Light Infantry and Afghanistan

[William F. Owen]

Modern communications and the wide open terrain of Afghanistan really ramp up the degree of difficulty. Vietnam at least you could manuever out of sight and every rice farmer didn't have instant world wide communication abilities.

True, but today the average platoon has a far greater technological edge over the enemy than in 1969. TI, IINV and UAVs all mean working at night is an good option, and one the Taliban don't like.

[Infanteer]

From my viewpoint, insurgent tactics in alot of areas in southern Afghanistan along with the nature of the terrain don't lend themselves to ambushes. Due to roaming death in the skies, insurgents walking around with weapons are likely to die from a Hellfire long before they stumble into a well-sited killzone. For this reason, they don't really walk around openly with weapons much which makes it hard to ambush insurgents. Others may have noticed different, but these were my observations. I understand that the terrain in RC(E) lends itself to open insurgent movement and small-unit ambushes have been much more successful.

As for light infantry in Afghanistan, the largest constraint is water. You simply aren't light if you have to sustain yourself in 40-50 degree celcius heat. As much as possible, the chain of command must plan on how to safely use local sources (which, in the dense green spaces of Afghanistan are often rife with Hep and other fun things). If you don't find a work around this, you are tied to a vehicle laager or a piece of tactical infrastucture.

[JMA]

As for light infantry in Afghanistan, the largest constraint is water. You simply aren't light if you have to sustain yourself in 40-50 degree celcius heat. As much as possible, the chain of command must plan on how to safely use local sources (which, in the dense green spaces of Afghanistan are often rife with Hep and other fun things). If you don't find a work around this, you are tied to a vehicle laager or a piece of tactical infrastucture.

Water? Why are the Light Infantry going to be required to walk around for days on end? Light Infantry by simple definition means they do not have the integral heavy support weapons and they have a light vehicle footprint. This of course does not mean that their mobility cannot be provided by choppers and their supporting weapons by air delivery. Find a target deal with it then move on.

[JMA]

They are ambushing us because they are patient, they know the terrain, they are hill people who were raised in and have finely honed senses of their environment, knowing the culture intimately they can hide amongst the people, they have great tactical flexibility, they are not impeded in mobility by excessive protection and creature comfort equipment, they have no media determined to point out every error or presumed error and they have a few good leaders who are well experienced and tactically competent and who are not risk averse.

Yes we are playing to their strength and showing an abject failure to display a thorough knowledge of enemy and terrain.

We see vehicle patrols and foot patrols blundering into ambushes all the time. Stupidity. Playing into the TB's hands.

[JMA]

True, but today the average platoon has a far greater technological edge over the enemy than in 1969. TI, IINV and UAVs all mean working at night is an good option, and one the Taliban don't like.

How many units will be capable of fighting at night in groups down to section level? Exactly how effective are the current night optics? 60% 75% 90% of daylight?

[Ken White]

Yes we are playing to their strength and showing an abject failure to display a thorough knowledge of enemy and terrain.

Hopefully by some means other than media reports -- those squirrels rarely get much right; they need to sell advertising and blood sells , success does not.

We see vehicle patrols and foot patrols blundering into ambushes all the time. Stupidity. Playing into the TB's hands.

Define all the time?

[William F. Owen]

How many units will be capable of fighting at night in groups down to section level? Exactly how effective are the current night optics? 60% 75% 90% of daylight?

Every infantry Battalion in the British Army in my day and I guess nothing has changed.
Every major attack in the Falklands, bar one, took place at night.
I think almost every man in the rifle platoon now has some kind of night vision device.

[JMA]

Every infantry Battalion in the British Army in my day and I guess nothing has changed.
Every major attack in the Falklands, bar one, took place at night.
I think almost every man in the rifle platoon now has some kind of night vision device.

There must be some reason for the reported lack of night action?

[Ken White]

because most reporters don't want to go out at night and few that do have night vision devices, night actions do not make good stories and they can't get good pictures or video clips

[JMA]

because most reporters don't want to go out at night and few that do have night vision devices, night actions do not make good stories and they can't get good pictures or video clips

I would have thought that the tracer and the flashes would make for wonderful TV?

Where are the Taliban at night? Other than IED work what would they typically be doing?

