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Thread: Lessons Not Learned

  1. #1
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    Default Lessons Not Learned

    On May 12, 2009, USIP held a conference: The U.S. Occupation of Iraq: What Lessons Should be Learned?

    The lead speakers were James Dobbins (Rand) and Stuart Bowen (SIGIR). Also present (and valuable contributors) were Dr. Gordon Rudd, Keith Crane (Rand), and Paul Hughes (USIP).

    Summary:

    Mr. Dobbins introduced a new Rand study on the history of the CPA: Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

    Mr. Bowen discussed SIGIR's publication: Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience.

    Both brought interesting observations of what went wrong and why in Iraq reconstruction. One of the more interesting comments by Mr. Bowen, in response to a question about State's new Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization, was that it was "still borne." He went on to describe the weaknesses in its creation, authority and structure.

    If Bowen is correct, no one should hold their breathe waiting for S/CRS to come on line. His recommendation was that Reconstruction won;t get serious and effective until an Office of Reconstruction is set up outside State and DoD. (Should we hold our breathe?)

    Dr. Rudd really brought an interesting perspective. He pointed out that the US's strongest experience was in "liberation" (such as in Italy, France, etc.), and that, perhaps, a focus on that model might have been more appropriate (how to support and reinforce a civilian government). His suggestion that we study those "liberations" for lessons was a unique contribution,

    While reinforcing that the military does not want the role of reconstructor, he questioned why, in Iraq and Afghanistan's civilian surges, the US government has not approached actual civilian associations like the associations of civilian city and county managers. Instead, the "civilians" are just foreign service officers and military assignees. Where are the real civilian experts?

    I was at an American Planning Association (APA) Conference in Minneapolis last month, and asked why they had not been engaged in the reconstruction effort. They indicated that, although they have a strong presence in Washington, they had no contacts to DoD, State or USAID--- the largest professional association for civilian planning and management couldn't break into the loop.

    It's always interesting to watch civilians in these audiences groan as the foibles of CPA and Hard Lessons are explained---as if the high-level mistakes are so obvious and frustrating---but, at some point, it starts to get old. Like when, after all these years, nobody has any serious solutions in progress.

    How do we get serious about civilian reconstruction?

    Steve
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 05-14-2009 at 11:34 AM. Reason: Added links.

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    Registered User Benjamin Walthrop's Avatar
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    Default This sounds suprisingly similar to

    Kaplan's Department of Everything Else. I agree in principle of the need for an "Office of Reconstruction" (don't like the name but that's just a quibble) IF (and that's a very big if) we as a nation see the need for these activities going forward. The expertise should be drawn from the civil governance and planning expertise that exists around the country (an example being the APA). Where I diverge from Mr. Bowen's narrative is that I believe this organization can and should be stood up under the State Department.
    V/R,

    B. Walthrop

    We need a universal translator. One of the first uses would be to allow communication between the Military and the State Department.

  3. #3
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Usaid

    WORKED. Until Clinton and Maddie dismantled it.

    So did USIA -- also dismantled.


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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default Just say no....

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    WORKED. Until Clinton and Maddie dismantled it.

    So did USIA -- also dismantled.

    The decision to move USIA into the State Department makes me want to start doing drugs-specifically LSD. Then, maybe I can understand that rationale.

    v/r

    Mike

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    Default Demise of USIA

    was Jesse Helms' doing. He insisted on dismantling it. USAID is more complex. From a major organization with its own experts and professionals it gradually became a contracting organization providing funds to NGOs for projects. This began in the Reagan years and escalated to the present.

    Cheers

    JohnT

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    Default Alternatives

    I believe it was Paul Hughes (USIP) who suggested that it stay in State but with the caveat that State, in order to prepare to engage in the modern environment for which contingency ops may be more typical than not, will have to be completely restructured from top to bottom to do it.

    As somebody just back from the 2007/2008 civilian surge in Iraq and with Afghanistan on the horizon, it seems like these kinds of ideas (rebuild State and or USAID), are possibly good ideas, but, by the time they could happen, would be ready to deal with a problem that may already be in the rear view mirror.

