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Thread: Economics and Irregular Warfare

  1. #41
    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    It seems we have both come to the same conclusions. Your development money profoundly affects the prestige and pecking order of societies. This is fine, as long as you understand you are doing so. I had heated arguments with a former co-worker over this - he insisted on "balanced development" across an AO, while I argued that development (CERP-level) should be employed as a reward/incentive for cooperation.

    Agreed. The military cannot effectively perform this kind of work. Our goals are too short term and transitory. That's why I don't think CERP should be used with long term development in mind. As you indicated, its a weapon system to be employed as a useful part of a broader combined arms/full spectrum approach to COIN.
    Mohommad Yunnis already solved this problem. We just asked the wrong questions. I don't want to say to much on this thread b/c it's part of my answer to the SWJ writing contest.

    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    To address one of the original points though, I found paying 20 individuals $50 to fix their own small problems bought more goodwill/info/cooperation than spending $5000 on a contractor to do a larger project. We also liberally used the small and micro rewards programs to a variety of purposes. This worked great in Tal Afar, oddly, MNF-W banned it at unit level in Anbar. It was a useful way for commanders to hand out up to $100 at a time to those that helped us in some way.
    Again, I agree. TBP from me I guess. I would suggest that everyone go back and read Niel's comments on this subject. I concur with his words.

  2. #42
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    Default Case study

    LOO's, Lines of Action, and product lines. What are the similarities, if any, and what does this say about what can be simultaneously managed?

    From The Economist: Nestlé

    Investors are also worried that Nestlé has become too large and unwieldy. The firm has 30 product lines that each generate more than SFr1 billion in annual sales, from Nescafé coffee and Nesquik milk to Purina pet food and Pure Life, a bottled water that is sometimes made from stuff that comes out of taps, rather than out of the ground. Consumers have been trading down to cheaper, unbranded foods in recent years, a trend that accelerated in the recession, potentially undermining the value of owning big brands.
    Richard Laube, the head of Nestlé’s nutrition business and a former pharmaceuticals executive, describes a “pipeline” of some 75 research projects. Borrowing terminology from the drugs industry seems appropriate, given the time required to develop these new products. Unlike the quick development cycles usually seen in fast-moving consumer goods, which typically take one to two years, products in Nestlé’s nutrition pipeline may take four to six years to develop.
    Finally, there is a risk that Nestlé’s new strategy could damage the firm’s blockbuster brands, which have taken decades to establish. This could happen in several ways. If some of the firm’s functional foods fail to pass muster with the regulators or, worse, turn out to cause harm rather than do good, then consumers could turn against all its products, even those that make no health claims at all. That could hurt, because most of its revenues will still come from selling treats like chocolate, ice-cream, coffee and flavoured milk.
    Marketing

    The term marketing concept holds that achieving organisational goals depends on knowing the needs and wants of target markets and delivering the desired satisfactions.[2] It proposes that in order to satisfy its organizational objectives, an organization should anticipate the needs and wants of consumers and satisfy these more effectively than competitors.[2]
    Sapere Aude

  3. #43
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default More economics...

    Bill,

    Your analysis, as always, covers interesting points and I appreciate the opportunities to consider what you have to say. You have been some places and seen some things and it shows in your words.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    You're bringing up examples of economic warfare that have nothing to do with economic development as it relates to COIN.
    The general point I was/am attempting to make is that economics are an inseparable component of human wars. From this it follows that victors of wars understand how to use economics to further their aims, and that the use of economics has both destructive and constructive components which need to be trained upon.

    By walking the land and studying it I have come to the understanding that all living things are designed to find/use/excrete resources, reproduce, and rest. Finding/using/excreting resources leads to competition/fighting/wars (and capitalism is one such manifestation of this design but I digress ). Plants fight for existing space/sunlight/water/nutrients/breeding rights, and animals fight for existing area/water/nutrients/breeding rights. Neither fights all day/night long everyday however, and it is obvious to me that more skills than just fighting are required in order to live life.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    This is exactly what I'm taking issue with, we do what we can instead of doing of the right thing. I'm sure ICRC and others "feel good" when they hand out school books and medicine, but during a COIN effort if it doesn't specifically target a select populace with the objective of separating them from the insurgency and pulling them into a closer relationship with the government then you're just doing humanitarian work to simply make yourself feel better, it doesn't contribute to a strategy. I ensure the enemy doesn't just do what it can, but has an agenda when they hand out aid.
    My friend, we follow FM's for many things however FM's are just individual trees in the proverbial forest. How about the 'strategy' of the Bible, Torah, and Koran?

