Eurasia Insight, 20 Nov 07: Afghanistan: A Law Enforcement Success Story in Kabul
..."Corruption is rooted in economics, and so is violence. Give me the equipment, the men and the money and I can turn this force into one that can clean the crime off these streets in a matter of months. Until then, I do my best with what I have.".....
Originally Posted by Jedburgh
Great article Jed, thanks for posting.
Afghan Police Struggle to Work a Beat in a War - NYTIMES, 13 January.
Many of the problems frustrating Afghanistan’s efforts to secure its dangerous eastern and southern provinces were evident in the bizarre tour of duty of Shair Mohammad, a police officer who spent 18 months in an isolated swath of steppe.
Until December, when a colonel arrived to replace him, Mr. Mohammad, 30, had been the acting police chief in the Nawa district of Ghazni Province. The job gave him jurisdiction over hundreds of square miles near Pakistan that the Taliban had used as a sanctuary since being ousted from power in 2001.
But his ability to police his beat was severely compromised.
Mr. Mohammad had no rank, no money for food and not enough clothing or gear to operate in cold weather. Two of his six trucks were broken. The ammunition the Pentagon provided him came in cardboard boxes that immediately crumbled, exposing cartridges to the elements on his storeroom’s dirty floor.
Compounding his woes, the possibility of mutiny was on his mind. It was a natural worry, he said, because since April none of his men had been paid.
“My commanders always just give me promises,” he said. “They never send the money ...”
18 Jun 08 testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs regarding Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice Sector in Afghanistan:
U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability, Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director, International Affairs and Trade, GAO
Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan, Frank Ward, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, DoS
Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice Sector in Afghanistan, David Johnson, Asst Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, DoS
Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan, Bobby Wilkes, Dpty Asst Secretary of Defense for South Asia, OSD
Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan, Mark Ward, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Asia Bureau, USAID
Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan, Bruce Swartz, Dpty Asst Attorney General, Criminal Division, DoJ
Lemme see if I have this right.
GAO -- who would not have a job if they found nothing wrong -- found things wrong. Okay.
Three DoS, One DoD, one USAID and One DOJ type all commented on the wrongs GAO found -- and added couple to show they were concerned. Okay.
A part of the reported problem is failure to adequately equip the ANP. No mention is made of the part played by our ridiculous procurement laws and regulations -- most at the behest of the Congress that is conducting this 'hearing' -- which are almost certainly primarily responsible for that flaw. Okay.
Another part is that the Afghans works on a different timetable and have different mores than we would like. Okay.
Could the excessive bureaucracy herein displayed also play a part in the failure of the ANP to walk on water?
Oh, wait; not too much water there...
We can save money if we store this and release it again a year from now; save the cost of another hearing to discover little real change. Or we could say no such hearing until 2012 and give things a chance to get fixed...
Not to disparage your posting Jedburgh, I appreciate it and your postings. It's just every now and then, my mind really boggles at how utterly ridiculous and overweight we've become. Verily, I have vented...
At your age
It's good to let it out, you don't need the added hyper tensionGAO -- It's just every now and then, my mind really boggles at how utterly ridiculous and overweight we've become. Verily, I have vented...
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
The price of working with the ANP
The BBC News reports:And a comment from an ex-UK commander:Five British soldiers have been shot dead in Helmand Province, in an attack the UK military blamed on a "rogue" Afghan policeman.See:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8341659.stm and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8341825.stmIt will undermine trust, certainly in the short term, until we establish exactly what happened. And it wouldn't at all surprise me now if there aren't a lot of soldiers, British soldiers in Afghanistan, with their fingers very firmly on the trigger when they're around Afghan police and military.
Not good news for Afghanisation and training the Afghans.
davidbfpo
ANP police officer kills five UK soldier
A few more details in follow-up reporting, notably the attack was within a compound: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-strategy.html
Commentary and links on:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...11/murder.html
davidbfpo
A terrible day. Murderous treachery is the basest crime of all. Sadly this is soft spot with a angle of attack which is very difficult to deal with.
Firn
A scathing indictment ....
is this article in the Independent, 'Most of them were corrupt and stoned on opium':
I particularly interested in this comment:'Most of them were corrupt and stoned on opium'
A senior serving soldier reveals how the Afghan policemen in Helmand are often a danger to the British forces they work with
Thursday, 5 November 2009
When I heard the news this morning, I thought "Christ, five in one go..." I was shocked and saddened – but I was not surprised that it had happened. I'm surprised it took this long.
We went out to Helmand to mentor the Afghan National Police without understanding the level they were at. We thought we would be arresting people, helping them to police efficiently. Instead we were literally training them how to point a gun on the ranges, and telling them why you should not stop cars and demand "taxes".
Most of them were corrupt and took drugs, particularly opium. The lads would go into police stations at night and they would be stoned; sometimes they would fire indiscriminately at nothing.
The primary problem in Astan is not military, but that of civil administration (part of the political effort, which is near FUBAR).The Afghan army are a lot more switched on. They have started to stand up for themselves. But the police have not had the same investment. There is no point in pushing the army through to clear ground if you leave a void behind with the police.
Uncheerful
Mike
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