Thailand.

You know the deal, when one is a revolutionary, one usually needs external help, and one rarely can be picky about where one gets it. Accepting help from France did not mean that revolutionary Americans wanted to be French. Accepting help from Russia did not mean that revolutionary Vietnamese wanted to be Russian; and equally, accepting help from AQ does not mean that revolutionary Thais, or Indonesians or Filippinos buy into the resistance against Western polices in the Middle East aspect of AQ's dogma.

The Indonesians that buy into the idea are not revolutionaries against their own Government. They are politicized Muslims seeking to identify with and feel part of a larger Islamic whole, and with a global cause. They believe that Islam will be ascendant and that the West is degenerate and will fall, and support any struggle that they see as part of that process.

As I said, the nations of SEA earned their sovereignty from the West during the Cold War, but the nations of the ME were manipulated by powerful external forces and largely held static in conditions designed meet the desires of those Western powers rather than the desires of the people who lived there. Now those people are actively moving to rectify that situation. Their era of revolution was delayed, but will not be denied.

Actually I think the revolutionary impulse in the Gulf has significantly declined since the 1990s, and I think you greatly overrate the post Cold War influence of the US, both actual and oerceived, in maintaining the Gulf status quo.

[carl]

Since you can't do everything, you have to prioritize. Prioritizing on the basis of religious affiliation and putting Christians on a preferred salvation list simply because they are Christians would be... just unacceptable in every way, or any other negative adjective in the book. Wrong, if you will. On every level.

Wrong to save some people who might be murdered? On every level? 'Sorry people. The takfiri killers are coming for you but I can't save you from them because it would be wrong on every level, just horribly wrong.'

Ok, if you say so...

[Dayuhan]

Wrong to save some people who might be murdered? On every level? 'Sorry people. The takfiri killers are coming for you but I can't save you from them because it would be wrong on every level, just horribly wrong.'

Ok, if you say so...

No, wrong to say Christians are more worthy of being saved than any of the other endangered people we might choose to save.

[AmericanPride]

Robert,

I've been thinking about the theoretical implications of your model of "occupation by policy" and the attendant concepts of "resistance" and "revolutionary" insurgencies. As someone pointed out earlier, the concepts are not new, and when taken together, there are several theoretical and practical grounds on which to debate the extent of its influence and/or relevancy in the present situation. However, it strikes directly at the issues surrounding power, domination, and revolution and your own words seem to confirm your recognition of the asymmetric relationship in regards to political and ideological legitimacy between the United States and insurgency movements.

You stated in the original post:

The roots, however, we tend to gloss over. After all, it is uncomfortable to confront the very real possibility that these are roots we planted ourselves.

This proposition is actually a very deep rabbit hole. To the extent that the United States champions the global political-economic system, the contradictions of which produce numerous conflicts, then yes there is a "very real possibility that these are roots we planted ourselves." You could call this "metastrategy" - how the shape and connections of the fundamental structure produces conflict or is manipulated to one's own advantage. I had asked you earlier about your views on the intersection of ideology and policy because your policy prescriptions are so full of ideologically charged terms. Unwittingly, you are perpetrating and reproducing the very contradictions ("occupation by policy") that you are claiming are so harmful to US interests. You stated that AQ from a strategic perspective is a symptom. A symptom of what exactly? Gramsci would argue that it's counter power coming back to bite the back end of hegemony. This should not be surprising for anyone familiar with the works of nearly every theoretician since Machiavelli. In globalization, there will be winners and losers, and there will be violent contests to determine which one whole peoples, cultures, and ideologies will be. The inheritance of global governance by democratic capitalism from imperialism is no accident, and neither is the continuation of resistance. This is not a question of any single policy, but instead the relentless logic of way the world is organized. "Occupation by policy" is one tool or strategy at the disposal of the powers that be within the larger metastrategy of sustaining Western-led globalization.

[Bill Moore]

I'm not so sure the Cold War was an ideological conflict. Between the US and the Soviet Union, perhaps. But the Cold War really wasn't cold at all... just as there's no such thing as a low intensity bullet, there's no such thing as a cold bullet. The hot part of the Cold War was fought by proxy, in the developing world, and involved dozens of different conflicts. Those conflicts may have been perceived as ideological by Americans and Soviets, but for those who actually did the fighting they were often anything but ideological. Many of those who fought for or against Communism in those proxy wars wouldn't have known Karl from Groucho, and hadn't a clue about the ideological baskets in which faraway governments framed their domestic conflicts.

Of course the Cold War was bloody, much bloodier than the current war we're in against terrorism, and it was also ideological. If the opposing ideologies for a dominant world ideology and system didn't exist, the Cold War wouldn't have existed. Not to make light of the proxies that died in this fight, they all may have been fighting for own individual motivations, but the larger context of why they were proxies was part of the larger fight.