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    As for police officers looking at it differently, could it be they're looking at a different problem set altogether? The elderly in the U.S. may be involved in the Meth trade now because they can't make it on social security, so that is an economic issue that must be resolved, because ultimately in this case that is the underlying issue.

    Kids in depressed areas may join gangs and get involved in illegal activities because that is the accepted economic model. If you improve the job aspects you only address one underlying issue. Normally there is another underlying issue that is seldom considered, and that is the security/social norm influence. If the strongest tribe in the neighborhood is the gang and you offered a fair paying job to a kid that is a gang member (without moving him out of that neighborhood/influence), do you think he would take it? More importantly do you think he would leave the gang and place his family and him/herself at risk?
    The human condition encompasses the spectrum from all out war to peace. Reductionist thinking/analysis (i.e. problem sets, control volumes, and free bodies) can be very powerful, but at the end of the analysis procedure we must reincorporate the resulting answers into an analysis of the particular system being studied in order to check for accuracy.

    I am of the opinion that much of the security LOO, in fact two out of the three blocks in the three block war, can and should be handled by police forces/rule-of-law-forces working in concert with the military. Like you I have been reading about policing, speaking with police friends, and I am also trying to understand our problem set (Iraq and Afghanistan) from this particular viewpoint. At the end of the day however I am a soldier and not a policeman/lawyer/judge and so I am still thinking about it.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    No one said insurgencies didn't require economic activity, I said the root cause wasn't about economics. By all means we need to target their economic engines, but you don't necessarily do that through economic development. It may or may not play a role.
    I believe that economics are an inseparable component of human wars.


    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Not germane, we're talking about insurgency and furthermore as you know were many factors that came together to create the perfect storm for the USSR. I suspect they spent far less on their military than we did, but they spent a greater proportion of their GDP. Still that was only one reason the wall came down.

    State versus State, not an insurgency
    You are correct here, to use Ken's word, I did indeed conflate some of the finer points that you have identified here while in pursuit of the larger point that victors of wars understand how to use economics...sloppy on my part.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    I call this the illusion of a plan, and it is the lazy man's way out of doing the real work that a real plan involves. Amazingly now how we can address any problem by making up four or five LOOs, put them on a power point slide, then we're done. If the simultaneous efforts aren't synchronized toward common objectives, then they lines to no where. Read Killcullen's example of building a road in Afghanistan as a form of political maneuvering, it wasn't simply doing what they could, but they built it with specific objectives in mind that had little to do with the road itself.
    Being able to successfully execute a campaign comprised of simultaneous efforts synchronized toward common objectives is the result of intensive training. How often does the GPF train on how to use economics as part of a campaign? How about SOF?

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    We're forgetting the basics.
    True.

    Our training process and content needs to be revamped...but that is for another thread

    Regards,

    Steve
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 11-22-2009 at 09:01 PM.
    Sapere Aude

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    Posted by Surferbeetle

    The general point I was/am attempting to make is that economics are an inseparable component of human wars. From this it follows that victors of wars understand how to use economics to further their aims, and that the use of economics has both destructive and constructive components which need to be trained upon.
    In any social system there is an ecomonic system, just as in any biological organism there is an energy system to sustain life processes. Yet I stand firm, unless convinced with strong logical arguments, that is not the same as the USG blindly "attempting" to economic development to undermine an insurgent movement. If economic development is even required, then it needs to be focused on supporting the political objective. The other side gets that, Hezbollah are good at, LeT is good at it, and some communist insurgencies have had some success. The issue isn't whether it is important or not, in some cases it is, in others it isn't. Blanket statements and templated approaches are dangerous.

    Being able to successfully execute a campaign comprised of simultaneous efforts synchronized toward common objectives is the result of intensive training. How often does the GPF train on how to use economics as part of a campaign? How about SOF?
    This one is easy, we give classes on DIME (or DIMEFIL), then after class we complain about the lack of an integrated whole of government approach.

