What we support and defend

[Fuchs]

It's also noteworthy that the primary tank gun in the USSR during WW II was an 85mm. Toward the end of the war, they want to a 100mm, both ten mm bigger than the US and German 75mm and later in the war US 90mm. The wild card is the German 88mm -- that probably killed more USSR tanks than anything, yet they didn't develop a 98mm...

85 mm was only important in late '43 to '45. most of the time the Soviets used much more of several 76.2 mm gun types (interchangeable ammo tank <-> field gun) and the 76.2 mm calibre remained very important until post-war (no wonder with more than 100,000 guns built!).

The Soviet 100 mm (D-10) proved to be superior to even the L/71 88 mm in post-War tests. the long 88 couldn't take on a T-54 frontally with an acceptable chance of success.
The U.S. insistence on 76 mm for a long time after the war was likely a result of the British great success with the 17 pdr gun (~77 mm IIRC) which equalled the German long (L/70) 75 mm gun in performance which in itself was almost identical to the early war (L/56) 88 mm in penetration. So basically the U.S. was stupid enough to stick for a decade with a gun that couldn't defeat an IS-2 or T-44 head-on and had at most adequate HE effect. South Korea would probably be gone if the North Koreans had had T-44's instead of T-34/85s in 1950. The normal (60mm) Bazookas were inadequate against T-44's from almost all angles.


About 98 mm; funny story. Due to the modern arms limitations treaty (forget the abbreviation, but it restricted all ordnance 100 mm or bigger), there are now a couple 98 mm mortars which are perfectly in between 81.4/82 mm and 120 mm in mortar bomb weight...
This makes as much sense as did all the Washington Treaty light cruisers; 10,000 tons but only 6" guns...

[Ken White]

85 mm was only important in late '43 to '45.

True -- but that's when WW II was 'decided.'

The U.S. insistence on 76 mm for a long time after the war was likely a result of the British great success with the 17 pdr gun (~77 mm IIRC) which equalled the German long (L/70) 75 mm gun in performance which in itself was almost identical to the early war (L/56) 88 mm in penetration. So basically the U.S. was stupid enough to stick for a decade with a gun that couldn't defeat an IS-2 or T-44 head-on and had at most adequate HE effect.

Uh, no. That's rather incorrect...

The US had adopted the 90mm as Standard A in late 1943, production started on the 90 mm M3 towed antitank gun, on the M36 Tank Destroyer and on the M24 Tank. All were in full production when the war ended. The lines were closed at Congressional insistence -- that meant reliance on the many still around but now obsolete M4A3E8s with the 76 up until early in Korea when M24 / M26 production was restarted and by mid '52, the M4s were history.

South Korea would probably be gone if the North Koreans had had T-44's instead of T-34/85s in 1950. The normal (60mm) Bazookas were inadequate against T-44's from almost all angles.

Not likely, most NK Tanks in 1950 were destroyed by Aircraft. The 2.36" / 60mm Rocket launchers were not effective against the T34 unless the Launcher gunner was less than 100 meters away due more to inaccuracy of the weapon than anything else, though few RLs work against any real degree of frontal armor with a decent slope -- glacis plates are thick for a reason. Both better training and the arrival of the 3.5" / 89mm Rocket Launcher (relatively accurate to about 200 m) fixed that by early to mid 1951. In the interim, after September of 1950 when they arrived in theater, after being pulled out of storage, those 90mm Towed AT guns were used with Tungsten hyper shot and they would literally blow a T34 apart.

About 98 mm; funny story. Due to the modern arms limitations treaty (forget the abbreviation, but it restricted all ordnance 100 mm or bigger), there are now a couple 98 mm mortars which are perfectly in between 81.4/82 mm and 120 mm in mortar bomb weight...
This makes as much sense as did all the Washington Treaty light cruisers; 10,000 tons but only 6" guns...

Very little makes much military sense -- too much political involvement...

[Fuchs]

True -- but that's when WW II was 'decided.'

In the American world view ... because they showed up too late to play a role in the widely recognized turning point battles...

Uh, no. That's rather incorrect...

The US had adopted the 90mm as Standard A in late 1943, production started on the 90 mm M3 towed antitank gun, on the M36 Tank Destroyer and on the M24 Tank.

Aside from the M24 being equipped with a 76 mm* (based very much on the first quick-firing gun ever; a rather weak calibre comparable to the T-34 M1940's gun) and 90 mm guns playing no role in U.S. WW2 mediums, I think you read a bit more into "insistence" than I meant to.
The U.S. kept 76 mm as a calibre in the M41 and in some post-war prototypes, and the ~76 mm-equipped Shermans were the almost exclusive medium tank of the U.S. until the Korean War wartime production mode kicked in.

*: I think you meant M26, which saw WW2 only in prototype-like quantities.

[Ken White]

In the American world view ... because they showed up too late to play a role in the widely recognized turning point battles...

Which, aside from Kursk was really what?

