Small War on Basilan (catch all)

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan

Agree that the U.S. can do little about it, and by our very presence create a handy 3rd party to lay blame at the feet of (governments do not take responsibility, and even populaces generally prefer to blame someone else's government over their own. This is every bit as true in the U.S. as it is in the Philippines. Well, Philippine culture is actually notably bad at not taking responsibility. 400 odd years of colonial rule and influence didn't help that situation.)

We pointedly avoid involvement in the NPA situation, though it is the main insurgent concern of Manila, it is not ours. However, when one builds security force capacity in another country one has little control over where or how that capacity will be applied. This is a important tidbit that we seem to overlook or minimize. Capacity developed in the south is shifted to the north. In Arab countries capacity developed to counter terrorism is applied to the suppression of nationalist subversion and insurgency. We are not very clever at deducing 2nd and 3rd order effects, so typically we focus on the primary objective and the primary effects of our efforts and go home calling the operation a big success. One reason why I am far more in favor of going after root causes rather than throwing a range of diverse and uncoordinated activities planned by State, Aid, 4 separate services and SOF, and a host of LEAs and NGOs at a problem. No efficiency, little synergy, and virtually all aimed at the symptoms of a problem with US interests in mind; with little consideration of what the higher order effects might be, or how it might affect the interests of the host govt or populace.

[Dayuhan]

We pointedly avoid involvement in the NPA situation, though it is the main insurgent concern of Manila, it is not ours. However, when one builds security force capacity in another country one has little control over where or how that capacity will be applied. This is a important tidbit that we seem to overlook or minimize. Capacity developed in the south is shifted to the north. In Arab countries capacity developed to counter terrorism is applied to the suppression of nationalist subversion and insurgency. We are not very clever at deducing 2nd and 3rd order effects, so typically we focus on the primary objective and the primary effects of our efforts and go home calling the operation a big success. One reason why I am far more in favor of going after root causes rather than throwing a range of diverse and uncoordinated activities planned by State, Aid, 4 separate services and SOF, and a host of LEAs and NGOs at a problem. No efficiency, little synergy, and virtually all aimed at the symptoms of a problem with US interests in mind; with little consideration of what the higher order effects might be, or how it might affect the interests of the host govt or populace.

To some extent yes, the built capacity is transferred, but the extent is limited. The fight with the NPA is, even more than the fight in the south, more political than military, and military action isn't all that prevalent. It's at a bit of an impasse. Most at the center know that political reform is needed to finish the reduction of the NPA, but Manila hasn't the will - or in many cases the ability - to take on the feudal rulers in the provinces and force reform. The feudal rulers in the provinces use repression to bottle up symptoms and keep Manila off their backs. That typically takes the place of close-range shootings by men on motorcycles. That hasn't really been affected by US capacity building; it's something they already knew how to do.

Similarly, I'm not really convinced that US "capacity building" has really had much impact on the ability of Arab regimes to suppress their populaces. It's a capacity they've always had and always used; they probably know more about it than we do. Our intel sharing cooperation probably helps us more than it helps them.

In some ways the current administration in Manila is well placed to lay on some pressure: there's a real mandate, the election isn't being questioned, and there's no rumbling of coup threats. These are factors that the military and the provincial elites have long used to keep the central government bottled up, and they aren't much in play now. Unfortunately, i don't see this administration having the backbone ort initiative to take on that kind of job.