Training observations

[Red Rat]

12 years later. What would be interesting is what the ranks of the the officers with Boer War experience were at the time of the Boer War. This also for the senior NCOs.

For the officers generally Major & above. The Boer War was unique in the annals of British Imperial military history in that it had an institutional effect on the British Army, most probably because it involved most of the British Army. It would be interesting to see what % of the US Army (Active & Reserve) have participated on operations in Iraq & Afghanistan.

Bought the book on Kindle, thank you.

You are very welcome. I'm sorry to say that I don't receive commission!

It was a cock-up.

The decision to stay and get involved with 'nation building' rather than leave after the Taliban broke and ran for Pakistan with the threat to come back if AQ ever returned was a catastrophic error.

it will be interesting to see what Chilcott says on the matter. What Chilcott has revealed so far is the absence of any coherent strategic decision making apparatus. That said, the UK does generally get a Government it voted for & that reflects society at large.

It is at this 'lower tactical level' that future senior officers and senior NCOs learn their trade. The question is whether these future generals and sergeants major have been exposed to war/combat/operations sufficiently to give them the needed grounding? Or did they just have the odd 6 months tour over a number of years?

Well, in a year on operations on the Western Front in 1916 the average subaltern would spend 101 days at the front of which 2/3 would be in frontline trenches. So a FOB deployed subaltern (as most Infantry platoons were) in Afghanistan would fit in slightly more frontline time (circa 150 days) then his 1916 contemporary. The difference of course being that a subaltern in WW1 had 4 x 101 whereas in Afghanistan a subaltern in 4 years would expect to deploy only twice. I'm not aware of WW2 being significantly different in terms of ratios, but I would have to do more analysis.

How exactly does all this improve the Brit military as a fighting force?

On the plus side:
Better targeting cycles
Better ISTAR
Better medical support
Better C-IED
All Pl Sgt & Coy Comds (and above) are operationally experienced, most combat proven.

On the minus side aspects of basic field craft are down (the Afghan snake is still too prevalent) and our planning cycles remain cumbersome and tempo low. At the strategic level an emphasis on the Army has lead to a haemorrhaging of Navy capabilities which I think the UK will rue in the long term.

Whenever I hear of reorgs and reshapings I think of this quote:

“We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. Presumably the plans for our employment were being changed. I was to learn later in life that, perhaps because we are so good at organizing, we tend as a nation to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.” - Charlton Ogburn, pp. 32-33, “Merrill’s Marauders: The truth about an incredible adventure,” Harper’s Magazine, January 1957 Previously flasely attributed to Gaius Petronius Arbiter

Phew! We're only doing the one!

Well that is another self inflicted wound.

The Brit rotation was 6 months in Afghan and then 18 months sitting around doing apparently very little before the next tour.

I asked again and again (in the Afghan thread) whether the most productive use of the 18 months had been made. No satisfactory reply. I am left to assume that the Brits being financial over extended anyway that there were no respources available to continue with training in other phases/types of warfare.

It was a self-inflicted wound. But there was no political or military appetite to break the army out of shape. Britain was committed to operations in Afghanistan, the nation & the Army were not at war per se. Was it smart? IMHO no, but it suited the Army to do what it did the way it did it. The fact that no politician would sign off on anything that looked like a deeper more enduring commitment to Afghanistan is in my opinion just a happy coincidence. Conflicts reflect the nature of the societies that wage them and the UK military commitment precisely matched the UK political commitment.

I would suggest that an important statistic is rather what percentage of officers and senior NCOs with significant combat exposure are retained to be in place for the next war ... and having passed on their experience in the intervening period.

I agree, but we cannot keep them in if they do not want to stay. Many I suspect will leave because of the lack of operational opportunities.

PS: good to see you back posting. May be travelling to mud-island shortly, you around?

Long weekend! Back to the grind tomorrow. I'm around all summer; it would be good to meet up again. I'd better warn you now though, the island is not so much muddy as sunken in the bottom half!