    I just don't get comfort from the idea that the US public is going to let this type and tempo of activity/spending/risks continue for too long. So, where is the urgency to streamline some actions that could happen within a real-time schedule?

    Steve

  7. #7
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Not the American way unless we're fired up by

    an existential war and Iraq is not that. Be happy Iraq is getting greater realtive priority than did Viet Nam -- things could be worse...

    Still it is annoying that a little bit off focused effort could be easily achieved and pay good dividends. Not likely to happen, Congress likes to play silly games about (1) party superiority and (2) reelection -- the needs of the nation come in a distant fourth after their State or District. .

    The public -- the majority of it -- is not the problem; a few in the public, the media and Congress can be problematical but I suspect the new Prez has got at least two years free credit.

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    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    Default

    Unless a review from the OMB hits the wire concerning waste, fraud, or abuse, the public has little knowledge of how reconstruction happens., and it would seem right now to not care.
    Last edited by jcustis; 05-14-2009 at 06:22 AM.

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    Council Member BayonetBrant's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve the Planner View Post
    Dr. Rudd really brought an interesting perspective. He pointed out that the US's strongest experience was in "liberation" (such as in Italy, France, etc.), and that, perhaps, a focus on that model might have been more appropriate (how to support and reinforce a civilian government). His suggestion that we study those "liberations" for lessons was a unique contribution,
    While our strongest recent experiences were in "liberations" I would argue that from 1776-1890s we did a whole LOT of nation-building... namely, ours. It was the military that mapped, garrisoned, cleared, bridged, and secured the open frontier. To say that "we don't do nation-building" is to ignore the history of the US. To say that "we don't do nation-REbuilding" is somewhat accurate.

    However, I'd argue that Iraq/Afghanistan is a hybrid of the two. We are rebuilding some infrastructure, but we are also building many new institutions for the first time. That is a significant challenge, and one that everyone seems to be running from because they seem to know it's all going to go wrong and don't want to be stuck holding the bag.
    Brant
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    “their citizens (all of them counted as such) glorified their mythology of ‘rights’… and lost track of their duties. No nation, so constituted, can endure.” Robert Heinlein, Starship Troopers 1959

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    Default

    Ken's point. A little bit of focused effort could be easily achieved and pay good dividends. Nothing is ever perfect, but if you miss a few big ones, or the cumulative effect of a lot of little ones....well, there you go.

    I don't think Dr. Rudd was arguing that Iraq was a straight up liberation game, but that were lessons to be learned from that.

    In the planning/public administration profession, the little bible is a book called "Implementation." (Authors: Pressman and Wildavsky). It explains their efforts to rebuild Watts after the LA Riots. Full faith and credit of the US Gov (Economic Development Agency, ie Great Society), and buy in from State and local. They explain the unsuccessful fiasco by outlining theories as valid today as then---interagency, for example. On the complexity of joint action and the compounding probabilities of failure, they not that if there are 100 yes/no points and 99% probability of success (a yes) at each point, the cumulative 1% risk is 100%: failure is assured. The book is chock full of the lessons learned then, and forgotten today.

    In Iraq, we had a post-Ottoman cultural and governmental structure which had been subject to several major, but half-hearted revisions, reforms over the Two Arifs and Baathist periods. But, underneath it all, it stayed the same---always defaulting to what it knew. Not that different from the US Gov---change the parties but the "system" remains the same.

    There, we came with little understanding or appreciation of the system, and set about building a new one (that didn't go all that well, and probably exceeded our time and investment horizon). Another strategy, built around "liberation" techniques, would have been to get the old system up and running, and work to redirect it and transition it to something else. Maybe Turkey was a decent model of a post-Ottoman society that was more compatible with US interests, whereas a half-implemented New England style "democracy" was not.

    At the USIP Conference, there was a report where a professor used Iraq to test the theory of whether structure of government is essential to democratic outcomes, ie, whether we had to replace the GoI structure to change the outcomes. His conclusion was, I believe, that it made no difference. Personally, I think he used the wrong data set---studying the Baghdad-centric national government of pre and post TAL instead of using a more fine grained model of government that accounted for services distributed down to the people (local, provincial, and national)--- but, I don't disagree with the conclusion.

