Understanding our wartime experiences...

[JMA]

Interesting article, I had not seen it before. It is IMO quite accurate, if anything it understates the damage done by that policy though it does seem to have caught all of them. It was indeed the most flawed personnel policy ever -- and note, we're now rotating units instead of people, so we did learn a little in Viet Nam. Very little. Steve is essentially correct in that the 6 month Officer rotations were for ticket punching purposes though it was as the article saed justified by saying it gave more 'combat experience.' I could never figure how bei8ng the Exchange Officer in Da Nang was combat experience...

It is of course difficult to believe that the top echelon of general staff (who probably did WW2 and Korea) can prove to be so inept in either/or/both military policy decision making and/or dealing with politicians. Then of course once the freight train starts rolling not much can stop it so the insane rotation of 6-month of platoon commanders continues... as they say like the great Mississippi just keep rolling along.

OK, so were are we now?

SO we agree that deployments should be by unit... but for how long and what size units (by brigade or by battalion)?

Then do we agree that the formation/unit's stateside base provides the replacements?

Now we get to:

Army Unit Cohesion in Vietnam: A Bum Rap

Some interesting stuff there.

"Prolonged tours during World War II had a devastating effect on
troop morale and the neuro-psychiatric health of infantrymen in particular.
Combat in North Africa and in Italy clearly indicated that psychiatric
breakdown in combat units was not a question of who but when, a con-
clusion later substantiated in France and Germany. Based on European
theater casualty rates, postwar researchers determined that 180 days of
combat represented the "burn-out point" for infantry and other front-line
troops. Of equal note was the discovery that after 180 days the neuro-
psychiatric casualty rate of the survivors exceeded that of untested
replacements."

and

"Since a soldier could easily reach burn-out within a year, it
was detrimental to unit efficiency to subject individual personnel to long
tours. Not surprisingly there were 927,307 cases of "battle fatigue" in
World War II, of whom 320,000 were discharged. This exceeded the number
of combat deaths (292,131) ..."

and importantly:

"In contrast to critics of individual rotation in Vietnam, World War II writers considered such tours to be the only solution to high levels of neuro-psychiatric casualties. They did not regard it as detrimental to unit cohesion because in their experience the infantry population of European theater units had been in constant flux anyway. Such units suffered casualties equal to their total personnel authorizations every 85 to 100 days in combat! This meant that the typical infantry unit was "destroyed" at least twice a year. Fifth Army casualty rates, which were average for the European theater, substantiate this estimate. Its infantry battalions possessed less than 18 percent of their original soldiers after 180 days, the majority of whom were cooks, clerks, and other support personnel. Thus there was no point to rotating units because the originals had long ceased to after even one year."

As to the last quote I do realise that casualty rates as mentioned are no longer the norm so that argument probably falls away.

[Ken White]

SO we agree that deployments should be by unit... but for how long and what size units (by brigade or by battalion)?

Combat wise, I'd say Bns -- but the personnel and training systems and organizations would have to be re-tooled to support that. Right now we're really structured and organized to do it by Division but have actually gone to a by-Brigade model, creating in effect a hybrid -- and not totally satisfactory -- situation.

Then do we agree that the formation/unit's stateside base provides the replacements?

I don't think it must the unit's home station; a central replacement system works well enough.

Some interesting stuff there.

It is that and brings to mind a thought. As a result of that WW II experience and the concomitant major combat induced personnel turnover and the psychiatric casualty effect we also had a one year individual tour effort in Korea. However, there were four significant differences. In my order of importance they were:

1. In Korea, most of the Officers above Lieutenant (and even many of them) and almost all NCOs above Sergeant had WW II experience and most also engaged in constant mentoring and training of subordinates. That included newly arriving units and most individual replacements through the end of the war. Not only was the experience factor lacking in Viet Nam, there was all too often a strange drop in mentoring and in unit training...

