North Korea: 2012-2016

[JMA]

Not even. Several have been far more significant. This one gets extra traction because a lot of people have digital cameras or phone that will do video today and the news media is on 24/7 and hungry for any 'bad' news' and goes looking for said pics and videos. We just communicate better (well, with more facility... )and more rapidly than we used to.

The Tunnels of the 80s were far more significant, the Song-O sub in 1986 was far more significant, the Axe murder in 1976 was more significant. Here's a partlal list of the larger incidents [(LINK) all of which exceeded this one in scope (thus far). Can't believe The Scotsman neglected the tunnels. You are of course correct that the sinking of the Cheonan last May was a greater provocation -- and thus more important...

There were others that occurred in the 50s and earlier in the 60s. Here's the Wiki with an even longer less including lesser incidents (LINK). This is just business as usual over the last 56 years

This one is most likely all about nothing more than Kim Jong Un nominally giving the order to establish his credibility as the Supreme Leader designee.

I need some help here. 200 artillery shells kill 5 (2 soldiers and 3 civvies) and wound 18 when fired into a civilian residential area.

Exaggerated number of shells fired, crap ammo, wild shooting, no one at home or what?

[Maeda Toshiie]

I need some help here. 200 artillery shells kill 5 (2 soldiers and 3 civvies) and wound 18 when fired into a civilian residential area.

Exaggerated number of shells fired, crap ammo, wild shooting, no one at home or what?

Supposedly there were two waves. The first had shells landing all over the place, apparently including water. The second more or less landed on the base itself. The island also has bunkers which the military and civilians took cover in. That probably explains the widespread damage (also partly thanks to the fires started by the shelling) and low casualties.

[JMA]

Supposedly there were two waves. The first had shells landing all over the place, apparently including water. The second more or less landed on the base itself. The island also has bunkers which the military and civilians took cover in. That probably explains the widespread damage (also partly thanks to the fires started by the shelling) and low casualties.

You know this or are you speculating?

[Maeda Toshiie]

You know this or are you speculating?

http://joongangdaily.joins.com/artic...sp?aid=2928852

There are other articles out there.

Try to give it a little thought and see what you come up with.

China? No one else has the leverage to do so.

[Dayuhan]

One of the interesting side effects of the recent incident is that China seems to have backed down on its opposition to a US carrier operating in the Yellow Sea. Previous announcements opposed any operation in the sea, now the reference is to areas within the 200 mile exclusive economic zone, which does not cover all of the Yellow Sea. I wonder if JMA will call this a "humiliating climb down".

Realistically, of course, it's less about China and the US than about China sending a message to North Korea. It would be a huge mistake to believe that China has full control over North Korea and that the North asks permission before taking any action: the North is and has long been quite willing to take their patrons by surprise. They are dependent, but they are well aware of the reasons China keeps them afloat and they are aware that the strategic imperative will still be there even if they throw Beijing a curveball now and then. I don't suppose the Chinese are very happy with the latest performance - hence the back-down on the US exercises that the North finds so offensive - but they still aren't going to allow the North to fold up. If that happened and the North was absorbed by the south, China would have an economically potent, militarily significant US ally on their border. They don't want that and the North Koreans know it, which gives the North leverage despite their dependence.

[Ken White]

and the answer to your question is "of course not..."

[Van]

...the US exercises that the North finds so offensive...

Bold assumption that DPRK finds the exercises offensive. The case could be made that the DPRK welcomes these excuses for military action.

The theme lately seems to be "avoid reunification at all costs". Note the failure of the Kaesung Industrial Complex, and how the most recent events derailed a scheduled reunification talk. The appearance is that the North is pursuing status quo, albeit an earlier status quo with more generous food shipments from the South. But it makes a twisted kind of sense.

What advantage is there for regime members in reunification? Who will guarantee their status, quality of life, personal security, and financial incentives? More important, who will guarantee KJI's steady stream of comfort girls?

But who in this game would benefit from reunification?
The U.S. would most likely lose basing (greatly diminished basing as the very least) in the region, and our foothold in the region.

China would lose the buffer between democracy and the middle kingdom, and would run what is likely to be an unacceptable risk of disturbing the harmony of the ethnic Koreans in China.

Japan would see both military and economic threats in the long term from a unified Korea.

South Korea would bear the brunt of rehabilitating an environmentally, socially, and economically devastated region.

Russia is the only player who might be open to reunification, simply to reduce the U.S. presense in the Pacific Rim, but runs risk to their interests in the region from branches and sequels of reunification (various possibilities for war, shifting economic blocks, etc).

So the big question is "What does DPRK really get out of this?"
-Shifting fishing in the region, now that the fishing villages on those islands have been relocated, although this might benefit China more.
-Attention. ("I'm such a big player now! Look how upset I got the U.S.")
-Leverage in the next round of food begging/barginning ("Feed us or we'll do this again!")

-Maybe, and this is the long-shot, Tom Clancy scenario; U.S. attention drawn away from a DPRK ally like Iran or Syria...

[Dayuhan]

Bold assumption that DPRK finds the exercises offensive. The case could be made that the DPRK welcomes these excuses for military action.

Ok granted, should have said "publicly". I've no doubt that the north needs and relies upon responses to provocation. Like so many other governments, they need somebody to hate.

In some ways the most provocative and disconcerting response we could give to provocation would be to completely ignore it, but that's difficult to do... and would leave the temptation to escalate the provocation until response was gained.

I suspect that many regional players would be happy enough to see the status quo of a divided and eternally conflicted Korea continue, but of course the rather eccentric nature of the north makes that status quo a bit shaky.