[JMA]

Hopefully by some means other than media reports -- those squirrels rarely get much right; they need to sell advertising and blood sells , success does not.Define all the time?

There is no blood that comes with success? Depends I suppose whose bodies get stacked up after the battle. If its a success then it should be their blood and their bodies, yes?

[tankersteve]

While this is probably not the norm, it is about as good as it gets in Afghanistan. CPT Howell was my counterpart at NTC. He didn't learn anything from me that allowed his unit to do this. Including the PFC and the selector lever...

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04...age...er Hicks, NYT)

KORANGAL OUTPOST, Afghanistan — Only the lead insurgents were disciplined as they walked along the ridge. They moved carefully, with weapons ready and at least five yards between each man, the soldiers who surprised them said. Last week, members of Second Platoon, Company B, surprised a Taliban column and killed at least 13.


Fight by fight, the infantryman’s war in Afghanistan is often waged on the Taliban’s terms. Insurgents ambush convoys and patrols from high ridges or long ranges and slip away as the Americans, weighed down by equipment, return fire and call for air and artillery support. Last week a patrol from the First Infantry Division reversed the routine....

Once the soldiers reached the ridge’s crest, almost 6,000 feet above sea level on the side of a peak called Sautalu Sar, they found fresh footprints on the trails, and parapets of rock from where Taliban fighters often fire rifles and rocket-propelled grenades down onto this outpost...

In all, the soldiers found eight bodies on the crest. They photographed them to try to identify them later, and collected their weapons, ammunition, radios and papers. Then the patrol swept down a gully where a pilot said he saw more insurgents hiding.

[Ken White]

One has no clue what is happening watching an infantry night fight on a screen...

Even one involved in such a fight without night vision gear has little more clue.

There is no blood that comes with success? Depends I suppose whose bodies get stacked up after the battle. If its a success then it should be their blood and their bodies, yes?

It is -- however, the US government will take but not ordinarily show such pictures and while the reporters and photographers who are there will show them, it's been my observation in a couple of other wars that Reporters are generally not around when bad firefights occur. Funny how that happens. Of course, there are exceptions but they are rare.

Note that Tanker Steve's quote is by a reporter telling the story of an ambush where he was not present and he almost certainly was not given permission to print the pictures the unit took, though he probably was allowed to see them. That one was just one of many and a reporter happened to hear of it, probably because it was allegedly that particular unit's first successful ambush on this deployment and he likely overheard some Troop chatter and checked it out -- so it makes the news. Most do not...

The opposition, OTOH, makes it a point to show picture and videos of any opposing dead. We don't sell by body count (or even release them, other than for a brief period that got quickly ended), they do. Different standards of conduct, rightly or wrongly and approach to the 'information war' angle. Western 'sensitivity' is a wonderful thing...

[William F. Owen]

While this is probably not the norm, it is about as good as it gets in Afghanistan. CPT Howell was my counterpart at NTC. He didn't learn anything from me that allowed his unit to do this. Including the PFC and the selector lever...

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04...agewanted=1&_r=3&hpw

While not wishing to Monday Morning Quarterback, or second guess those who were there, but...

a.) So they killed 13 or of 26? OK, better then nothing, but that is far less than a well executed ambush is suppose to achieve. Maybe there would good reasons. I was just surprised. Sure, not everyone can match Ralph Rodd and RT Florida, with 100+ dead in one ambush.

b.) Back when I was a boy you NEVER initiated an ambush by voice. ALWAYS and ONLY by fire.

[Ken White]

b.) Back when I was a boy you NEVER initiated an ambush by voice. ALWAYS and ONLY by fire.

Though my wife insists I'm still acting like a boy even she acknowledges that voice commands in combat are a no-no, too much chance for misunderstanding and that it is best if that initiating fire is somehow distinctive...

[Fuchs]

While not wishing to Monday Morning Quarterback, or second guess those who were there, but...

a.) So they killed 13 or of 26? OK, better then nothing, but that is far less than a well executed ambush is suppose to achieve. Maybe there would good reasons. I was just surprised. Sure, not everyone can match Ralph Rodd and RT Florida, with 100+ dead in one ambush.

b.) Back when I was a boy you NEVER initiated an ambush by voice. ALWAYS and ONLY by fire.

The text may be inaccurate.
According to its description, the ambush was a rather simple one. A picket, a few remotely controlled directional frag mines and firing from one position plus a bit pursuit.