2 There was no six-month rotation of Officers to 'broadening assignments.'

3. There was no Infusion program. This program, so far as I know, was a Viet Nam era aberration that was designed to place 'experienced ' soldiers, NCOs and Officers in newly arriving units during the 1966-67 buildup of forces. It entailed taking some all rank persons in varying percentages from units in country and assigning them to newly arrived units to provide a leavening of experience and to insure the entire unit did not rotate at tour end as a body. At the same time, taking some newly arriving units and assigning them to units already in-country (assuring that the new guys would be labeled as FNG at best...). Unfortunately, there was IMO little coherence to who came and / or went where; no 'sister' or affiliated unit -- it was done on an individual basis and the swaps were NOT always rank / job for same rank / job. It was not a well designed plan and it was also poorly implemented in an unduly bureaucratic mode. As you can envision, it created major havoc in units. I believe that program did far more damage than the six month rotation of Officers. It also I think was the most significant reason for the lack of mentoring / in unit training. What it obviously did was destroy unit cohesion at a critical time and the knock on effects continued after the build up period. ...

4. The Korean 'experience' of rotation, replacement and combat performance essentially lasted from July 1950 through July 1953, thus there were effectively only three 'rotations' (though there were actually more due to far higher early casualties as compared to other, later wars). Further, by July 1951 an effective stalemate existed and the war of movement ceased to be replaced by the tedium but still dangerous though relatively stabilized trench warfare effort -- two very different wars in one, In any event, the short span insured the deleterious effects of time did not evince themselves as they did in Viet Nam. Whether the system would have continued to work reasonably well cannot be known. My guess is it would have been at least slightly superior to that of Viet Nam due to the first three reasons above.

So we did learn a little and have since wisely opted for unit rotations.

To return to your earlier query on tour length, I'd personally opt for indefinite and aim for 18-36 months, type and intensity of combat defined. However, I doubt most democratic legislatures would support that and I think a year is a marginally acceptable compromise -- with the caveat that it be done a whole lot smarter than we did it in Afghanistan and Iraq. Return to the same area of operations should have been the norm but it was deliberately avoided to prove the 'modular' concept would work -- and for other obscure reasons (like too much work for Planners who also rotated at year or so intervals and thus had no memory of what came before...)

I also believe that type of combat makes a major difference in how units are rotated and employed. In a COIN / FID effort, unit stability and continuity are important, casualties will be generally lower and leaving the unit in place and rotating people (in line with some of your suggestions) can be done -- if the legislatures do not interfere too badly. In higher intensity conflict OTOH, a major war of movement against a peer, that continuity is not necessary and the frequent rotation of units in and out of combat can lessen the psychiatric casualty problem; replacements can be received, training undertaken and rest obtained.

As to the last quote I do realise that casualty rates as mentioned are no longer the norm so that argument probably falls away.

Yes but casualty rates are very much a function of each individual war and the current "norm" can be quickly replaced by one that approaches Viet Nam -- or Korea, even WW II.

No easy answers...

[JMA]

Comprehensive response, thank you.

Combat wise, I'd say Bns -- but the personnel and training systems and organizations would have to be re-tooled to support that.

SO let me understand here. The whole battalion trains together prior to deployment, deploys (fresh) together, stays together and then leaves all together... after a year or so?

From that paper:

"Personnel would return to the United States upon serving 12 months in Vietnam regardless of one's proximity to the fighting. Several factors, mostly bureaucratic, influenced this modification of Korean War policy (where tour length had been flexible, depending on type of assignment)."

Different tour lengths would complicate matter beyond the ability of most planners/schedulers.

What should we be concerned about? Apart from tropical diseases perhaps that 180 days of combat represented the "burn-out point" for infantry? What represents '180 days of combat'? Sitting in Khe Sanh for 180 days straight qualify? Being stationed at Cam Rahn?

I don't think it must the unit's home station; a central replacement system works well enough.

This is probably the simplified system that would probably have to be used when numbers in the hundreds of thousands are being deployed. A bit like a quality 'lucky-dip' in that you don't know what you are getting, especially when it comes to officers and NCOs.

