Roundtable on Proposed Civilian Reserve Corps

[PRT interest]

The common consensus was that USAID lacked the legislative and budgetary teeth to effectively deploy a CRC (right now that right belongs to the secretary of state who confers with the adminstrator of USAID, but I guess the CRC would be directly under the direction of the coordinator for reconstruction and stability).

The point here, again, is to work with what's already on the table with this subject.

The ethos behind it is that the USG HAS to look outside the USG to find the right manpower because it seems like everyone in the USG is tasked-out.

I guess the ideal CONTRACT one would sign would be a 4 year term with a 1 year deployment. So 4-5 months training and then 12 months overseas - 16-17 months active duty before returning to "Reserve" status and kept on retainer with a small monthly stipend similar to the DOD reserve system.

[marct]

Hi PRT interest,

I guess the ideal CONTRACT one would sign would be a 4 year term with a 1 year deployment. So 4-5 months training and then 12 months overseas - 16-17 months active duty before returning to "Reserve" status and kept on retainer with a small monthly stipend similar to the DOD reserve system.

You might want to rethink how closely you are modelling it on he HR policies of the DOD reserve system. Part of he problem has been a systemic strain on reserve units being called up, so this may cause a problem with recruitment. I would suggest you look more at the Canadian reserve system and adopt something along those lines. The key differences are:

1. While you can be called up, active deployment is purely voluntary.
2. You are paid a "wage" rate, not a retainer, and expected to "work" for X hours per month.

I would suggest that some HR policies along these lines would be more likely to get top notch people interested since, after their initial tour, they won't have their careers yanked apart by unexpected deployments.

Also, since we are talking about primarily non-kinetic expertise, a large amount of that can be tapped via reach-back centres by people who do not wish to physically deploy.

Marc

[AmericanPride]

Why bother with building a voluntary system when Congress has the power to order a conscripted "civilian corps" into place? The Health Care Personnel Delivery System can serve as a model for expanding conscription to necessary civilian fields of expertise. People will certainly complain, of course, but that's not something that can't be solved by decent pay, a little bit of ribbon, or a medal. And heck, if they want to be political about it, the Democratic Congress can target rural townships because of the proclaimed patriotism of the right IOT to decimate the local political leadership of the Republican Party (tongue-in-cheek ).

[PRT interest]

Dr. Tyrrell and American Pride,

Very good points. Apparently, the Italians and the New Zealand PRTs are "role models" according to the HASC report, and I've heard that the Candadians have a very effective mechanism for humanitarian/reconstruction/stability ops once deployed. I guess the key face that I'm basing this work on is:

-there is a "universe" (to use a campaign phrase) of Americans who want to deploy in a non-military capacity to assist the military in humanitarian, reconstuction, and stability operations, but they lack a mechanism to do so...

Now the Peace Corps brags about taking anyone 18-83 (it's on their website), and I actually went through Army BCT with a 42 year old grandmother (she was the best soldier in our company), so obviously I think a "voluntary" deployment system may work the best, but it also has to be open to a wide variety of people from entry level to senior managment (maybe not 83 years old, but I'd say 55 maybe older?).

How are the Aussies at this type of stuff? Namely, humanitarian/peace keeping missions? I've done some research in the policy behind them deploying to East Timor, but I don't really know the mechanism behind it.

Regards,

[PRT interest]

The paper will be finished hopefully soon. I am trying to make an economic argument that based on the past expeditures on COIN operations through just hard power that produces negotiable results, a better (less expensive) investment can be made on the soft power side vis-a-vis DOS, C/CRS, and a CRC...

To do so, (sigh) I'm looking at all sorts of COIN theory and trying to establish the following:

The less expensive, but more ruthless the COIN campaign (i.e. Rome and the Jews in 132 c.e.) the more effective. However, looking at the British experience in Malaysia and our recent successes in Iraq, it can be argued that tangible results are a direct product of utilizing a "joint command program" through both soft and hard power.

There is a ton written on the Brits being worried about how much the Boer War cost per week ($200 million in total according to the UK Defense Ministry, but I don't know if that's 1902 pounds or adjusted for inflation) actually in the NYT. Similarly, apparently the NYT is quoting that Iraq is costing the US $5,000 per second:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/op...23kristof.html

So, after all of that, I believe that there is no "inexpensive" solution to COIN strategy; however, an investment in soft power approaches catagorically does not lead to diminishing returns...

And I'm spent.