Aside from the M24 being equipped with a 76 mm* (based very much on the first quick-firing gun ever; a rather weak calibre comparable to the T-34 M1940's gun) and 90 mm guns playing no role in U.S. WW2 mediums, I think you read a bit more into "insistence" than I meant to.
The U.S. kept 76 mm as a calibre in the M41 and in some post-war prototypes, and the ~76 mm-equipped Shermans were the almost exclusive medium tank of the U.S. until the Korean War wartime production mode kicked in.

]*: I think you meant M26, which saw WW2 only in prototype-like quantities.

I did indeed mean the M26 -- that should also have been M26 and M46 with reference to Korea.. I'm old...

The M26 was indeed only in theater in small quantities but it did see combat and was headed for major production runs when the war ended and Congress stopped the procurement

The M24 didn't have a 76, it had a 75. The M41 did have a 76 but both were light tanks, scouting tanks to some and were not intended to engage other nations main battle tanks -- that was the job of the M26, 46, 47,(90s) 48, 60 (90 / 105) and 1 (105 / 120). We both agree that the Sherman was the principal de facto US tank until mid 1952 -- but that was because there was no war and, in the view of Congress, no need to produce more powerful tanks until then. Korea obviously changed that but still, once again, the US Army went to war with obsolete gear from the last war. My point was and is that is true but it was NOT because the Army wanted it that way and no one was stupid about it -- except Congress.

Nothing new in that.

[Steve the Planner]

I, for one, enjoyed flipping the turrets off of all of those little tanks with 105s and 152s (M60A1s and A2s) at Hohenfels.

Another Old Guy, I guess.

[Ken White]

I, for one, enjoyed flipping the turrets off of all of those little tanks with 105s and 152s (M60A1s and A2s) at Hohenfels.

Another Old Guy, I guess.

How you think an M4A3E8 Gunner and an M41 TC feel...

Not long before I retired, I was a Controller in an exercise and watched one 60A2 knock out two platoons of A1s (with MILES, of course)...

[Fuchs]

Which, aside from Kursk was really what?

Turning points of European WW2:

El Alamein for Commonwealth guys.
D-Day for Americans.
Stalingrad for everyone else.


The war was lost by Germany by late '41, though.
Almost nobody is going to discuss the loss of motor vehicles and quality horses in fall '41 as the final failure that made defeat inevitable, that's too complicated. Most people prefer simple battles (symptoms) as turning point markers.




Fig leaf for on-topic-ness:

The U.S. military expanded, and I see a couple main reasons for why it's not going to shrink to anything similar as envisioned 200+ years anytime soon:
(1) A childish belief that you can go to a war of choice and be better off afterwards than you would be without

(2) An exaggerated intolerance for distant phenomenons (no matter what size; only a handful distant phenomenons have the attention, and it's about the same attention no matter Red Army or a bunch of guys with fertiliser bombs)

(3) Bureaucratic self-preservation instinct

(4) Congressional corruption of the system (exploitation of budgets as a means to funnel money to the own district/state and donors)

(5) True conservatism that prefers the status quo over the experiment of not getting involved in so much (coupled with wild fantasies about the indispensability of U.S. military power)

[wm]

Turning points of European WW2:

El Alamein for Commonwealth guys.
D-Day for Americans.
Stalingrad for everyone else.


The war was lost by Germany by late '41, though.
Almost nobody is going to discuss the loss of motor vehicles and quality horses in fall '41 as the final failure that made defeat inevitable, that's too complicated. Most people prefer simple battles (symptoms) as turning point markers.

WWII was lost for all intents and purposes when Public Law 77-11, the Lend-Lease Act, was signed on 11 Mar 1941. After that, it was just a matter of time before the limited access to the natural resources need to fuel German industrial capability was swamped by the, for all practical purposes, unlimited access available to the US industrial base, which, BTW, was impervious to attack by the Axis powers. A second milestone in the path to victory was the establishment of the Persian Corridor and the deposing of the Shah in 1942 to ensure the path stayed open. The Arctic route to Murmansk/Archangel was open to attack by Germany naval forces and land-based aircraft. Even though the route Vladivostok accounted for over 50% of lendlease shipments to Russia, it was realitively open to interdiction by Japan (had Germany and Japan chosen to cooperate in the war against Russia). The route through Iran was out of the reach of both Japan and Germany.

[Steve Blair]

Fig leaf for on-topic-ness:

The U.S. military expanded, and I see a couple main reasons for why it's not going to shrink to anything similar as envisioned 200+ years anytime soon:
(1) A childish belief that you can go to a war of choice and be better off afterwards than you would be without

(2) An exaggerated intolerance for distant phenomenons (no matter what size; only a handful distant phenomenons have the attention, and it's about the same attention no matter Red Army or a bunch of guys with fertiliser bombs)

(3) Bureaucratic self-preservation instinct

(4) Congressional corruption of the system (exploitation of budgets as a means to funnel money to the own district/state and donors)

(5) True conservatism that prefers the status quo over the experiment of not getting involved in so much (coupled with wild fantasies about the indispensability of U.S. military power)

3 and 4 are the ones that are on-target.

[Ken White]

3 and 4 are the ones that are on-target.

Sadly...