The UK in Afghanistan

[davidbfpo]

Thomas Harding, the Daily Telegraph’s defence correspondent, has returned from his 12th visit to Afghanistan since British troops deployed to Helmand province five years ago. Here, he reflects on what has been achieved.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-we-leave.html

Some interesting parts alongside the odd, well at least from this "armchair":

The odd:

With political stability offered by Nato and Afghan forces, Helmand’s 180,000 farmers are able to sow pomegranates and carrots rather than opium poppies.

How often has this version of KLE been tried?

The British have also been adept at fostering good relations. Brig Patrick Sanders, the commander in Helmand, invited his opposite number, Brig-Gen Sheren Shah, and the chief of police, Gen Hakim Angar, to his Wiltshire home to meet his family. Hospitality is important in Afghan society and the gesture cemented a key relationship.

The ANP:

The police, on whom security will largely depend, are not the most trustworthy bunch. One police station had to be disbanded after officers robbed and murdered the owner of a new Shogun car carrying £1,500 in cash. At another station I visited with an Army officer, the reception from the commander was cordial at best. “He’s probably in the pay of the Taliban,” the officer quietly told me. “We just don’t tell him much at a tactical level.”

Level of activity:

in central Helmand, where the Taliban is still strong in pockets, fighting can be intense. One platoon from the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment saw 21 contacts with the enemy in 27 days.

[JMA]

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-we-leave.html

Level of activity:

That level of activity quote again:

But in central Helmand, where the Taliban is still strong in pockets, fighting can be intense. One platoon from the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment saw 21 contacts with the enemy in 27 days.

now read that in conjunction with this piece:

The US Marine Corps, responsible for much of the stability in Helmand, is planning to drop to as low as 6,000 troops within the next 10 months. Soon after, Britain is expected to start reducing its force of almost 10,000.

How does one interpret that?

I suggest it is safe to conclude that ISAF have given up on trying to clear Helmand (which is the first step in the clear, hold, build theory which has apparently been applied in Afghanistan).

Another failed theory which will probably be (harshly) judged as another military defeat of the major powers by a rag tag band of mercenaries (the Taliban). It will be difficult to argue against claims of victory by the Taliban when the US Marines are all but gone and the Brits are reducing their forces and conceding ground to the Taliban.

It would be interesting to hear it from the smart guys who run ISAF how it can be explained that before the armed mercenaries of the Taliban have been killed, captured or dispersed out of the area ISAF can be contemplating a reduction in force levels.

On that platoon's 21 contacts in 27 days. One needs more context but it is fair to assume that these contacts did not produce significant results for either side and the Taliban stayed right there in the area.

One may also wonder why given that they knew where this group of Taliban were located that the battalion and even the brigade reserve were not deployed to deal decisively with them?

If the Brit military thought the Iraq enquiry was harsh on them they better stand-by for the one on their performance in Afghanistan, its going to be a rough ride.

[Red Rat]

Clear, build hold still seems like a straightforward operational design concept which appears to work. However if it is applied as part of a fundamentally flawed strategy then it is not going to work.

I am not sure whether ISAF has given up on clearing Helmand per se. I am pretty certain that the intent is not to clear Helmand completely (I am not sure if that was ever the intent, if it was it would have been a naive intent), but as the campaign has evolved so have the strategic aims and with that the strategy. IMHO intent should be (now) to gain and maintain those areas that the Afghanistan Government think necessary for its long term viability. The drawdown in ISAF troop numbers also has to be balanced against the increase in ANSF numbers and the increased effectiveness of said ANSF elements.

I don't have the context on these specific troop contacts, most contacts nowadays are small arms fire, few result in casualties. I suspect that the reason the reporter picked up on this was that it was the exception that proved his point. 21 contacts in 27 days sounds intense but a 3 round 'shoot and scoot' carried out by one man is still a contact, carried out 21 times over 27 days...

Again without knowing the context of the contacts or how serious they were one cannot tell what steps were appropriate to be taken, let alone what steps were taken to deal with the issue. The pervasiveness of persistent wide area surveillance within Helmand means that follow up can be conducted in a variety of ways in a variety of timeframes.

Lastly a robust and independent scrutiny of the Afghanistan Campaign would most definitely be welcome by both the Armed Forces and (I suspect) by the (current) UK Government. I am sure we would learn a great deal from it.

[jcustis]

The drawdown in ISAF troop numbers also has to be balanced against the increase in ANSF numbers and the increased effectiveness of said ANSF elements.