[Granite_State]

On the minus side aspects of basic field craft are down (the Afghan snake is still too prevalent)

Do you mean what we call the Ranger file, long single-file formations?

[Red Rat]

Do you mean what we call the Ranger file, long single-file formations?

Yup! The only thing harder than getting the military to innovate is dismantling a tradition...

[Kiwigrunt]

An OC of mine used to refer to single file as 'idiot file'.

However, is a single file always necessarily an idiot file? Is it not a matter of balancing pros against cons? I assume (please correct me if this is wrong or simplistic) that a reason for it in Astan was to follow narrow routes, where IEDs were (perceived as) the main threats. Kinda like a cleared route through a minefield.

Terrain can be another reason for using the idiot file, if narrow channels of undulation or vegetation in otherwise flat or open ground provide the only cover or concealment. A double edged knife of course, given that these channels are ideal places for IEDs.

Another reason for single file could be control during night movement, think Falklands with its battalion snakes.

I suppose what I'm getting at is that emotive labelling of tactics or methods that - under the right context - can be quite valid, may lead to unjustified exclusion of those methods. (Junior) commanders can be quite sensitive to emotive labels. Saying 'the use of single file needs to be carefully tested against its tactical disadvantages' is not the same as saying 'use the idiot file at your peril.' 'Afghan snake' is of course not as emotive as 'idiot file', and may well have the context built in.

I'm not bringing this up to pin-pick on this particular example for its own sake, but as a training observation I made years ago. My section commander under afore mentioned OC did all he could to avoid using single files during one exercise, sometimes to the point of ridiculous. It opened my eyes to other such examples where labelling can have an adverse effect on training. However, I'm still interested to see if my assumption as to why single file was so prevalent in Astan is correct.

[Granite_State]

An OC of mine used to refer to single file as 'idiot file'.

However, is a single file always necessarily an idiot file? Is it not a matter of balancing pros against cons? I assume (please correct me if this is wrong or simplistic) that a reason for it in Astan was to follow narrow routes, where IEDs were (perceived as) the main threats. Kinda like a cleared route through a minefield.

Terrain can be another reason for using the idiot file, if narrow channels of undulation or vegetation in otherwise flat or open ground provide the only cover or concealment. A double edged knife of course, given that these channels are ideal places for IEDs.

However, I'm still interested to see if my assumption as to why single file was so prevalent in Astan is correct.

Yes, you've pretty much got it. It sometimes is the best tactical option for small patrols. But when it becomes your default formation and you lack the ability to move competently in any other way, that's a problem. Most of Helmand, let alone Afghanistan, is not a minefield.

[Red Rat]

Yes, you've pretty much got it. It sometimes is the best tactical option for small patrols. But when it becomes your default formation and you lack the ability to move competently in any other way, that's a problem. Most of Helmand, let alone Afghanistan, is not a minefield.

I quite agree.

It is a training and education problem to correct an experience mindset. The 'Afghan Snake' developed from the requirement to minimise the threat from IEDs. IED belts tend not to be widespread and tend to be focused around FOB locations, this means that most deployed infantry (in FOBs) will have operational experience of mostly moving in a particular manner - that becomes their default approach. Once you understand the threat then you understand when a particular TTP is relevant and as importantly when not. IED belts are obstacle belts, they are less likely to be found in a highly dynamic environment where locations have not gone static and the Forward Line Own Troops and/or Forward Line Enemy Troops are not well defined; UK training for contingency operations is focusing more on this latter type of operational environment.

I often think that low level tactical training focuses too much on what to do at the expense of why. If you do not understand the why then you cannot easily adapt.

[JMA]

When you restrict soldiers to strictly follow in the "Barma lane" ( as cleared by engineers) they have little choice but to use single file. In addition when ridiculously overloaded soldiers are sent out on 'patrol' what do you really expect?