    But, in my opinion, a successful Iraq, in the end, is going to be based on how it delivers services and prosperity to people, and not on the yardsticks of outsiders. Hopefully, they will devise a basically functioning structure, as we arguably have, and continue to fix/improve, over several centuries of trial and error.

    Steve

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    Default Wall Street Journal: Hard Lessons from Talibanistan

    Spent Friday night at Clyde's in Tysons Corner with my Iraq Braintrust.

    Between drinks, we discussed the recent WSJ article: Learning a Hard History Lesson in 'Talibanistan' (May 14, 2009) , a sad tale about the external impacts of constructing a new base in Karezgay (Zabul Province), but, in the process, destroying the underground canals (karez) on which area farming depends.

    "The karez "are the linchpin of their entire civilization here," says Capt. Paul Tanghe, who advises the Afghan National Army battalion in Karezgay."

    In the recent USIP Conference on Hard Lessons, they talked about the billions in mis-directed reconstruction spending---on schools, infrastructure, etc..., but there was not a one of these folks who had solutions. Nor, because their focus is on higher-level programs rather than field-based process, did they really get it.

    All it took was what planners & public admin folks routinely do: a scoping process. Followed by a simple site-specific planning/engineering process.

    I'm very familiar with the capabilities of a D9 Dozer, and what happens when somebody says "build me a base, fast." But there must be a way to malke small improvements that can make a big difference. (I hope?)

    Without some kind of mid-level planning structure, we are always just "doing stuff" like a school here and a school there---pretty soon you built 2800 of them (and spent billions of US taxpayer money doing it), but you don't have a school system, or a well-understood process of how these schools are supposed to be financed, staffed, and maintained into the future.

    Lessons to learn.

    Steve

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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve the Planner View Post
    ....I'm very familiar with the capabilities of a D9 Dozer, and what happens when somebody says "build me a base, fast." But there must be a way to malke small improvements that can make a big difference. (I hope?)....
    Here's a piece written three years ago; Analysis of the Karezes at the Gardez FOB. See page 4 for the discussion of small improvements, pages 6-8 for photos of the Karez, and pages 9-12 for diagrams and costs from a previous Karez improvement project.

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    Jedburgh:

    Shades of Iraq. Every time I found a problem in Iraq in 2008, I could find a report that laid out a simple solution, that often involved local practice (let the locals clear it out).

    Usually, the answer was ignored in favor of a USACE project that had been in progess somewhere for the last several years.

    The more things change...

    Steve

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    As a civilian on the side, I was always amazed at how the Republican Guard was touted to be top notch but then all of a sudden, the whole Iraqi Army was nothing but a bunch of cowardly bunglers and it would take many years to get them trained and ready. This seemed a glarying contradiction along with the notion of shock and awe somehow unfolding in densely packed urban areas. Give 'em rubble or give 'em respect I thought, then there was the matter of tens of thousands of young men standing idle on the streets. I always figured the logistic minds that could sustain an army could also figure out ways to get these guys off the streets without killing them. Germany and Japan were essentially turned to rubble and in 50 yrs. they became big players on the world scene so some lessons were available. Perhaps the only real measure of a great leader like General P. if found in his ability to open the gates of innovation and creativity and initiative for the lower echelons of the rank and file so that some good stuff flows up instead of only shi* flowing down. I think the Conventional is eternal and static and can only be tweaked from time to time by the emergence of certain types of leaders and some of it may simply be the luck of the draw.

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    goesh:

    As near as I can tell from the news media, there are some very effective Iraqi generals living outside of Iraq (Jordan, Syria, etc...), and the US was, in fact, in negotiation with them to stay for the transition (like keeping the AIG executives who knew where all the bodies were buried?). But, they left, so it's pretty hard to judge the real alternatives.

    The Embargo years certainly had an effect on the military, as it did on the economy at large, shifting a lot of otherwise productive capabilities to black market activities, so, between Gulf Wars, were the best and brightest going into the military, or into the more profitable sector?