Our performance in ANSF development has had a very deleterious effect on our ability to complete the clear.

We performed the clear, but had to go back to it in order to address a lot of loss of ground during the hold. In some areas, they were never 'clear', and we probably used poor descriptions for what 'clear' looked like in the first place.

[davidbfpo]

A slightly adapted title from The Guardian, which has an interview from the No.2 ISAF commander, Lieutenant General James Bucknall, who has just stood down:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011...nistan-warning

It opens with:

.. the Taliban cannot "assassinate their way to power" and too many lives have been lost over the last 10 years for the west to flinch in its campaign against the insurgents.

Then and I'm sure I posted a remark on this theme recently:

We almost owe it to those who have gone before to see the job through,...Having made this investment in blood, I am more determined. If I didn't think we could do this I would take a very different view but I am confident we can do it...

These are the two top ingredients. We have to stick together. We went in together, and we go out together. Managing a coalition in a draw down requires an awful lot more work than managing a coalition during a surge

More of the interview is on:http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/de...ral?intcmp=239

[ganulv]

We almost owe it to those who have gone before to see the job through,...Having made this investment in blood, I am more determined. If I didn't think we could do this I would take a very different view but I am confident we can do it...

The courage to stay the course or throwing good money after bad? Making the distinction is an unenviable task indeed.

[Ken White]

The courage to stay the course or throwing good money after bad? Making the distinction is an unenviable task indeed.

Further consider the sentiment expressed in your quote is not even a glimmer of an issue with said Political types and the thought in your statement is barely so.

The Generals merely try to provide some cover for their Bosses while -- hopefully -- rallying the troops...

[jcustis]

He's been there for 18 months, which is notable. I for one am keen to learn more about his thoughts and assessments, and what he measures a "good summer" by.

He's made some exceptionally distinct statements about insurgents not being able to hold ground, and reverting to a terrorist organization, and so I wonder. And when he is quoted as saying that "we are on track," I'm left wondering on track for what?

[BushrangerCZ]

I´ve seen Brits using new, short barreled (I guess 13 inch) .308 assault rifle in A-stan, is it standard issue or just for sharpshooter´s role? If standard, is it going to completely replace SA80 (or however is its newest modification called) in whole army, or just for deployed units? Thanks...

[jcustis]

What brand is it?

At 13 inches, I doubt it's being employed as a tack driver in any precision shooting application.

[BushrangerCZ]

my bad, it´s probably 16 inches, I´ve seen crappy picture. Now I understand it´s just for designated sharpshooters.

So SA80 goes on for regular rifleman?

[jcustis]

Yes, as it seems you discovered, that's the Lewis and Machine Tool (LMT) L129A1.

http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2...129a1-lmt-308/

The SA80 remains the frontline service rifle.

[davidbfpo]

Post 883 refers to the 2IC ISAF General James Bucknall being interviewed upon leaving his appointment.

Frank Ledwidge, a critic of the UK's campaign, contributed a response days later (which I missed) and some points he made have appeared here. For example:

Prior to the British deployment in 2006 Helmand was a relatively rich, virtually conflict-free province. When our current chief of defence staff General Sir David Richards, who was at the time commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan said, "Where's Helmand? It's not important" he was right. There were very few Taliban in central Helmand or indeed anywhere else in the province and the small US garrison had suffered no serious casualties. The SAS had ranged the area for years, successfully gaining intelligence and ensuring that al-Qaida could gain no traction. Before the British got to Helmand there was no "Taliban heartland" there.

He ends with:

It must be time now even for senior soldiers to admit that this has become a very bad investment indeed. We "owe it" to those whose lives and limbs may yet be saved to cut our losses.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...james-bucknall

[jcustis]

That's a peculiar analysis. Al Qaeda had no need to try to gain traction in Helmand. It's Helmand after all, and with nothing going for it besides agriculture and the popppy/marijuana harvests, it wouldn't make sense to Al Qaeda to have any interest.

The lines of communication in and out to Pakistan are difficult, resources to sustain oneself when not forcing the locals to feed and shelter you are low, and there aren't too many development projects or licit commercial activities that would garner an IO victory if attacked.

I understand the comments about Taliban in Helmand are sort of an aside to the main thrust of his article, but the writer is way off.