Not sure how the Brits are working this in Afghanistan but presume with the smaller numbers they are able maintain the rear link to their regimental structures in the UK?

If they came through the same regimental system the troopies would probably share at least the same training point of departure, had the same instructors or at least knew them and were able to share similar horror stories about the wrath of the training sergeant major. In other words the new guys arrive at the same standard the older guys were at the same time, with the new guys lacking only in experience and can learn quickly if attached to an older troopies for mentoring.

It is that and brings to mind a thought. As a result of that WW II experience and the concomitant major combat induced personnel turnover and the psychiatric casualty effect we also had a one year individual tour effort in Korea.

This 'round figure' of a year being settled on despite evidence that it is not time in theatre that is the problem but rather combat exposure that has a deleterious effect on soldiers?

However, there were four significant differences. In my order of importance they were:

1. In Korea, most of the Officers above Lieutenant (and even many of them) and almost all NCOs above Sergeant had WW II experience and most also engaged in constant mentoring and training of subordinates. That included newly arriving units and most individual replacements through the end of the war. Not only was the experience factor lacking in Viet Nam, there was all too often a strange drop in mentoring and in unit training...

Not surprising... how do inexperienced soldiers mentor others?

2 There was no six-month rotation of Officers to 'broadening assignments.'

One wonders who the bright sparks are who think up these ideas?

3. There was no Infusion program. This program, so far as I know, was a Viet Nam era aberration that was designed to place 'experienced ' soldiers, NCOs and Officers in newly arriving units during the 1966-67 buildup of forces. It entailed taking some all rank persons in varying percentages from units in country and assigning them to newly arrived units to provide a leavening of experience and to insure the entire unit did not rotate at tour end as a body. At the same time, taking some newly arriving units and assigning them to units already in-country (assuring that the new guys would be labeled as FNG at best...). Unfortunately, there was IMO little coherence to who came and / or went where; no 'sister' or affiliated unit -- it was done on an individual basis and the swaps were NOT always rank / job for same rank / job. It was not a well designed plan and it was also poorly implemented in an unduly bureaucratic mode. As you can envision, it created major havoc in units. I believe that program did far more damage than the six month rotation of Officers. It also I think was the most significant reason for the lack of mentoring / in unit training. What it obviously did was destroy unit cohesion at a critical time and the knock on effects continued after the build up period. ...

One understands that even with the best intentions mistakes can be made. The trick is to fix the mistakes and move on. What would have worked better?

4. The Korean 'experience' of rotation, replacement and combat performance essentially lasted from July 1950 through July 1953, thus there were effectively only three 'rotations' (though there were actually more due to far higher early casualties as compared to other, later wars). Further, by July 1951 an effective stalemate existed and the war of movement ceased to be replaced by the tedium but still dangerous though relatively stabilized trench warfare effort -- two very different wars in one, In any event, the short span insured the deleterious effects of time did not evince themselves as they did in Viet Nam. Whether the system would have continued to work reasonably well cannot be known. My guess is it would have been at least slightly superior to that of Viet Nam due to the first three reasons above.

So we did learn a little and have since wisely opted for unit rotations.

Ok so so maintaining unit integrity is the key. How would one be able to extend tour lengths without compromising unit cohesion?

To return to your earlier query on tour length, I'd personally opt for indefinite and aim for 18-36 months, type and intensity of combat defined.

And (as per my earlier question) how does one maintain unit cohesion and what replacement system does one use?

However, I doubt most democratic legislatures would support that and I think a year is a marginally acceptable compromise -- with the caveat that it be done a whole lot smarter than we did it in Afghanistan and Iraq. Return to the same area of operations should have been the norm but it was deliberately avoided to prove the 'modular' concept would work -- and for other obscure reasons (like too much work for Planners who also rotated at year or so intervals and thus had no memory of what came before...)

Yes, there is no accounting for what politicians get up to.

