Firstly, I was and still am opposed to the U.S. launching a military campaign to defeat Assad and remove him from office. I do not believe that his removal would hasten the war's end or lessen the carnage. The U.S. would also then bear a certain responsibility for the failure of the Syrian state and the continued violence. Nor do I believe that occupying and reconstructing Syria over a period of decades is in the U.S. national interest.
However, I am not averse to a palace coup wherein Assad is replaced by a more reasonable Alawi leader who would be satisfied with an armistice that involves the creation of an Alawi enclave and the retreat of Alawi forces to this enclave. Such an arrangement would also pertain to the Christian and Druze minorities which are neutral or have been fighting alongside the Alawis. This would reduce the sectarianism of the conflict and allow the Syrian Sunni Arabs to concentrate on defeating Al Qaeda and Daesh, and consolidating a Sunni Arab enclave in the central and eastern parts of Syria. The Syrian Kurds already have Rojava, however, the ethnic cleansing would have to cease and borders demarcated.
Would Russia be opposed to such an outcome? Probably not, given its history of managing various unresolved conflicts and fluidly transitioning from low-level war to full-scale war to ceasefire. Russia would retain its basing rights in Alawi Latakia and guarantee that the Sunni Arabs did not begin sectarian cleansing against the minorities with whom they have been fighting.
So who is the gorilla in the room? Iran, which brings me to my second point...
Secondly, Iran's intervention in Syria is an invasion by any means. Although Iran was invited in by the Syrian government, I regard this invitation in the same light as the Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian Hungarian, Czech and Afghan invitations extended to the Soviet Union, or Italy's invitation to Germany in 1943. Why?
From the outset of the civil uprising against Assad in 2011, it was clear that most protesters were from the Sunni Arab majority, from the same community that had risen up against Assad's father, and which the Assads had marginalized in the military and civil service, in favor of their own sect. Assad's brutal response to the uprising involved not only turning Alawi intelligence officers and paramilitaries (
Shabiha) on the protesters, but also the advice and direct participation of Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
I cannot see how a leader who is oppressing the majority of his citizens and who is dependent upon minority support and foreign forces, can be considered a legitimate head of state. His invitations to Iran and Russia are about as legitimate in my opinion as any invitations from any other faction in the war.
Therefore, Iran is an invader, no matter how many Petains or Quislings it can point to.
Thirdly, there may be a way through the chaos of the Civil War to intervene successfully, by driving out the foreign forces upon which Assad depends upon for
offensive campaigns. The Syrian Alawis, Druze and Christians can probably be counted upon to defend their homes and families, but there is mounting evidence that they are weary of subduing the Sunni Arab majority, let alone the Kurds.
Currently, Assad relies on the
following foreign forces led by Iran (20,000 to 30,000):
- Revolutionary Guards - from Iran (8,000 to 10,000)
- Regular Forces - from Iran (~1,000)
- Hezbollah - from Lebanon (6,000 to 8,000)
- Kata'ib Hezbollah - from Iraq (1,000 to 3,000)
- Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq - from Iraq (1,000 to 3,000)
- Liwa Fatemiyoun - from Afghanistan and Iran (2,000 to 3,000)
- Liwa Zainabiyoun - from Pakistan (1,000)
Exact estimates of fighting strength are difficult to come by, given casualties and rotations. According to the
NCRI/MEK, Iran has cobbled together a force of 60,000 to 73,000, but these numbers seem grossly inflated, and are not supported by the numbers of combatants observed in various pro-Assad campaigns.
Of these forces, only Hezbollah and Kata'ib Hezbollah are designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), accounting for roughly 1/3 of the pro-Assad foreign strength.
I would roughly recommend:
- Designating the other paramilitaries as FTOs as well as the Quds Force
- Signaling to all participants that non-Syrian FTOs must depart and that they will be subject to attack if observed in Sunni Arab or Kurdish areas (i.e. outside of Latakia and Damascus)
- Signaling that the U.S. government has no intention of ousting Assad or allowing Latakia to be overrun
- Making the Free Syrian Army agree to assume a defensive and static posture
- Attack any non-Syrian pro-Assad FTO that engages in hostilities against Sunni Arabs
- Attack any Islamist Sunni Arab offensive into non-Sunni areas (e.g. Al Qaeda's various derivatives)
This may drive a wedge between Assad and his people, as well as between Iran and its auxiliaries. It will also be an arrangement that Russia and most Syrians can live with, and will not involve the use of U.S. ground forces. Thoughts?
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
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