[davidbfpo]

I am sure the town of Nad-e-Ali has appeared before in Afghan threads, but I don't recall this story:

The Taliban were firmly entrenched in the Nad-e-Ali district of Helmand, with the population cowed and British soldiers confined to moving within a few hundred yards of their bases, when Lt Col James Coates took over the area. The commanding officer of 3 Para introduced a new tactic called “precision strike”, combining high level intelligence, CCTV camera surveillance and the use of precision missile attacks to wipe out Taliban command while causing minimal civilian casualties. In the coming months, the formerly fractious area will be handed over to Afghan control. British success attracted a host of inspecting VIPs. It was, said Gen David Petraeus, “a most impressive way to do business”. Precision strike is now used across Afghanistan.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...-the-year.html

Strange place for the story to appear.

A little digging found:

The unit served as part of Operation Herrick 13 in Helmand Province between October 2010 and April 2011.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-essex-15123581

[davidbfpo]

Ryan Evans is now at ICSR, London and was a member of a HTT n Helmand Province; he has written a FP Blog piece 'COIN is dead, long live the COIN' and is preparing:

..an article on the specific context of Central Helmand Province and the limits of COIN operations there due to specific local political, historical, and economic circumstances.

I have just listened to a short podcast of a talk Ryan Evans and a recently retired British Army Lieut.Col. Dougie Graham, whose last posting was Helmand, which has some gems and worth listening to. The seminar summary:http://icsr.info/seminar/counter-ins...and-and-beyond and the podcast is on:http://dl.dropbox.com/u/13850824/evans%20-%20main.wma

It was notable that the Dougie Graham conceded for the locals the GIRoA was seen as the enemy and that 99.9% of the dead insurgents lived with ten mile of their last contact.

[davidbfpo]

A laudatory article on the RN helicopters, designed for anti-submarine operations, identifying the Taliban's supply routes:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...echnology.html

What I noted was, with my emphasis:

By tracking pickup trucks and camel trains, the Navy team of three Sea King helicopters and 43 servicemen, including engineers and analysts, have produced a map made up of millions of dots that shows the highways across the desert. The lines show 12 main routes, most going to Pakistan but at least four heading into Iran.

I am always puzzled why such technology is revealed. (Addition follows). Apparently the technology in use is a variant of well known ISR technology:

...the use of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) had proved invaluable in the tracking and prosecution of enemy ground forces. ..radar is similar to the U2 ASARS radar, and collects SAR imagery and GMTI data.

Which is deployed on a UK aircraft:http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/sentinelr1.cfm

I would speculate that the routes heading into Iran are the mass movement of heroin.

[davidbfpo]

This is the headline in the Daily Telegraph and is IMO long overdue. I cite the sub-title:

Britain's most senior military officer has said the military move into southern Afghanistan was “amateurish” and “verging on the complacent” and accused ministers of failing to learn lessons from Iraq.

It appears that his remarks appear in a new book 'War Against the Taliban' by Sandy Gall.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...as-woeful.html

General Richards comments do not appear to answer all the critical points made here over the years, such as the six month tour of duty rotation system. Note he remains optimistic on the war in Afghanistan.

Link to Sandy Gall's book:http://www.bloomsbury.com/War-Agains.../9781408809051

[ganulv]

I would speculate that the routes heading into Iran are the mass movement of heroin.

I’ve made the acquaintance of a young Afghan man over the past couple of months (a student at a nearby college) and the last time I saw him our conversation veered into a short discussion of Helmand. He is quite well traveled in Afghanistan and Pakistan and I asked him if he had visited Helmand. He replied that he had not, that it was a very dangerous region. Unsolicited, he went on to explain that the danger stemmed from the movement of heroin bound for Iran through the area. Regardless of whether or not his statement is anything more than “that’s what everyone says, anyway…” it does fall in line with your speculation.

[davidbfpo]

The RUSI is holding a public event on 29th February 2012, entitled 'The Afghan Papers: Committing Britain to War in Helmand, 2005-06' and from the flyer:

A panel discussion including Sir Kevin Tebbit and Professor Michael Clarke on RUSI's latest Whitehall Paper assessing the controversial decision to go into Helmand province, Afghanistan. In 2006, British forces entered the Helmand Province of Afghanistan in what would become one of the defining military campaigns of the decade. At great cost in blood and treasure, the UK waged a protracted counter-insurgency against a resurgent Taliban. But how was the decision taken to commit Britain to such a difficult and drawn-out campaign?

Link:http://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E4F2ABF372E699

It will be curious to see how this institution so close to Westminster-Whitehall handles the issues.