[Bill Moore]

Bill,

lets not mix types of conflicts. Absolutely Shia vs Sunni writ large is about religion; but shia vs Sunni internal to Iraq, Bahrain, KSA, or Syria is about a government dominated by one sect using that authority to oppress the other.

The wars of the reformation, to include the 30 Years War were about throwing off the rule of the Holy Roman Empire, a rule that had grown to being seen as illegitimate by many Europeans, and a rule that used Catholicism as a single ideology to control the populace. Within a few years of Martin Luther posting his edict, it was hijacked by politically motivated insurgents who saw the power of the ideology for rallying the masses to join the revolt.

invariably political oppression comes first, revolutionary leaders second, ideology third.

IMO you are dead wrong, and you have the facts of your examples wrong.

Only example I can think of that fits your theory is the Pied Piper - and that is a fairy tale.

At least you wrote IMO, but then right afterward you confuse your opinion with facts. Unfortunately the Pied Piper is not myth, it reflects a good deal of human history. That aside, since your views are heavily biased by U.S. history during our Revolution the ideas came first. As most noted historians will explain the Revolutionary War was just the final aspect of the Revolution of ideology that took place over the previous three decades. America developed its own political ideology that was no longer compatible with Britain's. Our Civil War was similar, it was a fight largely over two separate political ideologies that emerged decades prior to the fighting. Many internal wars are about incompatible ideologies, whether based on religion or forms of governance, or a hybrid of the two. Unless we have different definitions for ideology, I think your argument falls flat.

Government is not always wrong, nor can government always adapt in ways that pleases all the various ideological groups. If some of these groups can't get their way and they want to pursue their way through violence, then the government of course is obligated to protect themselves perhaps the majority that support the government. Personally I think all revolts are based on a confluence issues that can be tied to ideology, economics, social order, politics, and even outside actors influencing the situation that all interact in various ways. It is never as a simple as a three step process where the government is always wrong.

It doesn't take a major stretch of the imagination to foresee a time when opposing ideology groups in the U.S. become so polarized that a viable compromise is not possible, and armed conflicts erupts. It is the chicken or egg argument, if one party oppresses another's preferred form of governance you could call it bad governance, at least it is in the eyes of the opposition group. IMO it is conflict mostly driven by opposing ideologies, and each group uses all the factors weighing on the situation to make a case on why their political ideology is best. You can argue that the factors drive the development of the ideology also, but the reality is it is an iterative process. Why is the economy broken? How do we fix immigration, Iran? Should gays have the right to marriage? etc. These issues will be used to mobilize support for different groups with opposing political ideologies. For the most part our system adapts and has demonstrated great resilience over the years, so kudos to our Founding Fathers, but we came apart at the seams once before over ideology during our Civil War, and countries today are coming apart due to ideological and identity groups differences that can't be resolved by government. When there is no middle ground, we enter the point where Mao is right, all power comes from the barrel of gun.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

It appears that we are equally "fixated." Just as I suggested to Dayuhan yesterday, we see the same facts, but assess the meanings from different backgrounds.

I struggle to see how the ideas built around the belief that "an island should not rule a continent" and that British rule was therefore illegitimate somehow came before Britain's rule of that continent. John Locke was perhaps the most influential theorist informing the thoughts of our founders (legitimacy coming from the people rather than power or God; the right of revolution when governments loses touch, etc), but he lived in England in the era following the heated events of the Civil War and the peace of Westphalia.

Thoughts on governance were evolving faster than governments. In the West this began when Mr. Guttenberg's printing press freed and empowered men to read, and think and communicate free from the control of such activities the Holy Roman Empire imposed through the Catholic Church. (Yes, governments use ideologies too). Guttenberg created a revolution of information which in turn fomented a revolution of thought and people's expectations of government and governance. This is not say that governance became evil or even ineffective, it simply grows stale and out of touch with the evolving expectations of the people in such eras. As friction grows, governments being made up of politicians, blame the challenger rather than themselves for the trouble.

Russia's policy of Glasnost had the same effect in the Soviet satellite states, as did modern communications tools in the Middle East. In each case governance comes first, a breakthrough of the state's ability to control information and thought comes second, perceptions of "poor governance" develop and spread, friction grows, (conditions of insurgency - often beginning to grow long before the first bullet is fired or bomb explodes), then informal leaders emerge and ideologies for change are adopted and applied.

This is a timeless, multi-act play. Just because governments tend to sleep through the first several acts does not mean the play begins when the first explosion wakes them up.

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert---this response goes back to the Indian comment of mine--which I still insist is an interesting event to understand---but you are correct overall in the ME it has been a fight between the Sunni vs Shia over governance and who dominants who carried out under the guise/gloss of religion.

Although the comments are varied your concept is still quite interesting as it tends to reduce the clutter/chatter and attempts to answer the question WHY?