Back to our discussions on the Afghan thread the question of what was the purpose of sending out these human pack mules? To draw fire from the Taliban so as to allow them to be taken on through an air strike?

It is not the patrol formation that needs to be ridiculed but rather the aimless wondering around. Don't lose sight of the real problem.

(all that said clearly patrol formations must be varied according to the ground/terrain and the proximity to the enemy. This was also discussed at some length in the Afghan thread)

I quite agree.

It is a training and education problem to correct an experience mindset. The 'Afghan Snake' developed from the requirement to minimise the threat from IEDs. IED belts tend not to be widespread and tend to be focused around FOB locations, this means that most deployed infantry (in FOBs) will have operational experience of mostly moving in a particular manner - that becomes their default approach. Once you understand the threat then you understand when a particular TTP is relevant and as importantly when not. IED belts are obstacle belts, they are less likely to be found in a highly dynamic environment where locations have not gone static and the Forward Line Own Troops and/or Forward Line Enemy Troops are not well defined; UK training for contingency operations is focusing more on this latter type of operational environment.

I often think that low level tactical training focuses too much on what to do at the expense of why. If you do not understand the why then you cannot easily adapt.

[Kiwigrunt]

I often think that low level tactical training focuses too much on what to do at the expense of why. If you do not understand the why then you cannot easily adapt.

“Form over function.” - Wilf.

Would it be a shortcoming inherent to the low level, as a result of insufficient contextual insight at that level? Or is it imposed through excessive form from higher levels? My guess, probably a bit of both.

[jcustis]

I quite agree.

It is a training and education problem to correct an experience mindset. The 'Afghan Snake' developed from the requirement to minimise the threat from IEDs. IED belts tend not to be widespread and tend to be focused around FOB locations, this means that most deployed infantry (in FOBs) will have operational experience of mostly moving in a particular manner - that becomes their default approach. Once you understand the threat then you understand when a particular TTP is relevant and as importantly when not. IED belts are obstacle belts, they are less likely to be found in a highly dynamic environment where locations have not gone static and the Forward Line Own Troops and/or Forward Line Enemy Troops are not well defined; UK training for contingency operations is focusing more on this latter type of operational environment.

I often think that low level tactical training focuses too much on what to do at the expense of why. If you do not understand the why then you cannot easily adapt.

That ingrained behavior is going to be a hard one to shake--like most behaviors that are not necessarily born of careful reflection, but more of mimicry. The same can often be said of weapons manipulation techniques, choice of weapons caliber, and on and on. As an example the FBI is looking at going back to 9mm for its service pistols (from the current .40 caliber) and it is causing the interwebs to go absolutely bat#### crazy with opinion. Very few of them are based on scientific fact...

[JMA]

On the plus side:
Better targeting cycles
Better ISTAR
Better medical support
Better C-IED
All Pl Sgt & Coy Comds (and above) are operationally experienced, most combat proven.

On the minus side aspects of basic field craft are down (the Afghan snake is still too prevalent) and our planning cycles remain cumbersome and tempo low. At the strategic level an emphasis on the Army has lead to a haemorrhaging of Navy capabilities which I think the UK will rue in the long term.

The problem with looking for positives out of Afghan is that the guys in the flip-flops and a pocket full of rounds have won the war at tactical level and are about to outlast the the 'invaders' in all respects.

The greatest negative is that while experiencing combat exposure there are few if any actual combat skills that can be taken away not only as lessons learned but as skills acquired.

Given the greatest weakness of the British officer corps - that being arrogance - they may start to use failed and fruitless tactical methods as a basis for training the next generation of soldiers. This would be disastrous.

[Red Rat]

The problem with looking for positives out of Afghan is that the guys in the flip-flops and a pocket full of rounds have won the war at tactical level and are about to outlast the the 'invaders' in all respects.

Debatable. Interested what matric you are using for this - perhaps on the Afghanistan thread?

[JMA]

Debatable. Interested what matric you are using for this - perhaps on the Afghanistan thread?