    Hard to tell. But one thing that amazed me was how they kept any of it (the economy or the military running)---even as just a shell---for so long. The amazing thing, in studying the Iran-Iraq War is not the strategic or tactical brilliance, but the ability to muster so many fighters in such historically bloody battles. So I don't discount Iraqi ingenuity and potential, even if, at the last, the military used the Irish strategy (run away to fight another day).

    Steve

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    Quote Originally Posted by John T. Fishel View Post
    was Jesse Helms' doing. He insisted on dismantling it. USAID is more complex. From a major organization with its own experts and professionals it gradually became a contracting organization providing funds to NGOs for projects. This began in the Reagan years and escalated to the present.

    Cheers

    JohnT
    Ahhh, yet another "success" for privatization!
    Reed
    Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

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    Default Systems Perspective Article

    SWJ Blog's new article: Perspective on the Systems Perspective
    How Army Special Forces Can Use Existing Systems within the Operational Environment
    by Major Michael Longacre, Small Wars Journal

    Major Longacre makes a great pitch for systems approaches to planning and basic infrastructure (road, electrical systems). Couldn't have said it better.

    Civilian planners are trained in looking at systems, linkages, and connections. Leg bone's connected to the tail bone, etc...

    Unfortunately, no one is focusing on this stuff, as evidenced by DoD, DoS, and US AID hiring postures. No planning advisers advertised for Afghanistan. Instead, planning is just a sub-heading within overall advisory positions.

    In Iraq, State reconstruction strategy was focused on province-by-province, and the military was focused on battlespace-by-battlespace. There was no big picture. No planning.

    Sounds like the same thing will happen in Afghanistan. Oh, well! So much for small changes that could create big improvements.

    Steve

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    Council Member reed11b's Avatar
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    In A-stan, province by province may not be a bad thing. The 'Stan lacks the history or infrastructure of a strong central government that Iraq had. Grass roots projects to bring up quality of life that the recipients can appreciate is more important then having big projects that make good press. However if the provincial governments chose and advise the projects then the graft will sink $$ in big a big way and possibly alienate more locals. Just my 2 cents.
    Reed
    P.S. Focus for us has to be military in nature regardless. If Karzai asks for funding for a national highway plan or something, I think we owe his country the support, but for planning on our national level, security first, security second and security third.
    Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

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    Default On the Way

    Reed:

    Reconstruction: Fixing what's broken.

    Development: Making something new. (with the caveat that the pioneer usually gets all the arrows).

    Problem is that Congress is funding $7 billion for State/US AID plus a half a billion in CERP Funds with a goal of obtaining some substantial economic and societal transformations---something new and different---whatever that may be.

    So, what is it? How is it going to work? How is it going to survive? How is the money going to get out of the capital and down to real people?

    I've heard big ideas like turning opium into commercial flower production. OK, but where is the refrigerated storage, and just-in-time delivery service to European flower markets. Seeds, bulbs, fertilizer, high-volume irrigation, power, transportation systems.

    And the dumb question, whether for flowers or any other regional or national transformative effort, needs to be asked: If it could be done profitably, why isn't somebody doing it already?

    If the answer is "but for the instability", or the lack of a critical infrastructure component, that's one thing, but if we are talking about re-engineering a sustainable change in a challenging region with minimal resources and infrastructure, I sure hope somebody is looking at this systemically, or it is just a waste of time and US taxpayer money (and a lot of lives).

    The big question I have, at a regional and provincial levels (and trickling down to local) is whether a viable strategy can be put together to make substantial changes that will transform the current situation?

    What are the pieces? How do you connect them?

    More than anything, the hundreds of empty, abandoned, unstaffed, unequipped, or never completed schools and health clinics in Iraq should have taught us that throwing things at a wall to see if it sticks is not really a plan, and isn't likely to work.

    Steve

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    Schools and health clinics fall under the "good press" column. Hence my focus on benefits the recipients can appreciate. In more rural areas of A-stan, that might be clean water or fixing irrigation. As far as plans to revitalize a national economy, most big plans have historically enriched a few and had little to negative impact on the majority of the population. A-stan may need a locally based economy for stability and build from there. World markets are not always the best option. I did read somewhere however that India used to be a major importer of Afghan agriculture, perhaps which could be a start point for outside currency?
    Reed
    Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

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