No L-shaped ambush or other more complicated patterns, no control of flight direction with 2nd ambush. The Plt Ldr faced probably too many unknowns and/or the small unit hadn't much training/experience in ambushing.

[Sylvan]

The text may be inaccurate.
According to its description, the ambush was a rather simple one. A picket, a few remotely controlled directional frag mines and firing from one position plus a bit pursuit.

No L-shaped ambush or other more complicated patterns, no control of flight direction with 2nd ambush. The Plt Ldr faced probably too many unknowns and/or the small unit hadn't much training/experience in ambushing.

Sounds like they weren't really in place.
30 seconds after settle down and the TB came?
I would say the writer, with no military experience, couldn't really relay what he was told in interviews.

If they had claymores set, you initiate with claymores. Even LTs know this.

Regardless, good on them. Maintain your principles and good things will happen.
This will reverberate with the Taliban a lot more than 1-26.

[JMA]

While not wishing to Monday Morning Quarterback, or second guess those who were there, but...

a.) So they killed 13 or of 26? OK, better then nothing, but that is far less than a well executed ambush is suppose to achieve. Maybe there would good reasons. I was just surprised. Sure, not everyone can match Ralph Rodd and RT Florida, with 100+ dead in one ambush.

b.) Back when I was a boy you NEVER initiated an ambush by voice. ALWAYS and ONLY by fire.

You are correct and I read this account with growing horror. This as it is told is a real case study of how not to do it. Remember one thing and that is when someone gets to talk to a number of the grunt participants then one gets the chance to cut through the crap that is contained in the official versions.

Yea, and I'll bet Pvt. First Class Troy Pacini-Harvey's mother is hoping he will be released from the stockade before Christmas.

[William F. Owen]

Sounds like they weren't really in place.
30 seconds after settle down and the TB came?
.

So probably an "Off track Snap-ambush?" - in which case dropping 50% of the bad guys is pretty good.

[JMA]

One has no clue what is happening watching an infantry night fight on a screen...

It would make for great TV though. What I'm saying is that if the troops were in fact operating at night at platoon strength at any regularity then we would have footage from the embedded media.

Even one involved in such a fight without night vision gear has little more clue.

I've been there and done that. If they fire at you get to see where they are (as do they if you do) if they move you hear them and can frag them. And the winner is... he who can keep his head in a time of utter confusion and the survivors are... those who change their firing positions after firing a few rounds.

It is -- however, the US government will take but not ordinarily show such pictures and while the reporters and photographers who are there will show them, it's been my observation in a couple of other wars that Reporters are generally not around when bad firefights occur. Funny how that happens. Of course, there are exceptions but they are rare.

'Bad' as in when there are more own forces casualties?

Note that Tanker Steve's quote is by a reporter telling the story of an ambush where he was not present and he almost certainly was not given permission to print the pictures the unit took, though he probably was allowed to see them. That one was just one of many and a reporter happened to hear of it, probably because it was allegedly that particular unit's first successful ambush on this deployment and he likely overheard some Troop chatter and checked it out -- so it makes the news. Most do not...

It seems it was the first positive result in the area so they (the military) need to milk it for all the propaganda value it may have. They probably want to concentrate on the 13 kills in one contact and can handle to 'minor' criticism that comes from the whole truth getting out.

The opposition, OTOH, makes it a point to show picture and videos of any opposing dead. We don't sell by body count (or even release them, other than for a brief period that got quickly ended), they do. Different standards of conduct, rightly or wrongly and approach to the 'information war' angle. Western 'sensitivity' is a wonderful thing...

Well we in Rhodesia got the media angle wrong. We allowed so few TV crews to accompany troops on operations (especially the big camp attacks) that we left ourselves open to the allegations we had taken out refugee camps. The first time the tame media hangers-on arrived was after the scene had been suitably 'stage-managed'. Having been on these ops we used to wonder where they got the childrens bodies from.

The message was simple, make the facts available otherwise only their version will be shown.

Interesting though that after the ceasefire I met a political commissar who survived a camp attack I was on (probably by breaking the world land speed record) and he was boasting that they had shot down ten helicopters that day. I asked him how that was possible as the camp was merely a unarmed civilian refugee camp being fed by UNHCR... wasn't it?