  5. #45
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    This one is easy, we give classes on DIME (or DIMEFIL), then after class we complain about the lack of an integrated whole of government approach.
    In the old days it was called Special Warfare which was why the old SF units had A-teams,CA-teams,PSYOP-teams combined as needed based upon the situation, now for some reason they don't do that anymore and things are not going so well I have read the Major Gant paper on tribes and how this is the mysterious all time whomper stomper strategy for A'stan. Except for a few exceptions that it exactly what I learned back in the 70's in NC because raising and training and advising indigenous forces on anything was what Green Berets did. Didn't have no DIMEFIL back then. We had the 7 steps of UW which doesn't seem any different now than then except we don't call it that. We are going back to the 70's Stagflation,Tribes and Cults oh boy! Guess we will have to start a Special Warfare Journal, Small Wars is becoming Obsolete

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    In the old days it was called Special Warfare which was why the old SF units had A-teams,CA-teams,PSYOP-teams combined as needed based upon the situation, now for some reason they don't do that anymore and things are not going so well I have read the Major Gant paper on tribes and how this is the mysterious all time whomper stomper strategy for A'stan. Except for a few exceptions that it exactly what I learned back in the 70's in NC because raising and training and advising indigenous forces on anything was what Green Berets did. Didn't have no DIMEFIL back then. We had the 7 steps of UW which doesn't seem any different now than then except we don't call it that. We are going back to the 70's Stagflation,Tribes and Cults oh boy! Guess we will have to start a Special Warfare Journal, Small Wars is becoming Obsolete
    Having been around in those old days I don't recall CA doing a lot of economic development with SF? Unfortunately the 7 phases of UW are very much military focused (more guerrilla warfare than UW, though some will argue the UW is implied), yet the reality is that very little attention was/is given to the political organization aspects. It was just assumed away except for some cursory instruction on the area command. I for one don't think MAJ Gant's paper was a strategy piece, at most it offered some TTPs, which as you said isn't anything new, but it would be fair to characterize it as a "rebirth" of common sense in SF.

    There is a Special Warfare Magazine, but it is a little too much focused on back slapping, look at me side for my tastes. We need something more along the lines of a Special Warfare Parameters magazine with some seriously thoughtful and self criticizing articles. You'll never get better if you keep telling yourself you're great and there is nothing left to learn, actually at that point you have become obsolete. I would recommend calling it Political Warfare Magazine, because now Special Warfare means different things to different people, whereas political warfare is the context we need to be thinking in.

    We had a Special Warfare Revolution in the 1950's and early 1960's that was embraced by the PSYWAR community, CIA and parts of the State Department, but not by many in DoD. A lot of incredibly smart folks wrote some serious papers on how to counter communist sponsored insurgencies and the various challenges associated with it. IMO we a Special Warfare evolution to address current threats and new global dynamics that impact the way war is fought now.

    I had a good friend/mentor (former Team Sergeant) who told me every Special Operations organization should be disbanded after 20 years, then another one stood up to get rid of the doctrinal and organizational baggage. I won't go as far as John Boyd in saying that once you have doctrine you're obsolete, but there is "some" truth in that statement. In some cases we're fighting too hard to protect the legacy organizations instead of building the force we need now.

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Bill, remember SF and the attempted SPARTAN doctine? Happened while I was up there.....don't know that it ever took hold, but more of what I think the CA/economic support should be.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Ten, max, I think...

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    ...every Special Operations organization should be disbanded after 20 years, then another one stood up to get rid of the doctrinal and organizational baggage...
    May be fifteen if they're really doing welll.
    ... I won't go as far as John Boyd in saying that once you have doctrine you're obsolete, but there is "some" truth in that statement. In some cases we're fighting too hard to protect the legacy organizations instead of building the force we need now.
    That, too...

    We do ad-hoc beautifully, though..

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    Bill, remember SF and the attempted SPARTAN doctine?
    Slapout, help me, I don't recall this doctrine, but then again I didn't read too much doctrine back then

    May be fifteen if they're really doing welll.
    Ken, it takes five years to get a concept approved, another 7 to get the funding and manning, so really my buddy's suggestion about every 20 years is probably about right. Completely unfeasible in our bureaucracy, but as LTG Boykin put in his book they had to form Delta because SF was too conventional. I don't think SF was too conventional, but they were rigidly adhering to legacy definitions of unconventional. What was the issue back then that was driving the force change requirements for SOF? Oh yea, terrorist groups from the Middle East, both Palestinian and Iranian sponsored. Amazing how long we can keep our heads buried in the sand.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Slapout, help me, I don't recall this doctrine, but then again I didn't read too much doctrine back then
    SPARTAN
    Special Proficiency at Rugged Training and Nation building. Google the whole!! name and you should get references.