Yes and the military general staff as well... I mean if troops were to return to areas where they had operated before it would mean they would have some local knowledge. Can't have that now can we? I'm telling you between the politicians and the general staff they are 100 times more effective in screwing up the intervention than the Taliban could ever be. What is the definition of treason again?

I also believe that type of combat makes a major difference in how units are rotated and employed.

Absolutely.

In a COIN / FID effort, unit stability and continuity are important, casualties will be generally lower and leaving the unit in place and rotating people (in line with some of your suggestions) can be done -- if the legislatures do not interfere too badly.

Yes again.

In higher intensity conflict OTOH, a major war of movement against a peer, that continuity is not necessary and the frequent rotation of units in and out of combat can lessen the psychiatric casualty problem; replacements can be received, training undertaken and rest obtained.Yes but casualty rates are very much a function of each individual war and the current "norm" can be quickly replaced by one that approaches Viet Nam -- or Korea, even WW II.

yes again... (three in a row)

No easy answers...

Not sure about that Ken, what you have summarised in this post would go a long way to making the Afghanistan deployment more effective for starters.

[Ken White]

SO let me understand here. The whole battalion trains together prior to deployment, deploys (fresh) together, stays together and then leaves all together... after a year or so?

I think that's the best compromise -- and virtually all solutions to the issue have to be compromises...

What should we be concerned about? Apart from tropical diseases perhaps that 180 days of combat represented the "burn-out point" for infantry? What represents '180 days of combat'? Sitting in Khe Sanh for 180 days straight qualify? Being stationed at Cam Rahn?

Obviously that last shouldn't count and should be avoided if at all possible. Using the Khe Sanh model is probably militarily effective but also probably bureaucratically and mechanically not possible. That entails another compromise -- some units are just going to have it tougher than others and little can be done about it. The truly exceptional can be catered for, minor excursions will have to be tolerated and what constitutes "minor" will change from war to war,

This is probably the simplified system that would probably have to be used when numbers in the hundreds of thousands are being deployed. A bit like a quality 'lucky-dip' in that you don't know what you are getting, especially when it comes to officers and NCOs.

True, yet another compromise.

If they came through the same regimental system the troopies would probably share at least the same training point of departure, had the same instructors or at least knew them and were able to share similar horror stories about the wrath of the training sergeant major. In other words the new guys arrive at the same standard the older guys were at the same time, with the new guys lacking only in experience and can learn quickly if attached to an older troopies for mentoring.

All true and probably achievable. The better features of the Regimental system can be adopted without picking up some of its less desirable ideas. As an old RSM once said, that system is at one time the strength and the bane of the British Army.

This 'round figure' of a year being settled on despite evidence that it is not time in theatre that is the problem but rather combat exposure that has a deleterious effect on soldiers?

IIRC, there was some sense to it. Tours were variously 16 months, 13 months, and 10 months dependent upon various factors such as the type of unit, probably exposure to the stress of combat -- in a 10 month tour, less than 200 days of actual combat would generally be accrued (and I believe the WW II derived figure was 200 days, not 180). That proved to be both politically untenable (Mothers complained to Congress of unfairness if their son was in a unit that hit the 16 month window while a neighbor's was in a 10 month unit...) and too complex for administration when the casualty rates varied dependent upon operational efforts so a year was settled upon as a compromise -- one the politicians could live with...

One interesting note on Korean War casualties, the US / UN rate varied with the quality of the unit in direct opposition and that was true during the war of movement and the static phase. I believe that was also true in WW II but have not seen much about that factor.

Not surprising... how do inexperienced soldiers mentor others?

That is certainly true but there were other factors as well.

One understands that even with the best intentions mistakes can be made. The trick is to fix the mistakes and move on. What would have worked better?

Unit rotation. We've done that. Now to improve how we do that...

Ok so so maintaining unit integrity is the key. How would one be able to extend tour lengths without compromising unit cohesion?