Is there any doubt that come the end of 2014 when all but a few 'advisors' have left what is going to happen in places like Helmand?

Certainly the end result is going to find the Taliban and the drug trade remaining intact and in place and claiming victory.

Reading Company Commander one is able to see clearly how the Brits had no idea how to take the war to the Taliban and were mainly confined to Beau Geste forts rather than operating out of a growing and expanding 'ink spots'.

Afghanistan has proven to be a sad and tragic experince for the British military.

[Red Rat]

Is there any doubt that come the end of 2014 when all but a few 'advisors' have left what is going to happen in places like Helmand?

Certainly the end result is going to find the Taliban and the drug trade remaining intact and in place and claiming victory.

A viable scenario, but that does not equate to the tactical defeat of Coalition Forces on the battlefield, more to a flawed strategy. If the strategy had however remained one of simply Counter-Terrorism at arms length then the endstate you infer would be a strategic success.

Reading Company Commander one is able to see clearly how the Brits had no idea how to take the war to the Taliban and were mainly confined to Beau Geste forts rather than operating out of a growing and expanding 'ink spots'.

That was 2008. It is hard to inkspot if your pen has run dry. We all know that the UK was overstretched in Afghanistan in 2008, even at the time it was recognised, but the Main Effort remained in Iraq. To expand from inkspots the UK would have had to collapse in to focus combat power and then to expand out. Collapsing in was not a politically viable (in UK or by Karzai), sending more combat power was not politically viable so the only option was to slog it out. Was it a mess? You betcha - but then the Coalition reorganised refocused, surged and 'inkspoted'.

Afghanistan has proven to be a sad and tragic experince for the British military.

I think they view it more as immensely frustrating at the operational level and disappointing at the strategic level. Corporately I am not aware of any feeling of sad or tragic.

[JMA]

A viable scenario, but that does not equate to the tactical defeat of Coalition Forces on the battlefield, more to a flawed strategy. If the strategy had however remained one of simply Counter-Terrorism at arms length then the endstate you infer would be a strategic success.

Been there. In Rhodesia and also the South Africans in Angola there was no question that there was a tactical victory in probably 99% of combat situations. The military strategies - in both cases - were severely limited/confined/restricted by the 'fluid' and ever changing political strategy and policy (much to the frustration of the combat troops).

Now I accept that the RoE have proved to have adversely affected the tactical options available to those actually making contact with the Taliban. Just like street criminals back in the home country the Taliban have exploited the restrictions placed on police/combat troops to their advantage.

Can't win even at the lowest tactical level with opposible restrictions.

That was 2008. It is hard to inkspot if your pen has run dry. We all know that the UK was overstretched in Afghanistan in 2008, even at the time it was recognised, but the Main Effort remained in Iraq. To expand from inkspots the UK would have had to collapse in to focus combat power and then to expand out. Collapsing in was not a politically viable (in UK or by Karzai), sending more combat power was not politically viable so the only option was to slog it out. Was it a mess? You betcha - but then the Coalition reorganised refocused, surged and 'inkspoted'.

Before you ask for more troops you need to utilize existing force levels optimally. Not sure this was done - given the information available.

I also question this metric that you need a 10:1 ration to fight insurgents. I suggest what is needed is to maintain contact with the Taliban and follow them relentlessly until you have accounted for maximum possible - killed or captured or as a consolation prize escaped but wounded. The Taliban was allowed time and again to "melt away" and fight another day with more combat experience.

I think they view it more as immensely frustrating at the operational level and disappointing at the strategic level. Corporately I am not aware of any feeling of sad or tragic.

Of course. From the nation that turned Arnhem into a 'victory' (for determination/resilience/dedication/bravery) there is no doubt the official spin will be to turn the whole Afghan debacle into something similar.

In the hearts of the soldiers who fought there the sadness and tragedy of the failed Afghan campaign as the country reverts to a state where there is no evidence of anything having been achieved through the sacrifice of the men involved.