    Early 70's when I new about it. Worked with American Indians in Florida, Montana and other places to practice Tibal Area Improvements.....no sh.. it was a little like Billy Jack Protect them and help them Prosper.


    Have to go watch a special on new info about the Kennedy Assasination....they still haven't figured it out....guess I will have to help them Be back in a little while. Slap

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    Default Billy Jack can't be bad

    Slapout, Thanks, some of the guys told me they did some work on the reservations, and I recall seeing a SF recruiting video about it, but I didn't know the name of the program. I'll take a look at it. Bet we stopped it because the Army couldn't see how that would stop tanks from rolling through the Fulda Gap, what do you think? Bill

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    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Thank you Google...

    Rand Monograph MR-1630 by: Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk: Terrorism and Development, Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism

    This report examines the social and economic development policies enacted by three countries — Israel, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom — to inhibit a resurgence of terrorism within their jurisdictions. Drawing on a broad research base, including numerous first-hand interviews, the authors outline the initiatives implemented by each country then assess their effectiveness, with the aim of informing U.S. decisionmakers of the benefits and pitfalls of such initiatives as they develop policy to counter terrorism. Among their conclusions are the following: Social and economic development policies can weaken local support for terrorist activities and discourage terrorist recruits, and such policies can be used as a "stick" to discourage terrorism. They caution, however, that the ability of these policies to inhibit terrorism depends on their implementation, and inadequately funded such policies are likely to renew support for terrorism.
    Case Studies in Economic Development, Third Edition, by Stephen C. Smith, George Washington University, Department of Economics

    Case Studies in Economic Development strives to represent alternative points of view in a balanced way. In doing so, the central role of market based development is stressed as a complement to the indispensable role of well-designed government policy. The prevalence of market failure in development is examined without overlooking the recurring problems of government failure. Finally, although at its core the text is one of development economics, it seeks to integrate the vital contributions of other disciplines when they help us to understand the complexities of development and guide the wise implementation of policy.
    Sapere Aude

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    Talking Give thanks after you read the study

    Steve,

    I did a quick read of the RAND study, and I find it supports my arguments. I look forward to reading the Case Studies in Development later.

    The RAND study was published in 2003, and it described the economic development in the Southern Philippines overall as a dismal failure because it was grossly under resourced ($6.00/per person), most of the aid went to the Christian population (not the target population), and that the government of the Philippines is corrupt through and through. It did site a couple of "minor" successes regarding banana plantations, where it gave "some" guerrillas an alternative life style via providing jobs.

    However, the fact of the matter is that the insurgency is still alive and well today in the Southern Philippines, and most of the economic development projects have failed. Different perspectives will give you different views. On one hand if you listen to Philippine and USG representatives they'll tell point out individual successes, and then if you talk to the Muslim Filipinos who live there, especially the ones not touched by these relatively micro successes, they'll tell you another story.

    Let's say you have 100,000 disenfranchised citizens who are active or passive supporters of the insurgency, and your economic development actually provides jobs for 5,000 of them. That makes for 5,000 folks who are more content (perhaps), and some kodak moments for your next brief, but you still 95,0000 disenfranchised folks who are active supporters of the insurgency.

    Not necessarily bad, because now you can point to the 5,000 and say if you quit fighting we'll do the same for you, BUT YOU BETTER BE READY TO DELIVER. As the study pointed out, if you give them rising expectations, but fail to deliver you will actually have made the problem worse with your false promises. This is exactly the failed economic aid I saw in Iraq, a number of promises made that never could be realized until we first established security by suppressing the insurgency.

    As the study stated, its focus was "inhibiting a resurgence" of violence, not defeating an insurgency. That is completely different than what we were discussing earlier. You were implying you could use economic development to defeat an insurgency, and I disagreed and still do unless the root cause of that insurgency is "simply" economics, and that is rarely the case.