I once had as a interrogator mentor years ago in Berlin who was a former WW2 German Army intel officer who worked the East Front tell me as a young beginner---if you think a human can do it believe it possible---if analyzing something always ask the final question WHY---if you cannot answer the Why then you have a hole a mile wide to drive through and you are not finished.

Here goes my response to India and why I think at least in SWA it has become the center of terror attacks from fundamentalists from outside India---India has been probably the only successful overthrow of colonialism that did not tear the populations inside the former colony apart afterwards. After every attack notice how the Islamic community rallies around the governance.

NOW in Iraq in Fallujah we are seeing something that is interesting and does not bode well for the Malaki government---the Awakening is actually taking on ISIS/AQI on their own with no support from the government but at the same time there are armed Sunni groups taking on the government out of frustration of poor Shia governance---actually think it is the IAI striking out on their own forcing now a Sunni/Shia showdown or actually as they are wording it a Sunni/Iran showdown-begs the question is the group the favorite of the Saudis right now inside Iraq?

Just a side note---if one looks at Sunnism there is a deep view held towards governance---before Khomeini the Shias did not seem to be interested in good governance or governance in general.

Robert agree that governance is one of the items in the difference but there is something in the development of Sunnism and Shiaism in India that has not been seen in the rest of the Islamic world.

In the drive to overthrow the British colonialism ---Islam together with the other resistance groups drove hard for independence with a large number of Islamic leaders being/participating/leading on the resistance side.

When one has the feeling that they were participants in history and helped in the establishing of a new country where they as a population can continue in their own direction there is a bond with other cultural populations that is not found in other Islamic countries.

If we look at the ME while there are Christians still in the individual ME countries there has not been the sharing of ideas and thoughts between the religions as there were between Islam and Hinduism. Yes we are “people of the book” but that is about it in the ME.

Secondly, Islam settled the Sunni/Shia divide in ways not done in other Islamic countries---actually over the years Shia converted to Sunnis' and vice versa to include several top Islamic thinkers with a ease not seen in other Islamic countries.

Shiaism had been identified in the eyes of Sunni’s to be supporters of colonial Britain so when independence came Shiaism was pushed to the side and it has stayed that way since independence. In some aspects Islam in India is secular in nature not fundamentalist.

Thirdly, and this is the important one-- Islam inside India due to the interaction with Hinduism developed into four elements of Sunnism due to their different interpretations of Islam---this has not happened in other Islamic countries-often overlooked are two (more Sunni fundamentalist influenced by Wahhabism) -- the Deobandi whose influence actually covers into the Pashtun region of Afghanistan and the Ahi-I Hadith that influenced the Lashkar-e Tayiba in Kasmir. Both are long time fundamentalists and influenced by Wahhabism.

A kind of resistance export out of Sunni India—which by the way the same two groups in India did not attempt to create discord inside India---maybe this is the reason for the terrorist attacks coming from outside India into India by fundamentalist groups as they dislike the Sunni secular participation in the governance.

So yes governance is/was a major point but how the population developed culturally and how the population helped in the fight for independence are two other big differences often overlooked.

Kind of a participatory democracy thing that at least for India has held for years.

[Bob's World]

American Pride,

The US is the biggest fish in the pond, and we must have a foreign policy, and that foreign policy will be hard on some and good for others. We are not distilled water poured into this global system, we are the largest and most disruptive agent, good, bad or indifferent.

The concept of "occupation by policy" is about when foreign policy falls out of step with those it affects thereby generating a resistance insurgency effect, much as a physical occupation does. This does not mean don't have foreign policy and don't affect people, it means that one must have mechanisms to honestly appreciate the effects one's governance has (intended or accidental) on various populations, and mechanisms to fine tune that governance to be as appropriate as possible.

Often insanely outrageous foreign policy begins with very logical and reasonable intent. Britain was sending vast amounts of capital to China to purchase tea. This created a problematic trade deficient as China had little interest in British goods, so only took gold or silver. Solution, pay them in opium instead. So for generations Britain solved a trade problem and created a nation of addicts. Today China has a grudge against the West, and one can hardly blame them. Their sovereignty has been compressed because they were too weak to stand up to Western military technology. There will be a reckoning, and the West will blame China when it happens.

Britain was not evil, but they were self-absorbed and self-interested, and ignored the growing signs that the perceptions of their foreign policies were growing worse (accelerated by the telegraph cables they emplaced to better manage the very empire that was increasingly in its perceptions of resistance). The transition from empire to the common wealth was a brilliant move that recognized that the form of governance/foreign policy had to evolve.

What I am not seeing is the US's similar recognition that we can either break ourselves attempting to enforce a status quo that is increasingly perceived as inappropriate, or we can evolve in how we pursue our interests to ways that are less caustic, less expensive, but equally (or more) effective. Our efforts at post-Cold War National Security Strategies have been well intended, but counter productive all the same. At a time when others want to be more like themselves, we profess a goal to make them more like us. That is a dangerous degree of being disconnected from reality, much like Britain and China in the 1800s.