I think that is very much particular war and operational methods driven; the largest impediment being casualty or other attrition rates.. In Viet Nam and Korea, casualties were the largest number of forced replacement (fewer psychiatric than in WW II), I've heard that currently, human factors (family illnesses or deaths, other personal issues) and physical problems not necessarily combat induced rival and occasionally exceed casualty numbers as a driver of replacements or personnel departures -- many are not replaced because the numbers aren't that high when taken by unit. It'll vary. The key, as you wrote is to adjust, adapt and move on -- bureaucracies are notoriously poor at that. Yet, they're like women; can't live with 'em, can't live without 'em...

And (as per my earlier question) how does one maintain unit cohesion and what replacement system does one use?

Not to be sarcastic but -- only with great difficulty and best according to METT-TC and the particular war.

Not sure about that Ken, what you have summarised in this post would go a long way to making the Afghanistan deployment more effective for starters.

Yes but implementing all that would / will not be easy due to those Politicians and that General Staff...

[JMA]

Yes but implementing all that would / will not be easy due to those Politicians and that General Staff...

OK, but know we all know where the problem lies.

[JMA]

I think that is very much particular war and operational methods driven; the largest impediment being casualty or other attrition rates.. In Viet Nam and Korea, casualties were the largest number of forced replacement (fewer psychiatric than in WW II), I've heard that currently, human factors (family illnesses or deaths, other personal issues) and physical problems not necessarily combat induced rival and occasionally exceed casualty numbers as a driver of replacements or personnel departures -- many are not replaced because the numbers aren't that high when taken by unit. It'll vary. The key, as you wrote is to adjust, adapt and move on -- bureaucracies are notoriously poor at that. Yet, they're like women; can't live with 'em, can't live without 'em... :wry

Talking about unit cohesion I suggest this piece by Henderson is worth study: Cohesion: the Human Element in Combat

IMHO any action taken by the bureaucracy that damages unit cohesion is criminal. I'm serious... with one stroke of a pen these staff bureaucrats can wreak more havoc in a second than the enemy in a year.

[JMA]

One interesting note on Korean War casualties, the US / UN rate varied with the quality of the unit in direct opposition and that was true during the war of movement and the static phase. I believe that was also true in WW II but have not seen much about that factor.That is certainly true but there were other factors as well.

OK I can understand that but the quality of the own forces will also have an effect on own forces casualties and the like?

This thesis looks at it from that angle:

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COHESION AND CASUALTY RATES: THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION AND THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION AT INCHON AND THE CHOSIN RESERVOIR

I quote:

The 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions fought two campaigns in Korea between September and December 1950. These divisions’ levels of unit cohesion prior to and during their employment affected the number of men who became casualties during the three and one-half months of combat. Casualty rates can be affected by friendly-enemy force ratios and tactical advantages, but this historical analysis shows that units opposing similar enemies in similar tactical situations still have markedly different casualty rates that are not attributable to enemy numbers and disposition.

Then importantly in the context of our discussions in this thread:

Programs such as the Selective Service and the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA), originally designed to help combat units, ultimately destroyed any hope for cohesion that the 7th Infantry Division might have had.

I'm sure that unit cohesion is a critical success factor - along the lines of Napoleons quote re the moral being as to the physical (and I would add the technical) as 3:1. As long as the tail is wagging the dog this will not be addressed. Time for someone to crack the whip?

[Ken White]

All known -- and all too frequently disregarded; often for inane or insane reasons.

Obviously, own unit quality has an effect on casualties and all other factors of warfare. The vagaries of that fact are a principal cause of the military propensity for overstrength and perhaps excessive redundancy. Regrettably, legislature, bureaucracies and poor leaders refuse to accept or understand that with obvious failures attributable to that refusal.

As a point of minor interest, I don't believe that the Selective Service issue, the Draft, contributed heavily if at all to a lack of unit cohesion not only in the 7th ID up north but in that Army in Korea as an entity. The KATUSA program was definitely an adverse impactor and a detriment to unit capability and performance (one the Marines refused to accept due to that fact regardless of the political desirability and the practical benefits to the Koreans) but poor Army personnel and training policies of the day contributed far more heavily to unit failures in Korea than did the Draft.