    The study also confirmed that poverty doesn't cause terrorism, but it may contribute to it. My previous point, if the issue that they're fighting over isn't economic disparity, then why waste time and our precious resources on economic development to begin with? Furthermore, if the economic development isn't synched with the plan (and used as a carrot and stick), then it is going to fail.

    I'm letting this thread die from my side, so in summary, economic development isn't something you do independently of the counterinsurgency effort, and there are more risks associated with doing economic development poorly than not at all. COIN is political warfare, and if you employ economic development as a leverage tool versus a handout, then "maybe" you can make a difference with it, but only if you really know what you're doing.

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Slapout, Thanks, some of the guys told me they did some work on the reservations, and I recall seeing a SF recruiting video about it, but I didn't know the name of the program. I'll take a look at it. Bet we stopped it because the Army couldn't see how that would stop tanks from rolling through the Fulda Gap, what do you think? Bill
    I think you are right......the Bear threat ate everybody now we are hungry for real UW capabilities.

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    Default development or spending money?

    As a current student and former military instructor of Economics, I appreciate you entertaining my mandatory ILE blog.
    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post

    Furthermore, if the economic development isn't synched with the plan (and used as a carrot and stick), then it is going to fail.

    so in summary, economic development isn't something you do independently of the counterinsurgency effort, and there are more risks associated with doing economic development poorly than not at all. COIN is political warfare, and if you employ economic development as a leverage tool versus a handout, then "maybe" you can make a difference with it, but only if you really know what you're doing.
    Economic development is much more than spending money as Bill Moore adeptly points out. Economic systems are absolutely about the synchronized objective, but the scope of the problem is even larger than this discussion has so far touched on as it encompasses almost every conceivable LOO or LOE.
    Economic development cannot succeed most efficiently in the absence of property rights, a known and predicitable means of settling disputes and some basis for enforcing contracts. These speak to a challenge greater than security - a functioning legal (not police) system.
    In this one man's humble opinion, MM12 simply asked how to best spend his money which is a far cry from the benefits and difficulties of imposing free market capitalism in the context of an English common law judicial system on a tribal Muslim culture. I have to agree with one John Nagl's points that economic development within our current COIN doctrine is equivalent to changing a society.

    I certainly admire, but don't envy MM12 for attacking either problem. Thanks for your service and keep up the good fight.

    Major Adam Albrich, student CGSC, Belvoir satellite campus
    "The views expressed in this "insert type" are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government."

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    Default MAJ Albrich, what are ...

    the "benefits" (if any) of "imposing free market capitalism in the context of an English common law judicial system on a tribal Muslim culture." ?

    The "difficulties" of attempting that are self-evident.

    I do agree with this:

    from brich
    Economic development cannot succeed most efficiently in the absence of property rights, a known and predicitable means of settling disputes and some basis for enforcing contracts. These speak to a challenge greater than security - a functioning legal (not police) system.
    although removing the words "most efficiently" would cause no uproar from me. I know of no functioning economic sytem that is absent some form of property rights, a known and predictable means of settling disputes and some basis for enforcing contracts - whether it be individualistic, collectivistic or tribal - including Astan's thriving poppy trade.
    Last edited by jmm99; 11-24-2009 at 05:19 AM.

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    Default Legal not police

    What is this?

    These speak to a challenge greater than security - a functioning legal (not police) system.

    I take it to mean a legal system with a responsive police force. As the gatekeepers to legal system the police are the only portion of that system that the law abiding citizen will ever see. Wild west hanging judges or Judge Dreads or thought police are far more practical than a legal system sans enforcers.

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    Default Property Rights

    In the regulatory and legal communities, there is a concept of a "bundle of rights" which is the background predicate for much of our interactions within our societies.

    We typically think of property rights as the unimpeded ownership or right of use of a property. But land tenure and holding patterns vary dramatically. In Iraq, most citizens live in a town or city, but have some form of ownership or use right in a plot of land outside the town.

    During the 2008 Drought, for example, many areas of Northern Iraq were intensively plowed, but not planted. Satellite images indicated a lot of "cultivation" which led the Ag Folks in DC to erroneously believe that bumper crops would be forthcoming. What was actually going on was a very old land tenure system where folks had a use right in land provided that they actively "used" the land. So many of these folks went out to till the land to demonstrate use under their tenure agreements, but had no rational reason to plant seeds in a drought. Many of you in Iraq last year sucked the dust from the record dust storms which were, in part, the result of the tilling needed to preserve their continuing "property right" interest in the land.

