JMA,

I don't disagree with any of your points, and I actually suspect that the majority of our capacity building efforts have failed or backfired since the end of the Cold War (and a number of them during the Cold War as well). There are a lot of factors that come into play, not the least of which is our inability to implement an integrated whole of government approach to dealing with security challenges, since building semi-competent security forces can be more of a liability than an asset when you have an incompetent and/or corrupt government.

Another factor that significantly reduces the U.S. military's effectiveness is its ever growing technical advantage over its partners in developing nations. It is a technical level that most developing nations can't hope to replicate in the next decade, so they need help with realistic approaches to security challenges they can sustain. We are now losing the last generation soldiers who grew up in a much less technical army, and even they haven't practiced that type of fighting in well over a decade. How will the new breed train soldiers in developing nations that have limited tech capability? This is where the private industry probably has an advantage over us. Another approach possible approach is to consider paying other developing nations who have relatively competent militaries to help other developing nations develop their military in a way that is sustainable, and train them on tactics that are appropriate based on their level of technological investment in their military. This is one reason I think talk about transforming some Army units into full time advisors is a mistake, they the U.S. trainers won't have relevant skills in basic bush craft, infantry, etc. Not only will they be dependent on technology those they're training won't have, they'll come across as fake if they're not experts in their field. You become expert by living the life day in and day out. We would be better off maintaining combat readiness, and pulling advisors from these units as required.

More than anything else though, our security assistance efforts must be part of a larger whole of government effort to be effective. If you apply just war theory to our steady-state operations, that means our efforts should both support human rights and ensure a better peace. Clearly that isn't the case in many situation. That is most often due to focusing on the wrong problem first (military development).

Nonetheless, that doesn't mean we shouldn't pursue security assistance as a tool to pursue our ends. What it shouldn't be in my opinion is a principle part of our strategic approach. We have demonstrated repeatedly that it fails more often than not as a method to achieve our desired ends.

Furthermore on the critical side is the so called indirect and slow approach has many draw backs that its advocates are hesitant to discuss. Long, indirect, and slow approaches often result in devastated local economies, perverted cultural morals based on violence, a militarized society whose human capital can do little more than fight and survive, and these groups often turn into warlords and/or organized criminal groups after the conflict finally ends. I think there is a parallel to the high level of violence we see Central America now to the long insurgencies that took place their throughout much of the Cold War. There is a cost that isn't always apparent if you focus on short term objectives to going slow (more than 3-5 years) versus pursuing a more decisive option if it is available. Instead of standing up multiple battalions of combat forces that the country can't sustain, imagine what that country could do if the threat was relatively rapidly neutralized (including political settlements), and that money was put into developing economic infrastructure and its human capital instead? What course of action is likely to result in longer term stability and better peace? I know it is idealistic, but we need to stop assuming that security assistance is the default answer to all our security problems.