Those personnel and training policies are a little better today still leave quite a bit to be desired...

I'm not at all sure that there's a decent solution to the problem of maintaining unit cohesion over the long term. Good or better cohesion will not always be possible but I believe it could be achieved far more often than not if units were properly organized, equipped and trained and if they were properly led -- and employed. That not least by the political leadership who do not do the employment thing well and who would not like the costs of such units...

We are stuck with the simple fact that good units develop and maintain unit cohesion under adverse conditions. The solution is to simply have more good units and that can be done by more selective recruiting followed by more effective training and by better selection of Commanders. Not really that hard -- but very difficult in an egalitarian democracy that is perhaps overly concerned with 'fairness.'

[Fuchs]

Not really that hard -- but very difficult in an egalitarian democracy that is perhaps overly concerned with 'fairness.'

I think you mix up poor decisionmaking with the phony justifications of the poor decisionmakers.

[JMA]

As an old RSM once said, that system is at one time the strength and the bane of the British Army.

Thats classic British for you. A statement making it possible to be in both camps (for and against) at the same time.

I would be interested to learn more of these supposed negatives but perhaps they are conjured up by those having no regimental system of note as some form of justification for their own position?

Meantime I refer to Sydney Jary from his delightful book '18 Platoon':

Infantry warfare is a wretched business. It makes the physical and the emotional demands on participants that run contrary to all human instinct. The strong minority must quietly help the weak majority. To me that is the essance of good team work and that jewel in the crown of the British Army, the regimental system, is the strong foundation upon which we all, knowingly or unknowingly, relied.

Then of course sage advice from an expected quarter:

Remember tradition does not mean that you never do anything new, but that you will never fall below the standard of courage and conduct handed down to you. Then tradition, far from being handcuffs to cramp your action, will be a handrail to guide and steady you in rough places. - Field Marshal Sir William Slim

...oh yes, and before the academics and those who have never fired a shot in anger start to get involved in this matter:

Only infantry officers are qualified to express opinions on this subject. - Lieut.-Colonel B.E. Ferguson, D.S.O., O.B.E., The Black Watch, "The Case for the Regimental System," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. XCVI, February to November 1951

[JMA]

David,

Did I ever ask you if you could get a copy of this?

Lieut.-Colonel B.E. Ferguson, D.S.O., O.B.E., The Black Watch, "The Case for the Regimental System," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. XCVI, February to November 1951

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

No, not that I recall. Should be able to get a copy soon.

[JMA]

David,

Received... Many thanks.

Bernard Fergusson (should be double s) was an outstanding officer and war time commander. I wanted to read this to get his view from 1951 as we discussed some of this stuff in various threads here a few years ago. Happy to say I was (inadvertently) in step with his thinking on the matter.

You should circulate this on your Brit network including our friend Red Rat.

Thanks again for going to all the trouble.
Mark

David,

Did I ever ask you if you could get a copy of this?

Lieut.-Colonel B.E. Ferguson, D.S.O., O.B.E., The Black Watch, "The Case for the Regimental System," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. XCVI, February to November 1951

[Red Rat]

Not sure how the Brits are working this in Afghanistan but presume with the smaller numbers they are able maintain the rear link to their regimental structures in the UK?

The regimental system has changed considerably in the last few years, away from a geographic and familial basis and more towards a capbadge centric basis.

That said a rear link to UK regimental structures is still retained. When a unit deploys it leaves an element behind within its Rear Operations Group (ROG) for Battle Casualty Replacements. The size and composition of this element depends on the operational analysis of prevailing casualty rates. The BCR (indeed the ROG) is not at the expense of the deploying element, but additional to it and the unit is uplifted with manpower in the months preceeding a deployment. The BCRs have largely conducted Mission Specific Training with the unit over the preceeding 6 months and the rank range is from Major through to private.

