U.S. alpine warfare capabilities?

[ganulv]

My understanding is that the 10th Mountain Division carries the <Mountain> designation for reasons related to its history rather than as a description of its contemporary capabilities and that the relevant Army and Marine Corps schools do primarily individual rather than unit training. Is the lack of a large unit dedicated to alpine warfare a calculated decision on the part of the DoD? Are there any small units optimized for mountain warfare? If my understanding of what the Special Forces do is correct I would assume there are SF teams for which this is true, though I understand that there might be some OPSEC concerns there.

Appreciated,
Matthew

[Neil Baumgardner]

The 86th IBCT (Vermont ARNG) is now trained for Mountain Warfare.

Hate to use wikipedia as my source link but I cant find any of the original sources right now http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/86th_In...ited_States%29

Moderator's Note

Post just approved and clearly pre-empts some of the following posts, PM to author.

[Fuchs]

It's imho a good idea to wait till the AFG campaign is over, for nowadays (afaik) alpine qualification is more about the preparation training for AFG deployment than about real formation specialisation.


There was a great amount of public criticism and outright bashing post-Anaconda concerning the 10th Mountain Div and its lack of mountain training area, lack of acclimatisation prior to deployment, lack of alpine expert trainers and so on.

[ganulv]

There was a great amount of public criticism and outright bashing post-Anaconda concerning the 10th Mountain Div and its lack of mountain training area, lack of acclimatisation prior to deployment, lack of alpine expert trainers and so on.

I think (could be wrong) that the Vermont National Guard runs the Army’s mountain warfare school. I’m not clear as to whether any of their units are true alpine warfare units or not.

The area around Watertown is flat as a board, but it’s close enough to the Adirondacks for easy day trips. But to keep acclimated to altitude within U.S. territory a unit would need to be based out west.

[Ken White]

The 10th is now only historically linked to its forebear which was trained for alpine warfare when it formed and trained at Camp Hale Colorado during WW II. It did fight in Italy; in the Appenines and the Alps.

Hale post WW II shifted from unit to individual training and later was closed in the 50s. Mountain and Cold Weather Training was moved to Fort Greeley, Alaska. It was closed post Cold War and the VT ArNG picked up the mountain training mission to include for the Active Army. It is individually focused but the School used to be willing to send out Mobile Training Teams to aid units training, probably still do but certainly could if deemed necessary. People in the Active Army also get sent to other nation's real mountain warfare schools (that's not a knock on the Vt Guard but on the fact that, in Vermont, the available mountains aren't...), to include India's but as Gunlv says, to do units, a western location would be necessary.

Anaconda suffered from more flaws than a lack of training, an overweening bureaucracy being but one. That overly bureaucratic bit and its allied overemphasis on force protection is in part a reaction to our less than stellar training; one cannot expect better than average or even average performance from below average training so one tends to be excessively cautious in employment. The sad thing is that Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, the Somalia affair and even moving into Bosnia where Rick Sanchez was afraid to have his Engineers bridge a river in an end 1995 non combat situation all were harbinger and examples of how not to do things. Or, more correctly, how to do things wrongly, expensively, cautiously and without achieving the desired effect in a timely fashion while taking and causing unnecessary casualties...

That's what happens when you treat your Army not as a real and existing military force but as a mere holding pool of people, funds and equipment for a mobilization and big war you might not ever see. That attitude BTW, is not totally a post Viet Nam phenomenon but it has grown exponentially and dangerously since VN. I believe that is true due to a -- flawed and failing IMO -- effort to influence US policy. The effort has not done that and has instead done the institution itself and the people in it a grave disservice. Not done well by the nation, either...

As Jon Custis once wrote, it's fortunate that most of the folks we fight are even more screwed up than we are...

[Fuchs]

As Jon Custis once wrote, it's fortunate that most of the folks we fight are even more screwed up than we are...

Did you already give back your U.S. citizenship?

You sound so totally un-American...after all, hooah!!!, Tom Clancy, easy bashing of underdeveloped nations' militaries, huge budgets and so on have convinced MANY U.S. Americans (and others) that all that shines is platinum.

[Rex Brynen]

Pfft, don't think we don't know the real reason the 10th Mountain Division is at Fort Drum.

[Ken White]

Did you already give back your U.S. citizenship?

With all our flaws, we still do better on more things than do any others of whom I'm aware. Many nations out perform us in specific areas but no one nation is as lucky to have so many fortuitous synergies roll into one acceptable but admittedly not great package.

