More killing. Less good deeds

[marct]

Hi Mike,

Using the definitions of COIN found in JP 1-02 and FM 3-24, COIN is an action that a government takes to quell internal rebellion or strife. Along those lines, the only COIN that the US can accomplish is within our internal borders. When we intervene in another countries internal affairs, the matter is inherently difficult as we must pick a side. IMO, this distinction is important, and our failure to address the issue only muddies the waters.

Yup. This is FID using COIN tactics. More on muddied waters in a minute...

In effect, when we intervene, we are picking a side. In Iraq, we back the Shia-heavy government over the Sunnis. In Afghanistan, we back the Karzai-heavy government over the Taliban. Both governments were put in place through elections, and we are hoping that these governments will eventually stabalize internal strife AND share our collective national security interests.

This is where I think semantics are crucial. In these instances, was it "picking" a side or "creating" a side? Both the Iraqi and Afghan governments were created by external force of arms and then "legitimated" through elections. I put "legitimated" in quotes, because the elections themselves did not allow the defeated governments to run (I doubt that SH would have won, but I'm not sure about the Taliban...), and the elections themselves were imposed.

Under one set of interpretations, it could be argued that what is being supported are a series of puppet regimes that were created by the US. Now, I'm not arguing for that particular interpretation (although I will mumble it ), but it does have some pretty serious implications. For example, the SOFA agreement with Iraq that led to the drawdown in troop commitments and the pulling out from the urban areas indicates, to me at least, that the GOI is being treated as if it were an independant, legitimate gov't. Good move.

Afghanistan, OTOH, is much more questionable. For example, the government of the Mayor of Kabul does not appear to have any control over the various foreign militaries, and many local, acting in his country (vide his repeated requests regarding the use of air strikes). Afghanistan is, IMO, the more interesting case, in part because the coalition is there acting under a UN mandate which includes rebuilding the government. It is less of an FID operation than a UN reconstruction operation (similar, at least in legal theory [yes, I'm waiting for JMM to jump in ] to the occupation of Germany and Japan after WW II, but without offical surrenders). So, is it FID? COIN? "War"? What?

My suspicion is that the semantic confusion as to exactly what is going on is at the heart of many of the problems we are facing there.

[MikeF]

So, is it FID? COIN? "War"? What?

My suspicion is that the semantic confusion as to exactly what is going on is at the heart of many of the problems we are facing there.

Hi Marc,

I agree with many of your thoughts, and I suppose that on the strategic level (my weakness), our analysis is akin to trying to play historian to present day actions. No doubt, our interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq will redefine modern warfare- call it hybrid, irregular or whatever. In some ways, we'll simply see how it plays out.

Paradoxically, I honestly believe that there is nothing new under the sun. War is war, and our continued efforts to redefine FID into SFA, COIN into IW, and differentiate between big and small wars, regular and irregular wars, only continues to muddy the waters; however, this distinction or semantics maybe a result of the continued evolution of our economies and modern nation-state system/governance. I suppose it is a chicken and an egg type debate.

I wish I had an answer. I do not.

Regardless, on the tactical level (my perceived expertise), the answer is simple. If and when you intervene, you must bring the "hate" to control the populace. These actions may require more than simple population centric "soft" approaches. In many areas, it requires killing the enemy. FM 3-24 refers to it as "stopping the bleeding" or an analogy to a gunshot victim in an emergency room.

After you have achieved control, then you can bring the "love" of nation-building. I would assert that this is more of a psychological action- a psychologist attempting to mend, adjust, or simply treat a victim of trauma after the incident.

Again, we'll see how it plays out. I'm cautious to accept that we can re-invent or redefine societies (particularly in a limited time frame). One of the greatest lessons that I've learned in studying small wars, emerging nations, failed and failing states, is the importance of time and patience- not a particular forte of the United States.

One needs only look at modern day Malaysia, Burma, Vietnam, Guatemala, and the Phillipines.

With that said, how does this intertwine with the observations/analysis of an anthropologist?

v/r

Mike