    Usually, too, we assume rights---quiet enjoyment; police won't kick down your door without a Court writ and show of cause; a permit issuer at the County will not demand a bribe as acondition of issuing a permit; the government will place taxes, once collected, in dedicated tax accounts for uses related to the purpose of the tax; that a mortgage or deed transfer cannot be recorded against a property you own without your consent.

    None of this has anything to do with police, but everything to do with a reasonably functional society and economy. The USG focus on Rule of Law often overlooks the most important non-police elements which create resistance to reconstruction, post-conflict stabilization.

    I read today that Iraq has finally passed an Investment Law which gives rights to foreign investors to defend claims, interests, ownership rights in things they may invest in in Iraq.

    Bear in mind, however, that even with that law, there remain claims outstanding from decades of past practices in Iraq. Sadaam's government forcing Turkmen to sell land for a pittance which was later given to military officers, etc... Even the Jews that were forced out of Baghdad in the 1950s still have potential claims wandering out in cyberspace about real properties and businesses in Iraq.

    Very complicated indeed. Especially in the places at issue.

    Steve

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    Default Civil vs criminal law

    What I speak of (and probably also MAJ Albrich) is the need for a civil legal system (property rights, contract rights, family & inheritance law, and dispute resolution of the same) to allow operation of a functioning economic system.

    We take much of that for granted in our organized society. We get the morning newspaper from the box at the end of our sidewalk ("our's" because the property lines are established by deed and plat; the newspaper because the paper carrier has been invited onto our property to deliver it; contract made and performed because we subscribed to the newspaper).

    In our society, the vast bulk of legal events are part of the civil legal system, which operates fairly seamlessly without need for lawyers and courts.

    In the Astan of 40 years ago, the civil legal system on a local village level was a triangular arrangement of village elders (shura or jirga - language dependent), the local mullah and the local "big man" (malik, district officer or local warlord). In the chaos of two generations of armed conflict, the traditional tribal legal system disintegrated in many areas, along with whatever educational system existed.

    As nature abhors a vacuum, so does law. So, various legal systems developed: those of the Taliban, regional warlords and drug lords. Now, we do not generally look at these as "legal systems" (often not that much in writing, but rules nonetheless). The villagers probably would have preferred their age-old traditional local institutions; but, in chaos, power and law flow from the barrel with the largest bore. In effect, the villagers have to select the best kind of insecurity that will allow their economic survival, which is often at the subsistence level or below (credits: Marc Legrange).

    Now, the police power obviously has something to do with all of this - if the police power carries the largest bore cannon, and if it is going to remain at the village level to enforce its own brand of security or insecurity. Add to that, the development of locally-based security forces as a necessity.

    The question then becomes whether the police power is going to impose its own brand of law (civil and criminal), as well as its ideas of economic and educational development; or whether it will seek to restore, as much as possible, the once stable traditional legal institutions; and to assist that economic and educational development needed to raise the villagers above the subsistence level (which to them would be "security") with minimum manipulation of their normal lifestyle (credits: Jim Gant).

    STP is right on point with his Iraqi examples. Astan is a much more primitive case; and the less sophistication imposed, so much the better.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Default Regulatory systems

    JMM:

    True. True.

    But in Iraq, the civilian side spent far too much time on writing US federal things like national banking and stock market laws years before they were really ripe and needed.

    Instead, the majority of our daily lives are defined by small scale regulations and complex webs of "agreed" standards (sometimes enforceable).

    Personally, I spend a tremendous amount of time in my private consulting practice on regulatory and finance/budget compliance issues. And its these little, yet standardized practices and regulations, that are what keeps our society functioning without having to have a lawyer in everyone's speed dial.

    Whether styled as formal or informal systems, they are the Rules of Law that we commonly understand.

    In Afghanistan, it seems logical that the systems JMM described really are the current functional norms, but as he notes, these are not the systems that governed things before. They are the aberations resulting from war, and stable replacement systems have not yet been established or applied.

    What good is a properly recorded deed if you can't occupy "your" house?

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