You sound so totally un-American...after all, hooah!!!, Tom Clancy, easy bashing of underdeveloped nations' militaries, huge budgets and so on have convinced MANY U.S. Americans (and others) that all that shines is platinum.

I think much of that is due to the failings of our media -- that's one area where even the worst in the world are ahead of us. A senior British Officer once said of our news people that their pathetic performance made us look like intemperate and rather ignorant clowns in the eyes of most of the rest of the world -- and he was IMO absolutely right. He added that he was truly shocked in actual interplay to find out that the truth was quite different.

Contrary to what those Squirrels say, show and write, my observation is that most Americans are pretty well aware of our benefits and shortfalls. The problem is that we're individualistic enough to squabble endlessly over what to do about correcting said shortfalls so needed results are agreed to but the routes are subject to almost endless negotiation and argument. Thus correction comes slowly -- though I sense that may be changing. Exasperation with Washington is always present and waxes and wanes but I think it has edge now that I've never seen before. The political crowd, the media, the White House and Congress really need to wake up and smell the coffee.

[Steve Blair]

Anaconda suffered from more flaws than a lack of training, an overweening bureaucracy being but one. That overly bureaucratic bit and its allied overemphasis on force protection is in part a reaction to our less than stellar training; one cannot expect better than average or even average performance from below average training so one tends to be excessively cautious in employment.

Quite. Especially when one considers that the 10th only provided headquarters elements for Anaconda...the combat force (outside of SpecOps) was from the 101st. Mix and match has become one of our other hallmarks, and we never remember that it quite often doesn't go well...

[Ken White]

Mix and match has become one of our other hallmarks, and we never remember that it quite often doesn't go well...

Lacking well trained or experienced troops, the results are predictably really bad -- and thus caution inspiring...

An unfortunate side effect is the creation of a culture of "I want only people I know to work for me." This attitude means eschewing the pipeline (which will be the only source of replacements in a larger war...) and creates sycophants. It also drives many good people out of the forces (plural...)

[kowalskil]

My understanding is that the 10th Mountain Division carries the <Mountain> designation for reasons related to its history rather than as a description of its contemporary capabilities ...

Generals probably think that mountain fighting is now less important than in the past. How else can this be explained?

Ludwik Kowalski (see Wikipedia)
.

[Fuchs]

Generals probably think that mountain fighting is now less important than in the past. How else can this be explained?

With a preference for expensive hardware solutions. The 101st (helicopter mobile) division was probably the real U.S. mountain division for a long time.

[Steve Blair]

With a preference for expensive hardware solutions. The 101st (helicopter mobile) division was probably the real U.S. mountain division for a long time.

Not likely.

[Pete]

We've had the reactivated 10th Mountain Division for around two decades, but I doubt they are trained up to the same standards of the World War II outfit. Still, I have to wonder whether their mountain-climbing training was really put into practice very frequently in Italy during '44-'45 -- did they really have to go up and down on ropes on cliffs as a matter of course?

This special training thing might be a bit like the Airborne philosophy -- it's not as much about the efficacy of large-scale parachute drops in combat today or rock-climbing, it's about the motivation level of the guys who volunteer for that kind of thing in the first place, and the "Never Quit" attitude they have.

[ganulv]

Still, I have to wonder whether their mountain-climbing training was really put into practice very frequently in Italy during '44-'45 -- did they really have to go up and down on ropes on cliffs as a matter of course?

That’s one of those “Hopefully, never!” things, right? For example, even if the EOD guys have never once been called to urgently disarm a nuclear weapon I still think it is worth the trouble to train them to be able to!

[Steve Blair]

We've had the reactivated 10th Mountain Division for around two decades, but I doubt they are trained up to the same standards of the World War II outfit. Still, I have to wonder whether their mountain-climbing training was really put into practice very frequently in Italy during '44-'45 -- did they really have to go up and down on ropes on cliffs as a matter of course?

This special training thing might be a bit like the Airborne philosophy -- it's not as much about the efficacy of large-scale parachute drops in combat today or rock-climbing, it's about the motivation level of the guys who volunteer for that kind of thing in the first place, and the "Never Quit" attitude they have.

Of course the 10th Mountain isn't trained to the same standards. That was a "heritage" naming that coincided with some of the light division ideas...rather like the 101st still being called airborne in some instances when in fact it's not or the 1st Cavalry Division (which is of course an armored division).