Personnel within the BCR cohort are at differing Notice To Moves. As casualties incur in theatre reinforcements flow out to theatre, moving in to a theatre based BCR pool where they conduct acclimatisation and in theatre training prior to being called forward. There is always a pool in theatre ready to be called forward immediately. I do not know how long people spend on average within the in-theatre pool before being called forward, but it is generally a minimum of 10-14 days. While in-theatre they are administered and trained by their parent unit.

[JMA]

Another recent thread discussed the merits of conscription.

Napoleon had this view:

Conscription forms citizen armies. Voluntary enlistment forms armies of vagrants and good-for-nothings. The former are guided by honour; mere discipline controls the latter. - Napoleon

Well its all about selection isn't it. If you sit in a static recruiting office waiting for strays to walk in off the street then that is what you get.

Both conscripts and volunteers need to be selected for. No army seems to do that well... they just take what they get and the system for selection never improves because of the insane belief that the military make-up must reflect society. If that is good for the military then why does it not apply to NASA, atomic energy, academia and all other specialist occupations? You select the right person for the job right? Wrong, when it comes to the military it seems.

Lord Moran in his seminal work 'The Anatomy of Courage' (in the chapter on selection) says at the time six-months after WW1:

The clear, war-given insight into the essence of a man has already grown dim. With the coming of peace we have gone back to those comfortable doctrines that some had thought war had killed. Cleverness has come into its own again. The men who won the war never left England.; that was where the really clever people were most useful.

Well this is what happens (seemingly) all the time... armies do not learn through experience. Once the particular war is over they clear away all the wartime clutter and get back to real soldiering. Everytime a coconut.



PS: I thank Fuchs for the heads-up on this article:

Why Is Getting Out of the U.S. Army So Tough?

[Ken White]

Take a really difficult and dangerous job and allow anyone that walks in the door to apply and serve, no matter their capability.

Insane -- but that's the way of it. That should really be changed. As you write, no Army really seems to do that totally well and the larger ones will have more problems.

That linked article you provide from Fuchs is IMO correct in its principal point -- there should be a trial period where one could leave if one discovered that military service was not one's cuppa. That would do several things; get rid of some malcontents (there'[ll always be a few of them about), force the services to put good people in charge of initial entry training instead of just assigning those one doesn't want in an operational unit or whose turn it happens to be (amazing number of designated 'trainers' who are totally unsuited for and do not want the job...) and improve a lot of things to retain people who aren't just trapped in a system (forced contractual servitude even when voluntarily entered is still forced servitude... ).

As an aside, the author cites no field training in Basic training. US practice is to minimalize that training in the generic, 'this is the Army (or Marine Corps, whatever...)' basic phase and save it for Advanced Individual Training which is job specific. That is a really poor and flawed approach. It is being changed but far too slowly and timidly. There's pressure to not change it on cost grounds -- though IMO, that's specious. Done right, it could be cheaper -- and it could also serve as a weeding-out effort.

He mentions the Canadian system of easy movement from reserve to active status with varying degrees of commitment. I've long thought we should do that better than we do -- though we are a lot better at that today than we used to be.

Fuchs told me the Bundeswehr volunteer has a six week trial period in which he or she can leave at any time. That's really smart -- we need to do that. It would be far cheaper (and far less disruptive) than trying to board them out later...

I suspect he also proves the point that the average intelligent, advanced degree holding person is far happier as a reservist Captain in a small community and tradition oriented Army than they would be as a younger Private in a large, impersonal active Army that treats people as -- and calls them -- 'assets.'...

[Red Rat]

The British Army recruit has the option of discharging himself as well in the first few weeks of training. While that may weed out some the reality is that the British Army suffers very high wastage rates in training, primarily due to homesickness...

British Army recruits go through an extensive selection process once they have volunteered for service, including psychometric and physical evaluation; but there's no cure yet for homesickness.

Interestingly (worryingly) defence recruitment in the UK has just been outsourced. Understandably there are a number of concerns with this...